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 Chapter 1 
Realism in Meta-ethics 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
One significant human activity is to pass estimations of various sorts. We 
appraise actions, persons and other objects from a number of perspectives, 
such as law, morality, prudence and rationality. The estimations that play 
the most important role for our relations to other people are presumably the 
moral ones. We say things like ‘It’s right to help people in need’, ‘I think it’s 
wrong of Amanda to betray her husband’, ‘She’s a typically good person’ or 
‘She showed how bad she is when she said all those terrible things about 
him’. Admittedly, many moral sentences are not as plain as these, but they 
can be taken to imply such sentences.  
 We may ask a number of philosophically intriguing questions in 
relation to moral sentences. To try to answer such questions is one of the 
enterprises of meta-ethics. Many moral sentences appear to be used to 
ascribe moral properties to objects. We may start to ask whether they, like 
other sentences of a similar form, are liable to truth and falsehood: 
 Are moral sentences capable of being true and false?  
If we answer this question affirmatively, we may continue by asking 
whether there exist any moral rightness, wrongness, goodness and badness 
so that some such sentences are true: 
 Are there any moral properties that make certain moral sentences 
 true?  
If we also answer the second question affirmatively, it becomes relevant to 
ask about the nature of moral properties. There are various questions of this 
kind. However, one of the most essential is whether moral properties are 
different from other kinds of properties so that there is a distinct moral 
aspect of reality. We might formulate this question thus:  
 Do moral properties constitute a separate kind of properties? 
To answer this question affirmatively is to deny that moral properties can be 
reduced to non-moral properties. 
 The meta-ethical view that answers these three questions affirmatively 
I will call moral realism. The main purpose of this thesis is to defend moral 
 1
 realism thus understood. One line of argument will be that if we accept 
moral realism, we are better suited to account for certain important meta-
ethical issues. As a part of this argument, I will maintain that answering the 
third question affirmatively makes it possible to answer the two first 
questions affirmatively. That is, I will argue that if we conceive of moral 
properties as making up a separate kind of properties, and hence as 
irreducible, we are able to sustain the view that moral sentences have truth-
value and that there are moral properties that make some of them true. 
Moreover, I will defend moral realism against certain objections. However, 
I will also indicate significant issues where this defence is insufficient and 
moral realism is in need of further examination. This means that my defence 
of moral realism is limited in important respects. 
 In this chapter, I set the ground for the subsequent investigation. 
Following some preparatory remarks in the next section, I defend in section 
3 a conception of moral realism, according to which this view should be 
understood in terms of moral properties being irreducible. In section 4, I 
characterise the various claims that are involved in moral realism and their 
respective opposites. In section 5, I consider very briefly some arguments 
against two of these views: non-cognitivism and error-theory. In section 6, I 
give an outline of the argument of the remainder of the investigation.  
 
2. Locating Moral Realism  
As I indicated in the last section, I take the defining feature of moral realism 
to be the claim that there are irreducible moral properties. ‘Realism’ is 
however a term that is used in numerous different senses. The senses in 
which it is used in ordinary language differ from the more or less technical 
ones it has acquired in various disciplines. The term has also acquired a 
number of senses within philosophy, not least in meta-ethics. Against this 
background it can justifiably be asked why we should understand moral 
realism in the way I advocate.  
 In response to this question, it may first be pointed out that to 
conceive of realism in terms of irreducibility is to understand it in 
accordance with one of the established senses of ‘realism’ in philosophy, 
meta-ethics included. Accordingly, it seems, at least prima facie, as legitimate 
to use the term in this sense as in some other of its established senses. 
2 
  Another relevant consideration concerns the importance of moral 
realism. Irrespective of how meta-ethicists understand moral realism, they 
generally agree that the issue of whether this view is correct is important in 
meta-ethics. Conceiving of moral realism in terms of irreducibility 
preserves, I think, this conviction. As I indicated in the last section, one of 
the fundamental questions to ask about moral properties is whether they 
make up a distinct kind of properties. The importance of this question will 
be confirmed below.  
 Moreover, I think it can be argued that there are reasons to conceive 
of moral realism in the way I advocate rather than in some of the other ways 
current in the literature. In the next section, I will provide some arguments 
to this effect.  
 To facilitate this discussion, we may start by trying to localise where 
moral realism is to be found among the various philosophical claims that are 
called ‘realism’. It should first be noticed that the philosophical claims with 
this label have different ‘objects’ as their subject matter. There are thus 
realist claims about a number of notions which concern various ontological, 
semantic and epistemological issues. For example, there are realist claims 
about such grand notions as truth, properties in general, possible worlds and 
the external world. That there are realist claims about a wide range of 
notions helps to explain why ‘realism’ has acquired so many different senses. 
However, it is also striking that many of the realist claims have as their main 
subject matter certain kinds of entities that are discussed in particular fields 
of philosophy, such as aesthetics, the philosophy of mind and ethics. These 
claims concern ontological issues since they deal with the nature of the 
entities in question. Thus, there are realist claims that have as their main 
subject matter the nature of aesthetic properties, mental properties, moral 
properties, and so forth.1 I will call this subclass of realist claims ontological 
realist claims. It is among ontological realists claims that we find moral 
realism. 
 
3. Moral Realism in Terms of Irreducibility—a Defence 
We may now continue with inquiring how moral realism should be 
understood.  
                                      
1 I say that the mentioned claims have these issues as their ‘main’ subject matter, since 
they may involve notions that are not ontological, e.g. various semantic notions. Moral 
realism is an example of such a view. 
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  Although ‘realism’ is used in ordinary language, it seems in 
philosophy to have acquired more or less technical senses that differ from its 
ordinary senses. Therefore, in understanding these senses of the term, we 
have limited help from the knowledge we have in our capacity as 
competent language users, and consequently, cannot expect to reach a 
straightforward analysis of the term that captures this knowledge. This also 
holds for ‘moral realism’, and it seems therefore preferable to aim at finding 
a conception of moral realism that answers to some reasonable desiderata. 
While we have limited help from our knowledge as competent language 
users in developing a conception of moral realism, other considerations are 
more helpful. In the literature there are various conceptions of ontological 
realist claims and moral realism which characterise these views in such a way 
that their correctness is of philosophical significance. These considerations 
are relevant to the conception of moral realism that is to be preferred, as we 
will see.  
 There are, I think, three relevant desiderata for a successful 
conception of moral realism.  
 (i) A conception of moral realism should extend to alternative 
conceptions of moral realism.2 Ideally, it should comprise these conceptions. 
It could, however, be difficult to find a conception which fulfils the 
desideratum in such a strong way. A conception may then fulfil it to a lesser 
degree, e.g. by explaining these conceptions. One rationale of this 
desideratum is that a conception of moral realism should make possible 
comparisons with the assertions of various meta-ethicists in relation to this 
view. Another rationale concerns the importance of moral realism. As 
mentioned above, whether moral realism is correct is generally thought to 
be an important issue. I also pointed out that various conceptions of moral 
realism characterise it in is such a way that the correctness of this view is of 
philosophical significance. It is therefore desirable that the conception we 
choose extends to alternative conceptions.  
 (ii) A conception of moral realism should be an instance of a 
conception of ontological realist claims that extends to alternative 
conceptions of such claims.3 This desideratum is an analogue to (i). As 
suggested above, and as we will see more clearly below, a certain 
                                      
2 Cf. Sayre-McCord (1988 (1986)), p. 5. 
3 Cf. Sayre-McCord (1988 (1986)), p. 5. 
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 conception of moral realism is generally an instance of a certain conception 
of ontological realist claims. To fulfil this desideratum in an ideal way, a 
conception of moral realism should be an instance of a conception of 
ontological realist claims, which in turn should comprise alternative 
conceptions of such claims. However, as it might be difficult to find a 
conception of moral realism that fulfils this desideratum in such a strong 
way, it might only be possible to fulfil to a lesser extent. The rationales of 
this desideratum are counterparts to the rationales of desideratum (i). A 
conception of moral realism should make possible comparisons with 
ontological realist claims made in other fields of philosophy. Moreover, 
conceptions of ontological realist claims concern important philosophical 
issues, and it is therefore reasonable that they should have a counterpart in 
moral realism. 
 If a conception of moral realism fulfils desiderata (i) and (ii), it will 
provide an appealing coherence to debates surrounding moral realism. 
Ideally, a conception of moral realism comprises alternative conceptions of 
this view, and this conception of moral realism is in turn an instance of a 
conception of ontological realist claims that comprises alternative 
conceptions of such claims. 
 (iii) A conception of moral realism should be useful in discussions 
regarding meta-ethical issues, and, in particular, it should promote clarity 
when such issues are discussed.  
 As far as I understand, there are four main ways of conceiving moral 
realism. In the following, I will briefly indicate that the first three 
conceptions fail to satisfy the desiderata and then argue that the last 
conception fulfils the desiderata to a satisfactory extent. However, to 
provide a fully satisfactory defence of a conception of moral realism would 
require discussions of several intricate philosophical problems. This is 
unfortunately something I cannot do here. 
  
The minimal conception 
According to the minimal conception of moral realism, this view comprises 
two conditions: (1) moral sentences have truth-value, and (2) there exist 
moral properties that make some moral sentences true.4 As far as I 
understand, it is uncontroversial that these two conditions form part of 
                                      
4 See e.g. Blackburn (1993 (1973)), pp. 111–112, and Smith (1991), p. 402. 
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 moral realism. The question is rather whether moral realism comprises some 
additional condition or conditions. 
 One difficulty with this conception is that it fails with regard to 
desideratum (i); that is, it fails to extend to alternative conceptions of moral 
realism. This point can be illustrated by an example of a meta-ethical 
position that fulfils the two conditions of the minimalist claim. Consider a 
view according to which moral sentences have truth-value, there is a moral 
property of actions, moral rightness, that make some of the sentences true, 
and this property consists in being desired by some human creature. It is 
highly doubtful whether we would say that this view qualifies as an instance 
of moral realism.5 This example indicates that there are meta-ethical views 
which fulfil the two conditions contained in the minimal conception of 
moral realism but do not qualify as instances of moral realism on established 
conceptions of this view. It seems for example incompatible both with the 
conception according to which moral realism characterises moral properties 
as mind independent and the conception according to which moral realism 
construes moral sentences literally. (I will return to these conceptions 
below.) 
 Another difficulty with the minimal conception is that it fails with 
regard to desideratum (ii); that is, it is not part of a conception of 
ontological realist claims that extends to alternative conceptions of such 
claims. One example that illustrates this point can be brought from the 
philosophy of science: operationalism. On this view, scientific sentences 
have truth-value and there is a kind of ‘entities’—observable results of 
scientific operations—that make some of them true. However, 
operationalism is widely considered to be a non-realist position. This 
example indicates that there are views in other philosophical fields which 
fulfil counterparts to the two conditions of the minimal conceptions but 
which are not ontological realist claims according to alternative conceptions 
of such claims. It seems for example to run counter to the conception 
according to which ontological realist claims characterise the objects at issue 
as mind independent and to the conception according to which such claims 
characterise objects ‘at face value’. Given this difficulty, it is not surprising 
that the minimalist conception does not seem to have any counterparts as 
ontological realist claims.  
                                      
5 Cf. Railton (1996a), pp. 67–68, and Sayre-McCord (1988 (1986)), pp. 18, 22. 
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  These difficulties show that the minimalist conception does not state a 
sufficient condition for moral realism. Hence, at least one more condition 
has to be added. 
 
Moral realism in terms of mind independence 
According to one influential conception of ontological realist claims, such 
claims characterise the kind of entities in question as mind independent.6 
How this exactly should be understood is not entirely clear. However, the 
central idea seems to be that an ontological realist claim characterises a 
certain kind of entities as objective in the sense that their nature is not 
conditioned by (the content of) our mental attitudes and other mental states. 
Thus, these entities are not the way they are just because we have certain 
observations, beliefs, desires or feelings, etc. Applied to moral realism, this 
means that the following condition should be added to (1) and (2): (3) 
moral properties are mind independent.7 For example, the moral rightness 
of actions does not consist their being desired or their being objects of 
certain beliefs. 
 One difficulty with this conception is that it fails with respect to 
desideratum (ii). Admittedly, to conceive of moral realism in terms of mind 
independence might extend to conceptions of ontological realist claims as 
regards some fields of philosophy. The example from the philosophy of 
science above, operationalism, can perhaps serve as an illustration. But in 
relation to ontological realist claims as regards at least one field, the 
philosophy of mind, the conception under consideration does not fulfil this 
desideratum. As an illustration, consider Cartesian dualism. Very roughly, 
this might be understood as the view that there are two substances, the 
mental and the physical, which have separate existences. If we conceive of 
ontological realist claims in the indicated way, we would have to classify 
Cartesian dualism as a non-realist claim, since mental properties on this view 
are not mind independent; indeed, they consist, so to speak, in mere mind. 
But this seems mistaken because, if anything, Cartesian dualism is an 
                                      
6 The literature on realism as mind independence is vast, but for some instructive 
examples, see Boyd (1984), pp. 41–42; Devitt (1991), pp. 14–17, and Grayling (1987), 
pp. 25–27. Michael Dummett is known for understanding realist theories about truth in 
terms of mind independence; see e.g. Dummett (1982), pp. 55–112. 
7 For accounts of moral realism (partly) in terms of mind independence, see e.g. Dancy 
(1986), pp. 167–168; Miller (2003), p. 4; Pettit (2002), p. 52; Quinn (1978), pp. 257–
258; Sturgeon (1986b), pp. 44–45, and Timmons (1999), p. 16.  
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 example of realism in the philosophy of mind. However, this is only an 
illustration of a general difficulty with this conception of ontological realist 
claims. The general problem is that it cannot represent any view that has as 
its subject matter something related to mind as an ontological realist claim. 
Like others, Elliott Sober argues that realism should not be understood in 
terms of mind independence since the entities that are the subject matter of 
a certain view might be mental properties, in which case it would be 
incorrect to claim that they are independent of the mental.8
 This point can be generalised even further. Suppose it is claimed that 
a view of a certain kind of entities qualifies as an ontological realist claim 
only if it characterises these entities as independent of X. Consider now a 
view that concerns X. No such view could be classified as an ontological 
realist claim as it can hardly be claimed to characterise X as independent of 
X. This suggests that it is mistaken to understand ontological realist claims in 
terms of independence of any particular phenomenon, mental or other.  
 It might be objected that this argument rests on a misunderstanding of 
how this conception of ontological realist claims comprehends the notion of 
mind independence. According to the notion of mental independence 
appealed to in this objection, such a claim states that the kind of entities in 
question is independent of mental states that concern this very kind of 
entities, particularly beliefs about this kind of entities. For example, an 
ontological realist claim about mental properties states that such properties 
are independent of beliefs about them. Accordingly, on this view moral 
realism states that moral properties are independent of beliefs about moral 
properties.9 Understanding ontological realist claims in this way is not 
vulnerable to the objection mentioned above in relation to Cartesian 
dualism. On this conception, Cartesian dualism would be classified as a 
realist ontological claim, since this view characterises mental states as 
independent of what we believe about them. However, there are at least 
three difficulties with this view. First, it fails with regard to desideratum (i). 
The reason is that there are meta-ethical positions which claim that there 
                                      
8 Sober (1982a), pp. 370–371. That mind independence for this reason fails to provide a 
general criterion of the distinction between realist and non-realist claims is a recurrent 
argument in the literature; see e.g. Alston (1996), p. 73; Railton (1996a), pp. 51, 57, and 
Sayre-McCord (1988 (1986)), pp. 5–6, 15.  
9 Some of the authors who understand moral realism in terms of mind independence 
indicate, more or less explicitly, that they conceive of mind independence in this way; 
see e.g. Railton (1996a), p. 57. 
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 exist moral properties that are independent of our beliefs about them but 
which do not seem to qualify as instances of moral realism. The view that 
moral rightness consists in being desired by some human creature can serve 
as an example. Second, for a corresponding reason it fails with regard to 
desideratum (ii). The reason is that there are claims about a certain kind of 
entities which characterises the entities as independent of beliefs about them 
but hardly qualifies as ontological realist claims. Operationalism and 
behaviourism can perhaps serve as examples. Third, this view of mind 
independence seems to lead to a certain kind of regress. According to this 
view, a claim about a kind of entities X qualifies as an ontological realist 
claim in so far as it characterises X as independent of beliefs about X. 
Consider now a claim about beliefs about X. A claim about these beliefs 
qualifies as an ontological realist claim only if it characterises beliefs about X 
as independent of beliefs about beliefs about X, etc. To stop this regress, 
there has to be a certain kind of beliefs about which there is no ontological 
realist claim, in which case a difficulty similar to the one noted above 
emerges. 
 Let us return, then, to the original way of understanding moral 
realism in terms of mind independence. There is a further difficulty with 
this view that is worth mentioning: it fails with respect to desideratum (iii); 
that is, it is not serviceable in discussions on meta-ethical issues. This 
difficulty can be illustrated by two examples of meta-ethical positions. 
Consider the view mentioned above according to which moral rightness of 
actions consists in their being desired by some human being. This view 
clearly does not characterise moral rightness as mind independent. Consider 
next a view which claims that moral rightness of actions consists in their 
being desired by a rational creature, where this is understood in a strict way, 
implying, for example, that the creature does not have any relevant false 
beliefs, all relevant true beliefs and a coherent set of desires.10 Does this view 
characterise moral rightness as mind independent? In one sense it does, since 
the property on this view is independent of what people actually desire. In 
another sense it does not, since it makes use of mental concepts. This 
illustrates that it is difficult to make a clear distinction between views that 
characterise moral properties as mind independent and those that do not. Of 
course, we might define mind independence so exactly that each given view 
                                      
10 See Smith (1994), esp. chap. 5. 
9 
 can be classified as characterising moral properties as mind independent or 
not. However, such a definition runs the risk of becoming arbitrary. For 
example, I think it would be arbitrary to say, without qualification, that the 
second position characterises moral rightness as mind independent; in one 
way it does, in another it does not. These considerations suggest, I think, 
that it is difficult to understand mind independence in a clear and non-
arbitrary way that can be used to decide whether a certain view characterises 
a moral property as mind independent or not. As a result, on this 
conception it is difficult to draw a clear and non-arbitrary distinction 
between views that are instances of moral realism and those that are not. In 
addition, the examples above indicate that mind independence comes in 
degrees, that a certain meta-ethical view can be more or less mind 
independent. For these reasons, it does not seem helpful to use this notion 
to draw the line between moral realism and other meta-ethical views. In 
particular, it does not seem to promote clarity in discussions about meta-
ethical issues. 
 It might be objected that on the conception that moral realism 
characterises moral properties as mind independent, moral realism should be 
understood to state that such properties are totally independent of mind. On 
this view, in order for moral properties to qualify as mind independent, 
these properties, and the non-moral properties in virtue of which objects 
have moral properties, should not be characterised in terms of any mental 
concepts whatsoever. If mind independence is understood in such a strict 
way, there is a clear and non-arbitrary understanding of mind independence, 
and the difficulty just mentioned is avoided. However, this understanding is 
presumably too strong, since quite few views of moral properties would 
classify as moral realism according to it. Consequently, it does not satisfy 
desideratum (iii). Furthermore, it fails to fulfil the other two desiderata. 
 
Moral realism in terms of literal construal 
According to another conception of ontological realist claims, such claims 
characterise the kind of entities in question ‘at face value’. What this exactly 
should be taken to mean is not entirely clear, but the basic idea seems to be 
that an ontological realist claim characterises the entities in question in a 
10 
 way that conforms with our ordinary notion of them.11 This means that 
there is a limit to how surprising the characterisation of the entities can be 
in order to qualify as realist, since, if it is very surprising, it presumably does 
not comply with our ordinary notion of these entities.12 In the meta-ethical 
literature, a similar conception has been formulated as the view that moral 
realism states that some moral sentences are true when interpreted literally.13 
I take this to imply that these sentences are interpreted in such a way that 
the moral properties they ascribe to objects are understood ‘at face value’.14 
On this view, the following condition should thus be added to (1) and (2): 
(3’) some moral sentences are true when literally construed. 
 Conceiving of moral realism in this way seems to confront a difficulty 
in relation to desideratum (iii). According to this conception, in order for a 
meta-ethical view to qualify moral realism, it has to construe some moral 
sentences literally.15 This means that we do not know whether a meta-
ethical view amounts to moral realism until we know whether it fulfils this 
requirement. Admittedly, there are views about which it is rather obvious 
that they do not construe moral sentences literally; the view according to 
which the moral rightness of actions consists in their being desired by some 
human creature can perhaps serve as an example.16 But as the meta-ethical 
literature bears witness, whether a certain view construes moral sentences 
literally is something that is often quite difficult to know and about which 
there is much disagreement. In fact, much of the meta-ethical controversy 
can be understood to concern what the correct literal construal of such 
sentences consists in. Consequently, it will be quite difficult to know 
whether a certain meta-ethical position qualifies as moral realism on this 
conception. This suggests that it is not useful to understand moral realism in 
this way; in particular, it does not promote clarity in discussions about meta-
ethical issues.  
                                      
11 See e.g. Alston (1996), p. 69; Horwich (1982), pp. 181–182, and Maddy (1990), pp. 
6–7, 14. 
12 Cf. Alston (1996), p. 69. 
13 For accounts of moral realism (partly) in terms of ‘face value’ or literal construal, see 
Railton (1996a), pp. 49–81; Railton (1996b), pp. 51–68; Sayre-McCord (1988 (1986)), 
pp. 1–23, and Sayre-McCord (1991), pp. 157–158. See also Butchvarov (1988), p. 396. 
According to Peter Railton, a literal construal of a certain discourse is ‘based upon our 
ordinary notions, folk theories as influenced by scientific developments, relatively 
uncontroversial applications, paradigm cases, and so on’ (Railton (1996b), p. 58). 
14 See e.g. Railton (1996a), p. 55–56.   
15 See e.g. Sayre-McCord (1988 (1986)), p. 22. 
16 Cf. Railton (1996a), pp. 67–68, and Sayre-McCord (1988 (1986)), p. 22. 
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  The mentioned difficulty has consequences for how the conception 
of moral realism under consideration relates to desideratum (i). According to 
this conception, we do not know whether a meta-ethical view qualifies as 
moral realism until we know whether it construes moral sentences literally. 
As a consequence, it is difficult to know to what degree this conception 
extends to alternative conceptions of moral realism.17 But it differs at least in 
one important way from the other conceptions. Suppose that conditions (1) 
and (2) are fulfilled. Suppose further that there is a meta-ethical view that 
succeeds to construe some moral sentences literally in the required way. On 
the present conception, it seems to follow by definition that this view 
constitutes moral realism. This seems to mean that, granted that the 
mentioned requirements are fulfilled, moral realism is in a significant respect 
correct by definition. On other conceptions, it is however a matter of 
substantial philosophical debate whether moral realism construes moral 
sentences literally and is the correct view in this respect; it does not follow 
merely from the assumption that conditions (1) and (2) are fulfilled together 
with the way in which realism is defined. 
 
Moral realism in terms of irreducibility  
According to another conception of ontological realist claims, such claims 
characterise the kind of entities in question as irreducible. Reduction may 
be understood in terms of a kind of entities, A, being subsumable under a 
certain kind of entities, B. Accordingly, I will take reduction to imply that a 
kind of entities A is identical with a set of entities belonging to a certain 
kind of entities B so that A makes up a subclass of B. For example, mental 
properties are reduced to physical properties only in so far as they are 
identical with some physical properties, thus making up a subclass of them. 
On the present conception of ontological realist claims, such a claim denies 
that a certain kind of entities is thus reducible.18 The idea which motivates 
this conception is, as already suggested, that an ontological realist claim 
characterises a certain kind of entities as making up a distinct kind of entities 
in relation to a certain other kind of entities, e.g. that there is something 
mental separate from the physical. If this notion of ontological realist claims 
is applied to moral realism, the following condition should be added to (1) 
                                      
17 However, it extends to the minimalist conception since it implies it. 
18 See e.g. Craig (1998), p. 117; Horwich (1996), pp. 188–190, and Pettit (2002), p. 52. 
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 and (2): (3’’) moral properties are irreducible.19 As I will understand this 
view, it says that moral properties are irreducible to non-moral properties. 
 It is possible to argue, I think, that this conception of moral realism is 
more successful in its fulfilment of the three desiderata than the conceptions 
considered earlier.  
 We may start with considering whether it fulfils desideratum (i), that 
is, whether it extends to alternative conceptions of moral realism.  
 This conception of moral realism clearly extends to the minimalist 
conception, since it implies it.  
 Moreover, I think it is reasonable to argue that conceiving of moral 
realism in terms of irreducibility extends to a reasonable degree the 
conception which understands moral realism in terms of mind independence. 
On the first-mentioned conception, moral properties are irreducible and 
hence not identical with any non-moral properties. This implies that moral 
properties are mind independent in the sense that they are not identical with 
non-moral properties pertaining to mind. Thus understood, the mind 
independence of moral properties is a consequence of their being 
irreducible; since they are not identical with non-moral properties, they are 
not identical with non-moral properties that pertain to mind. 
 It might be objected that moral properties being irreducible is 
compatible with their not being mind independent. To conceive of moral 
properties as irreducible is compatible with the view that objects have moral 
properties in virtue of having non-moral properties. Indeed, as I will argue 
in subsequent chapters, moral realism should be combined with this view. 
However, this means that the non-moral properties in virtue of which 
objects have moral properties might consist in non-moral properties 
pertaining to mind, in which case it might be doubted that moral properties 
are mind independent. 
 In reply to this objection, it should be stressed that even if objects 
have moral properties in virtue of having non-moral properties that pertain 
to mind, the moral properties themselves are mind independent in a certain 
sense. The reason is, again, that even if objects have moral properties in 
virtue of having non-moral properties, moral properties are not identical 
with such properties. The conception according to which moral properties 
                                      
19 For accounts of moral realism (partly) in terms of irreducibility, see e.g. Arrington 
(1989), p. 120; Butchvarov (1988), p. 396; Dancy (1998), pp. 534, 536; McNaughton 
(1998), pp. 41–46, and Platts (1979), pp. 244–245. 
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 are irreducible is therefore in the indicated sense incompatible with the 
view that such properties are not mind independent. 
 Furthermore, as was noted above, it is untenable to characterise moral 
properties as totally mind independent in the sense that they, and the non-
moral properties in virtue of which objects have moral properties, are 
characterised without mentioning of any mental concepts whatsoever. In 
view of this, it is reasonable to allow that a meta-ethical view which 
qualifies as an instance of moral realism may claim that objects may have 
moral properties in virtue of having non-moral properties that pertain to 
mind.20 So even if moral realism on the conception under consideration 
does not guarantee that moral properties are totally mind independent in the 
indicated way, it is reasonable to believe that it characterises moral 
properties as mind independent to a reasonable extent. 
 It can further be argued that conceiving of moral realism in terms of 
irreducibility extends to a reasonable degree to the conception that 
characterises this claim in terms of literal construal of moral sentences. Even if 
it can not be presumed that a meta-ethical view which characterises moral 
properties as irreducible provides a literal construal of moral sentences, such 
a view is likely to construe moral sentences in a way that does not strike us 
as obviously non-literal. Since it does not offer a reduction of moral 
properties, it implies that it is not possible to account for them entirely in 
terms of non-moral properties. Now, it is presumably accounts of moral 
properties exclusively in non-moral terms that we are likely to find most 
informative and hence potentially in conflict with our ordinary notion of 
them. It is therefore not far-fetched to assume that a meta-ethical view 
which characterises moral properties as irreducible does not offend our 
ordinary notion of them, at least not obviously. As a consequence, there is 
                                      
20 However, should irreducibility be considered too weak to assure mind independence, 
we might use the notion of mind independence to qualify the basic claim of 
irreducibility. There are mainly two ways to do this. One way is to state that a necessary 
condition for a view to qualify as an instance of moral realism is that it denies that the 
non-moral properties in virtue of which objects have moral properties pertain to mind, 
where this is conceived in a reasonably strong way. This would then be a fourth 
condition to add to the three previous ones. However, this alternative has the drawback, 
noted above, that it is difficult to account for mind independence in a clear and non-
arbitrary way. As we saw above, the notion seems to come in degrees. A more attractive 
alternative is therefore to allow for different moral realist views which vary in strength 
depending on to what extent they characterise the non-moral properties in virtue of 
which objects have moral properties as mind independent. However, I will not make use 
of this strategy. 
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 reason to believe that it does not construe moral sentences which ascribe 
such properties to objects in a way that we find obviously non-literal. 
 Let us next consider whether conceiving of moral realism in terms of 
irreducibility succeeds in relation to desideratum (ii), that is, whether it is an 
instance of a conception of ontological realist claims that extends to 
alternative conceptions of such claims. 
 Earlier we noted that the minimalist conception of moral realism does 
not seem to have any counterparts as ontological realist claims in other 
fields. In any case, to conceive of ontological realist claims in terms of 
irreducibility extends to such a conception, since it implies it.  
 Moreover, I think it is reasonable to argue that conceiving of 
ontological realist claims in terms of irreducibility extends in an appropriate 
way to the view which understands such claims in terms of mind 
independence. In doing so, it avoids the difficulties related to this conception. 
Above I argued that it is mistaken to understand ontological realist claims in 
terms of mind independence, since such a conception has difficulties in 
categorising any view that concerns the mental as realist. Furthermore, I 
argued that it is mistaken to characterise ontological realist claims in terms of 
independence with respect to any particular phenomenon X, mental or 
other, since this would make it impossible for there to be such claims about 
X itself. It should be noticed, however, that these difficulties leave open the 
possibility to conceive of ontological realist claims in terms of 
independence, although not in terms of independence of any particular 
phenomenon. I think it can be argued that one way to conceive of 
ontological realist claims in such a topic neutral manner is in terms of 
irreducibility. The idea that independence can be understood in terms of 
irreducibility is close at hand; after all, to hold that a certain entity is 
irreducible is to imply that it has a certain kind of independence in relation 
to the kind of entities to which it is irreducible. 
 According to this understanding of ontological realist claims, the part 
of such a claim that is concerned with irreducibility consists of two steps.21 
The first step it has in common with other ontological realist claims whereas 
the second step is allowed to vary depending on the kind of entities that 
                                      
21 Of course, an ontological realist claim might consist in additional conditions. These 
conditions may for example say that sentences related to the entities in question have 
truth-value and that some of them are true in virtue of these entities, i.e. analogues to 
conditions (1) and (2) above.  
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 constitutes the object of the particular claim in question. In the first step it is 
claimed about some kind of entities X that it is irreducible. This ‘declaration 
of independence’ should be understood to be topic neutral in that it does 
not state that X is irreducible to any particular kind of entities, e.g. mental 
properties.22 In the second step the ontological realist claim at issue specifies 
the kind of entities that X is irreducible to, where this is adapted to what is 
suitable to X. 
 There are, I think, at least two advantages with characterising 
ontological realist claims in this way. First, it is, in the first step, topic 
neutral. This means that it makes possible ontological realist claims as regards 
a wide range of different kinds of entities. Thus, it does not make the 
mistake of understanding such claims in terms of independence of a 
particular phenomenon. Especially, since ontological realist claims on this 
view are not understood in terms of mind independence, but in terms of 
topic neutral independence qua irreducibility, there are such claims also 
about mental properties. Hence, it does not have the difficulty related to 
characterising ontological realist claims in terms of mind independence 
noted above. Second, this conception of ontological realist claims allows, in 
the second step, ontological realist claims to vary concerning the kind of 
entities of which independence is claimed in a way that is tailor-made to 
these entities. As a consequence, it makes possible ontological realist claims 
about different kinds of entities in a way that agrees with our views of what 
realist claims about these entities should amount to. For example, it makes 
possible an ontological realist claim according to which a certain kind of 
entities, e.g. scientific entities, is irreducible to entities that pertain to mind. 
This means that in the cases it is appropriate, the proposed characterisation 
of ontological realist claims extends in a quite substantial way to the view 
that such claims should be understood in terms of mind independence. 
 The following examples might illustrate how this conception of 
ontological realist claims works. Ontological realist claims about scientific 
                                      
22 It might be trivially true that a certain kind of entities X is irreducible to some kind of 
entities. But the first step might simply be understood as the view that X is irreducible to 
a definite kind of entities in a non-trivial way, but that it at this stage is not decided what 
this kind of entities consists in. Alternatively, it might be understood as the claim that X 
is irreducible to the kind of entities that constitutes its ‘complement’, whatever kind of 
entities that is. In the case of mental properties, the ‘complement’ is constituted by 
physical properties; in the case of scientific entities, it is presumably constituted by 
entities that pertain to mind, etc. 
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 entities can be interpreted to embrace the topic neutral irreducibility claim 
about scientific entities (first step) and then to assert that such entities are 
irreducible to properties pertaining to mental states, understood in a rather 
broad sense, including beliefs and observations (second step). 
Operationalism, for example, does not fulfil this condition, and it would 
consequently not qualify as an ontological realist claim on this conception. 
Ontological realist claims about mental properties might be interpreted to 
embrace the topic neutral irreducibility claim about such properties (first 
step) and then to assert that mental properties are irreducible to physical 
properties, understood in a rather broad sense (second step). Since for 
example Cartesian dualism implies that mental properties are irreducible to 
physical properties, it would qualify as an ontological realist claim on this 
conception. However, some other views, such as behaviourism, do not fulfil 
this criterion and would consequently not qualify as realist. Moral realism 
might be interpreted to embrace the topic neutral irreducibility claim about 
moral properties (first step) and then to assert that such properties are 
irreducible to non-moral properties (second step).23
 It should be stressed that this proposal is not intended as a description 
of what authors mean when they label a certain view ‘realism’. Rather, it is 
intended as a way of understanding ontological realist claims that lends a 
certain coherence to various assertions in relation to them. Needless to say, 
here I am only able to give a very short outline of this proposal. 
 To conceive of ontological realist claims in terms of irreducibility also 
extends in a reasonable way to the conception that understands such claims 
in terms of ‘face value’. The reason for this being so should be familiar from 
what was said above. A view which states that a certain kind of entities is 
not reducible to entities belonging to another kind implies that the nature of 
the former kind of entities cannot be characterised completely in terms of 
the latter. However, it is presumably an account that does this that we are 
likely to find most informative and hence as characterising the entities in a 
way that conflicts with our ordinary notion of them. It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that an account of these entities which characterises 
them as irreducible does not characterise them in a strikingly unfamiliar way 
and hence not in a way that is obviously incompatible with our ordinary 
notion of them.  
                                      
23 In the discussion to follow, I will not make use of this distinction. 
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  Lastly, let us consider whether the conception of moral realism in 
terms of irreducibility fulfils desideratum (iii), that is, whether it is 
serviceable in meta-ethical discussions. I think it is. Whether a meta-ethical 
view is an instance of moral realism is according to this conception a rather 
straightforward matter, at least in principle; it turns on whether the view at 
issue reduces moral properties to non-moral properties. Since moral realism 
on this conception is a matter of ‘either or’, this conception promotes clarity 
in discussions about meta-ethical issues. 
 
4. Moral Realism and Its Opponents 
In the last section, I argued that we should adopt a conception of moral 
realism according to which this view comprises three conditions: first, moral 
sentences have truth-value; second, there exist moral properties so that some 
of these sentences are true, and, third, moral properties are irreducible to 
non-moral properties. These claims constitute, I think, necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions for a meta-ethical view to be an instance of moral 
realism.  
 In this section, I will examine what the meta-ethical views involved 
in these three claims amount to and contrast them with the meta-ethical 
views that are their respective opposites.  
 
Cognitivism contra non-cognitivism 
Cognitivism may roughly be understood as the view that moral sentences 
have truth-value; that is, that they are true or false. Hence, the first 
condition of moral realism is an affirmation of cognitivism. Non-
cognitivism may roughly be understood as the view that moral sentences 
lack truth-value. 
 What cognitivism and non-cognitivism amount to can be seen more 
exactly if we consider what they say about a certain type of sentences. Many 
sentences involve terms in virtue of which properties are ascribed to objects. 
Such sentences are true if the objects have the properties and false if they do 
not. By appearance, many moral sentences belong to this type or are 
reasonable interpreted as belonging to it. On cognitivism, this impression is 
correct because such moral sentences ascribe properties to objects in just the 
same way as other sentences of this type. That is, such moral sentences 
contain moral terms in virtue of which moral properties are ascribed to 
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 objects, and if the objects in question have the moral properties, the 
sentences are true, false if they do not. Non-cognitivism denies this and 
claims that, despite appearances, moral sentences differ from other sentences 
of a similar form. On this view, moral sentences of this type do not contain 
moral terms in virtue of which moral properties are ascribed to objects. 
Hence, non-cognitivism denies that moral sentences are true or false in the 
indicated way. Since non-cognitivism implies that no moral sentences are 
thus true, I will take it to imply that there is nothing that can make such 
sentences true in the indicated way; that is, I will take it to imply that there 
are no moral properties.24
 In view of this difference, cognitivism and non-cognitivism also differ 
as to what kind of states moral sentences are used to express. It might be 
claimed that on both views such sentences are used to express moral 
judgements; the term ‘moral judgement’ may then be taken to be neutral 
between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. However, they disagree as to 
what a moral judgement consists in. According to cognitivism, it consists, at 
least primarily, in a belief. Thus, on this view, moral sentences of the kind 
mentioned express beliefs to the effect that objects have certain moral 
properties. According to non-cognitivism, a moral judgement does not 
primarily consist in a belief but in a non-cognitive state of some sort. Thus, 
on this view, moral sentences express such states. 
 It might be asked what view on truth that cognitivism and non-
cognitivism involve. As far as I understand, there is no need for advocates of 
these positions to commit themselves to any particular view on this notion. 
These meta-ethical positions should thus, mutatis mutandis, be possible to 
combine with various views on truth. However, it is important that the 
view on truth involved in cognitivism and non-cognitivism is not different 
from the one involved in non-moral areas. As Geoffrey Sayre-McCord 
points out, the view at issue should be ‘seamless’ in the sense that 
‘whichever theories of meaning and truth are offered for the disputed claims 
must be extended as well to apply to all claims’.25 Above all, it should not 
                                      
24 Cf. Shafer-Landau (2003), p. 18, and Thomson in Harman and Thomson (1996), p. 
96.
25 Sayre-McCord (1988 (1986)), p. 6. Cf. Pettit (2001), pp. 242–245. 
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 be weaker than the view on truth appealed to in other areas. This 
requirement finds support in desideratum (ii).26  
 It should be mentioned that according to some non-cognitivists, 
moral sentences can express beliefs, although merely secondarily. On this 
view, moral terms have two kinds of senses: a primary sense, which consists 
in a certain non-cognitive attitude, and a secondary sense, which consists in 
certain non-moral properties.27 These properties can be understood to 
constitute the speaker’s moral criteria or principles that determine towards 
which objects she has the non-cognitive attitude and hence to which 
objects she applies the term. As a consequence of the secondary sense of 
moral terms, moral sentences can be taken to express beliefs about these 
non-moral properties. The reason to call the former ‘primary sense’ and the 
latter ‘secondary sense’ might perhaps be understood in the following way. 
Suppose a person asserts a sentence in which a moral term is involved, such 
as ‘It’s right to give money to the Red Cross’. When ‘right’ figures in such a 
sentence, it is necessarily used to express a non-cognitive attitude in the 
sense that unless a speaker has the attitude in question, her use of the term is 
                                      
26 It might be argued that non-cognitivists can claim that moral sentences have truth-
value. They can do this because they might adopt a deflationist or minimalist conception 
of truth. For example, they may maintain that to say that a sentence is true merely is to 
affirm it. This possibility is especially exploited by quasi-realists. (See e.g. Blackburn 
(1993 (1988)), pp. 166–181, and Blackburn (1998), pp. 68–83.) However, advocates of 
this view are non-cognitivists according to the characterisation above. The main reason 
is that they deny that moral sentences involve terms in virtue of which these sentences 
ascribe properties to objects in the same way as other, non-moral, sentences of a similar 
form. They deny therefore that any moral sentences are true or false in virtue of objects 
having or lacking these properties. Accordingly, they deny that there are any moral 
properties that can make sentences true in that way. Moreover, they deny that moral 
sentences express beliefs, at least primarily. In what follows, I will continue to say that 
non-cognitivists claim that moral sentences lack truth-value. What I will have in mind is 
that they claim that moral sentences are not true or false in the qualified sense described 
above.  
 It might be objected to this reasoning that non-cognitivists can claim that moral 
sentences ascribe moral properties and express beliefs. Non-cognitivists can claim this 
because just as they may adopt a deflationist or minimalist conception of truth, they can 
adopt such a conception of properties and beliefs. For example, they might argue that to 
say that an object has a moral property merely is to affirm a sentence to this effect or to 
say that a person has a moral belief merely is to say that she is disposed to affirm a certain 
sentence. However, advocates of this view would still be classified as non-cognitivists 
according to my characterisation. The reason is that they deny that moral sentences 
ascribe properties to objects and express beliefs in the same sense as other, non-moral, 
sentences do so. On their view, moral properties and beliefs are not full-blown 
properties and beliefs, but quite different from properties and beliefs in other areas. 
Hence, cognitivism can be understood as a thesis which stresses the continuity between 
moral discourse and ordinary discourse.  
27 See e.g. Hare (1952), pp. 118–126, and Hare (1997), pp. 48–56. 
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 incorrect. By contrast, the term is not necessarily used to claim that objects 
have any particular non-moral properties in this way. The non-moral 
properties associated with ‘right’ may consequently vary with different 
speakers even if their use of the term is correct. This means that two persons 
use ‘right’ in the same meaning only if they use it in the same primary sense. 
However, they may use the term in the same meaning even if they differ as 
regards the secondary sense they use it to have. As we will see in chapter 7, 
cognitivists can in a like manner argue that moral sentences express non-
cognitive states, although secondarily. 
 
Success-theory contra error-theory 
According to success-theory, there exist moral properties that make some 
moral sentences true.28 Hence, the first condition of moral realism is an 
affirmation of success-theory. As we saw above, cognitivism claims that 
certain moral sentences contain moral terms in virtue of which moral 
properties are ascribed to objects. Advocates of success-theory agree and add 
the claim that moral terms refer to existing moral properties with the 
consequence that some moral sentences of this kind are true. Advocates of 
error-theory also agree with cognitivism, but deny the second claim. On 
this view, there are no moral properties, with the consequence that no 
moral sentences of the mentioned kind are true; to the contrary, all such 
sentences are false.29
 It might be asked what notion of properties is involved in success-
theory and error-theory. In analogy with the answer to the corresponding 
question as regards truth, I think the proper response is that these views 
need not be committed to any particular view in this regard. Thus, success-
theory and error theory should, mutatis mutandis, be possible to combine 
with various views on properties. It is however important that the notion of 
property involved in these views is not different from the one appealed to in 
other areas. The reason is basically the same as the one regarding truth. 
 
 
                                      
28 I have borrowed the term ‘success-theory’ from Sayre-McCord (1988 (1986)), p. 10. 
29 It might be argued that some moral sentences actually are true on error-theory. One 
example might be ‘Everything is morally permissible’. However, I focus on sentences 
that attribute moral properties as rightness, wrongness, goodness and badness to objects. 
As I will understand error-theorists, they deny that that there are any true moral 
sentences of these kinds. 
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Realism contra Reductionism 
Moral realism is the affirmation of cognitivism and success-theory together 
with the claim that moral properties are irreducible to non-moral properties. 
Moral reductionism is the denial of this third claim. Moral reductionists 
accept cognitivism and success-theory but maintain that moral properties are 
reducible to non-moral properties. Henceforth I will refer to these views 
simply as ‘realism’ and ‘reductionism’, respectively. 
 We may now inquire what is involved in these views. What is it 
realists deny and reductionists affirm? 
 We may start by considering the scope of these views. Earlier I said, 
somewhat vaguely, that realists deny, whereas reductionists affirm, that 
moral properties are reducible to non-moral properties. The moral 
properties I have in mind are ‘thin’ moral properties, particularly moral 
rightness, wrongness, goodness and badness.30 In what follows, I will at 
times represent such a moral property as ‘M’. 
 Let us continue by considering what is involved in reductions of 
moral properties. The basic component of such a reduction is, as was 
indicated in the last section, the claim that moral properties are identical with 
certain non-moral properties.31 (It might appear paradoxical to say that 
moral properties are identical with non-moral properties. However, as non-
moral properties are characterised below, I think this impression is mistaken. 
But if this usage is thought to be peculiar in spite of that characterisation, we 
might label these properties in some other way.) This requirement is 
motivated by the following considerations.  
 First, although reduction is a notion that has been debated in 
philosophy, it seems nowadays fairly uncontroversial to claim that a 
necessary condition for a kind of entities A to be reduced to a certain kind 
of entities B is that A is identified with a set of entities belonging to kind B, 
                                      
30 A weaker form of realism is had if it is claimed that only some of these ‘thin’ moral 
properties are irreducible. In chapters 6 and 7, I will focus on rightness. This means that 
even though I take realists to argue that all the mentioned properties are irreducible, they 
may make a stronger case in relation to this particular moral property. As I consider 
moral properties unless I indicate otherwise, I will write ‘right’ instead of ‘morally right’, 
etc. 
31 For an account of the importance of identity claims in reductions, see e.g. Hooker 
(1981), pp. 201–236. 
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 so that A makes up a subclass of B. It is, in any case, uncontroversial in 
meta-ethics. 
 Second, as was indicated in previous sections, lack of identity is 
required for the realist claim that moral properties make up a distinct kind of 
properties; unless moral properties are non-identical with non-moral 
properties, they do not constitute a kind of properties distinct from non-
moral properties.  
 Correspondingly, the requirement that reductions involve identity 
claims is tightly connected to various reasons for reductions.32 Here I will 
only mention some reasons for reducing moral properties, but they have 
counterparts in other fields of philosophy. One reason is to simplify 
ontology. It might be argued that ontology can be simplified by subsuming 
moral properties under the category of non-moral properties. This requires 
that moral properties are identical with non-moral properties. Another 
reason for reduction is to save the existence of moral properties. Sometimes 
it is suspected that moral properties would be for example metaphysically or 
epistemologically deviant and that their existence therefore should be 
denied. In order to uphold the existence of moral properties, it might be 
argued that they are reducible to non-moral properties that are not deviant 
in these respects. This enterprise also seems to require that moral properties 
are identical with certain non-moral properties. A third reason for reduction 
is to be able to explain certain characteristics connected to moral properties. 
It might for example be argued that if moral properties are not reduced to 
non-moral properties, it is not possible to account for how they can be 
involved in causal explanations of various facts. This enterprise also seems to 
require that moral properties are identical with certain non-moral 
properties. 
 Realists, on the other hand, argue that these reasons for reductions are 
misguided. They may argue that ontology cannot be simplified with respect 
to moral properties because such properties actually make up a separate 
category of properties. And they may argue that moral properties are neither 
metaphysically nor epistemologically deviant even if they are not identified 
with non-moral properties. Further, they may argue that the characteristics 
connected to moral properties can be explained, and perhaps even better 
                                      
32 For various reasons for reductions, see e.g. Alston (1996), pp. 69–73; Hooker (1981), 
pp. 201–204, and Mumford (1998), pp. 185–190. For a discussion of reduction in ethics, 
see e.g. Railton (1989), pp. 155–163, and Railton (1993b), pp. 317–320.  
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 explained, without assuming identity with non-moral properties. In 
subsequent chapters we will find examples of these ways of arguing. 
 Reduction is an asymmetric notion since it implies that one kind of 
entities, the entities to which reduction is made, have some sort of priority 
over the entities that are reduced. Accordingly, although we may want to 
say that moral properties are reduced to non-moral properties, we are not 
prepared to say that the converse holds. However, identity is a symmetric 
notion. In consideration of this, it can be argued that even if identity 
constitutes a necessary condition for reduction, it does not constitute a 
sufficient condition. On this view, a reduction has to involve at least one 
additional component to become asymmetric.33 As a consequence, this view 
raises the question of how the additional asymmetric component of a 
reduction should be understood. This is a difficult issue that troubles 
philosophers in different fields, and I cannot deal with it here. However, I 
think it can be argued that identity claims are closely associated with certain 
asymmetric components. Most fundamentally, appropriate identity claims 
imply a certain type of ontological asymmetry. Above it was suggested that a 
necessary condition for moral properties to be reduced to non-moral 
properties is that the former kind of properties is identified with a set of the 
latter kind of properties, so that the former make up a subclass of the latter. 
This means that in so far as moral properties are reduced to non-moral 
properties, they are subsumed under a more inclusive class of properties. In 
this case, the asymmetric component consists in a relation holding between 
moral properties and the more inclusive class of non-moral properties of 
which they are a subclass. However, the examples of reasons to reduce 
moral properties above suggest other ways in which identity claims might be 
connected to asymmetric components. As regards the first reason for 
reduction, the identification of moral properties with certain non-moral 
properties might mean that they are more fundamental or simple than one 
believes. As regards the second reason for reduction, the identification of 
moral properties with certain non-moral properties might mean that they 
are less philosophically troublesome than one believes. As regards the third 
reason for reduction, the identification of moral properties with certain 
non-moral properties might mean that the characteristics connected to 
                                      
33 For a discussion of asymmetry in reductions, see Mumford (1998), pp. 172–176, 183–
191.  
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 moral properties are more readily explainable than one believes. In these 
cases, the asymmetric relation holds between, on the one hand, moral 
properties as one might believe they are and, on the other hand, how they 
are on the assumption that they are identified with certain non-moral 
properties. Unfortunately, I am unable to account for how the asymmetric 
component indicated by these claims should be explained more exactly. 
However, whereas the first-mentioned asymmetric component is 
ontological, the latter three are presumably epistemological or explanatory. 
 Since a necessary condition for reduction is identity between 
properties, it becomes relevant to ask what constitutes property identity. In 
the literature there are different views about this notion, but at least one 
necessary condition seems uncontroversial. It is generally agreed that a 
property A is identical with a property B only if it holds necessarily that if 
something has A it has B and vice versa. That is, A and B are identical only 
if they are necessarily co-extensive. Suppose a reductionist claims that a 
moral property M is identical with a non-moral property G. According to 
the mentioned requirement on identity, she is then committed to the truth 
of a necessary biconditional: 
 It is necessary that, for any object x, x is M if and only if x is G. 
Reductionists might maintain that G is a complex property, i.e. that G is a 
non-moral property which in turn consists of non-moral properties. In case 
G is claimed to complex, I will consider it to consist of a conjunction of 
non-moral properties. However, I will not allow that G consists of a 
disjunction of non-moral properties. Although it is not completely 
uncontroversial whether conjunction is a proper way of forming properties, 
it is, as far as I understand, fairly generally accepted that it can have this 
function. However, it is highly controversial whether disjunction is a proper 
way of forming properties. If disjunction cannot form properties, the 
resulting necessary biconditional would not provide a basis for an identity 
claim. It might also be thought that if disjunctions are allowed to form 
properties, there is a powerful argument against realism. I will consider this 
argument in chapter 8.34
 As I have formulated realism and reductionism, they deny and affirm, 
respectively, that moral properties are reducible to non-moral properties. 
                                      
34 In chapter 5, we will see that there might be a relativist version of reductionism. This 
view might be understood to imply that more than one necessary biconditional of the 
indicated kind holds. 
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 This raises the question of how the distinction between these two kinds of 
properties should be understood.  
 It should first be emphasised that as I understand this distinction, 
identity between them is not ruled out beforehand, since I do not use the 
terms ‘moral properties’ and ‘non-moral properties’ in such a way that a 
property is a moral property only if it is not a non-moral property and vice 
versa.35 Rather, I conceive of moral properties and non-moral properties as 
two kinds of properties about which it is an open question whether moral 
properties make up a subclass of non-moral properties. That is, as far as the 
distinction between these two kinds of properties goes, moral properties 
may constitute a separate kind of properties (as realists claim), or a subclass 
of non-moral properties (as reductionists claim). 
 Many meta-ethicists appeal to moral and non-moral properties to 
characterise various meta-ethical views. They often leave the distinction 
uncommented, thus suggesting that it is unproblematic. However, R. M. 
Hare tries to clarify this distinction.36 Mapped over to the terminology 
adopted here, Hare’s account of non-moral properties might be formulated 
in the following way: a property is a non-moral property in so far as it can 
be completely characterised without the use of any moral terms.37  
 We can employ this account of non-moral properties to illuminate 
the difference between reductionism and realism. According to 
reductionism, a moral property M is identical with a non-moral property, 
i.e. a property which is such that it can be completely characterised without 
the use of any moral terms. This view implies that there is a necessary 
biconditional with ‘x is M’ on the left-hand side and on the right-hand side 
a property G for which this holds. Realism, on the other hand, denies that a 
                                      
35 Cf. Baldwin (1985), p. 32.  
36 Hare (1997), p. 64. However, similar accounts are found in Pigden (1991), p. 421; 
Railton (1989), p. 160; Sayre-McCord (1997a), p. 281, and Timmons (1999), p. 48. 
37 This account should presumably be qualified. It seems trivially true that a property can 
be completely characterised without the use of any moral terms. For example, rightness 
might be characterised as the property people think of at a certain moment or as the 
property about which they make certain utterances. And this holds presumably even if it 
is irreducible. To avoid this problem, we may put some restrictions on the mentioned 
characterisation. The two examples suggest that at least two such restrictions are needed. 
First, the property should not be characterised as the object of an attitude. Second, it 
should not be characterised as something about which an utterance is made. However, 
other qualifications might be required as well. 
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 moral property M is identical with a property which is such that it can be 
characterised without the use of any moral terms.38  
 I previously mentioned that reductionism states that moral properties 
are identical with certain non-moral properties, so that the former kind of 
properties makes up a subclass of the latter kind. The account of non-moral 
properties can be employed to elucidate this claim. If, as reductionism says, 
moral properties are identical with certain non-moral properties, and hence 
constitute a subclass of non-moral properties, they can quite naturally be 
completely characterised without the use of any moral terms. On the other 
hand, if, as realism says, moral properties are not identical with any non-
moral properties, and hence constitute a class of properties separate from the 
class of non-moral properties, they cannot be completely characterised 
without the use of any moral terms.  
 However, it should be admitted that this account is not very helpful. 
For one thing, it is rather vague. Moreover, to characterise non-moral 
properties by means of moral terms raises the question of how moral 
properties should be understood. It seems difficult to account for them 
without making use of moral terms. It might then be suspected that the 
distinction between moral and non-moral properties cannot be accounted 
for in a way that is not circular.  
 Unfortunately, I do not know how to spell out the distinction in a 
satisfactory way. Above all, I do not know how to account for it without 
circularity. However, two comments might serve to alleviate this worry. 
First, the distinction between moral and non-moral properties appears to a 
fair extent to be intuitively clear. The fact that most authors do not dwell on 
it, thereby suggesting that it is unproblematic, is a sign of this. Another sign 
is that we normally do not seem to have any troubles classifying properties 
as moral or non-moral, even thought there might be exceptions. This holds 
especially as regards the kind of moral properties I will be concerned with, 
i.e. ‘thin’ moral properties, and non-moral properties. For example, we have 
no problems judging that the term ‘right’ in certain contexts refers to moral 
rightness, and hence to a moral property, whereas e.g. ‘maximising 
happiness’ refers to a non-moral property. Moreover, having found that the 
terms refer to a moral property and a non-moral property, respectively, does 
not prevent us from leaving it open that these terms refer to the same 
                                      
38 Cf. Hare (1997), pp. 64, 82. 
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 property. Second, a general distinction between the moral and the non-
moral is presupposed in a number of considerations, both in philosophical 
ethics and in everyday situations. We may for example ask whether the 
moral and the non-moral conflict or at certain points converge. The 
distinction between moral and non-moral properties is part of this general 
way to conceive of matters. This suggests that in so far as the distinction 
between moral and non-moral properties is problematic, this is part of a 
larger difficulty that concerns the general relation between the moral and 
the non-moral. It would thus not be a difficulty exclusive for the present 
work or for meta-ethics in general. 
 
Realism and naturalism 
The way I understand realism may be contrasted with a more traditional 
conception of what this position amounts to, influenced by the work of G. 
E. Moore.39 It takes, like my conception, its point of departure in the idea 
that realism characterises moral properties as making up a separate kind of 
properties. It therefore states that the characteristic feature of realism is the 
claim that such properties are irreducible. However, on this conception 
realism does not say that moral properties are irreducible to non-moral 
properties, but that they are irreducible to natural properties.40
 The main difficulty with this alternative conception of realism is that 
it rules out as non-realist a meta-ethical view that reasonably qualifies as 
realist. The view I have in mind says that moral properties are irreducible to 
non-moral properties but that they nevertheless are natural properties. On 
this view, moral properties constitute a separate category of properties, since 
they are distinct from the category of non-moral properties. Still, they are 
members of the category of natural properties. Suppose, as both my 
conception and the alternative one suggest, that the image realism is getting 
at is that moral properties constitute a separate kind of properties and that 
the characteristic feature of realism is therewith that moral properties are 
irreducible. Given this governing idea, it is difficult to see why the view 
under consideration should not be allowed as an instance of realism since it, 
after all, states that moral properties make up a separate kind of properties. 
                                      
39 Moore famously understood naturalism as the view that goodness is reducible to 
natural properties; see e.g. Moore (1993 (1903)), pp. 91–93. 
40 On this conception, realists also claim that moral properties are not reducible to 
supernatural properties. 
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 This holds particularly since this view is one that has been found attractive 
by some influential meta-ethicists widely accepted as realists, most 
prominently Nicholas L. Sturgeon and David O. Brink.41 Moreover, as is 
implied by the discussion in the last section, the view that moral properties 
are irreducible but nonetheless natural qualifies as realist in terms of the 
desiderata of a successful conception of realism.  
 These considerations suggest that there is a distinction between two 
kinds of naturalism.42 According to reductive naturalism, a moral property M 
is reduced to, and therefore identical with, a non-moral property that is a 
natural property. On this view, a necessary biconditional of the kind 
mentioned above holds where a non-moral property G consists in a natural 
property. According to non-reductive naturalism, M is a natural property, but 
it is not reduced to any non-moral property and hence not to any non-
moral property that consists in a natural property. Realism is incompatible 
with reductive naturalism but compatible with non-reductive naturalism. Of 
course, even if realists may hold that moral properties are natural properties, 
they need not. They may instead believe that moral properties are 
supernatural properties, or they may be neutral in this respect. 
 These remarks raise the question of how natural properties should be 
characterised. This is a difficult issue that has troubled meta-ethicists ever 
since Moore made use of this notion—not the least it troubled Moore 
himself. As far as I understand, there are basically three conceptions of 
natural properties in the literature that may be relevant to realism.43 
According to Moore’s official characterisation, natural properties are 
properties that are the subject matter of science.44 According to a second 
conception, natural properties are properties that are known empirically.45 
According to a third conception, natural properties are properties that are 
                                      
41 See e.g. Brink (1989), pp. 176–177; Sturgeon (1984), pp. 59–60, and Sturgeon 
(2003), pp. 536–540, 553. 
42 Cf. Brink (1989), p. 9, and Shafer-Landau (2003), p. 63. A similar distinction can be 
drawn between reductive supernaturalism and non-reductive supernaturalism by 
exchanging natural properties for supernatural properties. 
43 For an overview of the various ways in which the notion of natural properties has 
been understood, see Copp (2003), pp. 182–185. For overviews of Moore’s various 
attempts to define natural properties, see Baldwin (1985), pp. 25–30, and Sturgeon 
(2003), pp. 541–556.  
44 Moore (1993 (1903)), pp. 91–92. See also e.g. Brink (1989), pp. 9, 157; Shafer-
Landau (2003), p. 59, and Timmons (1999), p. 13. 
45 See e.g. Cargile (1989), pp. 142–144; Copp (2003), pp. 185–187, and Railton (1989), 
p. 154. 
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 part of nature in the sense of being involved in its causal relations.46 All 
these conceptions can of course be developed in different ways. In chapter 
9, I will argue that realists can defend the view that moral properties are 
involved in causal explanations, in which case moral properties are natural 
according to the third conception of such properties.  
 
5. Some Arguments against Non-cognitivism and Error-theory 
In this section, I will very briefly consider some difficulties with two of the 
meta-ethical positions mentioned above, non-cognitivism and error-theory, 
which provide at least prima facie reasons not to adopt these views. These 
difficulties, most of them quite well known, justify that we turn to the two 
other meta-ethical positions, reductionism and realism, and consider 
whether any of them are more plausible. Now, there are important 
arguments that are thought to speak in favour of non-cognitivism and error-
theory. In chapter 5, 7 and 8, I will discuss the most important meta-ethical 
issues considerations of which have been taken to provide support to these 
views. It seems reasonable to assume that if these issues can be accounted for 
by reductionism or realism, this, together with the difficulties to be 
considered below, suggests that non-cognitivism and error-theory can be 
rejected. However, if both reductionism and realism face problems as 
difficult as those troubling non-cognitivism or error-theory, or if both fail to 
explain the mentioned issues, we would have reasons to reconsider non-
cognitivism and error-theory. Fortunately, I do not think this will turn out 
to be necessary. 
 Consider first non-cognitivism.47 The most important difficulties with 
this view are centred on the fact that there are a number of indications that 
moral sentences have truth-value in the way indicated above. First, many 
moral sentences seem to involve terms in virtue of which they ascribe moral 
properties to objects. Hence, they seem to be true or false just in the way 
other sentences of this form are. Non-cognitivists, denying that moral 
sentences have truth-value, have thus to understand such sentences in a way 
that is not consistent with their appearance. Moreover, some of our 
                                      
46 See e.g. Baldwin (1985), pp. 34–35; Smith (1999), pp. 93–101, and Sturgeon (2003), 
p. 538. 
47 For overviews of difficulties with non-cognitivism, see e.g. Brink (2000), pp. 196–
200; Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992), pp. 144–152; Miller (2003), esp. pp. 38–51; 
Shafer-Landau (2003), pp. 22–38, and Thomson in Harman and Thomson (1996), chap. 
7. Of course, non-cognitivism has more difficulties than those I mentioned here.  
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 epistemic attitudes in relation to moral matters are such that moral sentences 
have to have truth-value. For example, we may take ourselves to know that 
Hitler was bad, to believe that it is right to let women decide whether they 
should have an abortion, to be unsure whether it is right to give money to 
beggars, to have been mistaken in believing that homosexual behaviour is 
wrong, etc. Such epistemic attitudes seem to require that moral sentences 
can be true or false. Since non-cognitivists deny this, they have difficulties 
accounting for these epistemic attitudes. 
 Relatedly, our notion of moral disagreement requires that moral 
sentences have truth-value. The most obvious indication of this is 
presumably that, at least normally, we consider a person who asserts a moral 
sentence to be genuinely disagreeing with a person who denies this sentence 
in such a way that their sentences are contradictory. If one person asserts a 
moral sentence and another denies it, we take it that they hold views that 
are incompatible. Thus, we take it that it is impossible that both are right; 
rather, one is right and the other wrong. Since non-cognitivists deny that 
moral sentences have truth-value, they seem to have difficulties accounting 
for moral disagreement.  
 There is one indication of moral sentences being truth-evaluative that 
appears even more troubling for non-cognitivism. On the received view, 
for sentences to function as premises and conclusions of valid inferences, 
they have to have truth-value. Now, it seems evident that moral sentences 
are involved in valid inferences. For example, we can validly infer from the 
premises ‘If it is wrong to beat one’s own children, it is wrong to beat other 
people’s children’, and ‘It is wrong to beat one’s own children’ the 
conclusion ‘It is wrong to beat other people’s children’. Since non-
cognitivists hold that moral sentences do not have truth-value, they are 
challenged to explain how such inferences can be valid.  
 A related difficulty emerges in relation to the view that moral terms 
are used to express non-cognitive attitudes. This view has perhaps some 
plausibility in contexts where moral sentences are asserted, e.g. ‘It’s wrong 
to beat one’s own children’. However, it seems difficult to maintain this 
view when the sentences are unasserted. For example, if a person asserts the 
sentence ‘If it’s wrong to beat one’s own children, it’s wrong to beat other 
people’s children’, she does not assert a sentence to the effect that it is 
wrong to beat one’s own children. It seems therefore implausible to hold 
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 that the term ‘wrong’ in such a context is used to express a non-cognitive 
attitude. The upshot is that non-cognitivists have to claim that moral terms 
have different meanings depending on the context in which they figure. 
However, we take moral terms to have the same meaning independently of 
context. Moreover, in order for moral sentences to be part of valid 
inferences, the terms involved in these sentences have to have the same 
meaning throughout such inferences. The mentioned problem thus 
underlines the difficulty of non-cognitivism to account for moral sentences 
being involved in valid inferences. 
 Consider next error-theory.48 According to this view, moral 
sentences do have truth-value. Error-theory is consequently not vulnerable 
to the same criticism as non-cognitivism. For example, on this view moral 
sentences can be involved in valid inferences. However, in some respects 
error-theory has difficulties similar to those of non-cognitivism. One such 
difficulty concerns our epistemic attitudes in relation to moral matters. As 
mentioned above, we take ourselves to know e.g. that Hitler was morally 
bad. Since error-theorists claim that no moral sentences in which moral 
properties are ascribed to objects are true, they have to say that we do not 
have any such knowledge. Similar considerations may hold in relation to 
some of the other attitudes mentioned above. 
 Another difficulty with error-theory concerns moral disagreement. 
On this view, in contrast to non-cognitivism, people involved in moral 
debates may genuinely disagree, since they may assert contradictory 
sentences. However, in one important respect, error-theory conflicts with 
our notion of moral disagreement. Suppose someone asserts a sentence that 
ascribes a moral property to an object, e.g. ‘That action is right’. Suppose 
someone else denies this sentence and claims that it is not the case that the 
action in question is right. According to error-theory, since there are no 
moral properties, all sentences that ascribe moral properties to objects are 
false. Hence, a person who denies such a sentence is right and her opponent 
wrong.49 As I indicated above, we seem to believe that in moral 
disagreements, someone is right and the other wrong. However, error-
theory gives an account of why this holds that opposes our conception of 
moral disagreement. Suppose a person who denies a sentence that ascribes a 
                                      
48 Error-theory has not been criticised to the same extent as non-cognitivism. But see 
e.g. Pettit (2001), pp. 255–258, and Wright (1992), chap. 1. 
49 Cf. Pettit (2001), p. 241. 
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 moral property to an object, such as the one just mentioned, is right. 
According to our notion of moral disagreement, she is right because as 
regards the particular moral issue under consideration she has identified the 
correct position to take. In terms of the examples, she has recognised that 
the action in question is not right, in contrast to certain other actions that 
have this property. However, according to error-theory, a person who holds 
that a sentence which ascribes a moral property to an object is false will 
always be right. Moreover, she will be so for the simple reason that there are 
no moral properties that can make such sentences true and not because she 
has identified the correct position to take regarding the moral issue under 
debate. Hence, error-theory gives a wrong reason for why she is right. 
 Moreover, in at least one respect error-theory seems to be less 
plausible than non-cognitivism. According to non-cognitivism, moral 
sentences do not have the function to ascribe moral properties to objects but 
to give expression to non-cognitive states. Above we have seen some reason 
to believe that this view is mistaken. However, according to non-
cognitivism, moral sentences are at least able to fulfil the function they are 
claimed to have on this view. According to error-theory, some moral 
sentences do have the function to ascribe moral properties to objects, but 
since there are no moral properties they can never fulfil it. In fact, with this 
view we are under the influence of a gigantic and collective 
misunderstanding about what we are doing when we use moral language. 
This seems prima facie untenable. Surely, we do not take moral sentences to 
systematically miss their target in this flagrant way. To the contrary, we use 
such sentences in the assurance that they do what we use them to do, 
however that should be understood. Of course, this does not prove that 
error-theory is false, but it suggests that we should try to find an alternative 
for it. 
 As is very well known, many of the objections to non-cognitivism 
and error-theory considered above have been replied to by advocates of 
these views. In the case of non-cognitivism, some of these responses have 
given rise to quite sophisticated versions of this view, which means that my 
characterisation of this view above is oversimplified. However, as already 
mentioned, I will not consider these responses. They would be necessary to 
consider if there were convincing arguments in favour of non-cognitivism 
or error-theory which cannot be accounted for by any other view, or if the 
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 alternative views have at least as serious difficulties of their own. However, 
since I will argue that this is not the case, I will not do so.  
 
6. Outline of the Argument 
In the last section, we saw that there are some arguments against error-
theory and non-cognitivism which justify considering whether any of the 
two other meta-ethical positions, reductionism and realism, are more 
plausible. 
 In the next two chapters, I examine what I consider to be the two 
main forms of reductionism: analytic reductionism and synthetic 
reductionism. In chapter 2, I argue that an amended version of G. E. Moore’s 
open question argument suggests that analytic reductionism is mistaken. In 
chapter 3, I argue that considerations of two questions in relation to certain 
thought experiments suggest the same conclusion regarding synthetic 
reductionism. However, the arguments of these two chapters are tentative 
and there are consequently reasons to return to reductionism later on in the 
investigation.  
 Some meta-ethicists would argue that the failure of reductionism 
means that either non-cognitivism or error-theory has to be correct. In 
chapter 4, I argue that this conclusion can be avoided by adopting realism. 
Now, even if realists claim that moral properties are irreducible, they have 
to account for our notion that objects have moral properties in virtue of 
having non-moral properties. In this chapter, I maintain that realists can do 
so by employing what I call ‘the realist formula’. The realist formula 
acquires confirmation from the discussion of analytic and synthetic 
reductionism in chapters 2 and 3 by explaining our responses to the 
questions discussed there. Moreover, since the realist formula implies that 
moral properties are irreducible to non-moral properties, these responses 
provide support to realism. 
 Above I mentioned that although there are reasons to believe that 
non-cognitivism and error-theory are mistaken, there are also important 
arguments that have been proposed in support of these views. This means 
that non-cognitivism and error-theory cannot be rejected until these 
arguments have been responded to. I also mentioned that although the 
arguments proposed in chapters 2 and 3 suggest that reductionism is 
mistaken, this view is in need of further examination. In chapters 5, 6 and 7, 
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 I argue that realism is able to explain certain meta-ethical issues concerning 
moral disagreement, moral reason and moral motivation and that it 
therefore is reasonable to maintain that realism is preferable to non-
cognitivism, error-theory and reductionism. With regard to non-
cognitivism and error-theory, I argue that realism is able to explain some of 
the issues which are argued to support these views. In combination with the 
difficulties with non-cognitivism and error-theory mentioned in the last 
section, this provides reasons to believe that realism is preferable to these 
two views. Moreover, I argue that realism is able to explain certain meta-
ethical issues better than reductionism, which gives reasons to believe that 
realism is preferable to this view as well. In particular, I argue that realism is 
more successful than reductionism in accounting for the meta-ethical issues 
that are taken to support non-cognitivism or error-theory. Accordingly, 
realism is, in contrast to reductionism, capable of defending the view that 
moral sentences have truth-value and that there are moral properties. 
However, it might be objected that realism suffers from difficulties of its 
own which mean that even if it is preferable in the mentioned respects, it 
should not be adopted. I will respond to some of the most important 
arguments to this effect in chapters 8 and 9. 
 In chapter 5, I consider the argument from moral disagreement, 
according to which the nature of moral disagreement should have us 
conclude that there are no moral properties. This argument can be proposed 
in support of either non-cognitivism or error-theory. Reductionism, I 
argue, fails to explain the relevant kind of moral disagreements. By contrast, 
realism is capable of doing so by employing the realist formula. 
Consequently, in contrast to reductionism, realism has the resources to 
refute the argument from moral disagreement and maintain the existence of 
moral properties.  
 In chapter 6, I consider the view that moral judgements involve 
reasons to perform actions. Rather than considering the much-debated 
question of whether moral judgements involve rational reasons, as 
rationalists claim, I focus on the more basic notion that moral judgements 
imply moral reasons. By considering fundamental normative questions, I 
argue that reductionism fails to account for this notion, whereas realism is 
able to do so by employing the realist formula. As a result, unlike 
35 
 reductionism, realism is able to provide an accurate account of the 
normativity of moral judgements. 
 In chapter 7, I consider the internalist argument, according to which 
internalism concerning moral motivation together with the Humean theory 
of motivation entails that moral judgements do not consist in beliefs. This 
argument has been proposed in support of non-cognitivism. I argue that this 
argument can be refuted by rejecting internalism and adopting externalism. 
As a part of this reasoning, I consider Michael Smith’s fetishist argument in 
favour of internalism and against externalism. Smith’s argument raises the 
question of how people’s moral motivation should be characterised 
according to externalism. I argue that realism, in contrast to reductionism, is 
able to account for how externalists should understand a pertinent aspect of 
moral motivation. Thus, similar to the reasoning in chapter 5, I maintain 
that realism, unlike reductionism, is able to account for a meta-ethical issue 
that is thought to provide support to non-cognitivism. In contrast to 
reductionism, realism has accordingly the resources to refute the internalist 
argument and maintain that moral judgements consist in beliefs.  
 Above I indicated that for realism to be a reasonable meta-ethical 
position, it is vital that it can account for our notion that objects have moral 
properties in virtue of having non-moral properties or, as I also will 
formulate it, that moral properties depend on non-moral properties. The 
importance of this is underlined by the fact that some of the arguments 
proposed in earlier chapters appeal to the realist formula. In chapter 8, I 
develop the realist notion of moral dependence further. Above all, I defend 
the realist formula against various objections. One important feature of the 
realist formula is that it entails strong supervenience. Simon Blackburn and 
Jaegwon Kim have suggested arguments to the effect that realists face 
dilemmas in regard to strong supervenience. I argue that there are reasons to 
believe realism can avoid these dilemmas. Another kind of contentions that 
partly concern the realist notion of dependence is J. L. Mackie’s arguments 
from queerness in support of his view that there are no moral properties. I 
suggest that realism is not vulnerable to the queerness arguments and that 
the existence of moral properties therefore can be maintained. However, it 
is also pointed out that Kim’s and Mackie’s arguments might raise problems 
for realism that I cannot deal with in the present thesis. 
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  In chapter 9, I consider a well-known argument proposed by Gilbert 
Harman, according to which moral properties do not figure in causal 
explanations, at least not if they are irreducible. He maintains that we 
therefore are not justified in believing in the existence of such properties. 
Against Harman’s contention I argue that it is reasonable to assume that 
moral properties do figure in the relevant kind of explanations, even if they 
are irreducible, and that realists therefore are justified in maintaining their 
existence. I also argue that there is reason to believe that moral properties 
can have causal powers. However, in relation to the causal powers of moral 
properties realism might face difficulties that I am not able to discuss here. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I have set the ground for the subsequent chapters by 
defending a conception of moral realism according to which this view says, 
in brief, that there exist moral properties that are irreducible to non-moral 
properties. Moreover, I have characterised the meta-ethical views implied 
by moral realism and the views that constitute their opposites. We have also 
found that two of these meta-ethical views—non-cognitivism and error-
theory—have difficulties that justify us into considering whether realism or 
reductionism is more plausible. 
 In the last section, I mentioned some of the issues I discuss in 
subsequent chapters. However, I should also indicate some important issues 
that I do not discuss. First, although I consider the two forms of 
reductionism that I find most important, there are other forms I do not 
discuss, in particular so-called ‘revisionist reductionism’ and the view that 
has been labelled ‘moral functionalism’.50 Second, with the exception of 
some brief remarks in chapter 6, I do not consider rationalism. Third, and 
                                      
50 One well-known advocate of revisionist reductionism is Richard B. Brandt; see 
Brandt (1979), esp. chap. 1. Moral functionalism is proposed by Frank Jackson and Philip 
Pettit; see Jackson and Pettit (1995), pp. 20–40, Jackson (1998), chap. 5 and 6, and 
Jackson (2003), pp. 557–575. Moral functionalism may be a reductionist view, although 
it does not need to be (see Jackson and Pettit (1995), pp. 27–28, and Jackson (1998), pp. 
141–142). However, Jackson and Pettit seem to be attracted to a reductionist version of 
functionalism. Moreover, moral functionalism seem to exist in both an analytic version 
and a synthetic version (see Jackson and Pettit (1995, p. 28). I think it can be maintained 
that the arguments directed against reductionism in the chapters to follow can be 
directed against a reductionist version of moral functionalism as well, but I will not argue 
for this claim here. For criticism of various aspects of moral functionalism, see e.g. 
Hatzimoysis (2002), pp. 10–22; Roojen (1996), pp. 77–81; Smith (1994), pp. 48–56, and 
Zangwill (2000), pp. 275–286. 
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 most important, with the exception of some brief remarks in chapter 8, I do 
not consider epistemic issues. Fourth, there are important issues concerning 
the implications of realism, and which version of this position that is most 
reasonable, that I do not discuss. Moreover, there are important general 
philosophical notions that I make use of but leave by and large 
uncommented. Some of the issues I do discuss also require a good deal more 
attention than I give them. The main reason for this incompleteness is lack 
of time, space and ability. But I have also wanted to pursue a certain line of 
thought, something that might have been more difficult if I had considered 
additional issues. Since some of the issues I do not discuss might be relevant 
to the plausibility of realism, this view is in need of further examination 
than I provide in the chapters to follow. 
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 Chapter 2 
Analytic Reductionism and the Open Question Argument 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In the last chapter, I mentioned that reductionism exists in basically two 
forms: analytic reductionism and synthetic reductionism. For a long time, 
analytic reductionism was thought to be the only available kind of 
reductionism, and it is presumably still the one that is most established in 
meta-ethics. It therefore seems appropriate to start with discussing the 
plausibility of this form of reductionism. Moreover, the most renowned 
argument against this view is G. E. Moore’s open question argument. The 
main purpose with the present chapter is to argue that an amended version 
of this argument provides reason to believe that analytic reductionism is 
erroneous.1
 In the next section, I provide a bare outline of analytic reductionism. 
In section 3, I revise the original version of the open question argument in 
order to make it as plausible and resistant against objections as possible. In 
sections 4 and 5, I develop the argument further and defend it against the 
most prominent objections raised against it. The conclusion of my reasoning 
is that the open question argument offers the best explanation of our 
responses to the questions put in the argument, namely that analytic 
reductionism is mistaken.  
 
2. Analytic Reductionism 
Analytic reductionism states that a term, ‘M’, applying to objects with a 
moral property M, has the same meaning as a term, ‘G’, applying to objects 
with a non-moral property G. Because of this meaning equivalence, 
advocates of this view claim that ‘M’ and ‘G’ refer to the same property and 
that M and G consequently are identical. Analytic reductionism can be 
explicated in the following way. According to the received view, if two 
general terms have the same meaning, then both terms apply to objects with 
a certain property and only to objects with this property, and this holds 
                                      
1 This chapter corresponds, with the exception of some minor revisions, to Strandberg 
(2004), pp. 179–196. 
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 merely in virtue of language. Analytical reductionists are then committed to 
the truth of the following biconditional: 
 It is analytically necessary that, for any object x, x is M if and only if x 
 is G.  
The biconditional says that it holds analytically that those and only those 
objects that have M also have G; that is, merely as a matter of language, the 
terms ‘M’ and ‘G’ apply to objects with these properties in such a way that 
something is M if and only if it is G. The expression ‘necessary’ in the 
biconditional indicates that, since analytic truths like this hold true merely in 
virtue of language, they hold true whatever other, non-linguistic, conditions 
may be the case, i.e. in whatever counterfactual circumstances or possible 
worlds. As we saw in the last chapter, if a necessary biconditional of this 
kind holds, a necessary condition for M and G being identical is satisfied. 
According to a somewhat simpler way of formulating analytic reductionism 
that I will occasionally make use of, it says that the meaning of a moral term 
‘M’ is constituted by a non-moral property G with which M is identical. 
 Analytic reductionists are generally considered to propose reductive 
analyses of moral terms, and I will at times employ that usage here. It might 
be argued, however, that analysis should be distinguished from sameness of 
meaning. That an analysis expresses sameness of meaning is arguably a 
necessary condition of its being correct, but this condition may not be 
sufficient to guarantee such correctness. Here I will be interested in analysis 
only in so far as it concerns sameness of meaning. 
 In the subsequent sections, there will be opportunities to further 
clarify what analytic reductionism amounts to.2
 
3. An Amended Version of the Open Question Argument 
In Principia Ethica, Moore presents an argument that has been thought to 
demonstrate that analytic reductionism is erroneous: the open question 
argument. For a long time, and for several reasons, this argument has 
however become subject to several important objections. Partly as a 
                                      
2 Whether a certain work represents analytic reductionism is matter of interpretation, but 
among others the following ones are relevant: Adams (1981 (1973)), pp. 83–108; Firth 
(1952), pp. 317–345; Harman (1975), pp. 3–22; Lewis (1989), 113–137; Smith (1994), 
esp. chap. 5; Wong (1984), esp. chap. 4, and Zimmerman (2001), chap. 4. See also 
Jackson and Pettit (1995), pp. 20–40; Jackson (1998), chap. 6, and Jackson (2003), pp. 
557–575. It should be noted, however, that some of these authors focus on values in 
general rather than on moral properties. 
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 consequence of these objections, analytic reductionism has become more 
popular in recent years. However, I think the open question argument can 
be developed in a way that makes it possible to answer these objections and 
that the argument, thus understood, indicates the falsity of analytic 
reductionism. 
 Moore formulates the argument in the following well-known passage: 
 
The hypothesis that disagreement about the meaning of good is disagreement with 
regard to the correct analysis of a given whole, may be most plainly seen to be incorrect 
by consideration of the fact that, whatever definition be offered, it may be always asked, 
with significance, of the complex so defined, whether it is itself good. To take, for 
instance, one of the more plausible, because one of the more complicated, of such 
proposed definitions, it may easily be thought, at first sight, that to be good may mean to 
be that which we desire to desire. Thus if we apply this definition to a particular instance 
and say ‘When we think that A is good, we are thinking that A is one of the things 
which we desire to desire’, our proposition may seem quite plausible. But, if we carry 
the investigation further, and ask ourselves ‘Is it good to desire to desire A?’ it is 
apparent, on a little reflection, that this question is itself as intelligible, as the original 
question ‘Is A good?’—that we are, in fact, now asking for exactly the same information 
about the desire to desire A, for which we formerly asked with regard to A itself. But it 
is also apparent that the meaning of this second question cannot be correctly analysed 
into ‘Is the desire to desire A one of the things which we desire to desire?’: we have not 
before our minds anything so complicated as the question ‘Do we desire to desire to 
desire to desire A?’ Moreover any one can easily convince himself by inspection that the 
predicate of this proposition –‘good’ – is positively different from the notion of ‘desiring 
to desire’ which enters into its subject: ‘That we should desire to desire A is good’ is not 
merely equivalent to ‘That A should be good is good.’ It may indeed be true that what 
we desire to desire is always also good; perhaps, even the converse may be true: but it is 
very doubtful whether this is the case, and the mere fact that we understand very well 
what is meant by doubting it, shews clearly that we have two different notions before 
our minds.3
 
A reasonable understanding of Moore’s argument is this. If an analysis is 
proposed to the effect that ‘good’ has the same meaning as a certain term or 
sequence of terms, e.g. ‘desire to desire’, one should ask ‘Is whatever is 
desired to be desired good?’ And if one finds the question intelligible—that 
is, if the question is ‘open’—it follows that the question, and hence the 
analysis, does not express sameness of meaning. Thus, the analysis fails in this 
regard.4 This is the first part of the argument. In the second part it is claimed 
that there can be no successful reductive analysis of ‘good’, since ‘whatever 
definition be offered’, we will find the corresponding question intelligible.  
                                      
3 Moore (1993 (1903)), pp. 67–68. 
4 There has been some controversy about how to interpret the quoted passage; see e.g. 
Fumerton (1990), pp. 68–69, and Lewy (1965), pp. 258–259. The open question 
argument is closely related to the naturalistic fallacy. On this notion, see Frankena (1976 
(1939)), pp. 1–11. 
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  The argument should, I think, be modified in several ways. 
 Firstly, Moore applies the open question argument to ‘good’, whereas 
I will, as has become customary, apply it to ‘thin’ moral property terms. I 
have particularly in mind ‘morally right’, ‘morally good’, and their 
counterparts ‘morally wrong’ and ‘morally bad’. The main reason is of 
course that I am concerned with whether moral properties referred to by 
these terms are reducible. Another reason is that it can be questioned 
whether it makes sense to say that something is right or good without 
presupposing that it is right or good in a particular way, e.g. morally, 
rationally or prudentially.  
 Secondly, we should modify the response to the question figuring in 
the argument. Moore suggests that the relevant response is that one finds the 
question intelligible (or ‘significant’, which I take to amount to the same 
thing). To find a question intelligible is presumably to take it to be raised 
with some point. However, I believe that this response is not entirely suited 
to the purpose of the argument, since it is possible to find a question 
intelligible in this sense even if it involves sameness of meaning. For 
instance, the question ‘Is whatever is a male that has a sibling who has a 
child an uncle?’ seems intelligible. As we shall see below when we discuss 
the paradox of analysis, such questions may be intelligible because, although 
they express analytic truths, they convey information in some sense.  
 To avoid this problem, I suggest that we take the relevant response to 
the question to be doubt as regards the correct answer—a response Moore 
hints at towards the end of the quoted passage. The basic idea is that if a 
truth is analytic we should not, as persons with a particular kind of 
knowledge, have doubt as to how to answer a question corresponding to it, 
even if we may find it intelligible. Although the question ‘Is whatever is a 
male that has a sibling who has a child an uncle?’ is intelligible, we do not 
doubt how to answer it, at least not after some reflection. I should also 
mention that I use the term ‘doubt’ in a somewhat unusual way, in that I 
take it to cover a spectrum of certainty in reactions to the question, ranging 
from doubt in the proper sense (where one is not sure whether to answer 
affirmatively or negatively), to the propensity to respond with an outright 
‘no’. The reason for using ‘doubt’ in this broad sense is that if a response of 
hesitation—doubt proper—signals that the analysis is incorrect, so does a 
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 clear ‘no’.5  
 Thirdly, it should also be pointed out that the persons whose doubt is 
alleged to be significant have to be linguistically competent with respect to 
the terms in question; that is, they have to be competent language users of 
this part of language. If they are not, it would be pointless to ask them a 
question with the purpose of investigating whether the terms have the same 
meaning. We should however not regard such a person’s doubt as an 
indisputable proof of the incorrectness of the proposed analysis. On 
occasion, even a person who is competent in the required way can be 
mistaken about what a term means, so we should say that the presence of 
doubt merely suggests that the analysis is incorrect. 
 Fourthly, we should increase the number of questions put to use in 
the argument. As we saw above, the argument invites us to take the non-
moral property on the right-hand side of an allegedly analytically necessary 
biconditional, G above, and inquire whether it is a sufficient condition for 
something having the moral property on the left-hand side, M: ‘Is whatever 
is G also M?’ Since a successful analysis of the relevant kind requires the 
truth of a biconditional, it follows that if there is a response of doubt 
indicating that G is not a sufficient condition, the analysis fails. But there is 
no reason to confine the argument so that it employs only questions of this 
type. Given that the response to this type of question is significant, we could 
reach the same conclusion if we instead ask ‘Is whatever is M also G?’, i.e. 
ask if G is a necessary condition for something having M, and the response 
                                      
5 There seems to be a further reason to view the response of doubt as regards the correct 
answer to the question, not of finding the question intelligible, as the relevant response. 
Whether one finds a certain question intelligible or not presumably depends partly on 
what one believes about the person who asks it: what one believes about her knowledge, 
intelligence, sense of humour, etc. It would seem that a question may be found 
intelligible even if it contains an analytic truth, since it can be surmised that it is asked by 
a person who, for example, is not linguistically competent in the relevant way or who 
wants to make some strange kind of joke. Finding the question intelligible can then not 
be used as a test of whether it contains an analytic truth. Of course, one could stipulate 
that one always should imagine the question to be asked by a person who is linguistically 
competent, who does not want to make a joke, etc. However, the problem would then 
be that to employ this response is unnecessarily convoluted since it forces one to take a 
stand on things that are irrelevant to whether the question contains an analytic truth, 
namely, among other things, the epistemic position and intentions of the person who is 
imagined to be asking it. If, on the other hand, one uses doubt as the relevant response, 
one does not have to advance any particular hypotheses about the person who asks the 
question, for one simply asks oneself the question and lets one’s own doubt determine 
whether the question contains an analytic truth. To the extent that one is linguistically 
competent with respect to the terms in question, one’s response is reliable. We will then 
have a response that is better attuned to what the argument is intended to test. 
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 is one of doubt. Similarly, where G is complex—so that it follows that if 
something has G it has e.g. F, H and I—we could ask ‘Is whatever is M also 
F?’ (i.e. ask if a certain ‘part’ of G is a necessary condition for something 
having M) and so on. Generally, we can take propositions which would be 
analytic truths if the proposed analysis is correct, reformulate them into 
questions, and allow our responses to these questions to indicate whether 
the analysis states sameness of meaning. 
 Lastly, we should be more careful than Moore concerning the second 
part of the argument. The first part of the argument has not been applied to 
all possible analyses of moral terms. Even if one accepts this part of the 
argument, it is therefore difficult to see how one can rightly claim to know 
that ‘whatever’ analysis is offered, one’s response would be one of doubt. 
One reaction to this challenge is to say that the argument only offers a test. 
A more offensive rejoinder would be to maintain that the claim that there is 
no correct reductive analysis offers the best explanation of the evidence 
available. We will come back to this issue in section 5. 
 We will have further opportunities to clarify this modified version of 
the open question argument when we consider objections to it. Before we 
do this, we should however consider whether there is any reason in the first 
place to think that the procedure of inquiring into the meanings of terms 
that the argument makes use of is reliable. In other words, if a linguistically 
competent person is asked a question in which a proposed analysis is 
contained—or what would be an analytic truth if the analysis is correct—
and she has doubts about what to answer, does this suggest that the analysis 
fails to express sameness of meaning?  
 To answer this question, we may start by considering two 
biconditionals.  
 (1) x is a brother if and only if x stands in the family relation to a 
       person that is the main theme of the story of Cain and Abel. 
While true, (1) does not state the meaning of ‘brother’. An indication of this 
is that we can imagine that ‘brother’ applies to a person even in 
counterfactual circumstances in which the right-hand side of (1) is false. By 
contrast, consider: 
 (2) x is a brother if and only if x is a male sibling. 
An indication of (2) being analytically necessary is that one cannot think of 
any object in any counterfactual circumstance such that ‘brother’ is, and 
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 ‘male sibling’ is not, attributable to it (or vice versa). 
 It might be argued that there are good reasons for us to use language 
in such a way as to include analytic truths like (2), although they may not be 
as strong as biconditionals. However, I would like to stress that I do not 
want to commit myself to any particular theory about analyticity. Rather, I 
here speculate about what one takes the function of analytic truths to be if 
one thinks there are such truths. It might be argued, however, that in order 
to communicate properly we have, at least regarding some terms, to agree 
that when the term is used, it picks out the same set of properties (or at least 
a limited set of a range of properties), in all counterfactual circumstances 
merely in virtue of language. First, if some terms did not pick out the same 
set of properties (or a limited set of a range of properties) in this way, it 
would be difficult to understand how communication was at all possible, 
since we would not have any guarantee that we were talking about the same 
things or the same properties of things. Moreover, it is important that truths 
about which properties these terms pick out are not conditioned by factual 
circumstances but hold merely in virtue of language. One reason is that if a 
term is to be useful in communication, it is important that persons with 
quite different knowledge of the world understand which properties the 
term picks out. If the correctness in applications of a term were conditional 
on the way the world actually has been, is, or will be in certain respects, the 
term could not be used by persons who lacked knowledge of these 
particular facts. Hence (1), unlike (2), would be rather useless as a rule for 
the usage of ‘brother’. Analytic truths, then, can be said to work as fixed 
points in language: they guarantee that we talk about the same things and 
the same properties of things in different circumstances, and that we do this 
from a common epistemological basis ensuring mutual understanding.  
 Now, how do these simple remarks bear upon the question whether 
the open question argument can be relied on in inquiring into the meanings 
of terms? If some truths hold merely in virtue of language, and if the 
existence of such truths is an essential feature of us being able to 
communicate, it seems reasonable to assume that persons who are 
linguistically competent possess knowledge of these truths. Indeed, if they 
did not, they would lack something essential in their ability to 
communicate, and it could then be questioned whether they really were 
competent in the relevant respect. But if linguistically competent persons 
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 have this knowledge, it seems reasonable to treat their responses of doubt to 
questions of the kind put in the open question argument, such as ‘Is 
whatever is M also G?’, as indications of ‘M’ not having the same meaning 
as ‘G’. For these responses would simply be expressions of the linguistic 
competence of these persons. It is this tight connection—that is, between 
analyticity and linguistic competence, and between linguistic competence 
and responses to the questions utilised in the argument—that gives us reason 
to believe that the open question argument makes use of a reliable 
procedure of inquiring into the meanings of terms. 
 
4. Defence of the First Part of the Argument  
(i) One well-known objection to Moore’s argument can be formulated as 
the following reductio. If the open question argument were valid, it could be 
used to refute hypotheses to the effect that two terms refer to the same 
property or natural kind. But it can clearly not do this.6 To take Gilbert 
Harman’s example, suppose that we ask someone ‘Is whatever is H2O 
water?’ and that the person is doubtful of the correct answer. Her response 
would however not indicate that ‘water’ does not refer to the same natural 
kind as ‘H2O’.7
 This objection rests on the presupposition that the open question 
argument is intended to determine whether two terms refer to the same 
entity, e.g. the same property or natural kind. Although this might have 
been how Moore understood the argument, we may, as I suggested in the 
last section, consider it to indicate whether two terms refer to the same 
property in virtue of having the same meaning (in the indicated sense of 
‘meaning’).8 The argument does not necessarily have any implications for 
the question whether two terms refer to the same entity where the reason 
for this is understood in some other way. 
 (ii) According to another objection to the open question argument, 
the fact that a person does not find a question intelligible—or does not have 
                                      
6 See e.g. Brink (1989), pp. 164–166; Durrant (1970), pp. 360–361; Harman (1977), p. 
19; Lycan (1986), pp. 80–81; Putnam (1981), pp. 206–208, and Sturgeon (2003), pp. 
533–534. For defences of Moore’s argument against this contention, see Baldwin (2003), 
pp. 322–324; Ball (1988), pp. 198–201, and Ball (1991), pp. 8–15. For another positive 
view of Moore’s argument, see Shafer-Landau (2003), pp. 56–58. 
7 Harman (1977), p. 19. 
8 Moore’s view of the argument was presumably due to his assumption that two terms 
refer to the same property only if they have the same meaning. For relevant references, 
see previous note.  
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 doubts about the answer—does not show that the question expresses 
sameness of meaning.9 For instance, the fact that we do not doubt how to 
answer the question ‘Is whatever is H2O water?’ does not show that ‘water’ 
and ‘H2O’ have the same meaning. Quite generally, there seem to be a 
number of truths we do not doubt but that are not analytic. 
 This objection rests on a misunderstanding. The open question 
argument does not imply that lack of doubt is a sufficient condition for 
sameness of meaning. Thus, the fact that we do not doubt how to answer 
the mentioned question does not imply that ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ have the 
same meaning. According to the first part of the open question argument, if 
we, in our capacity as linguistically competent, doubt how to answer a 
question in which a proposed analysis is contained, this indicates that the 
analysis fails to express sameness of meaning. Thus, the argument rather 
suggests that lack of doubt is a necessary condition for sameness of meaning. 
However, as we have already seen and as we will see further below, this 
claim should be qualified in various ways. 
 (iii) Some authors suggest that advocates of the open question 
argument overlook the paradox of analysis.10 One way to formulate this 
paradox is as follows. A successful analysis should express sameness of 
meaning. In doing this, an analysis cannot state anything that is not 
contained in what is being analysed, since it should report only what holds 
merely in virtue of language. In principle, then, 
 (3) x is an uncle if and only if x is male and has a sibling who has a 
      child, 
should not state anything that is not contained in  
 (4) x is an uncle if and only if x is an uncle.  
So, on the one hand, successful analyses should be uninformative, as (4) is. 
But on the other hand, it is obvious that, even when they are considered to 
be correct, they are often informative. To take the minimal case, (3) is at 
least somewhat informative. 
 The paradox of analysis is chiefly a problem for the pursuit of analysis 
as such, but it can also be appealed to against the open question argument in 
the following way. The most reasonable response to the paradox is generally 
                                      
9 See Brandt (1959), pp. 165–166. For a criticism of Brandt’s view, see Nielsen (1974), 
pp. 51–56. 
10 See e.g. Baldwin (1990), p. 88; Fumerton (1983), pp. 477–479; Fumerton (1990), p. 
73, and Smith (1994), pp. 37–38. 
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 considered to be that analyses can be correct and yet informative. However, 
the open question argument may seem difficult to reconcile with this view. 
In its original formulation, the argument suggests that we can take the fact 
that an analysis is such that, when it is reformulated into a question, the 
question is found to be intelligible as an indication of the incorrectness of 
the analysis. The argument may thereby be taken to imply that an analysis 
cannot be correct and yet informative. This is indeed so, since if an analysis 
is informative, we find a question corresponding to it intelligible. Quite 
generally, if a question conveys information that is new to us, we find it 
intelligible.  
 It should be noted, however, that this objection is not effective 
against the open question argument as it is formulated here, where the 
relevant response is that of doubt or lack thereof. For it is possible for an 
analysis to be correct and informative and yet such that, when it is 
reformulated into a question, one does not doubt how to answer the 
question. Understood in this way, the open question argument is thus 
compatible with the recommended response to the paradox of analysis. In 
general, there seems to be no inconsistency in claiming that one does not 
doubt the truth of a sentence even if the sentence is informative. However, 
it might be argued that even if straightforward inconsistency is not involved, 
the fact that something like it occurs needs to be explained. I will postpone 
this explanation until another, and more pivotal, issue has been addressed.11
 We should also bear in mind here that in the amended version of the 
open question argument, a wider set of questions is allowed so that not only 
a whole analysis can figure in a question but also parts thereof. The 
implication of this in the present context is that even if an analysis is correct 
and informative, and one is doubtful about what to answer to a question in 
                                      
11 In relation to the paradox of analysis a possible misreading of the open question 
argument can be mentioned. (See Fumerton (1983), p. 478, and Magnell (1988), pp. 77–
78.) In order to preserve sameness of meaning (3) above should not report anything that 
is not involved in (4). Now, the open question argument says that if one responds with 
doubt to an analysis in the interrogative form, this indicates that the analysis fails to 
express sameness of meaning. It may then be thought that the argument implies that if 
two sentences, such as (3) and (4), reformulated into questions, differ in terms of the 
epistemic attitude they elicit, as (3) and (4) probably would, then they have different 
meanings (which (3) and (4) do not). However, a defender of the argument is not 
committed to the view that the two questions have to elicit the same response in order 
to contain sameness of meaning. Even if the questions contain sameness of meaning, our 
responses to them may vary from firm certainty to other considerably weaker reactions as 
long as doubt, in the sense described above, is not involved.  
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 which the whole analysis occurs, one may not be doubtful about what to 
answer to a question in which only a part of it occurs. What it is mentioned 
below about reflection is also relevant here. If one’s response to a question 
put in the open question argument is allowed to be grounded in reflection 
upon it, a question expressing sameness of meaning may elicit a doubt-free 
response. 
 However, as already indicated, there is an issue regarding the open 
question and the paradox of analysis that needs to be addressed. The 
favoured response to the paradox of analysis is, as mentioned, that an 
analysis can be both correct and informative. But, as was argued in the last 
section, the open question argument receives support from the notion that 
the reason why a person’s doubt how to answer a question put in the 
argument has anything to say about sameness of meaning is that she, qua 
linguistically competent, knows analytic truths. Now, it might be wondered 
how the response to the paradox squares with this aspect of the argument. If 
a person knows a certain truth, how can it be informative for her? 
 The answer to this question is that something that one, in one sense, 
knows can indeed be informative. In order to see this, we have to make a 
distinction between two kinds of knowledge of the meanings of terms: 
knowledge how and knowledge that.12 When we say that a person knows 
the meaning of a term, we are normally referring to the fact that she is able 
to apply the term correctly. If the meaning of a certain term ‘M’ can be 
stated by a biconditional, we can say that she applies ‘M’ in accordance with 
the biconditional. This is an instance of knowledge how. It is knowledge of 
how to use a term, i.e. the ability to apply it correctly. This kind of 
knowledge should be separated from a more comprehensive kind of 
knowledge. A person endowed with the mentioned ability may start to 
reflect on it and try to formulate a principle that codifies the pattern she 
follows in using the term. That is, instead of merely applying the term 
according to the biconditional, she may try to formulate it explicitly. After 
such reflection, she may have gained propositional knowledge of an 
analytically true biconditional. She will now have knowledge that regarding 
                                      
12 This distinction is found explicit or implicit in writings about the paradox of analysis; 
see e.g. Fumerton (1983), pp. 488–489; King (1990), pp. 162–163, and Myers (1971), 
pp. 301–302. Frank Snare has appealed to it in a paper addressing the open question 
argument: Snare (1975), p. 126. The distinction was presumably introduced by Gilbert 
Ryle: Ryle (1966 (1949)), chap. II. 
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 the meaning of the term. 
 The objection mentioned above can now be answered. An analysis 
may be informative for a person who has knowledge how, but not 
knowledge that, in regard to a term’s meaning. Even if she can apply the 
term correctly, she will not have knowledge that regarding its meaning. 
Consequently, when an analysis is presented to her, it is informative for her. 
There is an illuminating analogy to this phenomenon in our knowledge of 
grammar.13 A person who is said to know a certain grammatical rule is able 
to apply the rule correctly. Such a person can then be said to have 
knowledge how that reflects the grammatical characteristic described in the 
rule. Yet, if she is presented with a formulation of the rule, it may be 
informative for her because she lacks knowledge that regarding it. 
 The distinction between knowing how and knowing that could also 
be engaged in giving the explanation announced above. That is, it could 
explain how it is possible for a correct analysis to be informative and yet 
such that, when it is formulated as a question, one does not have doubt as to 
how to respond to the question. By invoking her knowledge how regarding 
the meaning of a certain term, a person may be in no doubt regarding the 
answer to the question, for the analysis accords with her use of the term. 
However, the analysis may yet be informative for her if she lacks knowledge 
that regarding the term’s meaning.14
 Having noticed the difference between the two kinds of knowledge 
in relation to meaning, we can also be clearer about what the open question 
argument amounts to. Questions that figure in the argument, such as ‘Is 
whatever is M really G?’, should be assumed to be addressed to persons who 
are linguistically competent in virtue of having knowledge how regarding 
the meanings of terms used in the questions. In the present case the 
addressee is asked whether things with the property in virtue of which ‘M’ 
applies, i.e. M, must have the non-moral property G, in virtue of which ‘G’ 
applies. The argument is devised to appeal to how such a person actually 
would apply ‘M’. It aims to investigate whether, exercising knowledge how, 
she would apply it in this way. Hence, the argument does not require the 
                                      
13 Cf. Snare (1975), pp. 126–127. 
14 Hilary Putnam stresses that the open question argument should be understood to 
employ the ability to use terms, not abstract knowledge of concepts; see Putnam (1975a), 
p. 13. 
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 addressee to possess knowledge that regarding the meaning of the term.15
 That it is knowledge how as regards meaning that is involved in the 
open question argument also reveals that the procedure utilised in the 
argument is involved in everyday situations—situations in which one in a 
number of ways and for different reasons asks questions about the meanings 
of terms. Suppose, for example, that I am unsure whether I have used a 
certain term, e.g. ‘racist’, correctly. In order to check this, I may employ the 
procedure used in the open question argument and by doing so utilise my 
knowledge how regarding the meanings of terms. I may ask, for example, if a 
person who has the characteristics that prompted me to use the term really is 
a racist, i.e. if she has properties in virtue of which ‘racist’ applies. Or 
suppose that I am trying to find a word for something I want to express, but 
that I have difficulty doing so. In order to find a suitable term, I am likely to 
come up with various proposals. When I examine these proposals, I may 
employ the procedure used in the open question argument and by doing so 
utilise my knowledge how regarding the meanings of terms. For example, I 
may ask if something to which a proposed term, say ‘racist’, applies has the 
properties I want to pick out. 
 As these examples demonstrate, the kind of questions persons with 
knowledge how ask in order to inquire into the meanings of terms remains 
the same, and the kind of response, doubt or lack thereof, has the same 
function, irrespective of which the particular terms at issue are. Thus, the 
examples emphasise that the open question argument is just an instance of a 
general procedure of inquiring into the meanings of terms. 
 These examples also suggest that one can execute these inquiries with 
various degrees of reflection. In some cases—of which the second case 
above might be an example—one may perform the procedure routinely 
without being conscious of asking various questions and responding to 
them. In other cases, as when counterexamples are involved, these inquiries 
may be executed with a considerable degree of reflection.16 In the latter 
                                      
15 However, after having doubted the kind of question that is asked in the open question 
argument, a person may acquire a kind of knowledge that regarding the meaning of a 
term: the knowledge that the term does not have the meaning proposed in the analysis at 
issue. 
16 The procedure used in the open question argument is intimately, although not 
necessarily, linked to counterexamples. In some cases discovery of a counterexample can 
be said to be a part of the argument. When one asks ‘Is whatever is M also G?’, it comes 
naturally to try to imagine some existing or non-existing object that is M but not G, and 
so on for other questions the argument employs. If one can do so, one has found a 
51 
 kind of cases, one may be highly aware of the procedure, reflect critically on 
the different questions asked, their implications, and one’s own responses. 
As a result of such an inquiry, one might at best come up with a correct 
analysis of the term. It is moreover reasonable to assume that the degree of 
reflection needed to reach a significant result may vary depending on the 
term at issue. There seems to be no reason not to acknowledge that there 
will also be various degrees of reflection when the issue concerns the 
meaning of a moral term. If the open question argument is an instance of a 
general way of inquiring into the meanings of terms that may vary as regards 
degree of reflection, the argument itself may take different forms in this 
regard. 
 The fact that the open question argument is part of a general 
procedure of inquiring into meaning has implications for the strength of the 
argument. If the procedure utilised in the argument is brought to bear on 
non-moral cases, and if it is significant in these cases, then someone who 
wishes to argue that the open question argument does not have any 
implications for the meanings of moral terms will need to point to a 
difference between the moral case and other cases. (As we shall see below, 
there is at least one objection along these lines.) Of course, an objector to 
the argument may maintain that the procedure has no implications for 
meaning at all. That, however, would be a very strong claim, blatantly at 
variance with the fact that we do use the procedure and in fact rely on it to 
a great extent. 
 (iv) Some authors accept that it is possible to inquire into the 
meanings of certain terms by means of the kind of questions put in the open 
question argument. They argue however that in certain cases, of which the 
moral case is one, a person may find such a question intelligible—or may 
have doubts about the answer—even if the analysis is correct. The reason 
they submit is that an analysis may be so complex that the resulting question 
is difficult to grasp fully, which explains why one’s response to it does not 
                                                                                                              
counterexample to the proposed analysis, and as a result, one responds to the question 
with doubt. In other cases a counterexample is not part of the argument, but it can be 
said to be tracked by the response. After having responded with doubt to a relevant 
question, one can try to find a counterexample on the assumption that one’s response 
suggests the direction in which a counterexample is to be found. In yet other instances of 
the argument counterexamples may be absent.  
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 accord with its involving an analytic truth.17 Take the question: 
 (5) Is whatever is a closed plane figure, equidistant at all points from     
      some fixed point, a circle?18
It can be argued that although the analysis (5) contains is correct, one would 
have doubts about the answer because the analysis is so complex that (5) is 
difficult to grasp completely. 
 As a first reply to this objection, it should be recalled that in the open 
question argument as we now understand it, room is left for reflection 
before one responds to the question. It is not the case, then, as this 
objection suggests, that one has to respond instantaneously without any 
deliberation. Thus, after reflection one may come up with a response to (5) 
that is significant as to the correctness of the proposed analysis. 
 It should further be noted that this objection presupposes that the 
open question argument only can employ questions of one type: questions 
in which it is asked if the right-hand side of the analysis, analysans, is 
sufficient for the left-hand side, analysandum. Above we extended the range 
of possible questions, however, to include questions about whether the 
whole or part of analysans is necessary for analysandum. Since it is not a 
complete analysis that figures in the latter type of questions, such a question 
is presumably easier to grasp; and given this, a response of doubt to such a 
question can be taken to indicate that the analysis fails to express sameness of 
meaning. Let us grant that (5) is difficult to grasp owing to its complexity. 
The questions ‘Is whatever is a circle equidistant at all points from some 
fixed point?’ and ‘Is whatever is a circle a plane figure?’ may be easier to 
grasp and not elicit doubt.  
 There is a further point that is relevant to the plausibility of the 
objection under consideration. As was noted above, the procedure of 
inquiring into the meanings of terms employed in the open question 
argument is also utilised when an analysis is devised. Proponents of the 
present objection claim that an analysis might be so complex that the 
procedure employed in the open question argument is not applicable in the 
relevant way. However, they have then difficulties explaining how a correct 
complex analysis can be formulated at all. 
 
                                      
17 See Brandt (1959), pp. 164–165; Broad (1971 (1934)), p. 115; Jackson (1998), p. 151, 
and Zimmerman (2001), pp. 78–79.  
18 I have borrowed this example from Zimmerman (2001), p. 79. 
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 5. Defence of the Second Part of the Argument 
If what has been said so far is correct, it follows that when an analysis of a 
moral term is proposed, one can put the analysis—or what should be an 
analytic truth if the analysis is correct—in the interrogative form, and if one, 
as a person who is linguistically competent with respect to the terms at issue, 
has doubt (in the described sense and perhaps after reflection) about how to 
answer the question, this suggests that the analysis fails to express sameness 
of meaning. The open question argument can in other words be used as a 
test of whether an analysis states sameness of meaning. This corresponds to 
how Moore uses the argument in chapters II, III and IV of Principia Ethica. 
However, as is indicated by the quotation above, Moore seems to have 
thought that the argument offers not just a test for individual analyses but 
also generally shows that analytic reductionism is mistaken. The latter is 
obviously a much stronger claim and there is reason to take up a humble 
attitude towards efforts to prove it outright. But although no such 
straightforward proof may be available, it is plausible to argue that the claim 
that there is no correct reductive analysis of moral terms offers a better 
explanation of available evidence than does the contrary claim. 
 Let us first recall that the amended version of the open question 
argument has extended the range of responses that can indicate whether an 
analysis is correct or not. Besides asking whether the analysis offers a 
sufficient condition, we can ask if it, or a part of it, offers a necessary 
condition. Furthermore, besides taking into account instantaneous responses 
to the questions asked, we have allowed responses that to various degrees 
are based on reflection and its results, such as counterexamples. Given the 
wide range of questions and accompanying responses that result from these 
amendments, it is not far-fetched to hypothesise that, in meta-ethical debate 
to date, no analysis of a moral term has been presented that has not been 
exposed to a question of the relevant sort and has not also elicited a response 
of doubt to the question. Most of the presented analyses, especially the more 
prominent and discussed ones, seem in fact to have been the subject of a 
number of such questions, questions that have elicited responses of doubt. 
Moreover, in these analyses there seems to be no significant necessary 
condition that has not figured in a question the answer of which has been 
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 doubted.19
 Suppose we accept these generalisations. (Admittedly, they are 
somewhat bold but, as I have indicated, I think they can be defended in the 
light of the reception of various analyses.20) What we should ask then is: 
which is the best explanation of the available evidence? Two explanations 
are relevant here. The first is that there is a correct reductive analysis of the 
moral term we are interested in. The other is that there is no correct 
reductive analysis of the term in question. 
 Suppose first, in accordance with the first explanation, that there is a 
correct reductive analysis, but that it has not yet been presented. For this 
claim there seems to be no evidence. Until an analysis has been presented 
that, were it put interrogatively, we would not doubt, there is no reason to 
believe that there is a correct analysis of this kind. 
 Furthermore, advocates of this version of the first explanation have to 
explain why, in spite of the amount of the time and effort spent on the 
enterprise, no analysis has yet been presented which is not vulnerable to a 
response of doubt. In particular, they have to explain why no necessary 
condition has yet been presented which has not elicited this response. (Note 
that it would be misleading to point out here that there are few accepted 
analyses of non-moral terms even when it comes to rather trivial terms, such 
as ‘chair’, ‘ball’, etc. Any estimation of the prospect of accomplishing a 
correct analysis of a certain term will have to be related to the time and 
effort invested in the project.) Assuming that the philosophers who have 
proposed analyses are linguistically competent, in the sense of having 
knowledge how regarding the meanings of moral terms, it seems reasonable 
to expect that, however difficult the task might be, at least one necessary 
condition should have been presented by now that is not vulnerable to a 
sceptical response. It should also be noted that even if a necessary analytic 
                                      
19 The qualification ‘significant’ is important, although admittedly vague. There are 
analytically necessary conditions that have not been doubted, e.g. ‘If something has a 
moral property it has it in virtue of some of its non-moral properties’. This and other 
truths are often implied by proposed analyses, but they are not such that they together 
with other necessary conditions that have not been doubted can constitute correct 
reductive analyses. When I use the expression ‘necessary condition’ in the present 
context, I refer to a necessary condition that is significant in a way that these conditions 
are not. 
20 They are also supported by some more or less systematic surveys; see e.g. Feldman 
(1978), chap. 2; Pigden (1991), pp. 428–430, and Schurz (1997), chap. 11. Cf. Railton 
(1989), p. 152. Ball points out that the open question argument should be understood as 
‘an inductive generalization from linguistic behaviour’ (Ball (1991), p. 19). 
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 truth of the relevant kind is found, this would not necessarily take the 
analytic reductionist very far, since an analytic reduction would presumably 
consist of a number of such truths.21  
 Suppose, next, in accordance with the first explanation, that a correct 
analysis has been presented. This claim seems difficult to reconcile with the 
evidence of responses of doubt to questions containing analyses or parts of 
them. If the previous arguments are correct, then, if a question contains an 
analytic truth, one should not, given the qualifications entered, respond to it 
with doubt. But so far there seems to be no analysis that has not been 
responded to in this way, and as regards more prominent analyses, there 
seem to be a number of such responses. Of course, it might be replied that 
the open question argument does not support these claims because it does 
not indicate whether an analysis is correct. But I have argued, against some 
notable objections, that it does. Particularly, it is difficult to deny that it does 
given the connection between analytic truths, linguistic competence and 
responses to the questions put in the argument. As linguistically competent 
persons we have knowledge of these truths, and our responses to the 
relevant questions could then be taken to suggest that the proposed analysis 
is incorrect. Further, it is difficult to deny that the open question argument 
indicates whether an analysis is correct given that the procedure it utilises is 
prevalent in other, non-moral, cases. Denying the significance of the 
argument, one is committed to the view that an established procedure of 
testing meaning is generally mistaken. However, that contention would be 
hard to render plausible. 
 It should also be noted that advocates of this version of the first 
explanation face an explanatory task corresponding to the one mentioned 
above. Considering the invested time and effort, they have to explain why, 
given that there is a correct analysis, analyses to such an extent have been 
developed that are vulnerable to sceptical responses, even regarding their 
necessary conditions. 
 The second explanation avoids the problems of both versions of the 
first explanation. The hypothesis that there is no correct reductive analysis is 
supported by evidence—that there is no presented analysis that, when put 
interrogatively, has not been doubted, even as regards a necessary condition. 
                                      
21 In chapter 7, I will argue that one of the strongest candidates for a necessary condition 
does not constitute such a condition. Accordingly, this argument provides further reason 
to believe that there is no reductive analysis of the required kind.  
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 And so the second explanation accounts for the fact that no such analysis has 
been presented: there is none. Besides its evidential and explanatory 
advantage, it is also simpler, since it does not require us to explain why no 
analysis has been presented that is invulnerable to a sceptical response, or—
on the assumption that such an analysis has been presented—why so many 
analyses have been produced that are so vulnerable, even regarding their 
necessary conditions. There are thus reasons to conclude that the second 
explanation is to be preferred. 
 A certain objection against the second explanation may readily come 
to mind. It might be argued that also within other areas in philosophy there 
are no proposed analyses that have not been subject to the kind of doubt 
appealed to in the open question argument. But in these areas we normally 
do not take the best explanation to be that there is no correct reductive 
analysis. So why should we do so in meta-ethics? 
 It might actually be the case that we, after some consideration, would 
come to the conclusion that an explanation similar to the second one above 
is also correct for other areas. Nevertheless, we are not committed to 
accepting that kind of explanation in other cases only because we think it 
holds in the moral case. In fact, I think comparisons with other areas would 
confirm the view that the second type of explanation is especially 
appropriate in meta-ethics.  
 It should first be noted that theoretical submissions labelled ‘analysis’ 
in philosophy are often something else than what has been discussed above, 
i.e. an analysis of a term as it is used in ordinary language. For example, 
analyses might be intended to be revisionist. The fact that an analysis of the 
first kind has been shown to be unsuccessful is not necessarily a reason to 
think that there is no correct analysis of the latter kind. 
 Moreover, in other philosophical areas it seems easier to find at least 
some non-trivial necessary conditions that have not been seriously doubted. 
And even if these conditions have been doubted, this seems in any case less 
common than in meta-ethics. This suggests that, in contrast to meta-ethics, 
successful reductive analyses might be achieved in these areas. For example, 
I take it that it is fairly uncontroversial to claim that one acts freely only if 
one is not forced to do what one does not want to do, or is prevented from 
doing what one wants to do, by some internal or external power; and that 
one knows something only if one believes it, it is true and one is justified in 
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 believing it. What is controversial is exactly how these conditions should be 
understood and whether they are sufficient. In meta-ethics, however, there 
seems to be no nontrivial necessary condition that has not been doubted, 
and that has not been doubted to a great extent. 
 Relatedly, in meta-ethics analyses are sometimes deliberately devised 
to be incompatible with features that are part of other analyses, features that 
equally deliberately have been incorporated in these analyses. For example, 
some meta-ethicists propose analyses designed to capture the view that the 
fact that an action is right or ought to be done gives a person reason to 
perform the action only if the person has a pro-attitude towards it. Others 
argue that this would imply that moral reasons are arbitrary and propose 
accordingly analyses designed to exclude precisely this feature.22 Again, 
some meta-ethicists formulate analyses designed to capture the idea that 
something has a moral property only relative to a certain culture, society or 
group, whereas others propose analyses avowedly intended to exclude just 
this.23 Such deliberate clashes between analyses do not seem prevalent in 
other areas. This suggests that there is little of conceptual common ground 
in meta-ethics and hence that the prospects of successful reductive analyses 
in the moral area are slim. 
 It is further notable that in other philosophical areas debate is often 
centred around counterexamples that move the debate forward. To describe 
the matter in a somewhat idealised way: an analysis of a certain term is 
proposed and a counterexample suggested; on the basis of the 
counterexample, the analysis is adjusted or a completely new analysis is 
proposed, and so on. The fact that the debate develops in this way suggests 
that there are quite specific conditions that have to be fulfilled for the terms 
to apply; otherwise the confidence in counterexamples would be difficult to 
explain. Although counterexamples are also common in meta-ethics, they 
tend there to be more controversial. They also tend to play a primarily 
negative role in that they are used to showing that a certain analysis is 
inaccurate, but do not move the debate forward in the way described. This 
suggests that as regards moral terms there are no particularly specific 
analytically necessary conditions that have to be fulfilled for the terms to 
apply and hence no conditions of the kind needed for there to be successful 
                                      
22 For example, compare Harman (1975), pp. 3–11, and Smith (1994), pp. 164–175.   
23 For example, compare Wong (1984), esp. chap. 4, 5 and 6, and Firth (1952), pp. 318–
319.   
58 
 reductive analyses of these terms.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
According to analytic reductionism, a term ‘M’, applying to objects with a 
moral property M, and a term ‘G’, applying to objects with a non-moral 
property G, have the same meaning and that M and G are identical. This 
view commits analytic reductionists to the truth of an analytically necessary 
biconditional which would establish that a necessary condition for M and G 
being identical is fulfilled. Above I have argued that the procedure 
employed in an amended version of Moore’s open question argument can 
be used to test whether terms have the same meaning. Moreover, I have 
argued that the open question argument, thus understood, offers an 
explanation of our responses to the questions put in the argument that seems 
superior to its competitor: that there is no reductive analysis that succeeds to 
state sameness of meaning. Hence, the open question argument provides 
reason to believe that the mentioned biconditional is false and that the 
alleged identity does not hold. To put the point in a slightly different way: 
there is reason to believe that the meaning of a moral term ‘M’ is not 
constituted by a particular non-moral property G. Consequently, there are 
reasons to believe that analytic reductionism is mistaken.  
 It is important to stress, however, that this conclusion might be 
falsified in the light of further considerations. Although the mentioned 
explanation appears to be the best of the available evidence, there might 
turn out to be correct reductive analyses. In subsequent chapters, there will 
be reasons to return to analytic reductionism and direct further criticism 
towards it. However, thus far the conclusion of the open question argument 
seems sufficiently established to encourage us to try to find an alternative to 
analytic reductionism. Traditionally the open question argument has been 
thought to provide support to non-cognitivism.24 But, as we saw in the last 
chapter, this view is vulnerable to several objections that at least prima facie 
seem serious. In that chapter we saw that also error-theory appears to have 
serious shortcomings. For these reasons, we should investigate whether 
there is some other version for reductionism, or a kind of realism, that is 
preferable to non-cognitivism and error-theory. 
                                      
24 See e.g. Ayer (1952), chap. 6, and Hare (1952), chap. 5. However, it might be argued 
that non-cognitivism itself is vulnerable to the open question argument; see Miller 
(2003), pp. 47–51, and Smith (2001b), pp. 102–107.  
59 
 Chapter 3 
Synthetic Reductionism and the Two Questions 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
According to analytic reductionism, a term applying to objects with a moral 
property and a term applying to objects with a non-moral property have the 
same meaning. On the basis of such a meaning equivalence, advocates of 
this view claim that the moral property and the non-moral property are 
identical. In the last chapter, I argued that an amended version of the open 
question argument provides reason to believe that the relevant terms do not 
have the same meaning and that the alleged identity consequently does not 
hold. Following Saul Kripke’s and Hilary Putnam’s account of the reference 
of natural kind terms, it is now widely accepted that two terms can refer to 
the same property despite not having the same meaning. Hence, property 
identity can be the case even though it is not expressed in meaning 
equivalence. Advocates of synthetic reductionism employ this account to 
maintain that a moral property is identical with a non-moral property. As 
the open question argument is designed to show that property identity does 
not hold because the relevant terms do not have the same meaning, it 
cannot be used to challenge this kind of reductionism. In this chapter, I will 
argue that synthetic reductionism is mistaken. However, in the next chapter 
I will suggest that it also contains many ideas worth retaining by realism.  
 In the next section, I briefly outline the aspects of Kripke’s and 
Putnam’s account of the reference of natural kind terms that I think are 
relevant to synthetic reductionism. In section 3, I consider how synthetic 
reductionism might be understood. In sections 4 and 5, I examine synthetic 
reductionism by posing two questions that appeal to thought experiments 
similar to those Kripke and Putnam employ when they argue for their view. 
Our considerations in relation to these questions suggest that synthetic 
reductionism is mistaken. However, they also point towards a realist 
account of the way in which non-moral properties make objects have moral 
properties which will be developed in chapter 4 and onwards. 
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 2. Natural Kind Terms 
According to Kripke’s and Putnam’s account of the reference of natural 
kind terms, we are able to apply such a term correctly because there are 
certain characteristics that we associate with it and that typically are had by 
the stuff to which the term applies.1 Characteristics of this sort enable us to 
pick out the natural kind in such a manner that we can apply the term 
correctly even if we do not have knowledge of the correct scientific account 
of the natural kind. In some respects, these characteristics function in a 
similar way to analytically necessary conditions: they help us to talk about 
things and to do so from a shared epistemic perspective that facilitates 
mutual understanding. To know that the term applies to what has these 
characteristics may even be considered to be part of what it is to be 
linguistically competent with respect to the term. Thus far there appears to 
be significant similarities between natural kind terms and the type of terms 
upon which analytic reductionism models its reductionist endeavour. 
 However, on this view, the mentioned characteristics do not 
constitute the meaning of a natural kind term. Thus, these characteristics do 
not yield a necessary biconditional such that there is reason to believe that 
what the term refers to is identical with a set involving these characteristics. 
What does yield a necessary biconditional of this kind is a scientifically 
identified stuff, a natural kind, which the mentioned characteristics help us 
to pick out. These characteristics fix the reference of the term and may 
consequently be called ‘reference-fixing characteristics’. They can do so 
because the natural kind is causally responsible for these characteristics and 
so causally regulates our use of the term by means of them. The mentioned 
necessary biconditional does not state sameness in meaning. It is therefore 
not true merely in virtue of language and is consequently synthetically, not 
analytically, necessary. Accordingly, it is sometimes said that a synthetic 
identity has been found.  
 Kripke and Putnam argue for their view of the reference of natural 
kind terms by help of thought experiments that employ our linguistic 
intuitions concerning the application of such a term in different possible 
worlds.2 Suppose there is a stuff that causally regulates our use of a natural 
                                      
1 Kripke (1980), esp. Lecture III, and Putnam (1975b), pp. 215–271. There are 
differences between Kripke’s and Putnam’s views of the reference of natural kind terms, 
but as these are not relevant to the present investigation, I will ignore them. 
2 Cf. Horgan and Timmons (1992b), pp. 161–162. 
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 kind term in the way just outlined. Suppose further that science has found 
what this stuff consists in and that it fulfils the appropriate requirements on 
natural kinds. On the present view, the term refers to that stuff in 
compliance with a necessary biconditional and hence in all possible words. 
In our capacity as linguistically competent with respect to ‘water’, we 
should then be prepared to apply the term to that stuff, and only to that 
stuff, in all possible worlds. Especially, we should be so disposed irrespective 
of whether the mentioned characteristics are exemplified or not. 
 Let us employ thought experiments in relation to what has become 
the main example of a natural kind term: ‘water’.3 The stuff which we apply 
this term to typically has certain characteristics, such as being colourless, 
transparent, odourless, wet and liquid. We associate these characteristics 
with the term and apply it to the stuff that has them. That stuff is causally 
responsible for these characteristics and so causally regulates our use of the 
term. Science has found that this stuff has the chemical formula H2O and 
that it fulfils the appropriate requirements on natural kinds. Suppose that we 
are linguistically competent with respect to ‘water’ and that we know this 
result from science. In order to examine whether ‘water’ refers to H2O in 
the way Kripke and Putnam maintain, we may imagine two kinds of 
possible worlds and ask two corresponding questions. Imagine first a possible 
world where there is a stuff which has quite another chemical formula than 
H2O: XYZ. However, this stuff has the characteristics mentioned above: 
colourlessness, etc. The inhabitants of that possible world have a certain 
term, ‘water’, with which they associate these characteristics, and they apply 
the term to what has them. The stuff that causally regulates their use of the 
term via these characteristics is XYZ. We can now ask the first question: if 
there is something that is XYZ in that world, is it water? We seem to have 
the intuition to answer ‘no’. We would say that it certainly appears like 
water, but that it is not water. Hence, there is reason to believe that H2O is 
a necessary condition for something to be water in that possible world (and 
that the mentioned characteristics do not constitute a sufficient condition). 
Moreover, we seem to have the intuition that we and the inhabitants of that 
possible world refer to different stuffs with our respective terms; whereas we 
refer to H2O, they refer to XYZ. Let us next imagine a possible world 
where there is a stuff that is H2O. However, in that world H2O does not 
                                      
3 See Kripke (1980), pp. 128–129, and Putnam (1975b), pp. 223–226, 229–235. 
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 have the mentioned characteristics: colourlessness, etc. We may also assume 
that the inhabitants of that world have a term, ‘water’, with which they 
associate the mentioned characteristics in the way outlined above, but that 
their use of this term is not causally regulated by H2O. We can now ask the 
second question: if something is H2O in that world, is it water? Here our 
intuition seems to be to answer ‘yes’. We would say that it certainly does 
not appear like water, but that it is water. Hence, there is reason to believe 
that H2O is a sufficient condition for something to be water in that possible 
world (and that the mentioned characteristics do not constitute a necessary 
condition). 
 The support our responses to the two questions provides to Kripke’s 
and Putnam’s view of the reference of natural kind terms can be described 
in different ways. It seems however correct to claim that, on the assumption 
that our responses to the two questions are reliable, they provide reasons to 
believe that something is water if and only if it is H2O. Since our responses 
concern what is the case in other possible worlds, they moreover provide 
reasons to believe that this biconditional holds necessarily. On this ground, 
it may be maintained that ‘water’ refers to H2O and that water is identical 
with H2O. One way to put this view is to say that ‘water’ is a rigid 
designator in that it refers to H2O in all possible worlds. However, ‘water’ 
and ‘H2O’ do not have the same meaning. Consequently, the mentioned 
biconditional does not hold merely in virtue of language and is not 
analytically necessary. As I indicated above, it is reasonable to assume that it 
is part of being linguistically competent with respect to ‘water’ to know that 
the term refers to some given stuff in the indicated way, given that it fulfils 
certain appropriate requirements. Otherwise it might be difficult to 
understand how our responses to the questions posed in the thought 
experiments could be assumed to generate reliable results. But it is not part 
of this competence to know that the term refers to H2O. Rather, this is 
something we come to know from a scientific and empirical investigation. 
There is therefore reason to claim that the mentioned biconditional is 
synthetically necessary.4
 
 
 
                                      
4 Sometimes this is expressed by saying that it is metaphysically necessary that water is 
H2O. 
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 3. Synthetic Reductionism 
Synthetic reductionism states that a term ‘M’, applying to objects with a 
moral property M, and a term ‘G’, applying to objects with a non-moral 
property G, refer to the same property and that M and G consequently are 
identical. However, unlike analytic reductionists, advocates of this view do 
not believe that ‘M’ and ‘G’ have the same meaning. Accordingly, they do 
not assert the truth of an analytically necessary biconditional involving M 
and G. Yet, they assert the truth of the following biconditional:  
 It is synthetically necessary that, for any object x, x is M if and only 
 if x is G.  
If a biconditional of this kind holds, a necessary condition for M and G 
being identical is fulfilled.5 
 Although the inspiration to adopt synthetic reductionism comes 
from the account of the reference of natural kind terms outlined above, 
advocates of synthetic reductionism are presumably not prepared to map 
over this view of reference to the moral domain without amendments. 
Before I examine synthetic reductionism, I will therefore consider on what 
points advocates of this view should modify it in order that it be appropriate 
to moral terms. In connection with these points, I will take the opportunity 
of clarifying this kind of reductionism. This is important also for realism, as I 
will argue in the next chapter that this view may adopt a number of the 
ideas in synthetic reductionism. However, my aim is not to provide a full 
account of this view and many simplifications are unfortunately necessary. 
 The first point concerns the role of analytically necessary conditions 
on applications of natural kind terms and moral terms, respectively. The 
reference-fixing characteristics associated with natural kind terms function, 
as we saw above, in some respects as if they were such conditions, although 
                                      
5 Several authors have argued that a moral property may be identical with a non-moral 
or natural property even though this is not expressed in meaning equivalence; see e.g. 
Brink (1989), pp. 151–167; Brink (2001), pp. 157–163; Durrant (1970), pp. 360–361; 
Harman (1977), pp. 19–20; Lycan (1986), pp. 80–81; Putnam (1975a), p. 280, and 
Putnam (1981), pp. 205–208. (Although Brink is inclined to the view that moral 
properties are irreducible to, but constituted by, natural properties, he holds the 
possibility of reduction and property identity open.) For other accounts, see Adams 
(1981 (1979)), pp. 109–119; Copp (2000), pp. 120–134; Merli (2002), pp. 214–231, 
Railton (1989), pp. 155–161; Railton (1993b), pp. 315–328, and Sayre-McCord 
(1997a), pp. 267–292. See also Scanlon (1998), pp. 11–13. Richard N. Boyd offers an 
account of the reference of moral terms akin to Kripke’s and Putnam’s account of the 
reference of natural kind terms: Boyd (1988), pp. 194–199, 209–212. The discussion of 
moral relativism in Miller (1985), pp. 507–556, is inspired by Putnam’s view of 
reference.  
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 they are not. But at least as regards moral terms there seem to be some 
characteristics that constitute genuine analytically necessary conditions for 
such terms to apply.6 For example, in relation to ‘right’, I think it is fairly 
uncontroversial that the following two claims provide such conditions: ‘If 
something has a moral property, such as rightness, it has this property in 
virtue of having certain non-moral properties’, and ‘If an action is right, 
there is a moral reason to perform it’. (I will return to these conditions in 
subsequent chapters.) A synthetic reductionist may also want to include 
other conditions in this category. When considering thought experiments in 
the next two sections, we should presume that the relevant analytically 
necessary conditions are satisfied. 
 However, in consideration of the open question argument, there is 
reason to believe that the analytically necessary conditions are insufficient 
for us to be able to apply a moral term correctly.7 It may therefore be 
maintained that there are some characteristics that help us to do so which 
work as reference-fixing characteristics, analogous to how such 
characteristics work in relation to natural kind terms.8 For example, it might 
be assumed that there are certain characteristics that we associate with the 
term ‘right’ and which typically are had by the actions to which we apply 
this term. These characteristics, we may suppose, enable us to apply the 
term correctly even if we are ignorant of the accurate account of the 
property. Some of these characteristics may also be such that knowing that 
‘right’ applies to actions that have them is part of what it means to be 
linguistically competent with respect to the term. However, in contrast to 
analytically necessary conditions, they are not necessarily had by what is 
right. The reason why the mentioned characteristics can have this function 
is that actions that are right have a non-moral property which is causally 
responsible for these characteristics and so causally regulates our use of 
‘right’ by means of them.  
                                      
6 Cf. Adams (1981 (1979)), pp. 112–113. Michael Smith believes that synthetic 
reductionists have to deny that there are any analytically necessary conditions for ‘right’ 
to apply, or, if synthetic reductionists accept that there are such conditions, that they 
‘simply fail to take into account’ these conditions (Smith (1994), p. 32). I cannot see that 
Smith offers any arguments for these claims.   
7 Here and elsewhere, I will assume that at least sometimes we are able to apply moral 
terms correctly. 
8 Cf. Adams (1981 (1979)), pp. 113–114; Horgan and Timmons (1992b), pp. 163–164; 
Miller (2003), pp. 163–164; Railton (1989), pp. 162–163, and Sayre-McCord (1997a), p. 
276.   
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  Since the mentioned characteristics are not necessarily had by the 
objects to which a moral term applies, they need not be had by all such 
objects. Some of these characteristics are presumably had by most, although 
perhaps not by all of them. But other such characteristics might be quite 
particular and had merely by a smaller group of the objects to which the 
moral term applies. Concerning ‘right’, many of the characteristics 
presumably consist in various features pertaining to people’s beliefs, attitudes 
and responses in relation to actions; for example: ‘People approve of right 
actions being performed’, ‘People believe that it is of great importance that 
actions which are right are performed’, and ‘People encourage each other to 
do what is right’. 
 We can now see, in bare outline, how synthetic reductionism 
identifies a moral property with a non-moral property. Suppose, for 
example, that our use of ‘right’ is causally regulated by a non-moral 
property G by means of characteristics of the kind mentioned above. On 
synthetic reductionism, ‘right’ refers to G, and rightness is identical with this 
non-moral property. As a consequence, synthetic reductionists are 
committed to the truth of a necessary biconditional of the kind mentioned 
above. This biconditional is synthetically, not analytically, necessary. It is 
not part of being linguistically competent with respect to ‘right’ to know 
that the term refers to G, although it presumably is part of this competence 
to know that ‘right’ refers to some given non-moral property in the 
indicated way. One important consequence of this conception is that a 
linguistically competent person may refer to G with ‘right’ even if she is not 
aware of this fact and even if she believes that rightness consists in 
something quite else.  
 However, it should be stressed that synthetic reductionists 
presumably are prepared to claim all this only on condition that certain 
appropriate requirements as regards G are fulfilled. Below I will make some 
remarks with bearing on these requirements, but more needs to be said 
about them to provide a satisfactory account of synthetic reductionism. 
 A second point concerns the epistemic methods by which it is found 
out that a natural kind term refers to a certain natural kind and a moral term 
refers to a certain non-moral property, respectively. As regards natural kind 
terms, such accounts are arrived at via scientific and empirical methods. In 
regard to the moral case, it might be argued that such methods are not 
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 available or at least play a more subordinate role. However, in the meta-
ethical literature, epistemic methods have been suggested that are not 
necessarily scientific or empirical, although some of them might be. The 
most influential is coherentism, according to which a belief is justified in so 
far as it is part of a coherent set of beliefs.9  
 In relation to natural kind terms and moral terms as understood by 
synthetic reductionism, one aspect of justification is the ability to explain 
reference-fixing characteristics. Thus, in order for the view that ‘water’ 
refers to H2O to be justified, it should be possible to explain how this stuff 
is causally responsible for the reference-fixing characteristics we associate 
with the term and so how it can causally regulate our use of it. An 
analogous demand holds for the view that moral terms refer in the way 
synthetic reductionists maintain.10 On the view that a moral term refers to a 
certain non-moral property, it should be possible to explain how this 
property is causally responsible for the reference-fixing characteristics we 
associate with the term and so how the property can causally regulate our 
use of it.11 For example, if it is claimed that ‘right’ refers to a certain non-
moral property G, it should be possible to explain how G is causally 
responsible for characteristics such as ‘People approve of right actions being 
performed’. In this way, synthetic reductionism may be able to explain some 
of the functions of ‘right’ and many of our everyday views associated with 
the term. 
 As we have seen, according to synthetic reductionism a moral term 
such as ‘right’ refers to a non-moral property G which causally regulates our 
use of the term via reference-fixing characteristics. However, this should not 
be taken to imply that all people who refer to G with ‘right’ have their use 
of the term causally regulated by G in the sense that they stand in immediate 
causal contact with G. Some people’s use of the term might be directly 
causally regulated by G in this way, whereas other people might apply it to 
roughly the same objects as the first group of people, although they are not 
directly causally involved with G. Accordingly, there need not be causally 
                                      
9 See e.g. Boyd (1988), pp. 199–202, 206–209; Brink (1989), chap. 5; Goldman (1988), 
chap. 5, and Sayre-McCord (1996), pp. 137–179. For a useful overview of various 
epistemological positions in ethics, see Tännsjö (1990), chap. 2. 
10 Cf. Railton (1989), p. 161–163.  
11 The point here is not that such explanations actually have to be provided, but that 
there have to be explanations of this kind, even if they as a matter of fact are not 
available. 
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 explanations of all people’s use of ‘right’ in terms of their being in 
immediate causal contact with G. Indeed, it might be the case that quite a 
few people stand in such a contact with G. However, also in the latter case 
people’s use of the term is causally regulated by G, since their use has its 
origin in other people’s causal interaction with G. 
 It should be pointed out that I have merely given a very rough and 
simple sketch of how the causal regulation of our use of moral terms might 
be viewed on synthetic reductionism. I have not commented on certain 
important aspects of this notion which a satisfactory theory must account 
for.12 For example, a theory of causal regulation should account for the 
possibility that the way in which our use of a term is causally regulated 
might develop as we get to know more about G and as our epistemic 
situation improves in other respects. 
 The requirement that an account of what a moral term refers to 
should be able to explain the reference-fixing characteristics has implications 
for the kind of non-moral property the term refers to. As a consequence, 
this requirement is also relevant to which type of moral theory specifies this 
non-moral property. As we saw above, on synthetic reductionism there 
should be explanations of reference-fixing characteristics in terms of the 
non-moral property that constitutes the reference of a moral term. For 
example, according to the view that ‘right’ refers to G, there should be 
explanations of reference-fixing characteristics such as ‘People approve of 
right actions being performed’ in terms of G. This means that G should 
consist of that which makes us—or at least some of us—have the beliefs and 
attitudes, and so forth, involved in these characteristics. This indicates that 
the theory which specifies what a moral term refers to is a normative moral 
theory rather than a meta-ethical theory. To see this, consider the 
following. It is often claimed that meta-ethical theories concern what moral 
terms mean. This indicates that such theories, among other things, are 
designed to systematise the features which function as conditions under 
which moral terms apply, where it is part of being linguistically competent 
to know that the terms apply to objects that have these features. As was 
suggested above, some reference-fixing characteristics can be understood to 
constitute such features, even if they are not necessarily had by what the 
                                      
12 For a more sophisticated account of causal regulation, see Boyd (1988), pp. 195, 209–
212. See also Brink (2001), pp. 167–176; Copp (2000), pp. 113–120, and Sayre-McCord 
(1997a), pp. 269–271, 279–280. 
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 terms applies to. However, meta-ethical theories are not designed to explain 
what it is about objects that make them have these features. Normative 
theories, on the other hand, can be understood to do that, among other 
things. If a normative theory is correct, it can be assumed to account for 
what it is about the objects to which a moral term applies that make us have 
the beliefs and attitudes, and so forth, involved in the reference-fixing 
characteristics. Accordingly, on synthetic reductionism, a moral term refers 
to a non-moral property of the sort involved in a normative theory.   
 There is a further reason to assume that what a moral term refers to 
on synthetic reductionism is specified by a normative theory. As mentioned 
above, on this view it is not part of being linguistically competent with 
respect to a moral term to know what the term refers to. It was also 
suggested that meta-ethical theories are, among other things, designed to 
systematise features which are such that it is part of being linguistically 
competent with respect to a moral term to know that it applies to objects 
that have these features. This suggests that, on synthetic reductionism, the 
reference of a moral term is not stated by a meta-ethical theory, but by a 
normative theory. 
 This view is also confirmed both by what synthetic reductionists say 
about their own position and the examples they give of moral theories that 
they think might determine the reference of moral terms.13 Advocates of 
synthetic reductionism put forward this idea by saying that what a moral 
term refers to is determined by the best normative theory. 
 A third point concerns what sort of entities natural kind terms and 
moral terms, respectively, refer to. A natural kind term refers, 
unsurprisingly, to a natural kind. But it does not seem reasonable to assume 
that a moral term refers to a non-moral property that constitutes a natural 
kind—at least not if we understand such entities in the way Kripke and 
Putnam do. In particular, it does not seem plausible to assume that the non-
moral property in question has the same fundamental causal role and 
explanatory function as a natural kind. Moreover, the various objects that 
have the non-moral property may fall into different natural kinds, with the 
result that the various instances of the non-moral property exemplify 
different natural kinds. But it can nevertheless be maintained that a moral 
                                      
13 See e.g. Brink (2001), p. 162; Copp (2000), p. 116; Merli (2002), p. 222; Railton 
(1989), pp. 157, 167–173, and Sayre-McCord (1997a), p. 286.  
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 term refers to a non-moral property in a way that corresponds to how a 
natural kind term refers to a natural kind.14 
 In the last section, we saw that Kripke’s and Putnam’s account of the 
reference of natural kind terms can be examined by asking two questions 
that appeal to thought experiments. In the next section, I will examine 
synthetic reductionism by asking two analogous questions. But first I would 
like to comment on the relation between the open question argument and 
the kind of argument employed here. As mentioned in the introductory 
section, the procedure employed in the open question argument cannot be 
used to examine whether a certain term refers in the way outlined above. In 
inviting us to ask questions like ‘Is whatever that is M really G?’, the open 
question argument appeals to the knowledge we have qua linguistically 
competent persons of the meanings of certain terms or, more generally, of 
certain analytic truths. Appealing to this kind of knowledge, the argument 
thus employs our responses to appropriate questions to test whether certain 
terms have the same meaning. Since the view under discussion here is not 
based on meaning equivalence, it cannot be tested by appeal to this 
knowledge. However, the kind of argument with which we are concerned 
here resembles the open question argument in that both arguments rest on 
the idea that we, in virtue of being linguistically competent with respect to 
the terms at issue, have knowledge about the conditions under which the 
terms apply and hence respond to certain questions in a way reliably 
mirroring this knowledge.15 As mentioned, the open question argument 
appeals to our knowledge of the meanings of terms or analytic truths. 
However, the present kind of argument appeals to our knowledge of 
something quite specific: whether a certain term refers to the stuff or 
property that causally regulates our use of the term and fulfils certain other 
requirements.16
                                      
14 This point is stressed by Sayre-McCord (1997a), p. 271. See also Kim (1997), pp. 
293– 301, and Sayre-McCord (1997b), pp. 320–323. 
15 Cf. Horgan and Timmons (1992b), pp. 161–162. 
16 This difference between the open question argument and the kind of argument under 
consideration here means that the latter kind of argument is stronger than the open 
question argument in at least two respects.  
 First, the two kinds of arguments differ concerning the extent to which they 
have to be applied to various views about what a term means or refers to in order to 
yield significant results. As regards the procedure employed in the open question 
argument, we have to ask the appropriate questions about each single analysis and 
respond to the questions with doubt, to establish that there is no reductive analysis that 
states the meaning of the term at issue. (Unless, that is, we appeal to an inference to the 
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  In the last chapter, I argued that doubt or lack thereof is the response 
that should be taken to be significant to questions put in the open question 
argument. Concerning the questions appealed to in the kind of argument 
with which we are concerned here, I have indicated that the appropriate 
responses are ‘yes’ or ‘no’. This difference is of no particular importance, 
especially as I use ‘lack of doubt’ and ‘doubt’ in such a way that they cover 
‘yes’ and ‘no’. The reason why I have chosen to use different terms is 
merely an effect of the fact that in the kind of argument we are concerned 
with here, the responses seem to be made with less hesitancy, at least as 
regards natural kind terms. However, also as regards this kind of argument 
we may respond with weaker responses than an outright ‘yes’ or ‘no’. 
Concerning both kinds of arguments, strength in argument varies with 
strength in response.  
 
4. The First Question 
In this section and the next, I will employ thought experiments in order to 
examine the plausibility of synthetic reductionism.17 As in the thought 
                                                                                                              
best explanation, as I did in the last chapter.) As regards the kind of argument we are 
concerned with here, we do not have to ask the two questions about each single view of 
what the term at issue refers to, to establish that it does not refer to a certain stuff or 
property in the way suggested. On the present view of reference, we only need to ask a 
question which indicates whether it is true that the term refers to the stuff or property 
that causally regulates our use of it and fulfils certain other appropriate requirements. The 
first question posed in this kind of argument is such a question, although there might be 
other considerations that yield the same result. If we respond to this question with ‘yes’ 
or lack of doubt, this indicates that the mentioned claim does not hold. This response 
thus suggests that the term does not refer to any stuff or property in the way proposed, 
whatever the stuff or property is.  
 Second, the open question argument and the kind of argument employed here 
differ as regards the significance of a response of lack of doubt or ‘yes’ to the questions 
put in them. As mentioned in the reply to objection (ii) in the last chapter, a response of 
lack of doubt to a question put in the open question argument cannot generally be taken 
to indicate that a certain truth is analytic. The reason is that there are presumably a 
number of truths that we do not doubt but that are not analytic. We run in other words 
the risk of taking a non-analytic truth for an analytic one. However, a response of lack of 
doubt or ‘yes’ to the second question—together with a negative answer to the first 
question—can be taken to indicate that a term refers to a stuff or property in the 
indicated way. One reason is that the latter argument does not appeal to knowledge of 
various analytic truths. Rather, it appeals to knowledge of something quite specific: 
whether a term refers to the stuff or property that causally regulates our use of it and 
fulfils certain other appropriate requirements. In the latter case, there seem to be no 
corresponding risk of confusion. 
17 Synthetic reductionism, or issues in relation to it, is critically discussed by e.g. Ball 
(1991), pp. 8–15; Barnett (2001), pp. 243–253; Blackburn (1993 (1990)), pp. 203–204; 
Blackburn (1998), pp. 119–121; Brandt (1996), chap. 6; Gampel (1996), pp. 191–209; 
Gampel (1997), pp. 147–163; Hare (1999 (1996)), pp. 81–86; Holland (2001), pp. 177–
195; Horgan and Timmons (1992b), pp. 153–175, and other works by Horgan and 
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 experiments in relation to ‘water’, we will imagine two kinds of possible 
worlds and in relation to these ask two questions. Analogous to our response 
to the first question as regards ‘water’, our response to the first question here 
indicates whether, for a non-moral property G that causally regulates our 
use of ‘M’, the following implication holds: It is synthetically necessary that, 
for any object x, if x is M, x is G. That is, the response to the first question 
indicates whether, in all possible worlds, G is a necessary condition for 
something to have M. However, we will also see that there are other 
considerations in connection with this question that might be used to 
determine the correctness of synthetic reductionism. As above, I will use 
‘right’ as the example of a moral term. 
 In order to be able to ask the first question, we need to start by 
describing a scenario that complies with the outline of synthetic 
reductionism in the last section. Suppose that there are various 
characteristics that we associate with the term ‘right’ and that actions to 
which we apply the term typically have. Some of these characteristics are 
such that knowing that ‘right’ applies to actions that have them is 
considered to be part of what it means to be linguistically competent with 
respect to the term. However, these characteristics are not analytically 
necessary, something which is indicated by the fact that they do not pass the 
test provided by the open question argument. Rather, there is a non-moral 
property that causally regulates our use of the term by means of these 
characteristics. We may also assume that this property fulfils the other 
appropriate requirements hinted at in the last section. Now, suppose that 
according to the normative theory U this property is maximising happiness. 
On synthetic reductionism, ‘right’ refers to maximising happiness and 
rightness is identical with this property. According to this view, it is thus 
synthetically necessary that an action is right if and only if it maximises 
happiness. 
 Let us now imagine a possible world that resembles our world in 
many respects, but also differs from it in certain respects. In that world, a 
certain term ‘right’, phonetically and orthographically identical with our 
term, is used. The inhabitants of that possible world associate certain 
characteristics with this term and apply it to actions that have these 
                                                                                                              
Timmons (see references below); Jackson (1998), pp. 144–150; Kim (1997), 293–230; 
Smith (1994), pp. 28–34; Sosa (1997), pp. 303–312; Tännsjö (1990), pp. 29–31, and 
Wong (1984), pp. 52–59. 
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 characteristics. Some of these characteristics are such that it is considered to 
be part of being linguistically competent with respect to this term to know 
that it applies to actions that have them. These characteristics are generally 
the same as the characteristics that play the corresponding role in our world. 
Since these characteristics are generally the same, the inhabitants of the 
world under consideration have generally the same beliefs about what they 
apply their term ‘right’ to as we have about what we apply ‘right’ to. This is 
especially the case since both in our world and in their world these 
characteristics are ‘common knowledge’, something which is emphasised by 
the fact that some of these characteristics are connected in the mentioned 
way to linguistic competence. Consequently, they believe that people 
approve of the actions to which ‘right’ applies being performed, that people 
think it is of great importance that actions to which ‘right’ applies are 
performed, and so forth as regards the other characteristics. Moreover, since 
these characteristics are generally the same as those we employ, the 
inhabitants of that possible world to a great extent apply ‘right’ to the same 
kind of actions to which we apply ‘right’. As in our world there is a non-
moral property that causally regulates people’s use of ‘right’ by means of the 
mentioned characteristics. However, in that world, the property that 
causally regulates people’s use of ‘right’ is not the same as in our world. In 
the world under consideration, the property in question is specified by the 
normative theory DD. According to DD, the property consists in being 
desired to be desired. The explanation for why this property causally 
regulates their use of ‘right’ in virtually the same way as maximising 
happiness causally regulates our use of ‘right’, can be found in a certain 
morally neutral difference between our world and theirs. For example, we 
and they might differ slightly genetically, with the effect that we and they 
differ somewhat in temperament.18
 We may now ask the first question: if an action in the possible world 
described above is such that it is desired to be desired, is it right? I think we 
are inclined to answer that it might be. At least, I do not think we are 
inclined to answer a straightforward ‘no’.19 This provides some reason to 
believe that the non-moral property that causally regulates our use of ‘right’ 
is not a necessary condition for an action to be right in that possible world. 
                                      
18 Cf. Horgan and Timmons (1992b), p. 165. 
19 Cf. Horgan and Timmons (1992b), p. 166. 
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 This would in turn imply that the synthetically necessary biconditional 
mentioned above does not hold. Our response to the first question seems to 
differ when it is asked about ‘water’ and when it is asked about ‘right’. As 
far as ‘water’ is concerned, our response indicates that for something to be 
water in another possible world, it has to be the stuff that causally regulates 
our use of ‘water’, viz. H2O. However, our response to the first question as 
regards ‘right’ does not seem to provide support to the corresponding claim. 
Thus, whereas our response to the first question provides support to 
Kripke’s and Putnam’s view of the reference of ‘water’, it does not seem to 
support the view that ‘right’ refers in the way proposed by synthetic 
reductionism. 
 However, there are other, and perhaps more compelling, 
considerations in relation to the thought experiment put forward above that 
indicate that synthetic reductionism is mistaken. Consider the following. 
Suppose that we somehow were to communicate with the inhabitants of the 
possible world described above. Suppose further that we then come to 
know that they assert the following sentence: ‘It’s right to execute 
murderers’. Let us assume that we do not assert the corresponding sentence; 
that is, we do not believe that it is right to execute murderers. According to 
synthetic reductionism, we do not disagree with them but merely talk past 
each other. The reason is that since their use of ‘right’ is causally regulated 
by another non-moral property than our use of ‘right’, they do not refer to 
rightness. As Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons argue in their influential 
papers on ‘moral twin earths’, this description of the situation seems 
mistaken.20 We have the intuition that we do disagree with the inhabitants 
of the possible world as to whether it is right to execute murderers. Hence, 
there is reason to believe that we and they refer to the same property: 
rightness.  
                                      
20 For this point see e.g. Horgan and Timmons (1992b), p. 165. Horgan and Timmons 
argues against synthetic reductionism and related views in the following works: Horgan 
and Timmons (1991), pp. 447–465; Horgan and Timmons (1992a), 221–260; Horgan 
and Timmons (1992b), pp. 152–175; Horgan and Timmons (1996), pp. 3–39; Timmons 
(1990), pp. 97–129, and Timmons (1999), chap. 2. Before Horgan and Timmons, 
Robert Merrihew Adams has discussed an argument based on a similar thought 
experiment: Adams (1981 (1979)), pp. 117–118. The works by Horgan and Timmons 
have provoked several critical responses; see e.g. Brink (2001), pp. 154–176; Copp 
(2000), pp. 112–137; Kraemer (1991), pp. 467–472; Merli (2002), pp. 208–240; Miller 
(2003), pp. 163–168; Sayre-McCord (1997a), pp. 267–292, and Zangwill (1997), pp. 
509–518. Horgan and Timmons have replied to Copp in Horgan and Timmons (2000), 
pp. 142–149. 
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  This contention is strengthened by a further reflection. Were we 
somehow to communicate with the inhabitants of mentioned possible 
world, it seems that we could have meaningful discussions with them about 
various issues pertaining to moral rightness. For example, it seems that we 
could debate with them in a rational way as to whether executing murderers 
is right or not. However, if we and they do not refer to the same property, 
it is difficult to see how this could be the case. As we and they would not 
disagree, but merely talk past each other, our debates with them would 
presumably be rather pointless. 
 Our considerations in relation to disagreement indicate that our 
intuitions as regards ‘right’ are not the same as regards ‘water’. As we saw 
above, regarding the latter term we feel that the inhabitants of a possible 
world whose use of their term ‘water’ is causally regulated by something else 
than H2O refer to something else than we do with our term ‘water’. 
However, as regards ‘right’ we are not of the corresponding view. Hence, 
neither in this respect does our intuition provide support to synthetic 
reductionism; rather, it indicates that this view is mistaken. 
 Moreover, it seems plausible to assume that we and the inhabitants 
of the possible described above world disagree about what the reasons are 
for actions being right. According to us, actions are right because they 
maximise happiness, but according to them, actions are right because they 
are desired to be desired. One way to express this is that we have another 
view of what makes actions right than they have. It is also reasonable to 
suppose that this difference explains why we disagree with them as to 
whether certain actions are right. (I will return to this issue in the next 
chapter.) 
 A similar reasoning holds concerning agreement about moral issues. 
Suppose that we come to know that the inhabitants of the mentioned 
possible world assert the following sentence ‘It’s right to help people in 
need’. Let us also assume that we assert the corresponding sentence; that is, 
we believe that it is right to help people in need. According to synthetic 
reductionism, in asserting this sentence, we do not really agree with them 
that it is right to help people in need. The reason is, again, that since their 
use of ‘right’ is causally regulated by another property than causally regulates 
our use of ‘right’, they do not refer to rightness. However, we seem to have 
the intuition that we and the inhabitants of that possible world do agree that 
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 it is right to help people in need. Hence, there is reason to believe that they 
refer to the same property as we do. Moreover, while we agree with them 
in the indicated respect, it seems reasonable to assume that we and they have 
different views about what makes actions right. 
 These considerations suggest that a term—such as the term used by 
the inhabitants of the possible world described above—might refer to 
rightness even if its use is not causally regulated by the non-moral property 
that causally regulates our use of ‘right’. Hence, there is reason to believe 
that the terms refer to the same moral property. This indicates that ‘right’ 
does not refer to a non-moral property in the way synthetic reductionism 
maintains.  
 Let us return for a moment to the possible world described above. It 
might be argued that the normative theory embraced in that world is 
mistaken. As a result, it might be argued that we should not accept that, in 
that possible world, if an action is desired to be desired, it is right. The 
conception hinted at above is compatible with this view. According to this 
conception, both we and the inhabitants of the possible refer to rightness. 
However, it might be maintained that they are mistaken about what makes 
actions right and hence that the mentioned implication does not hold. On 
the other hand, it might be maintained that we are not thus mistaken. This 
conception seems to find some confirmation if we consider a person who 
embraces a particular normative conception. Consider for example a 
convinced utilitarian. It is reasonable to suppose that she would consider 
herself to be disagreeing with the inhabitants of the possible world as regards 
the normative conception they accept. One reason for this assumption is 
that she considers herself to be disagreeing with proponents of the 
corresponding normative conception in our world, just as she disagrees with 
proponents of virtue ethics and various deontological theories in our world. 
Hence, it is reasonable to assume that she would believe that the inhabitants 
of that possible world refer to rightness with their term ‘right’. However, 
she would most certainly maintain that they are mistaken about what makes 
actions right. 
 Although I have merely argued that synthetic reductionism is 
mistaken as regards one term, ‘right’, there seems to be no reason to believe 
that it would be more successful regarding other thin moral property terms. 
Thus, I think the arguments above suggest that synthetic reductionism is 
76 
 mistaken also when it comes to these terms. 
 To argue against synthetic reductionism by means of the kind of 
thought experiment that is employed in the first question is quite expected 
and not very original. After all, Kripke and Putnam make use of similar 
thought experiments to establish their account of natural kind terms. 
Moreover, Horgan and Timmons appeal to one such thought experiment to 
refute synthetic reductionism. They argue, as I have done above, that this 
view is mistaken because people in a possible world whose use of a term is 
causally regulated by another property than our use of a corresponding term 
may disagree with us, not just talk past us, as synthetic reductionism implies. 
However, they never in effect ask the second question that I will consider in 
the next section. In the next chapter, I will argue that this is significant 
because if we take into account our considerations in relation to both 
questions, we will see that they provide support to realism. Horgan’s and 
Timmons’s argument against synthetic reductionism has evoked a number 
of interesting responses.21 A thorough examination of synthetic 
reductionism would have to address the issues these responses raise. I will 
not do so here, however. As just indicted, my strategy will instead be to 
argue that these responses are better accounted for by realism than by 
reductionism. 
 
5. The Second Question 
Let us turn to the second question. Analogous to our response to the second 
question as regards ‘water’, our response to this question would indicate 
whether an implication of the following kind holds: It is synthetically 
necessary that, for any object x, if x is G, x is M, where G is a non-moral 
property that causally regulates our use of ‘M’. That is, the response to the 
second question indicates whether, in all possible worlds, G is a sufficient 
condition for something to have M. 
 In order to be able to ask the second question, we should start with 
imagining a scenario that complies with the outline of synthetic 
reductionism in section 3. So assume that the scenario described in the last 
section holds. That is, suppose that our use of ‘right’ is causally regulated by 
the non-moral property specified by the normative theory U, i.e. 
                                      
21 See especially Brink (2001), pp. 154–176; Copp (2000), pp. 112–137, and Sayre-
McCord (1997a), pp. 267–292. 
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 maximising happiness. 
 Let us now imagine a possible world that resembles our world in 
certain respects, but also differs from it in certain other respects. Consider a 
world where there are actions that maximise happiness. However, in that 
world actions with this non-moral property typically do not have the 
characteristics we associate with ‘right’. That is, in that world these actions 
do not generally evoke the beliefs and attitudes involved in these 
characteristics; they are not such that people approve of them being 
performed, etc. We may also assume that the inhabitants of that world have 
a term ‘right’ which is phonetically and orthographically identical with our 
term ‘right’. They associate the mentioned characteristics with this term and 
apply it to actions that have them. But in that world, these actions typically 
are not such that they maximise happiness. Accordingly, their use of the 
term ‘right’ is not causally regulated by this property. 
 Let us now ask the second question: if an action maximises happiness 
in that world, is it right? I think we are inclined to answer that it might be. 
We would say that the action might be right in spite of the fact that these 
actions do not have the mentioned characteristics. Here our response 
resembles our response to the second question as regards ‘water’, although 
we in the present case presumably are less inclined to answer a 
straightforward ‘yes’. Analogous to how we reasoned in relation to ‘water’, 
we may support our response by saying that an action in that world which 
maximises happiness is right, but that the inhabitants of that world do not 
recognise this. Hence, we have not found reason to believe that the non-
moral property that causally regulates our use of ‘right’ is not sufficient for 
an action to be right in that world. 
 For there to be a possible world of the kind appealed to in the 
thought experiment above, it has to differ from our world, and this 
difference should explain why actions which have the non-moral property 
that causally regulates our use of ‘right’ do not have the mentioned 
characteristics in that possible world. That is, the difference should explain 
why, in that world, these actions are not such that people approve of them 
being performed, etc. Now, I think our response to the second question is 
reinforced in consideration of such differences. Return to the scenario 
according to which our use of ‘right’ is causally regulated by maximising 
happiness. Suppose, by way of illustration, that the difference which 
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 provides the required explanation is that the inhabitants of the other possible 
world, due to their genetic traits, experience happiness very seldom. As a 
matter of fact, most of them have not experienced it at all, and if they have, 
they have done so only a few times. I do not think this explanation would 
have us to respond differently to the second question. Moreover, I do not 
think we would respond in any other way if we imagine possible worlds 
where the difference which provides the required explanation is any other 
than the one suggested. Imagine worlds that are like the world mentioned 
above, except that the relevant difference is any of these: due to a past 
event, the inhabitants feel guilt about happiness; they suffer from severe 
depression that makes them uninterested in happiness; they suffer from a 
certain disease that makes them experience happiness very seldom; that 
world is polluted in a certain way with the same effect. About each of these 
possible worlds, I think we are inclined to respond in the same way: we do 
not want to deny that an action that has the non-moral property which 
causally regulates our use of ‘right’ is right, in spite of the fact that it does 
not have the mentioned characteristics. To generalise, I think it is difficult 
to come to think of any difference that would make us deny this. 
 These considerations may also be seen in the light of what was said 
in the last section. When the first question was discussed there, it was 
suggested that the non-moral property which causally regulates our use of 
‘right’ might not provide a necessary condition for an action to be right in 
another possible world. In particular, we saw that there are reasons to 
believe that a moral term does not refer to a non-moral property in the way 
maintained by synthetic reductionism. However, we do not seem to have 
corresponding results as regards the second question. It does not seem 
plausible to claim that an action which maximises happiness is not right in a 
possible world on the ground that happiness in that world, because of 
people’s genetic traits, is experienced seldom or that happiness in that world, 
because of past events, is associated with guilt, etc. As was suggested above, 
it seems more plausible to say that these features may have the effect that the 
inhabitants of these possible worlds are prevented from recognising what is 
right. Thus, none of these differences provides reasons to assume that the 
non-moral property which causally regulates our use of ‘right’ does not 
provide a sufficient condition for an action to be right in these worlds. 
Moreover, I find it hard to come to think of any difference that 
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 convincingly would show this. 
 What our response to the second question suggests is that given that 
a non-moral property causally regulates our use of ‘right’, an action in 
another possible world which has that property is right. This response 
indicates that as regards ‘right’, the implication mentioned above does hold. 
In line with what was said in the last section, it can be suggested that such a 
non-moral property makes actions right. (I will return to this proposal in the 
next chapter.) Although I have only argued for this conclusion concerning 
one moral term, ‘right’, I see no reason to believe that it does not hold also 
for other terms of the relevant kind. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Advocates of synthetic reductionism maintain that a term ‘M’, applying to 
objects with a moral property M, and a term ‘G’, applying to objects with a 
non-moral property G, refer to the same property and that M and G 
consequently are identical. They are then committed to the truth of a 
synthetically necessary biconditional which provides a necessary condition 
for M and G being identical. In this chapter, I have argued that our response 
to the first question posed above gives some reason to believe that it is not 
synthetically necessary that if something is M, it is G. This would imply that 
the mentioned biconditional does not hold. But I have especially maintained 
that a moral term ‘M’ does not refer to a non-moral property G in the way 
proposed by synthetic reductionism. There are consequently reasons to 
believe that synthetic reductionism is mistaken. However, I have also 
suggested that our response to the second question indicates that it is 
synthetically necessary that if something is G, it is M. We have also seen 
some indications of the way in which non-moral properties can make 
objects have a moral property. 
 The arguments proposed in this chapter might be responded to in 
various ways.22 For example, it might be argued that, on closer inspection, 
we do not have the intuitions appealed to in the arguments, or that these 
intuitions can be explained in a way that is consistent with synthetic 
reductionism. Advocates of this view might also try to characterise synthetic 
reductionism in such a way that it is consistent with our responses. As 
mentioned earlier, Horgan’s and Timmons’s argument against synthetic 
                                      
22 For various possible responses, see Horgan and Timmons (1992b), pp. 168–169.  
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 reductionism has evoked a number of interesting defences of this view. 
Instead of considering these proposals, I will in the next chapter argue that 
realism is able to account for our considerations in relation to the two 
questions in a way superior to synthetic reductionism. Moreover, since the 
arguments put forward against synthetic reductionism in this chapter might 
be objected to, there will be reasons to return to this view in subsequent 
chapters. 
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 Chapter 4 
Realism and the Realist Formula 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, I argued that there are reasons to believe that 
analytic reductionism and synthetic reductionism are mistaken. On the 
assumption that they comprise the two main forms of reductionism, these 
arguments give reasons to conclude that reductionism is mistaken. Some 
meta-ethicists would presumably take this result as an indication of the 
correctness either of non-cognitivism or error-theory. However, in chapter 
1 we saw that there are prima facie reasons to reject both these views and 
instead adopt their respective contraries: cognitivism and success-theory. 
According to the classification of meta-ethical positions provided in that 
chapter, there are two kinds of meta-ethical positions which deny non-
cognitivism and error-theory and affirm cognitivism and success-theory: 
reductionism and realism. Taken together, these points provide support to 
realism. That is, the arguments indicating that reductionism is mistaken, 
together with the arguments indicating the implausibility of non-
cognitivism and error-theory, provide support to realism. However, we 
have also seen that the arguments against analytic and synthetic reductionism 
may be questioned. Moreover, although non-cognitivism and error-theory 
seem to have rather serious shortcomings, there are well-known arguments 
in support of these views. Thus, we have reasons to return to the two forms 
of reductionism and to consider the arguments put forward in favour of 
non-cognitivism and error-theory. 
 In this chapter, I will argue that our considerations in relation to the 
questions posed in the open question argument and the two questions posed 
in the last chapter provide further support to realism. More exactly, I will 
maintain that these considerations give reason to hypothesise that objects 
have moral properties in virtue of having non-moral properties in a manner 
I will refer to as ‘the realist formula’. By suggesting the realist formula, these 
considerations confirm realism because this formula implies that moral 
properties are not reducible to non-moral properties. 
 In the next section, I argue that our reflections concerning the 
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 mentioned questions suggest the realist formula, and hence provide support 
to realism, in the indicated way. In section 3, I argue that realists can make 
use of several of the ideas in synthetic reductionism.  
 
2. The Realist Formula  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, although there is no analytically 
necessary biconditional of the sort maintained by analytic reductionism, 
there are certain analytically necessary conditions that have to be fulfilled for 
moral terms to apply. I also mentioned the condition that seems most 
directly relevant to the relation between moral and non-moral properties: it 
is analytically necessary that an object has a moral property M in virtue of 
some of its non-moral properties. This can also be put by saying that it is 
analytically necessary that an object’s moral property M depends on some of 
its non-moral properties or that some of its non-moral properties make it 
have M.1 I will return to the importance of this relation between moral and 
non-moral properties in chapter 8. Now, the fact that this feature is an 
analytically necessary condition on the application of moral terms means that 
realists have to account for it. So even if realists are correct in claiming that 
moral properties are irreducible to non-moral properties, they have to 
account for the notion that objects have moral properties in virtue of having 
non-moral properties. 
 The analytically necessary condition on applications of moral terms, 
together with our considerations in relation to the questions posed in last 
two chapters, give reasons to hypothesise that the following formula 
accounts for the relation between moral properties and non-moral 
properties: 
 The realist formula: (i) It is analytically necessary that, for any object x, 
 and for any moral property M, if x has M, then there is a set of non-
 moral properties G such that (A) x has G, and (B) it is synthetically 
 necessary that, for any object y, if y has G, then y has M. (ii) M is 
 not identical with any non-moral property. 
The occurrence of analytic necessity at the opening of (i) is intended to 
capture the fact that it is analytically necessary that if an object has a moral 
                                      
1 Other ways to put this relation is to say that an object has M because it has certain non-
moral properties or that certain non-moral properties determine that an object has M. One 
might distinguish between ‘depend’, ‘determine’, etc.; see Grimes (1991), p. 83, and Van 
Cleve (1990), p. 226. However, I will not do so here. 
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 property M, it has it in virtue of some of its non-moral properties. The 
realist formula then says that if something has M, there is a set of non-moral 
properties G such that (A) the object has G. Thus understood, the realist 
formula says that if something has M, it has some set of non-moral 
properties, not that it has one particular set of non-moral properties which 
objects must have whenever they have M.2 This claim provides some 
support from our responses to the questions posed in the open question 
argument and from our response to the first question posed in the last 
chapter: that there is no necessary implication from a moral property to a 
particular non-moral property. The realist formula says next, in (B), that it is 
synthetically necessary that if an object has G, it has M. This claim reflects 
our response to the second question posed in the last chapter: that there is a 
synthetically necessary implication from a non-moral property to a moral 
property.3
 What is said in (i) is compatible with a moral property M being 
identical with a non-moral property G, something that is irreconcilable with 
realism. However, the realist formula also includes (ii): the claim that M is 
not identical with any non-moral property. The insertion of this claim into 
the realist formula is justified by our considerations in relation to the 
questions posed in the two preceding chapters. These considerations suggest 
that the meaning or reference of a moral term ‘M’ is not constituted by a 
particular non-moral property G in the way maintained by reductionism, 
i.e. a non-moral property with which M is identical. Accordingly, these 
considerations suggest that M is not identical with G.4 Moreover, the 
                                      
2 In what follows, I will assume that the set of non-moral properties referred to in the 
realist formula is not empty. In so far as the set consists in more than one non-moral 
property, I will assume that it consists in a conjunction of non-moral properties. I will 
also assume that if a certain object has a moral property M, it has only one set of non-
moral properties that makes it have M. 
3 As can easily be seen, the first part of the realist formula, (i), is a variant of what is 
known as strong supervenience. In chapter 8, I will consider the relation between the 
realist formula and strong supervenience. For a version of strong supervenience which 
resembles the realist formula as to the way the two occurrences of ‘necessary’ is read, see 
Dreier (1992), p. 20. Cf. Danielsson (2001), p. 95, and McLaughlin (1995), p. 27. There 
are certain general problems that trouble any attempt to formulate a non-reductive 
dependence relation between properties; see e.g. Grimes (1988), pp. 152–160, and Kim 
(1993 (1990)), pp. 144–149. Unfortunately, I will have nothing to say about these 
difficulties here. 
4 According to one view of property identity, the truth of a necessary biconditional 
provides a necessary and sufficient condition for property identity. This means that if a 
property A and a property B are not identical, there is no true necessary biconditional 
involving A and B. On this view, (ii) in the realist formula—the claim that a moral 
property M is not identical with any non-moral property—implies that there is no true 
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 insertion of (ii) can be motivated in terms of our responses to the questions 
posed in the open question argument and our considerations in relation to 
the first question posed in the last chapter, since these indicate that no 
necessary biconditional involving M and a non-moral property holds. If that 
is correct, In that case, a necessary condition for M being identical with a 
non-moral property is not fulfilled.5  
 As just indicated, on the realist formula there might be more than 
one set of non-moral properties in virtue of which objects have a moral 
property M. Put in a way inspired from the philosophy of mind: M is 
multiply realisable. In that case, more than one implication of the kind (B) is 
true. 
 In the light of what has been said above, the difference between 
reductionism and realism can be formulated in the following way. 
According to reductionism, there is a symmetric relation between a moral 
property M and a non-moral property G in that M is identical with G. 
According to realism, the relation between M and a set of non-moral 
properties G is asymmetric in that objects have M in virtue of having G, but 
M is not identical with G. 
 It might be argued that (ii) is insufficient to guarantee that there is an 
asymmetric relation of the mentioned kind. The reason is that according to 
some views on property identity, the fact that a property A is not identical 
with a property B is compatible with A and B being necessarily co-
extensive, in which case a necessary biconditional involving A and B holds. 
However, in that case we would hesitate to claim that the relation between 
A and B is asymmetric. Consequently, on this view the realist formula is 
compatible with the truth of a necessary biconditional involving M and a 
non-moral property, and it might be argued that it therefore is insufficient 
to guarantee that there is an asymmetric relation of the kind mentioned 
above.6 I have two comments on this argument. First, as we saw above there 
are some reasons to deny that there is any true necessary biconditional of 
this type; indeed, it is partly considerations to that effect that justify the 
insertion of (ii) into the realist formula. For that reason, the realist formula 
                                                                                                              
necessary biconditional involving M and a non-moral property. However, this view on 
property identity is controversial. I will briefly return to these issues in chapter 8. 
5 For a version of strong supervenience that involves a condition similar to (ii), see 
Depaul (1987), p. 433. 
6 Cf. Depaul (1987), pp. 433–434.  
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 might be taken to suggest that no such necessary biconditional holds. 
Second, on the indicated view on property identity it might be the case that 
a moral property M and a non-moral property are not identical even if the 
mentioned type of necessary biconditional holds. So even if it would turn 
out that such a biconditional holds, the realist formula might be true.7 
However, in that case it might be incorrect to say that it states an 
asymmetric relation. 
 In subsequent chapters, I will say that, according to the realist 
formula a set of non-moral properties makes objects have a moral property. 
Thus, to formulate the realist formula in a simple way that I occasionally 
will make use of, it says that an object which has a moral property has a set 
of non-moral properties such that it makes objects have that moral property. 
(It should be admitted, however, that my usage of ‘make’ to a certain extent 
is a stipulation, since one might want to utilise this term even if one does 
not share this view of the relation between moral and non-moral 
properties.) 
 As we have seen, the realist formula incorporates our considerations 
in relation to the questions posed in the open question argument and the 
argument in the last chapter. It is therefore reasonable to hypothesise that 
the realist formula explains these considerations. It can in other words be 
assumed that we respond as we do to these questions because the relation 
between moral properties and non-moral properties is the one described in 
the realist formula.  
 One aspect of the explanatory capacity of the realist formula is 
particularly worth observing. In discussing the first question posed in the last 
chapter, we imagined a possible world where the inhabitants have their use 
of a term ‘right’ causally regulated by another non-moral property than 
causally regulates our use of ‘right’. In spite of this, we believe that we may 
disagree with these people as to whether actions are right. Hence, it seems 
                                      
7 Suppose, in accordance with the objection above, that there is a true necessary 
biconditional involving a moral property M and a non-moral property G, but that M and 
G are not identical. It might then be argued that the realist formula should be 
reformulated in such a way that it captures the fact that such a necessary biconditional 
holds. However, I do not think such a reformulation would be desirable. Even if such a 
necessary biconditional holds, this is not something which we want to commit ourselves 
when we assert that an object has a moral property M. In particular, we do not want to 
commit ourselves to the view that it is necessary that whatever object has M has one 
particular non-moral property which objects must have whenever they have M. The 
reason is that we want to leave open the possibility that there is more than one set of 
non-moral properties in virtue of which objects have M. 
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 that we and they refer to the same property: rightness. We also saw that it is 
reasonable to say that our view of what makes actions right differs from 
theirs. The realist formula can explain this. On this conception, both we 
and the inhabitants of that possible world refer to rightness because both we 
and they refer to the property as it is characterised in the realist formula. 
Roughly put, in asserting that an action is right, both we and they claim 
that it has a set of non-moral properties such that it is synthetically necessary 
that whatever action has that set of non-moral properties is right. However, 
we and they have different views about what makes actions right because 
we and they have different views about what such a set of non-moral 
properties consists in. More precisely, we and they differ as to whether it 
holds about a certain set of non-moral properties that it is synthetically 
necessary that whatever action has that set of non-moral properties is right. 
As we saw above, we might believe that the inhabitants of the other possible 
worlds are mistaken about what makes actions right. Our differing views in 
this regard might explain why we disagree with them as to whether certain 
actions are right. (I will return to similar considerations in the next chapter.) 
 Moreover, the realist formula furnishes realists with an account of 
the way in which non-moral properties make objects have moral properties 
which implies that moral properties are not reducible to non-moral 
properties. Thus, our considerations in relation to the various questions 
posed earlier provide support to realism because they suggest a formula 
which states a relation between moral and non-moral properties which 
implies that the former are irreducible to the latter. 
 
3. Reusing Synthetic Reductionism 
In the previous chapter, I argued that there are reasons to assume that 
synthetic reductionism is mistaken. This conclusion notwithstanding, I think 
a number of ideas in synthetic reductionism can be incorporated in a realist 
account of moral properties. In this section, I provide a bare sketch of such 
an account. Since its essential parts have been mentioned in the preceding 
chapter, I will make it brief. The idea, roughly put, is that what according 
to synthetic reduction holds for the non-moral property that constitutes the 
reference of a moral term holds according to realism for a set of non-moral 
properties that makes objects have a moral property. Once more, I will use 
‘right’ by way of illustration, but I believe that this account is valid for other 
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 thin moral properties as well. 
 In the previous chapter, I suggested that there are some analytically 
necessary conditions that have to be fulfilled for ‘right’ to apply. (In the last 
section, we saw the relevance of one of them.) However, the open question 
argument indicates that these conditions are not sufficient for us to be able 
to apply the term correctly. To explain how this is possible, it may be 
hypothesised that there are certain characteristics that work analogously to 
how reference-fixing characteristics work concerning natural kind terms. 
We associate such characteristics with ‘right’ and they are typically had by 
the actions to which we apply the term. By means of these characteristics, 
we are able to apply ‘right’ correctly even if we are not aware of the correct 
account of the non-moral properties that make actions right. Some of these 
characteristics may be such that knowing that ‘right’ applies to actions that 
have them is part of what it means to be linguistically competent in respect 
of the term. However, unlike analytically necessary conditions, they are not 
necessarily had by what the term applies to.8 Rather, these characteristics 
can fulfil this function because actions that are right have certain non-moral 
properties which are causally responsible for these characteristics and so 
causally regulate our use of the term via these characteristics. However, 
there might be other factors than the reference-fixing characteristics that 
help us to apply ‘right’ correctly; for example, it might be the case that we 
are aware of some aspects of what makes actions have that moral property. 
 Suppose that some actions have a set of non-moral properties G that 
causally regulates our use of ‘right’ and that fulfils the other appropriate 
requirements.9 To see the implication of this, we should return to our 
response to the second question posed in the last chapter. This response 
suggests that it is synthetically necessary that if an action has G, it is right. In 
terms of the usage adopted above, G is a set of non-moral properties that 
makes actions right. This set of non-moral properties will consequently 
figure in the kind of implication (B). 
 In the preceding chapter, it was suggested that in order for a view to 
the effect that ‘right’ refers to a certain non-moral property to be justified, it 
                                      
8 In connection with realism, it might be misleading to call these characteristics ‘reference-
fixing characteristics’. Perhaps they should rather be called ‘dependence-fixing 
characteristics’ or something of the kind. I will however continue to use the first phrase 
so as to keep the connection to synthetic reductionism. 
9 If there are number of sets of non-moral properties of this kind, it might be the case 
that one of them only causally regulates a particular aspect of our use of the moral term. 
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 has to be able to explain the reference-fixing characteristics and so how the 
property can causally regulate our use of the term. Similarly, in order for a 
view to the effect that a certain set of non-moral properties makes actions 
right to be justified, it has to be able to explain these characteristics. 
Synthetic reductionism and realism differ concerning what provides the 
required explanation. According to synthetic reductionism, it is the non-
moral property to which ‘right’ refers that is causally responsible for the 
reference-fixing characteristics. According to realism, it is what makes 
actions right that is causally responsible for these characteristics. Thus, if G is 
a set of non-moral properties that makes actions right, G should help 
explaining the mentioned characteristics.  
 The demand that a view of what ‘right’ refers to should be able to 
explain the reference-fixing characteristics suggests, for reasons supplied in 
the last chapter, that the kind of theory that specifies the reference of the 
term is a normative theory. Similarly, the demand that a view of what 
makes actions right should provide such an explanation might be taken to 
indicate that it is a normative theory that specifies the right-making 
properties. However, as far as the realist formula is concerned, there might 
be a number of sets of non-moral properties that make actions right and 
these sets might be heterogeneous. Moreover, a set of non-moral properties 
that makes actions right might consist of a conjunction of a number of non-
moral properties and these properties may be quite heterogeneous. 
Furthermore, these properties might be related to each other in various 
ways. It seems doubtful whether normative theories—understood as proper 
theoretical accounts that are intended to be systematic and coherent—are 
designed to specify such sets of non-moral properties. I will therefore put 
the present point in more general terms and say that what specifies such a set 
is a ‘normative conception’. 
 What was said about epistemic method in relation to synthetic 
reductionism also applies to realism. It might be the case that a scientific or 
empirical method is unavailable, or plays a modest role, in the process of 
finding out what makes actions right. However, other methods which are 
not necessarily scientific or empirical, although some of them can be, might 
be pertinent. Some version of coherentism appears to be a promising 
candidate. Moreover, analogous to what was argued in the previous chapter, 
a set of non-moral properties that makes actions right does not constitute a 
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 natural kind.   
 This sketch comprises various parameters that realists can understand 
in various ways. Accordingly, different versions of realism emerge 
depending on, among other things, how the following questions are 
answered: (i) What are the analytically necessary conditions that have to be 
fulfilled for ‘right’ to apply? (ii) What are the reference-fixing characteristics 
in respect of ‘right’? (iii) What makes actions right? (iv) What is the correct 
epistemic method to determine this? Corresponding questions can of course 
be asked about other moral terms and properties. With the exception of 
some remarks on (i) and (iv), I will not take up these questions. This 
limitation is important, since the plausibility of realism might depend on 
how they are answered. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I have argued that our considerations in relation to the 
questions posed in chapters 2 and 3, together with some arguments against 
non-cognitivism and error-theory, provide support to realism. Moreover, I 
have argued that these considerations give reasons to adopt the realist 
formula, which describes the way in which non-moral properties make 
objects have moral properties. In doing so, the mentioned considerations 
provide further support to realism, since the realist formula implies that 
moral properties are not reducible to non-moral properties. We have also 
seen that realism can make use of many of the insights of synthetic 
reductionism. However, as we have seen in the two previous chapters, the 
arguments put forward against reductionism can be questioned. Moreover, 
there are influential arguments in favour of non-cognitivism and error-
theory. It should therefore be stressed that the case put forward in support of 
realism above is by no means conclusive. Rather, I regard realism as a 
promising hypothesis that is in need of further evidence and assessment. In 
the following three chapters, I will argue that realism, much owing to the 
realist formula, is able to account for certain meta-ethical issues and that 
realism therefore is preferable to reductionism, non-cognitivism and error-
theory. It might however be argued that the realist formula is vulnerable to 
several objections. I postpone a discussion of these objections to chapter 8.  
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 Chapter 5 
Explaining Moral Disagreement 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the features most commonly associated with morality by 
philosophical laymen is presumably disagreement. On a prevalent view, 
disagreement permeates morality and justifies far-reaching sceptical 
conclusions in regard to it. Among meta-ethicists there is controversy as to 
the philosophical significance of moral disagreement, but an influential line 
of thought follows the popular view. Proponents of non-cognitivism and 
error-theory have accordingly argued that reflections on the nature of moral 
disagreement should make us conclude that there are no moral properties. 
In this chapter, I will maintain that realism, in contrast to reductionism, is 
able to defend the existence of moral properties against such arguments. 
However, the occurrence of moral disagreements has given rise to a number 
of arguments, and I will comment only on those I find most troubling for 
the view that there are moral properties.1
 The arguments I have in mind are generally based on the assumption 
that moral disagreements have some distinctive feature that gives reason to 
believe that there are no moral properties. In the next section, I give an 
outline of such an argument which I will refer to as ‘the argument from 
moral disagreement’. As I construe this argument, it contains a placeholder 
where different features of the mentioned kind can be inserted, thereby 
generating different versions of it. Two features of moral disagreements are 
typically appealed to: their being widespread or persistent. After noticing in 
section 3 that there are various types of moral disagreements, I discuss in the 
rest of the chapter the premises of the argument in turn, with some 
exception. In section 4, I consider the relation between moral disagreement 
and error. In section 5, I argue that the version of the argument from moral 
disagreement according to which the distinctive feature of moral 
disagreements consists in their being widespread is unconvincing. In section 
6, I maintain that a more cogent version of the argument is obtained if this 
                                      
1 For a systematic discussion of the meta-ethical significance of moral disagreement, see 
Tersman (2002), chap. 2–5. 
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 feature is assumed to consist in moral disagreements being persistent. The 
basic reason is that the persistence of moral disagreements is closely 
connected to a phenomenon I will refer to as ‘normative divergence’, by 
which I mean, briefly put, that people may disagree even if they have 
different normative conceptions and therefore take the moral term in 
question to have different conditions for application. In sections 7 and 8, I 
argue that reductionism fails to explain persistent moral disagreements, 
mainly because it fails to account for normative divergence. In section 9, I 
argue that relativism does not provide any help to reductionism. In sections 
10, 11 and 12, I argue that realism, by employing the realist formula, 
succeeds in accounting for normative divergence and is able to explain 
persistent moral disagreements. I conclude in the final section that this 
means that realism is able to reject the argument from moral disagreement. 
 
2. The Argument from Moral Disagreement 
J. L. Mackie is presumably the philosopher most closely associated with the 
view that the phenomenon of moral disagreement provides an argument 
against the existence of moral properties. In a much-quoted passage he 
writes: 
  
The argument from relativity has as its premiss the well-known variation in moral codes 
from one society to another and from one period to another, and also the differences in 
moral beliefs between different groups and classes within a complex community. [- - -] 
[R]adical differences between first order moral judgements make it difficult to treat those 
judgements as apprehensions of objective truths. [- - -] [T]he argument from relativity 
has some force simply because the actual variations in the moral codes are more readily 
explained by the hypothesis that they reflect ways of life than by the hypothesis that they 
express perceptions, most of them seriously inadequate and badly distorted, of objective 
values.2  
 
Mackie does not state his argument very clearly, and my purpose is not to 
offer an interpretation of his contention. However, Mackie’s reasoning can 
be understood to exemplify the argument from moral disagreement. This 
argument can be represented as follows:3  
                                      
2 Mackie (1977), pp. 36–37. 
3 Similar ways of reasoning are found in e.g. Loeb (1998), pp. 282–283; Tersman (2002), 
esp. chap. 2; Wright (1992), pp. 150–157, and Wright (1996), pp. 13–14. That the 
argument should be understood in roughly this way is agreed to by those who oppose it; 
see e.g. Brink (1989), pp. 197–198; Shafer-Landau (2003), pp. 215–216, and Wreen 
(1985), pp. 149–150. Sometimes arguments similar to the argument from moral 
disagreement are assumed to support relativism rather than the view that there are no 
moral properties; see e.g. Harman in Harman and Thomson (1996), pp. 8–14, and Wong 
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  (1) If there are any moral properties, the best explanations of moral 
  disagreements imply that there is an error in relation to a moral 
  property. 
 (2) Moral disagreements have a distinctive feature F. 
 (3) Due to feature F, the best explanations of such disagreements 
  do not imply that there is an error in relation to a moral  
  property. 
 (4) Therefore, there are no moral properties. 
Different versions of the argument are obtained by letting ‘F’ in premise (2) 
represent different features of moral disagreements.4 Proponents of the 
argument from moral disagreement often take this feature to consist in such 
disagreements being widespread. According to this version of the argument, 
the fact that moral disagreements are widespread makes it unlikely that they 
are best explained by people having, as Mackie formulates it, ‘seriously 
inadequate and badly distorted’ ‘perceptions’ of a moral property. It is 
simply regarded as implausible that people are in error to such a great extent 
such an explanation would require. Sometimes the mentioned feature of 
moral disagreement is instead supposed to consist in their being persistent. 
This version of the argument gains support from the idea that since these 
disagreements concern issues that have been extensively debated without 
any solution having emerged, they are not best explained in terms of an 
error in relation to a moral property. It is simply thought that if they were 
best explained in this way, this is something that would have been found 
out, considering that these issues have been persistently debated. 
 There are other features of moral disagreements than their being 
widespread or persistent that can be appealed to in the argument from moral 
disagreement, especially what I will call ‘normative divergence’. However, 
since these two features are most commonly thought to be operative in the 
argument, it seems reasonable to focus on versions of it that take their point 
of departure in them. Proceeding in this way will also highlight significant 
interconnections between various aspects of moral disagreements. This will 
                                                                                                              
(1984), esp. chap. 8. Cf. Sayre-McCord (1991), pp. 163–172. I will comment briefly on 
relativism in section 9. 
4 Another argument is that there are no moral properties because if there were, people 
would agree about moral issues to a much larger extent than they do. (For a discussion of 
an argument on that line, see Wiggins (1987 (1983)), pp. 162–171.) One difficulty with 
this argument is that moral agreements might have various explanations that do not 
involve the assumption that there are moral properties. Cf. Williams (1985), p. 136.  
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 be especially clear in section 6 where the close connection between the 
persistence of such disagreements and normative divergence will become 
evident. 
 The conclusion of the argument from moral disagreement entails that 
reductionism and realism is false. To avoid it, advocates of these views have 
to deny some of its premises. The conclusion can be taken to support either 
error-theory or non-cognitivism, depending on whether moral sentences 
have truth-value or not.  
 As the argument of disagreement has been construed here, it focuses 
on the conclusion that there are no moral properties. However, the 
argument also implies that the best explanations of moral disagreements—if 
there are any explanations of that kind—are provided in terms of something 
other than an error in relation to a moral property. Some meta-ethicists, of 
which Mackie is an example, focus on this aspect of the argument rather 
than the one accentuated here. Accordingly, advocates of the argument 
propose explanations of moral disagreements which they believe are 
superior to those implying the existence of a moral property. As can be seen 
in the quotation above, Mackie claims to do so by combining his error-
theory with the idea that moral disagreements reflect different ‘ways of life’. 
Non-cognitivists typically argue that moral disagreements are best 
explainable in terms of people having conflicting non-cognitive states.5  
 
3. Types of Moral Disagreement 
In the meta-ethical literature moral disagreement is usually considered as a 
homogeneous phenomenon. I think it is worthwhile, however, to 
distinguish between different types of such disagreements. One reason is that 
the kind of argument outlined in the last section varies in strength 
depending on which type that is under discussion. Another is that the 
plausibility of certain responses to it varies accordingly. These reasons will 
become clearer as we proceed.  
 The field of moral disagreement can of course be divided in a number 
of different ways. For my purposes it is expedient to make a tripartite 
division based on about what people disagree. The resulting distinctions can 
be combined with the distinction between widespread and persistent 
                                      
5 For non-cognitivist accounts of moral disagreement, see e.g. Nowell-Smith (1954), pp. 
193–197, and Stevenson (1963), essay I, II and IV. See also references to Hare below. 
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 disagreements.   
 (i) The most basic type of moral disagreement occurs when people 
disagree as to whether a particular object has a certain moral property M or 
not.  
 (ii) Another type of moral disagreement occurs when people disagree 
as to whether objects belonging to a certain kind—e.g. abortion, bigamy, death 
penalty, eating meat, euthanasia and raising animals for food—have a certain 
moral property M or not. Here we find the cases most often appealed to in 
the argument from moral disagreement.  
 (iii) A third type of disagreements occurs when people disagree as to 
whether a certain normative conception as regards a moral property M holds or 
not. In this kind of disagreement, people have different views about which 
normatively relevant non-moral properties objects should have in order to 
have M.6 Sometimes this is put by saying that they have different views 
about which the good-making or right-making properties are. Formulated 
in another way, they have different views about which, in terms of 
normatively relevant non-moral properties, the conditions are for ‘M’ to 
apply. Examples of disputes about normative conceptions are debates about 
normative theories, such as those between utilitarians and deontologists. 
However, all disputes about normative conceptions do not concern views 
that are intended to be so systematic and coherent that they properly can be 
called normative theories; hence, the term ‘normative conception’ seems 
more to the point.  
 
4. Moral Disagreement and Error 
In the remaining sections of this chapter, I will consider the premises of the 
argument from moral disagreement in turn, with some exception. Thus, we 
start with premise (1). One way to respond to the argument is to refute this 
premise. However, I do not think this response is plausible.7
 Let us start by observing that on the assumption that there are moral 
properties, a moral disagreement involves an error in relation to a moral 
property. So assume that there are moral properties. It is then reasonable to 
suppose that declarative sentences pertaining to these properties are either 
true or false. A disagreement occurs in case someone asserts a sentence and 
                                      
6 Unfortunately, this is rather vague. By saying that the non-moral properties at issue are 
‘normatively relevant’, I want to indicate that the views in question are not meta-ethical. 
7 In section 9, I will consider relativism, which can be understood to deny premise (1). 
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 someone else denies it. It follows that if two persons disagree in any of the 
ways mentioned in the previous section, some of them claims something 
that is false. On the assumption that there are moral properties, a person is 
then in some sort of error in relation to a moral property that explains this 
and so explains the disagreement.8 (What an ‘error in relation to a moral 
property’ amounts to will become clearer as we proceed.) This being the 
case, it seems plausible to claim that if there are moral properties, any 
reasonable explanation of a moral disagreement involves the assumption that 
there is an error of the mentioned kind.9 Admittedly, this might be an error 
which is very difficult, perhaps even impossible, to avoid. Even so, the 
person in question is in error in the sense that there is some consideration in 
relation to a moral property such that if she somehow had differed with 
respect to that consideration, she would not have claimed something false. 
In the subsequent sections, I will consider various proposals of such 
considerations.10  
 Explanations of moral disagreements may involve further aspects in 
addition to the assumption that there is an error in relation to a moral 
property. Thus, on the view that there are moral properties, it seems more 
correct to say that reasonable explanations of such disagreements imply that 
there is an error of the mentioned sort, rather than that they outright consist 
in the stating of such an error. These additional aspects of explanations 
might be felt to be more important than the error they make reference to, 
                                      
8 This should not be taken to imply that the person who asserts a true sentence is not 
subject to any kind of error. Indeed, she might have reached her opinion in a defective 
way. For this reason it might perhaps be more accurate to say that the proper explanation 
of a moral disagreement implies that at least one of the persons involved in it is mistaken. 
Correspondingly, it might be more accurate to say that there is at least one error. 
However, in what follows I will ignore this complication. 
9 This view is in accordance with Crispin Wright’s principle of ‘cognitive command’. 
Wright takes this principle to imply that ‘one obligation of the moral realist will be to 
hold, and therefore to justify holding, that moral disagreements [. . .] have to involve 
defects of process or materials: at least one of the protagonists has to be guilty of a 
deficiency in the way he arrives at his view, or to be somehow constitutionally unfit’ 
(Wright (1996), p. 14). See also Wright (1992), pp. 92–93, 143–157. Wright may also be 
understood to endorse premise (1).   
10 It should be noted that even if error-theory accepts that people might be in error 
because the moral sentences they assert are false, it would be misleading on this view to 
say that they are in error in relation to a moral property, as there is no moral property to 
be in error in relation to. Rather, on this view people are in error in so far as they 
assume that there are any moral properties. Thus, error-theorists do not provide the kind 
of explanation proposed by advocates of the existence of moral properties. In particular, 
they do not consent to the view that the best explanations of moral disagreements imply 
that there is an error in relation to a moral property. This is indicated by Mackie’s appeal 
to explanations in terms of different ‘ways of life’. 
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 and different explanations might vary in value because of them.11 
Accordingly, the explanations that are best may be so because they contain 
other aspects than the stating of the mentioned kind of error. However, 
from the claim that any reasonable explanation of a moral disagreement 
implies that there is an error in relation to a moral property, it follows that 
the best explanations of such disagreements imply that there is an error of 
that sort, even if they contain other aspects as well. 
 It might be objected that the above reasoning is defective because it 
ignores the possibility of moral terms being vague. On this objection, if a 
moral term ‘M’ is vague, there are cases where it is neither true nor false 
that an object has the moral property M.12 This means that if someone 
claims that something has M and someone else denies this, it does not 
follow that any of them claims something that is false. Then there is no 
disagreement that is to be explained in terms of an error. I have three 
comments on this objection. First, according to one view of vagueness, 
when ‘M’ is vague, it is either true or false that an object has M; it is just 
that we cannot know whether this is the case or not. Second, even if the 
account of vagueness appealed to in the objection is correct, it is hardly the 
case that vagueness accounts for all, or even particularly many, cases of 
assumed moral disagreements. Hence, in so far as one believes there are 
moral properties, one has to explain such disagreements in terms of an error 
in relation to a moral property in some, and probably most, cases. Third, we 
can accommodate the mentioned view by reformulating (1) to say ‘If there 
are any moral properties, the best explanations of moral disagreements imply 
that there is an error in relation to a moral property, at least unless the 
pertinent terms are vague’.13 However, in view of the two first remarks, I will 
ignore this complication in what follows. 
 There is a further point that is relevant in the present context. In the 
introductory chapter, we saw that both non-cognitivism and error-theory 
have difficulties accounting for moral disagreement. According to non-
                                      
11 For example, suppose it is proposed that people disagree morally because they 
embrace different religious convictions. This information might be thought to be more 
valuable than the information that there is some sort of error involved in the 
disagreement. However, on the present conception, the proposed explanation suggests 
that the reason why the people in question disagree is that their different religious 
convictions make some of them subject to an error of the indicated kind. 
12 See e.g. Shafer-Landau (1995), pp. 83–96. 
13 Cf. Wright (1992), pp. 144–145.  
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 cognitivism, moral sentences do not have truth-value. This means that 
people who debate moral issues do not disagree in the sense that they assert 
contradictory moral sentences. This opposes our notion of moral 
disagreement. According to error-theory, moral sentences have truth-value. 
Consequently, people who are involved in moral disagreements do assert 
contradictory moral sentences. However, the participant in a disagreement 
who asserts a moral sentence in which a moral property is ascribed to an 
object is always wrong, and the explanation is simply that there are no 
moral properties at all, not that she is wrong about a particular moral issue. 
Also this opposes our notion of moral disagreement.14 Advocates of 
reductionism and realism do not have these difficulties. Contrary to non-
cognitivists, they claim that moral sentences have truth-value so that people 
who debate moral issues can genuinely disagree by asserting contradictory 
moral sentences. Contrary to error-theorists, they claim that there are moral 
properties so that people who assert moral sentences that ascribe moral 
properties to objects are not always necessarily wrong and wrong for an 
awkward reason. This indicates that there are prima facie reasons to maintain 
that the best explanations of moral disagreements are made on the 
assumption that there are moral properties. Consequently, prima facie it 
seems that the best explanations of moral disagreements imply that there is 
an error in relation to a moral property. I will return to this consideration in 
the last section. 
 
5. Widespread Moral Disagreement  
We may now continue with considering premise (2) in the argument from 
moral disagreement. As mentioned above, feature F in that premise is 
regularly taken to consist in moral disagreements being widespread. It is 
often supposed that disagreement belonging to type (ii) have this feature. 
Moreover, it is typically assumed that there are widespread disagreements of 
this type between people belonging to different cultures. 
 However, I do not find this version of the argument from moral 
disagreement especially convincing. 
 One reason for this contention is that it is questionable whether moral 
disagreements are widespread in the relevant way. Let us first notice that the 
                                      
14 In chapter 1, I formulated this difficulty in terms of the person who is right, but it can 
be formulated just as well in terms of the person who is wrong. 
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 claim that such disagreements are widespread involves a covert comparison 
with disagreements within other areas than morality. The claim that moral 
disagreements are widespread will only have force if this kind of 
disagreement is more widespread than disagreements within other areas. This 
is so since we presumably are not prepared to accept that the argument from 
moral disagreement applies generally to other areas. That is, we are not 
generally prepared to conclude that a certain kind of properties does not 
exist because there are disagreements in relation to it, even if these 
disagreements are widespread. If the argument ‘spread’ in this way to other 
areas, this would probably have us question the argument itself, not the 
existence of these properties.15 Next it should be observed that the question 
of whether moral disagreements are more widespread is an empirical one 
that seems very hard to settle. Suppose the focus is on moral disagreements 
between persons belonging to different cultures. To determine whether 
such disagreements are more widespread would not only require thorough 
empirical investigations of the morality in different cultures and careful 
interpretations of the resulting data; it would also require comparisons with 
similar investigations in other areas to settle the relative amount of 
disagreement within the moral area. Until such an investigation has been 
carried out, something that is unlikely to happen, we are not in the position 
to tell whether the prevalence of moral disagreements can be legitimately 
appealed to in the argument from moral disagreement. 
  It might also be denied that moral disagreements are more 
widespread than disagreements in other areas. The claim that moral 
disagreements are widespread suggests a picture of morality where people 
have conflicting views about very many moral issues. However, this is 
hardly an impression the meta-ethical literature warrants.16 Often authors 
just take for granted that moral disagreements are widespread. But in so far 
as they present any support of this view, they come up with quite short lists 
of types of moral issues about which there is supposed to be disagreement. 
Moreover, these lists tend to contain the same items.17 Thus, rather than 
demonstrating that moral disagreements are widespread, the literature 
                                      
15 Cf. Shafer-Landau (2003), p. 220. 
16 Cf. Wreen (1985), pp. 149–150.  
17 For such a list, see e.g. Harman in Harman and Thomson (1996), pp. 8–11. Some 
authors argue that people within a certain culture—but also people belonging to different 
cultures—tend to reach moral agreement under favourable circumstances; see e.g. Brink 
(1989), pp. 208–209. 
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 indicates that they are isolated phenomena that concern rather few but 
recurrent issues.  
 Furthermore, it seems possible to explain why moral disagreements 
might appear more widespread than disagreements in other areas, although 
they are not. Moral disagreements might receive more attention than other 
kinds of disagreement because they are more easily discernible, have 
practical implications and therefore are significant for our lives.18 
Disagreements in other areas may be as widespread but not as easily 
discernible or especially consequential. There is also another way in which 
moral disagreements may just appear more widespread. Suppose that a 
certain kind of actions, bigamy for example, is judged to be wrong in one 
culture but not in another. Then there appears to be a disagreement 
between these people as to the wrongness of these actions. However, this 
view can be questioned on the ground that people in these cultures may 
apply the same normative conception to different circumstances.19 For 
example, in both cultures utilitarianism might be embraced. The 
circumstances in one of the cultures may be such that bigamy makes people 
happy, whereas the circumstances in the other culture may be such that it 
makes people unhappy. People in the first culture may then be correct in so 
far as bigamy in their culture, with its circumstances, is not wrong, whereas 
people in the second culture may be correct in so far as bigamy in their 
culture, with its circumstances, is wrong. 
 However, suppose that moral disagreements are more widespread 
than disagreements in other areas. In that case, a defender of the existence of 
moral properties can respond by denying premise (3). On realism, she may 
do so in basically two ways. First, she may argue that widespread 
disagreements can be explained in terms of an error as regards non-moral 
facts. Second, she may argue that they can be explained in the same way as 
persistent disagreements. I will discus these types of explanations in sections 
8 and 11, respectively.20
                                      
18 Cf. Wellman (1975), p. 212. 
19 Cf. Brink (1989), pp. 200–202; Railton (1993), pp. 282–283; Ross (1939), pp. 18–19, 
and Wreen (1985), pp. 150–152. This kind of explanation is criticised by e.g. Mackie 
(1977), pp. 37–38.  
20 Above I mentioned that the version of the argument from moral disagreement under 
considerations typically appeal to the view that disagreements of type (ii) are widespread. 
However, it might be objected that disagreements of type (iii)—disagreements 
concerning normative conceptions—also may be widespread. Mackie can be taken to 
suggest this when he refers to ‘variations in moral codes’ in the quotation above. But if it 
100 
  
6. Persistent Moral Disagreement and the Phenomenon of Normative Divergence 
In the last section, I argued that the version of the argument from moral 
disagreements that takes feature F in premise (2) to consist in moral 
disagreements being widespread is not particularly persuasive. We may 
continue with enquiring if a more powerful version of the argument is 
obtained if feature F is assumed to consist in moral disagreements being 
persistent. 
 The most obvious examples of persistent moral disagreements are 
disagreements of type (iii), i.e. disagreements about normative conceptions. 
In moral philosophy there are such disagreements as regards rightness 
between proponents of various normative theories such as, to name but a 
few, utilitarians and deontologists, various kinds of utilitarians, various kinds 
of deontologists, deontologists and virtue ethicists. However, not all 
disagreements about normative conceptions are disagreements about 
normative theories.   
 Persistent disagreements are not only to be found in disagreements of 
type (iii), but also in type (i) and (ii). However, it is reasonable to assume 
that persistent disagreements of type (i) and (ii) typically can be accounted 
for in terms of disagreements of type (iii). It seems in other words plausible 
to suppose that if people have debated some moral issue belonging to type 
(i) and (ii) extensively without having reached any solution, this is because 
they embrace conflicting moral conceptions. This underlying disagreement 
may thus account for why they have not resolved their disagreements at the 
other levels. Consider disagreements of type (i). It is not too uncommon 
that people disagree for example about the rightness of a particular action 
and after a lengthy discussion come to suspect that there is a more 
fundamental disagreement that explains the original one. Persistent 
disagreements of type (ii) are even more readily explainable in the indicated 
way. Consider for example the persistent debates about abortion, death 
                                                                                                              
is difficult to show that disagreements of type (ii) are widespread, it seems at least as 
difficult to show that disagreements of type (iii) are widespread. The reason is that the 
only way to show that disagreements of the latter type are widespread seems to be to 
show that disagreements of the former type have this feature. That is to say, the 
prevalence of disagreements belonging to type (iii) will make it known through 
disagreements belonging to type (ii). However, in case disagreements of type (iii) are 
widespread, it might be suggested that they can be explained in the same way as 
persistent disagreements. 
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 penalty, euthanasia, eating meat or raising animals for food. These issues 
have been debated extensively without agreement having been reached. It 
therefore seems plausible to assume that the underlying reasons for such 
disagreements regularly are to be found in conflicting normative 
conceptions. Indeed, quite often these issues are explicitly debated in such 
terms.21
 Now, as R. M. Hare in particular has brought attention to, 
disagreements about normative conceptions have a remarkable feature.22 
This feature is relevant to the prospect of explaining persistent moral 
disagreements in terms of an error in relation to a moral property. In 
disagreements about normative conceptions, the antagonists have different 
views about the conditions under which a moral term applies. For example, 
one of them may embrace a utilitarian theory about the conditions under 
which ‘right’ applies, whereas the other may embrace a deontologist 
conception about this. We may also imagine cases where the antagonists 
embrace normative conceptions that differ more extensively, e.g. a 
theological view according to which these conditions consist in fulfilment of 
God’s will and a version of hedonism according to which they consist in 
satisfaction of purely sensuous pleasures. What is remarkable is that we 
conceive of people who have different—perhaps widely different—views of 
this kind to actually disagree. As regards non-moral terms, or at least as 
regards many such terms, we are less inclined towards such a conclusion. 
Consider a situation where two persons have quite different views about the 
conditions under which a certain non-moral term, ‘prime minister’ say, 
applies. For example, one holds that ‘prime minister’ applies to roughly the 
same individuals that we apply it to, whereas the other holds that the term 
applies to people who are, say, happy, rich and generous. A reasonable 
                                      
21 The view of persistent disagreements proposed in the present section—that they 
should be understood as expressions of conflicting normative conceptions—fits well with 
the idea suggested in the previous section, that moral disagreements, rather than being 
particularly widespread, are isolated phenomena which concern rather few but recurrent 
issues. Conflicting normative conceptions may often yield the same results—i.e. generally 
classify the same objects as having the same moral property—in most cases but come to 
contrary results in some others. It might then be argued that the cases where normative 
conceptions yield different results are precisely the rather few but recurrent cases about 
which there are persistent disagreements. It is in these cases the differences between 
various normative conceptions come to the surface. 
22 See e.g. Hare (1952), pp. 148–149. See also e.g. Blackburn (1984), p. 168; Schiffer 
(1990), pp. 609–610, and Tersman (2002), pp. 120–125. See also references to Hare 
below. 
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 conclusion to draw in such a case would probably be that they do not 
disagree because they do not take the term to have the same meaning. That 
is, we seem to believe that, since they do not take the term to have the same 
meaning, they do not refer to the same property and consequently do not 
disagree.  
 Thus, what is remarkable about moral terms is that we are inclined to 
say that people who have (widely) different normative conceptions—and 
hence (widely) different views about the conditions under which a moral 
term applies—actually disagree, whereas we are less inclined towards a 
corresponding view concerning (many) non-moral terms. I will call this 
phenomenon normative divergence.  
 It may now be asked if the version of the argument from moral 
disagreement that appeals to the persistence of moral disagreements can be 
responded to in the same way as the version that appeals to their being 
widespread. It may seem so. Like the appeal to prevalence, the appeal to 
persistence involves a covert comparison with disagreements in other areas. 
And also in other areas there are presumably persistent disagreements. It 
might consequently be thought that in so far as we are not inclined to the 
conclusion that properties involved in these disagreements do not exist, we 
should not draw that conclusion as regards moral properties either. 
However, the phenomenon of normative divergence suggests that persistent 
moral disagreements cannot be dismissed in this way even if there is not 
more persistent disagreement in the moral area than in other areas. 
 The reason is that, due to normative divergence, it is a particular 
problem of explaining persistent moral disagreements in terms of an error in 
relation to a certain moral property. As was noted earlier, as regards (many) 
non-moral terms, we are inclined to say that people who hold (widely) 
different views about the conditions under which a term applies do not 
disagree because they do not refer to the same property. It may then be asked why 
we as regards moral terms are inclined to believe that people do disagree in 
spite of their having (widely) different views of this kind. Given our 
response in the non-moral case, it seems that the best explanation cannot 
involve the assumption that people involved in a disagreement about 
normative conceptions refer to the same moral property in relation to which 
some of them are in error. On the contrary, it seems that there has to be 
something else that provides the best explanation of their disagreement. 
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  This reasoning finds support in a common way of thinking of the 
meaning of terms. We tend to assume that a term such as ‘prime minister’ 
applies to objects that we—at least if we are linguistically competent in 
respect of the term’s meaning—believe fulfil certain conditions in the form 
of having a certain set of properties. This set of properties is what we take to 
constitute the meaning of ‘prime minister’ and, hence, that to which the 
term refers. We also take this set of properties to be what makes up the 
property of being a prime minister. Consequently, if someone takes the 
term to apply to objects that have (widely) different properties than we take 
it to apply to, we assume that she does not refer to the property of being a 
prime minister, but to something else that she calls ‘prime minister’. And if 
we do not refer to the same property, we do not disagree. Applied to the 
moral case, this reasoning would mean that a moral term does not refer to a 
certain moral property error in respect of which we can explain 
disagreements concerning normative conceptions. Hence, it may be thought 
that such disagreements are best explained in some other way.  
 Moreover, it might be argued that the assumption that people who 
disagree about normative conceptions do not refer to the same property 
helps to explain why some moral disagreements are persistent. If people do 
not refer to the same property, it is only to be expected that they continue 
to disagree for the simple reason that they do not refer to a common subject 
matter in relation to which they can reach agreement.23
 Thus, according to this reasoning, if feature F in premise (2) of the 
argument from moral disagreement is understood to consist in moral 
disagreements being persistent, there is a version of the argument that seems 
more persuasive than the one that appeals to such disagreements being 
widespread. As we have seen, typically persistent disagreements directly 
concern, or can be accounted for in terms of, disagreements belonging to 
type (iii): disagreements about normative conceptions. Such disagreements 
are characterised by the phenomenon of normative divergence. For the 
reason submitted above, it therefore seems reasonable to assume that the 
best explanations of such disagreements do not imply that there is an error 
in relation to a moral property. If this is correct, there are no moral 
properties, according to the argument from moral disagreement.  
 Non-cognitivists who employ the distinction between a primary and 
                                      
23 Cf. Tersman (2002), p. 123. 
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 a secondary sense of moral terms may argue that they have the resources to 
provide a better explanation than one which involves the existence of moral 
properties. In fact, one of R. M. Hare’s most recurrent arguments for his 
version of non-cognitivism rests on an argument to this effect.24 Hare 
maintains that on the view that the meaning of a moral term is constituted 
by a set of non-moral properties, people who embrace different views about 
the conditions under which the term applies do not refer to the same 
property and hence do not disagree. He then appeals to the mentioned 
distinction to solve this problem. The primary sense of a moral term consists 
in a certain non-cognitive attitude, on Hare’s view a prescription. The 
secondary sense of a moral term consists in certain non-moral properties. 
These properties constitute the person’s moral criteria or the moral 
principles that determine towards which objects she has the non-cognitive 
attitude and hence to which object she applies the moral term. Formulated 
in terms of the vocabulary adopted above, they can be said to constitute her 
normative conception. Hare proposes that people may take the term to have 
the same primary sense, i.e. a non-cognitive attitude, but differ as regards 
the secondary sense they take it to have, i.e. differ in their normative 
conceptions. Accordingly, they may disagree in virtue of having conflicting 
non-cognitive attitudes while at the same time embrace different normative 
conceptions. 
 
7. The First Reductionist Explanation of Persistent Moral Disagreement 
In the last section, we saw that a powerful version of the argument from 
moral disagreement is obtained if feature F in premise (2) is taken to consist 
in moral disagreements being persistent. Advocates of the existence of moral 
properties should then dispute premise (3) in this version of the argument. 
In order to do so, they should offer a plausible kind of explanation of 
persistent disagreements which involves the assumption that there is an error 
in relation to a moral property. 
 In the last section, we also saw that the basic reason why the 
persistence of moral disagreements gives rise to a significant version of the 
argument from moral disagreement is its connection to the phenomenon of 
normative divergence. This indicates that a satisfying explanation of 
                                      
24 See e.g. Hare (1981), pp. 68–71; Hare (1997), pp. 54–60, 68–70, 136–137; Hare 
(1999 (1993)), pp. 5–10, and Hare (1999 (1996)), pp. 83–85. See also e.g. Stevenson 
(1963 (1948)), pp. 1–3, 8–9, and Stevenson (1963 (1937)), pp. 26–29.   
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 persistent disagreements has to comprise an account of this phenomenon. 
On the assumption that there are moral properties, this means that such an 
explanation has to comprise an account of how people who embrace 
(widely) different normative conceptions can refer to the same moral 
property and so how they can disagree in a way that is explainable in terms 
of the mentioned kind of error. 
 For reductionism primarily two types of explanations of moral 
disagreements are available. As we noted earlier, reductionism can be 
understood to state that the meaning or reference of a moral term ‘M’ is 
constituted by a non-moral property G, where G is identical with a moral 
property M.25 This implies that whether objects have M depends on two 
things: what non-moral property constitutes the meaning or reference of 
‘M’ and whether the objects have that property. Thus, if people are 
involved in any of the kind of disagreements mentioned in section 3, a 
reductionist explanation should primarily be either that they are in error 
about the meaning or reference of ‘M’, or that they are in error about some 
non-moral fact, i.e. some fact pertaining to the mentioned non-moral 
property.26  
 The two main forms of reductionism provide different explanations 
of the first kind, whereas the second kind of explanation is common to 
both. In this section, I will examine the first kind of explanation and in the 
next the second kind of explanation. 
 
Analytic reductionism  
According to analytic reductionism, the meaning of a moral term ‘M’ is 
constituted by a non-moral property G. The distinctive explanation analytic 
reductionism offers for why people morally disagree is provided in terms of 
an error concerning the meaning of the term thus understood. 
 On analytic reductionism, the explanation that some people who are 
                                      
25 I use the phrase ‘meaning or reference’ to indicate that reductionism exists in basically 
two versions: analytic and synthetic reductionism. 
26 There are other explanations that reductionists may employ to account for persistent 
moral disagreements. For example, they may propose that the error in question is due to 
a failure to draw the correct conclusion from the relevant premises. I doubt, however, 
that these explanations are of the significance that they would have any important 
implications for my arguments against reductionism. In what follows, I will argue that 
the two main types of explanations reductionists can employ fail. Even if there are other 
kinds of explanations that they can appeal to, I doubt that they would be sufficient to 
show that reductionism succeeds to account for persistent moral disagreements.  
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 involved in moral disagreements are mistaken about the meaning of a moral 
term indicates that they lack linguistic competence in respect of the term in 
the sense of not knowing what constitutes its meaning. This suggestion 
generates two problems. 
 Firstly, concerning most moral disagreements, it is implausible to 
maintain that people are not linguistically competent in the indicated way. 
Most noteworthy in the present context, it is untenable to understand those 
who hold erroneous normative conceptions as not knowing what the term 
in question means. For example, on the assumption that utilitarianism is the 
correct normative conception concerning rightness, we believe that those 
who oppose this view, deontologists for instance, are mistaken, but not that 
they do not know what ‘right’ means.  
  Secondly, the explanation under discussion suggests that moral 
disagreements are merely apparent. As we have seen, people who are 
mistaken about the meaning of the moral term at issue are not linguistically 
competent with respect to the term in the sense that they do not know 
what non-moral property constitutes its meaning. The proposed explanation 
then suggests that they take the term to refer to something else than it 
actually does. This, in turn, suggests that they and the people with whom 
they debate do not refer to the same property and hence do not disagree, 
but just talk past each other. This is unreasonable since we certainly 
conceive of the participants in such a debate as actually disagreeing. In 
particular, in relation to debates about normative conceptions, it is 
unreasonable to take, for instance, utilitarians and deontologists not to 
disagree, but just to talk past each other. 
 The last point is particularly important in relation to the phenomenon 
of normative divergence. As regards (many) non-moral terms, we are 
inclined to accept that people who have (widely) different views about the 
conditions under which such a term applies do not disagree. However, as 
we saw in the last section, this is not a conclusion towards which we are 
inclined when it comes to moral terms. The explanation analytic 
reductionism offers is therefore especially untenable with regard to such 
terms. Consequently, this explanation is unable to account for normative 
divergence. 
 According to David O. Brink, it is possible to disagree with people 
who embrace a moral view that on analytic reductionism would be 
107 
 expression of the meaning of a moral term. He writes:  
 
Suppose most speakers associate features X, Y, and Z with general term ‘G’. It ought to 
be possible for a heretical inquirer to express disagreement with the prevailing view. A 
speaker ought to be able to say that the very thing that most speakers use ‘G’ to refer to 
is not X, Y and Z, but rather is A, B and C (where ‘X, Y and Z’ and ‘A, B, and C’ have 
different extensions). However, this is ruled out by the traditional descriptional theory, 
for on this view the meaning and reference of ‘G’ is given by the description—X, Y, and 
Z—that is conventionally associated with ‘G’. The heretic’s claim would thus be 
analytically false. But certainly not all heretical claims are false—much less analytically 
false—as the progressive nature of various inquiries shows us.27
 
Brink’s argument can be understood in the following way. According to 
analytic reductionism as Brink understands it, the meaning of a moral term 
consists, roughly put, in the set of non-moral properties that competent 
speakers conventionally associate with the term. In Brinks view, it is 
possible for a person to disagree with people who embrace the prevailing 
moral conception and consequently to reject the conception expressed in 
the assumed meaning of such a term. That this is possible is shown by the 
fact that, through history, what was once the received moral opinion about 
various moral issues has later been reappraised and considered to be 
mistaken. However, this is impossible on analytic reductionism as Brink 
understands it, since a person who rejects such a view would have to take 
the term to refer to quite another set of non-moral properties than the one 
which constitutes its meaning. Hence, Brink claims, analytic reductionism is 
mistaken. In sections 10 and 11, we will see that, according to realism, it is 
possible to disagree about conceptions even if they express the received 
moral opinion.  
  
Synthetic reductionism  
According to synthetic reductionism, the reference of a moral term ‘M’ 
consists in a non-moral property G. The distinctive explanation synthetic 
reductionism offers for why people morally disagree is provided in terms of 
an error as regards the reference of the term thus understood. 
 This explanation does not suffer from the two main difficulties with 
the explanation analytic reductionism offers of moral disagreements. First, 
according to synthetic reductionism people who are mistaken about the 
reference of a moral term need not lack linguistic competence with regard 
                                      
27 Brink (2001), p. 159.  
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 to it. On this view, it is not part of this competence to know what non-
moral property constitutes its reference. This is something that is found in 
an investigation, the results of which linguistically competent persons do not 
necessarily have access to. Second, the explanation under discussion does 
not imply that moral disagreements are merely apparent because people refer 
differently with the moral term in question. As just mentioned, on this view 
it is not part of being linguistically competent with respect to a moral term 
to know what non-moral property constitutes its reference. This means that 
people may refer to this non-moral property with a moral term without 
necessarily knowing which this property is and even if they think that it 
consists in something quite else than in actually does. This leaves open the 
possibility that people may refer to the same non-moral property as those 
with whom they disagree while erroneously believing that the moral 
property consists in something else. Hence, the explanation under 
consideration allows for genuine moral disagreements. 
 Moreover, as the second comment suggests, synthetic reductionism 
seems able to account for the phenomenon of normative divergence.28 
According to this view, in contrast to analytic reductionism, people who 
embrace (widely) different normative conceptions, and hence have (widely) 
different views about the conditions under which a moral term applies, may 
refer to the same moral property. As suggested above, this is so since they 
may refer to the same non-moral property with the moral term in spite of 
the fact that some of them are mistaken about its reference and hence are 
mistaken about what conditions should be fulfilled for the term to apply. It 
might therefore be argued that on synthetic reductionism disagreements 
about normative conceptions are explainable in terms of an error in relation 
to a moral property. 
 However, I think it can be argued that synthetic reductionism has 
certain shortcomings.  
 Firstly, synthetic reductionism opposes our notion of what people 
who are involved in disagreements about normative conceptions refer to 
with moral terms. In chapter 3, I argued that on synthetic reductionism 
people refer with a moral term to a non-moral property that is specified by a 
                                      
28 This is often thought to be one of the main advantages of synthetic reductionism; see 
e.g. Adams (1981 (1979)), p. 112; Boyd (1988), pp. 209–210; Brink (2001), pp. 162–
163; Goldman (1988), p. 153; Merli (2002), p. 208, and Sayre-McCord (1997a), pp. 
269, 276, 281. Cf. Loeb (1998), pp. 294–295.  
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 particular normative theory. This view proves to be problematic in the cases 
where the antagonists in a moral disagreement embrace specific normative 
conceptions. To see this, consider the following example. Suppose that, as 
regards rightness, the normative theory in question is utilitarianism so that 
‘right’ refers to maximising happiness. Suppose further that a convinced 
utilitarian debate with a person who is equally convinced that utilitarianism 
is mistaken and that quite another normative conception is correct, e.g. a 
dedicated deontologist. According to synthetic reductionism, the 
deontologist then refers to maximising happiness when she uses ‘right’. 
Moreover, she does so without knowing it and in spite of her believing that 
rightness consists in something quite else. Consequences like this oppose, I 
think, our view of what people involved in disagreements over normative 
conceptions refer to with moral terms. Accordingly, I do not think we 
understand a person who is a sworn opponent to utilitarianism and 
convinced that another normative conception is correct to be referring to 
maximising happiness with ‘right’. In so far as we believe that she refers to a 
non-moral property that is specified by a particular normative theory at all, 
we take her to refer to quite another non-moral property, namely the one 
specified by the normative theory she embraces, in case there is such a 
theory. The deontologist would quite plausibly agree; in particular, she 
would strongly insist that she does not refer in a way that presumes the truth 
of utilitarianism.  
 Secondly, synthetic reductionism construes the contents of certain 
moral sentences accepted by participants in disagreements about normative 
conceptions in a way that opposes our notion of what the contents of these 
sentences consist in. This difficulty also has its origin in the view that people 
refer with a moral term to a non-moral property which is specified by a 
particular normative theory. To see this difficulty, imagine once again that a 
utilitarian and a deontologist are engaged in a debate about their normative 
conceptions. Suppose also that the normative theory that specifies the 
reference of ‘right’ is utilitarianism so that the term refers to maximising 
happiness. Let us first consider a kind of case that Ernest Sosa calls attention 
to.29 Suppose the deontologist utters the following sentence: ‘Only actions 
that comply with the deontological conception are right’. According to 
synthetic reductionism, she has then produced a sentence with the following 
                                      
29 Sosa (1997), p. 310. 
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 content: ‘Only actions that comply with the deontological conception 
maximise happiness’. As Sosa remarks, ‘This is hard to believe’. However, 
this is not the end of the matter. Suppose the utilitarian says: ‘Actions that 
maximise happiness are right’. According to the view under consideration, 
she has then produced a tautology: ‘Actions that maximise happiness are 
such that they maximise happiness’. Moreover, suppose the deontologist 
utters the following sentence: ‘Actions that are right don’t maximise 
happiness’. According to synthetic reductionism, she has then produced a 
contradiction: ‘Actions that maximise happiness don’t maximise happiness’. 
Also this is hard to believe. As noted several times, on synthetic 
reductionism people may refer to a non-moral property with a moral term 
without necessarily knowing which this property is. Hence, the participants 
in the disagreement need not, and presumably do not, understand 
themselves to utter sentences that have these contents. Yet, I think synthetic 
reductionism construes the contents of these sentences in a way that opposes 
our notion of what these sentences plausibly can be taken to say.30
 These two arguments have implications for the prospect of synthetic 
reductionism to account for normative divergence. Normative divergence 
concerns disagreements about normative conceptions. Since the two 
arguments indicate that synthetic reductionism misconstrues disagreements 
about normative conceptions, there is reason to believe that it fails to 
account for normative divergence. 
 Advocates of synthetic reductionism may argue that they can counter 
these objections by providing an explanation of why it is reasonable to 
understand people to be referring to a non-moral property with a moral 
term in the way synthetic reductionism states. As we saw in chapter 3, 
synthetic reductionism claims that we refer to a certain non-moral property 
with a moral term in so far as our use of the term is causally regulated by 
that non-moral property. Return to the example of a disagreement 
                                      
30 It should be noted that according to the view of the reference of natural kind terms 
mentioned in chapter 3, a person who uses a natural kind term, e.g. ‘water’, refers to a 
natural kind, e.g. H2O, without necessarily knowing it and even if she believes that what 
she refers to consists in something else. Hence, this view has implications similar to that 
of synthetic reductionism. I will not discuss this issue here, but two comments are worth 
making. First, I think implications like those considered above are intuitively more 
problematic as regards moral terms than as regards natural kind terms. Second, it might 
be argued that there are differences between natural kind terms and moral terms that 
explain this. According to one such explanation, moral terms have quite other functions 
than natural kind terms. 
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 concerning normative conceptions above. There are considerable 
differences between the normative conceptions defended by the utilitarian 
and the deontologist. However, in spite of these differences, it might be 
maintained that their use of the term is causally regulated by the same non-
moral property, in the example above that of maximising happiness. More 
precisely, it might be argued that maximising happiness is causally 
responsible for certain reference-fixing characteristics that both of them 
utilise to apply ‘right’ and so that both their use is causally regulated by this 
non-moral property. This explanation, synthetic reductionists may contend, 
makes it reasonable to claim that people who embrace different normative 
conceptions do refer to the same non-moral property, despite the two 
objections mentioned above. 
 However, rather than providing a plausible response to the two 
objections, I think this argument suggests that synthetic reductionism is 
vulnerable to an additional objection. There is reason to believe that people 
may disagree about their normative conceptions even if these conceptions 
are so different that it is implausible to assume that their use of the moral 
term in question is causally regulated by the same non-moral property.31 
This is problematic for synthetic reductionists because they are committed 
to the view that people whose use of a moral term is not causally regulated 
by the same non-moral property—for example because they embrace 
widely different normative conceptions—do not refer to the same property 
and hence do not disagree. This indicates that synthetic reductionism is 
unable to account for how people with (widely) different normative 
conceptions can disagree. It reinforces thus the contention suggested above: 
that synthetic reductionism is incapable of accounting for normative 
divergence. 
 To illustrate the mentioned kind of situation, consider a case where 
people debate about normative conceptions that differ more thoroughly 
than the normative conceptions embraced by the utilitarian and the 
                                      
31 In this regard moral terms might be contrasted with natural kind terms like ‘water’. I 
think we might be prepared to accept that if people’s beliefs differ widely in the relevant 
respect, their use of the term ‘water’ is not causally regulated by the same stuff (H2O) 
and that they therefore do not refer to the same thing. In the moral case, we might be 
inclined to say that if people’s normative conceptions differ widely, their use of the term 
‘right’ is not causally regulated by the same non-moral property. However, we do not 
take this to mean that they do not refer to the same property and that they cannot 
disagree as regards rightness. 
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 deontologist.32 Imagine, for example, that a person advocates a theological 
normative conception according to which the rightness of actions consists in 
their fulfilling God’s will, where this is understood in terms of the Old 
Testament. Suppose she debates her moral outlook with a person who 
advocates a version of hedonism according to which the rightness of actions 
consists in their bringing about purely sensuous pleasures. Assume further 
that they follow their respective normative conceptions reliably in the sense 
that they apply ‘right’ in accordance with their respective view. Considering 
the difference between their normative conceptions, they presumably apply 
‘right’ rather differently. In such a case, it does not seem plausible to assume 
that their use of ‘right’ is causally regulated by the same non-moral property. 
In particular, it does not seem plausible to assume that a particular non-
moral property—such as maximising happiness—is causally responsible for 
certain reference-fixing characteristics which both of them utilise when they 
apply the term. On synthetic reductionism, this would mean that they do 
not refer to the same non-moral property with the term and therefore do 
not disagree. Yet, I think we are inclined to say that they do disagree and 
consequently refer to the same property with ‘right’. 
 Advocates of synthetic reductionism may reply to this argument by 
maintaining that there are explanations of how people can have their use of 
a moral term causally regulated by the same non-moral property in spite of 
their embracing widely different normative conceptions. In particular, they 
might argue that people’s beliefs about the relevant non-moral facts can 
differ in such a way that the mentioned kind of situation occurs. 
 It should be admitted that it is difficult to outright demonstrate that 
such explanations are not available. However, given that people’s normative 
conceptions may differ extensively and that they are faithful to these views 
when they apply the moral term in question, it seems questionable whether 
such differences generally are explainable in the suggested way. Moreover, 
                                      
32 This argument is similar to the one directed against synthetic reductionism in chapter 
3 and to the argument Horgan and Timmons direct against this view; see e.g. Horgan 
and Timmons (1992b), pp. 240–248. However, the arguments are distinct. The former 
argument is, briefly put, that people whose use of a moral term is causally regulated by 
different non-moral properties may disagree, and they refer consequently to the same 
property. My argument here is, briefly put, that the difference between people’s 
normative conceptions might be so extensive that it is implausible to assume that their 
use of the moral term in question is causally regulated by the same non-moral property. 
However, in spite of this, they may disagree, and they refer consequently to the same 
property. 
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 in the next section I will argue that people who are involved in moral 
disagreements, particularly those involved in disagreements about normative 
conceptions, may take a moral term to refer to the same property and yet 
not differ as regards any relevant non-moral beliefs.  
 
8. The Second Reductionist Explanation of Persistent Moral Disagreement 
As we have seen, for reductionists there are two principal ways to explain 
moral disagreements: an error as regards meaning or reference of a moral 
term and an error as regards non-moral facts. In the last section, I argued 
that the first kind of reductionist explanation fails to provide the required 
explanation of persistent disagreements. In this section, I will investigate 
whether the second kind of reductionist explanation succeeds in doing so.33  
 Let us first notice an implication of this kind of explanation. Suppose 
two persons disagree in any of the ways mentioned in section 3. Suppose 
further that neither of them is mistaken as regards the meaning or reference 
of a moral term. Reductionists are then likely to suggest that the 
disagreement is explainable in terms of an error as regards some non-moral 
fact. This explanation implies that people who disagree differ concerning at 
least one non-moral belief pertaining to such a fact. 
 It should be admitted that an error as regards non-moral facts 
presumably provides a plausible explanation of a number of moral 
disagreements. We may assume that it explains many disagreements of type 
(i); for instance, the fact that people disagree as to whether a particular 
action is right can be explained by some of them having erroneous non-
moral beliefs about it. The reason why people entertain erroneous beliefs of 
this kind might for example be that they are influenced by self-deception 
and egoistic motives. More interestingly, errors as regards non-moral facts 
also seem suitable to explain a number of widespread disagreements of type 
(ii); for instance, the fact that people in different cultures disagree as regards 
the rightness of certain types of actions might be explained by some of them 
having erroneous non-moral beliefs about these actions. People might for 
example entertain erroneous non-moral beliefs about the relevant 
consequences of a certain kind of actions because knowledge about these 
consequences is very hard to acquire or because they are influenced by 
                                      
33 This kind of explanation is proposed by e.g. Brink (1989), pp. 202–203; Ross (1939), 
pp. 16–17, and Shafer-Landau (2003), pp. 218–219. This kind of explanation is criticised 
by e.g. Hare (1997), pp. 68–69, 73–78, and Loeb (1998), pp. 283–284, 290. 
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 certain culturally transmitted prejudices. 
 However, there is one significant difficulty with this kind of 
explanation. The basic reason is that it seems that people who are involved 
in moral disagreements can take a moral term to have the same meaning or 
reference and yet not differ concerning any relevant non-moral beliefs.  
 Let us first notice, as Charles L. Stevenson in particular has drawn 
attention to, that the mentioned kind of situation is conceivable.34 The 
following example can be used to illustrate this. Suppose that two persons 
have disputed for quite a while as to whether a certain action, or a certain 
kind of actions, is right without having reached agreement. They both take 
‘right’ to have the same meaning or reference, something that is confirmed 
by the fact that both of them are considered as linguistically competent in 
respect of them term. Since they believe that they take ‘right’ to have the 
same meaning or reference, they assume that the explanation of their 
disagreement is to be found in their differing as regards some relevant non-
moral beliefs. They then ask themselves if they have different beliefs about, 
for example, the consequences of the type of actions under dispute or the 
intentions with which such actions typically are performed. But they do not 
find any non-moral belief that explains why they disagree. As a matter of 
fact, there is no such belief; they agree about all relevant non-moral beliefs. 
 It seems reasonable to suppose that situations as the one described are 
not merely conceivable, but actually occur at times. Sometimes we seem to 
be involved in moral disputes where we take the moral term in question as 
having the same meaning or reference, and hence genuinely disagree, but 
yet cannot find any difference in relevant non-moral beliefs. It is notable 
that in such situations we are inclined to say that we disagree because we 
embrace fundamentally different views about moral matters. Formulated in 
the terms employed here, we disagree because we embrace different 
normative conceptions. This may be taken to suggest that disagreements 
about normative conceptions cannot be explained merely in terms of 
differing non-moral beliefs.  
 It is notable that as regards non-moral terms, or at least as regards 
many non-moral terms, the mentioned kind of situation does not seem to 
                                      
34 See Stevenson (1944), esp. chap. 1; Stevenson (1963 (1938)), pp. 51–54, and 
Stevenson (1963 (1948)), pp. 5, 7–9. This view is also suggested by Hare; see previous 
references. See also e.g. Darwall (2003), p. 11; Loeb (1998), p. 290; Tersman (2002), p. 
32, and Wedgwood (2001), pp. 27–29. 
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 be conceivable, much less occur. Suppose, for example, that two persons 
disagree as to whether a certain individual is a prime minister. On the 
assumption that they both take the term ‘prime minister’ to have the same 
meaning or reference, it seems that they have to differ as regards some 
relevant ‘non-prime minister belief’. It seems difficult to come to think of a 
situation where people disagree whether a certain individual is a prime 
minister, take the term to have the same meaning or reference, and yet do 
not differ in the mentioned respect. 
 As Stevenson suggests, the observed phenomenon may be thought to 
give support to non-cognitivism. The reason is that people on this view 
may hold the same non-moral beliefs and yet disagree morally in virtue of 
differing with regard to the non-cognitive attitude that constitutes the 
(primary) meaning of the moral term in question.35
 Above it was suggested that the mentioned type of phenomena is 
conceivable, and may occur, in relation to disagreements as to the moral 
property of a particular object or a certain kind of objects, i.e. disagreements 
of type (i) and (ii). However, it is presumably even more likely to occur in 
relation to disagreements about normative conceptions, i.e. disagreements of 
type (iii). This is important in the present context, since persistent 
disagreements typically concern, or are explainable in terms of, 
disagreements about normative conceptions. It seems especially implausible 
to characterise disagreements about normative conceptions in a way that 
makes them explainable merely in terms of differing non-moral beliefs. The 
main reason is that disagreements about such views, rather than being 
concerned with purely non-moral facts, seem fundamentally moral in 
nature. As D. Loeb remarks, ‘consider the debate between Kantians and 
utilitarians. It seems very unlikely that the continued existence of this debate 
hinges upon disagreement over the non-moral facts.’36
 This contention finds support if we consider some of the arguments 
presented in debates about normative conceptions. As an illustration, reflect 
on the well-known arguments put forward against utilitarianism, e.g. that it 
threatens personal integrity and special relationships like love and friendship 
or that it is too demanding. It would be far-fetched to consider these 
arguments as intended to point out that some purely non-moral facts are or 
                                      
35 See references to Stevenson above. 
36 Loeb (1998), p. 290.  
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 are not the case. Rather, these arguments seem typically to concern moral 
notions in the sense that they are meant to call attention to which non-
moral properties, in some sense, contribute to, or fail to contribute to, 
actions being right. Put somewhat more exactly, they seem primarily 
intended to draw attention to either of two types of cases. Either that a 
certain non-moral property (e.g. keeping a promise) contributes to actions 
being right, but that this fact is not accommodated by utilitarianism. Or that 
a certain non-moral property does not, at least not always, contribute to 
actions being right, but that utilitarianism implies so; that is, it might be 
argued that what contributes to actions being right is not that they maximise 
happiness, at least not always. 
 
9. A Note on Relativism  
In the preceding two sections, I have argued that reductionists are not 
successful in rejecting the pertinent version of the argument from moral 
disagreement by opposing premise (3) of the argument. At this point, 
reductionist may want to take a step back and question something that is 
tacitly presumed in premise (1), namely that there are any moral 
disagreements of the relevant kind in the first place. This response to the 
argument may be proposed by reductionists who advocate relativism.37
 We may start with considering, in bare outline, what the operative 
feature of the relevant type of relativism amounts to. To illustrate, suppose 
that a person asserts a moral sentence in which rightness is ascribed to an 
action. According to the type of relativism at issue, a person who appears to 
deny the sentence may not really be doing so. The reason is that morality is 
relative, with the consequence that she uses ‘right’ in such a way that it has a 
different meaning or reference than the term has when it is used by the 
person who asserts the sentence. To put it very roughly, one person uses the 
term in such a way that its meaning or reference consists in one non-moral 
property, whereas the other uses it in such a way that its meaning or 
reference consists in another non-moral property.38 Accordingly, morality is 
relative in a way that allows that they do not actually disagree as to the 
                                      
37 For this line of reasoning, see e.g. Harman in Harman and Thomson (1996), pp. 8–
19, and Wong (1984), esp. chap. 9–11.  
38 However, this should not be understood to imply that they are aware that their usage 
of ‘right’ differs in this way. 
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 rightness of the action, although it might appear that they do so disagree.39
 This characterisation of the operative feature of the relevant kind of 
relativism needs undoubtedly to be refined in a number of ways. Especially, 
it should be made explicit what the relativity of morality amounts to. This 
can be done in a variety of ways. According to Gilbert Harman, morality is 
relative because of the existence of various ‘moral frameworks’. More 
precisely, ‘a judgment of the form, it would be morally wrong of P to D, has to 
be understood as elliptical for a judgment of the form, in relation to moral 
framework M, it would be morally wrong of P to D. Similarly for other moral 
judgments.’40 According to the version of relativism that is relevant here, 
‘framework M’ can be taken to consist in a normative conception which 
states that the moral property in question, e.g. rightness, is constituted by a 
certain non-moral property. It may then be assumed that a moral term such 
as ‘right’ varies in meaning or reference depending on which the normative 
conception in question is. Moreover, the present version of relativism says 
that there are various normative conceptions, which claim that the moral 
property in question is constituted by different non-moral properties, and 
that these conceptions are equally correct. 
 How the relevant type of relativism makes use of the operative 
feature mentioned above in order to reject the argument from moral 
disagreement depends partly on which kind of moral disagreement that is 
appealed to in the version of the argument at issue. On the version of the 
argument which concerns us here, this is persistent disagreements. Such 
disagreements are typically expressions of different normative conceptions, 
as we have seen earlier. As just indicated, relativists may then claim that 
people who embrace different normative conceptions use ‘right’ in such a 
way that its meaning or reference consists in different non-moral properties. 
It follows that they do not disagree. It can then be argued that, contrary to 
what premise (1) implicitly suggests, there are no relevant moral 
disagreements, i.e. no disagreements of the sort that is appealed to in the 
present version of the argument from moral disagreement. Thus, it might be 
                                      
39 Of course, they may disagree in other respects; for example, they may disagree in the 
sense of having diverging attitudes. 
40  Harman in Harman and Thomson (1996), p. 4. David Wong proposes similar 
analyses for ‘morally ought’ and ‘morally good’: Wong (1984), chap. 4–6. Cf. Garcia 
(1988), pp. 269–271; Lyons (1982), pp. 211–213, and Sayre-McCord (1991), pp. 161–
163. Needless to say, there are other versions of relativism than the one considered here; 
for example, relativism need perhaps not be reductionist. 
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 maintained that there are no relevant disagreements that are to be best 
explained in terms of an error with respect to a moral property. Hence, the 
argument cannot be used to show that there are no moral properties. 
 Relativism undoubtedly requires much more attention than I am able 
to give it here. However, some simple standard arguments indicate that 
reductionism should not make use of this view to respond to the argument 
from moral disagreement.41
 Firstly, it runs counter to one of our fundamental convictions about 
morality, namely that there are moral disagreements of the mentioned kind. 
Suppose two persons debate whether a certain type of actions, e.g. abortion, 
is right. Surely, we conceive of them as disagreeing and not only talking past 
each other because they embracing different normative conceptions.42 In 
the like manner, we conceive of a person who asserts a sentence to the 
effect that abortion is right to be agreeing with a person who accepts the 
sentence, even if they embrace different normative conceptions. The same 
reasoning applies in the cases where people debate normative conceptions as 
such. For instance, we take the utilitarian and the deontologist to be 
disagreeing, not just talking past each other.  
 In this connection, it should also be pointed out that relativism is 
incompatible with normative divergence, since it implies that people 
involved in debates about normative conceptions do not disagree.  
 Moreover, relativism suggests implausibly that debates about moral 
matters are pointless. On this view, it would be pointless for a person to 
debate whether a certain type of actions is right with someone who 
                                      
41 It might perhaps be doubted whether relativism is an instance of reductionism. On a 
relativist view of a moral property such as rightness, there is more than one non-moral 
property that constitutes the meaning or reference of ‘right’. There is thus not one moral 
property, rightness, which is identical with a particular non-moral property. Rather, for 
each meaning or reference of ‘right’ there is a non-moral property. There is thus one 
property, right1, which is identical with a certain non-moral property, a further property, 
right2, which is identical with another non-moral property, and so forth. However, I 
will not dwell on this issue as it does not seem particularly important to the present 
discussion. In this context, it can also be noted that just as there might be a relativist 
version of reductionism, there might perhaps be a relativist version of realism. On this 
view, there are several moral properties of a certain kind, e.g. right1, right2, and so forth, 
where each such moral property is irreducible to a non-moral property. Hence, it is not 
the case that each such moral property is identical with a certain non-moral property. 
However, for each of these moral properties, there might be analogues to the realist 
formula which state that different sets of non-moral properties make actions right1, 
right2, etc.  
42 Of course, this is a common objection against relativism; see e.g. Lyons (1982), p. 
222, and Sturgeon (1994), pp. 97, 99–100.  
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 advocates another normative conception for the simple reason that they 
would not disagree but only talk past each other. For the same reason, it 
would be pointless for people who embrace different normative conceptions 
to argue about these conceptions as such. However, we find moral debates 
meaningful to pursue even when we discuss with people who hold quite 
different normative conceptions than we do. For example, a utilitarian finds 
it presumably meaningful to debate whether abortion is right with someone 
who judges abortion differently because she holds another normative 
conception; indeed, she may even find it more to the point to debate with 
someone who holds a different normative conception. Likewise, advocates 
of different normative conceptions find it meaningful to debate normative 
conceptions as such. 
 In reply to these objections, relativists may point to two 
considerations that they believe talk in favour of their view. 
 First, they may argue that they are able to explain what is troubling 
with persistent disagreements.43 Relativists may explain how it can be that 
people debate certain moral issues extensively without reaching agreement 
by suggesting that they talk about different things; if people talk about 
different things, it is not very surprising that they do not agree, as they do 
not debate some common subject matter about which they can reach 
agreement. 
 In response to this argument, it should be pointed out that even if 
relativism can explain why people involved in persistent disagreements do 
not reach agreement, it is unable to explain why they continue to debate. 
Assuming relativism, if people have debated an issue extensively without 
having reached agreement, it seems that they should have come to the 
conclusion that they talk about different things and accordingly brought the 
debate to an end.  
  Moreover, advocates of relativism may argue that this view offers the 
only alternative for those who want to uphold the existence of moral 
properties. As we have seen in the preceding two sections, non-relativist 
reductionism fails to respond to the version of argument from moral 
disagreement at issue. Thus, if we adhere to this view we have to accept the 
conclusion of the argument: that there are no moral properties. Relativists 
avoid the argument by arguing that there are no disagreements of the 
                                      
43 Cf. Harman in Harman and Thomson (1996), p. 11. 
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 relevant kind. They may admit that with relativism follows some undesired 
consequences, but maintain that these have to be accepted to save the 
existence of moral properties. 
 This argument rests on the presumption that there is no other way to 
reject the argument from moral disagreement than those offered by non-
relativist reductionism and relativism. Against this presupposition, I will in 
the next three sections argue that realism provides a way of disputing the 
argument from moral disagreement under consideration which does not 
have the drawbacks of either of these views.  
 
10. A Realist Account of Normative Divergence 
In section 6, we saw that if feature F in premise (2) of the argument from 
moral disagreement is assumed to consist in moral disagreements being 
persistent, a significant version of this argument is obtained. In order to 
reject it, advocates of the existence of moral properties should dispute 
premise (3) of the argument thus understood by offering a plausible 
explanation of persistent disagreements in terms of an error in relation to a 
moral property. In sections 7 and 8, I argued that reductionism fails to 
provide such an explanation. In the previous section, I argued that 
reductionism should not take support on relativism to evade the argument. 
In this and the two subsequent sections, I will argue that realism is able to 
provide the required explanation and hence is capable of rejecting premise 
(3).  
 We noticed in section 6 that the main reason why the persistence of 
moral disagreements can be appealed to in the argument from moral 
disagreement is its close connection to normative divergence. For this 
reason an explanation of persistent disagreements has to comprise an account 
of this phenomenon. We also noticed that the failure of reductionism to 
account for normative divergence is one of the main reasons why it is 
unable to explain persistent disagreements. I start therefore in this section 
with a realist account of normative divergence and continue in the two next 
sections with a realist explanation of persistent disagreements. 
 Normative divergence, we may recall, is the phenomenon that people 
who hold (widely) different normative conceptions—and hence have 
(widely) different views about the conditions under which a moral term 
applies—nonetheless may disagree. By contrast, as regards (many) non-
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 moral terms, we regard people who hold (widely) different views about the 
conditions under which such a term applies not to be disagreeing because 
they take the term in case to have different meanings and, hence, do not 
refer to the same property. It might therefore be argued that normative 
divergence means that persistent disagreements needs to be explained in 
some other way than in terms of an error in relation to a moral property.  
 On the realist account of normative divergence, people who hold 
different normative conceptions may take the moral term in question to 
have the same meaning and may accordingly refer to the same property. 
Despite what the comparison with non-moral terms suggests, their 
disagreements can thus be explained in terms of an error in relation to a 
moral property. The suggestion of how this is possible is, roughly put, that 
the conditions under which people employ a moral term so as to have the 
same meaning and, hence, refer to the same property, are, in a certain 
respect, less specific as compared with (many) non-moral terms.  
 When it comes to non-moral terms, the meaning of a term might be 
stated by necessary and sufficient conditions that yield an analytically 
necessary biconditional. This suggests that people who have (widely) diverse 
views about these conditions do not refer to the same property with the 
term. Admittedly, the conditions that constitute the meaning of a non-
moral term need not be so strict so as to yield an analytically necessary 
biconditional. Yet, concerning (many) non-moral terms, they are so strict 
that it is not possible for people to have different views—at least not widely 
different views—about the conditions under which such a term applies and 
still refer to the same property. Hence, it is not possible for people who 
hold (widely) different views of this kind to disagree. 
  However, the conditions under which people employ a moral term 
to have the same meaning, and hence refer to the same property, are not 
specified in that way. In particular, there are reasons to believe that, contrary 
to what analytic reductionism implies, no analytically necessary 
biconditional involving a moral property and a non-moral property holds. 
Instead the relevant aspect of the meaning of moral terms is captured in the 
realist formula.  
 We may illustrate how the realist account of normative divergence 
works as regards the meaning of a particular moral term, ‘right’. In relation 
to this term, the realist formula says, roughly put, the following: (i) It is 
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 analytically necessary that if an action is right, there is a set of non-moral 
properties G such that (A) the action has G, and (B) it is synthetically 
necessary that whatever action has G is right. (ii) Rightness is not identical 
with any non-moral property. 
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, I think it is reasonable to 
suggest that the set of non-moral properties mentioned in the realist formula 
is of the kind specified by normative conceptions. Thus, on the realist 
formula, when people assert that an action is right, they can be understood 
to claim that it has a set of non-moral properties—i.e. a set of non-moral 
properties of the kind involved in a normative conception—such that it is 
synthetically necessary that whatever action has that set of non-moral 
properties is right. In the last chapter, it was also implied that on the realist 
formula, there is not one particular set of non-moral properties that actions 
must have whenever they are right. Rather, on this view people who assert 
that an action is right can be understood to claim that the action has some set 
of non-moral properties—some set of non-moral properties of the kind 
involved in a normative conception—such that it is synthetically necessary 
that whatever action has that set of non-moral properties is right. 
 Thus, that people use ‘right’ in accordance with the realist formula 
does thus not imply that they refer to a particular set of non-moral 
properties that is involved in a normative conception. On the contrary, the 
formula allows that people who advocate different—even widely different—
normative conceptions nevertheless may refer to the same property with the 
term. It is accordingly possible for them to disagree in respect of rightness in 
spite of their embracing (widely) different normative conceptions. 
 Above I suggested that the set of non-moral properties mentioned in 
the realist formula is of the kind specified by normative conceptions. 
According to this view, people who disagree about normative conceptions 
consequently disagree about what such a set of non-moral properties consists 
in. In the preceding chapter, I mentioned that the realist formula can be 
understood to say that a set of non-moral properties makes objects have a 
moral property, such as rightness. On this account, advocates of different 
normative conceptions can accordingly be said to disagree about what 
makes actions right. This suggestion can be specified further. It might be 
proposed that implications like (B) in the realist formula are expressions of 
normative conceptions. That is, advocates of different normative 
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 conceptions can be understood to have differing views of what the set of 
non-moral properties referred to in such an implication consists in and 
consequently whether such an implication holds.44  
 On the realist account, a disagreement between two persons about 
normative conceptions with regard to rightness can be understood to 
involve two aspects. First, both of them refer with ‘right’ in accordance 
with the realist formula. Roughly put, in asserting that an action is right, 
they claim that it has a set of non-moral properties—some set of non-moral 
properties of the kind involved in a normative conception—such that it is 
synthetically necessary that if an action has that set of non-moral properties, 
it is right. In virtue of this, they refer to the same property, rightness, and 
can consequently disagree. Second, they disagree as to whether a certain set 
of non-moral properties makes actions right. More exactly, they disagree as 
to whether a synthetically necessary implication of the kind (B) holds. In 
virtue of this, they disagree about normative conceptions. 
 
11. A Realist Explanation of Persistent Moral Disagreement   
In the previous section, I argued that realism is able to account for 
normative divergence. In the present section, we can continue with 
considering how realism can explain persistent moral disagreements.  
 Let us start by briefly recalling the two primary kinds of explanations 
reductionists offer of moral disagreements. According to reductionism, the 
meaning or reference of a moral term ‘M’ is constituted by a non-moral 
property G. This means that whether objects have a moral property M 
depends on two things: what non-moral property constitutes the meaning 
or reference of ‘M’ and whether objects have that non-moral property. 
Reductionists may then suggest that people disagree because of an error as 
regards the meaning or reference of the term or because of an error as 
regards some non-moral fact pertaining to the mentioned non-moral 
property. It might be observed that only the first of these considerations 
concerns what constitutes the moral property. 
 According to the realist formula, the meaning or reference of a moral 
term does not consist in a particular non-moral property. This means, as we 
shall see, that realism is able to explain persistent moral disagreements in a 
                                      
44 This account should not be taken to imply that they consciously think of the 
disagreement in terms of such an implication. 
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 manner that directly concerns what constitutes a moral property in another 
way than reductionism. 
 Let us now consider how realism can account for persistent moral 
disagreements. Because of the tight connection between such disagreements 
and normative divergence, what was said in the last section has already 
given a hint of this explanation. I will use ‘right’ to illustrate this 
explanation, but I think it applies to other moral terms as well. 
  According to realism, people involved in a persistent moral 
disagreement in relation to rightness take ‘right’ to have the meaning and 
reference as stated in the realist formula. Hence, the error that explains the 
disagreement does not consist in an error concerning the meaning or 
reference of the term. Neither does it consist in an error concerning non-
moral facts, so the explanation of the disagreement is not to be found there 
either. Rather, what explains their disagreement is an error concerning what 
makes actions right, where ‘make’ is understood in accordance with the 
realist formula. More precisely, it is an error as regards the kind of 
implication (B) in the realist formula, i.e. an error as to whether it is 
synthetically necessary that if actions have a certain set of non-moral 
properties, it is right. 
 We may now see that the realist explanation does not have the 
difficulties of the reductionist explanations. Let us first see why this is so in 
relation to the first kind of explanation reductionism employs. 
 Consider first this kind of explanation when employed by analytic 
reductionism. Analytic reductionism has, as we saw in section 7, mainly two 
problems in relation to this kind of explanation. First, it suggests that some 
people involved in debates concerning rightness are linguistically 
incompetent in respect of the meaning of ‘right’. Second, it suggests that 
people involved in such debates do not really disagree because they do not 
refer to the same property with the term. As a consequence of the last 
difficulty, analytic reductionism is unable to account for normative 
divergence. 
 The realist explanation of persistent moral disagreements does not 
have these difficulties. First, it does not imply that some people involved in 
debates concerning rightness are linguistically incompetent in the sense of 
not knowing the meaning of ‘right’. According to the realist explanation, it 
can be assumed that people involved in such debates are linguistically 
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 competent with respect to the term in so far as they know its meaning as it 
is stated in the realist formula. Second, it does not imply that people do not 
disagree because they do not refer the same property. According to the 
realist explanation, they refer to the same property with ‘right’, viz. to 
rightness as the property is characterised in the realist formula, and they may 
thus disagree in the relevant respect. The last point is especially important 
since it indicates that realism, unlike analytic reductionism, is able to 
account for normative divergence.  
 Moreover, the realist explanation is not vulnerable to Brink’s 
argument against analytic reductionism. As Brink understands that view, it 
says that the meaning of a moral term consists in the set of non-moral 
properties that competent speakers conventionally associate with the term. 
Brink argues that it is possible to disagree with people who embrace the 
prevailing moral conception and consequently to reject the conception 
expressed in the assumed meaning of such a term. However, on analytic 
reductionism as Brinks understands it, this is not possible, since the meaning 
of a moral term consists in a set of non-moral properties of the mentioned 
kind. However, according to the realist explanation, this is possible, since 
the meaning of a moral term is not constituted by such a set of non-moral 
properties. Furthermore, according to the account offered by realism, 
people may disagree even if they embrace widely different moral 
conceptions. 
 Consider next the first kind of reductionist explanation when 
employed by synthetic reductionism. As we saw in section 7, synthetic 
reductionism has mainly three difficulties in relation to this explanation. 
First, it opposes our notion of what people who are involved in 
disagreements about normative conceptions refer to with ‘right’. Second, it 
construes the content of certain sentences concerning normative 
conceptions in a way that opposes our notion of what these sentences say. 
Finally, contrary to what synthetic reductionism implies, people who 
embrace widely different normative conceptions may disagree even if their 
use of ‘right’ is not causally regulated by the same non-moral property. 
Particularly as a consequence of the last difficulty, synthetic reductionism 
fails to account for normative divergence.  
 I think it can be argued that the realist explanation does not have 
these difficulties.  
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  Let us start with the first problem for synthetic reductionism 
mentioned above. The source of this difficulty is the view that people refer 
with a moral term such as ‘right’ to a non-moral property of the kind 
specified by a normative theory. Realists oppose this view because they 
believe that ‘right’ does not refer to such a non-moral property; indeed, in 
their view, the term does not refer to a particular non-moral property at all. 
To see the relevance of this difference between synthetic reductionism and 
realism to the problem under discussion, we may return to the example 
mentioned in section 7. In this example, ‘right’ refers to maximising 
happiness according to synthetic reductionism, and a utilitarian and a 
deontologist debate their normative conceptions. Synthetic reductionism 
implies then implausibly that the deontologist refers to maximising 
happiness with ‘right’. According to the realist explanation, this is not the 
case. Rather, the deontologist refers to rightness as the property is 
characterised in the realist formula. Roughly put, in asserting that an action 
is right, she claims that it has a set of non-moral properties such that it 
makes actions right. Moreover, she holds that the normative conception she 
embraces specifies a set of non-moral properties that makes actions right. 
Hence, the realist explanation does not have the untenable consequence of 
synthetic reductionism.  
 Let us next consider the problem that synthetic reductionism 
construes the content of certain sentences relating to normative conceptions 
in a way that opposes our notion of what these sentences say. This difficulty 
has the same source as the first one. Realism is not susceptible to this 
difficulty because, again, it does not take ‘right’ to refer to a non-moral 
property that is specified by a normative theory. To see the relevance of this 
difference between synthetic reductionism and realism, we may return to 
one of the examples mentioned in section 7. In this example, it was once 
more assumed that ‘right’ according to synthetic reductionism refers to 
maximising happiness. It was further assumed that a utilitarian utters the 
sentence ‘Actions that maximise happiness are right’. According to synthetic 
reductionism, this sentence says then, implausibly, ‘Actions that maximise 
happiness are such that they maximise happiness’. However, according to 
realism ‘right’ in the first sentence does not refer to maximising happiness or 
any other non-moral property that is specified by a normative theory. 
Rather, it refers to rightness as this property is characterised in the realist 
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 formula. As a consequence, realists do not construe the sentence in the same 
way as synthetic reductionism does. Similar comments hold for the other 
types of sentences mentioned in section 7. 
 Finally, we saw that there is reason to believe that people may 
disagree about their normative conceptions even if these conceptions are so 
different that it is implausible to assume that their use of ‘right’ is causally 
regulated by the same non-moral property. On synthetic reductionism, this 
is not possible because people whose use of ‘right’ is not casually regulated 
by the same non-moral property do not refer to the same property and 
hence do not disagree in the relevant respect. On realism, however, people 
whose use of ‘right’ is not causally regulated by the same non-moral 
property may refer to the same property and can accordingly disagree. The 
reason is that on this view, ‘right’ does not refer to a non-moral property 
that causally regulates our use of the term; indeed, it does not refer to a 
particular non-moral property at all. Rather, it refers to rightness as this 
property is characterised in the realist formula.45 That realism avoids this 
                                      
45 Put explicitly, the argument is the following. Given that two persons differ 
extensively in their normative conceptions and consequently differ to a significant extent 
concerning what they apply ‘right’ to, it seems implausible to assume that their use of the 
term is causally regulated by the same non-moral property. In particular, given that they 
differ extensively in the mentioned respect, it is implausible to assume that a certain non-
moral property—such as maximising happiness in the example above—is causally 
responsible for certain reference-fixing characteristics that both of them utilise to apply 
the term. According to synthetic reductionism, it follows that they do not refer to the 
same property, rightness and so do not disagree. However, we do not seem prepared to 
accept that conclusion.  
 It might be wondered whether realism is not vulnerable to this objection as well. 
The reason to suspect this is that I proposed in chapter 4 that realists may adopt the view 
that we are able to apply a moral term such as ‘right’ correctly by help of reference-fixing 
characteristics that we associate with the term. However, there is an important difference 
between synthetic reductionism and realism. According to synthetic reductionism, a 
moral term such as ‘right’ refers to the non-moral property that is causally responsible for 
the reference-fixing characteristics and so causally regulates people’s use of the term. This 
means that if two persons do not have their use of ‘right’ causally regulated by the same 
non-moral property, they do not refer to the same property. However, on realism the 
reference-fixing characteristics are not connected to reference in this way. According to 
this view, it is not the non-moral property that ‘right’ refers to that is causally responsible 
for the reference-fixing characteristics; indeed, there is no such non-moral property on 
this view. Rather, according to realism, it is the non-moral properties that make actions 
right that are causally responsible for these characteristics. This means that people whose 
use of ‘right’ is not causally regulated by the same non-moral property may nevertheless 
refer to the same property. On realism, people refer to rightness in so far as they refer to 
this property as it is characterised in the realist formula. However, it should be admitted 
that if a person does not apply ‘right’ to actions that have the reference-fixing 
characteristics that we associate with the term to a certain extent, we would presumably 
doubt that she refers to rightness with the term. We might also be inclined to say that if 
she does not apply ‘right’ to actions that have certain of the reference-fixing 
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 difficulty is especially important since it indicates that this view, in contrast 
to synthetic reductionism, is able to account for normative divergence. 
 Let us now turn to the second kind of explanation that reductionism 
employs.   
 According to this explanation, people disagree morally because of an 
error regarding non-moral facts. In section 8, I argued that the main 
difficulty with this explanation is that even if people involved in a moral 
disagreement take the moral term in question to have the same meaning or 
reference, they need not differ as regards any relevant non-moral beliefs. 
This is particularly likely to occur in relation to disagreements about 
normative conceptions and hence in relation to persistent moral 
disagreements. 
 The realist explanation of persistent moral disagreements is not 
vulnerable to this difficulty. According to this explanation, what explains 
persistent disagreements pertaining to rightness is an error as regards what 
makes actions right. More precisely, such disagreements are explained in 
terms of an error as regards an implication of the kind (B) in the realist 
formula: a synthetically necessary implication from a certain set of non-
moral properties to rightness. This means that the antagonists in a persistent 
disagreement have conflicting beliefs about such an implication. What is 
important to note is that since such beliefs make reference to an irreducible 
moral property, they are not non-moral beliefs, but rather a kind of moral 
beliefs that concern a certain type of moral principle. Consequently, in 
contrast to what the second reductionist explanation implies, people who 
are involved in a disagreement concerning rightness may take the meaning 
or reference of ‘right’ to be the same and yet not differ as regards any 
relevant non-moral beliefs. Put differently, they may agree about the meaning 
or reference of ‘right’ and about all relevant non-moral beliefs; the only 
significant aspect in which they disagree is their beliefs about the mentioned 
kind of implication from a set of non-moral properties to rightness. 
 As we observed in section 8, one difficulty with the reductionist 
explanation of the second kind concerns the arguments presented in debates 
                                                                                                              
characteristics, she is not linguistically competent with respect to the term. But it might 
still be the case that people who we believe refer to rightness differ in the way they apply 
the term—and so differ as to whether they apply it to actions that have the reference-
fixing characteristics—to such an extent that it is implausible to assume that their use of 
the term is causally regulated by the same non-moral property. 
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 about normative conceptions. Rather than being intended to point out that 
some non-moral facts are or are not the case, such arguments are typically 
intended to call attention to which non-moral properties contribute to, or 
fail to contribute to, actions being right. On the present proposal, a 
normative conception about rightness states which non-moral properties 
make actions right, in the sense of ‘make’ specified above. Accordingly, 
when arguments against normative conceptions appeal to the contribution 
of non-moral properties to the rightness of actions, realists may understand 
such arguments in the indicated sense of ‘make’. Recall the example 
mentioned earlier. On the account proposed by realism, the arguments put 
forward against utilitarianism are basically intended to call attention to either 
of two types of cases. Either that a set of non-moral properties makes actions 
right, but that utilitarianism does not accommodate this fact. Or that a 
certain set of non-moral properties does not, at least not always, make 
actions right, but that utilitarianism implies so; that is, it might be argued 
that what makes actions right is not that they maximise happiness, at least 
not always. 
 It should further be noted that the realist explanation of persistent 
disagreements avoids relativism. Unlike the version of relativism considered 
in section 9, realism does not imply that people involved in debates about 
normative conceptions use ‘right’ in such a way that its meaning or 
reference is constituted by different non-moral properties. Rather, on 
realism they use the term in such a way that its meaning and reference 
consists in rightness as this property is characterised in the realist formula. 
This means that realism does not have the untenable consequences of 
relativism. 
 It is important that the realist explanation of persistent moral 
disagreements appeals to a type of implication that is synthetically, not 
analytically, necessary. If the implication were understood in the latter way, 
it would be analytically necessary that if an action has a certain set of non-
moral properties, it is right. In case such an implication holds, there is reason 
to believe that persons who are linguistically competent in the relevant 
respect and who have beliefs regarding the mentioned set of non-moral 
properties would also have beliefs regarding rightness. The reason is that if 
an implication is analytically necessary, linguistic competence involves 
knowledge of it. In that case it might not be tenable to claim that people 
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 who are involved in persistent disagreements may share all relevant non-
moral beliefs and yet disagree regarding rightness.  
 Finally, return to widespread moral disagreements. It might be argued that 
some of these disagreements are explainable in the same way as persistent 
moral disagreements. Suppose, for example, that people belonging to 
different cultures disagree to a great extent as to whether a certain kind of 
actions is right. According to realism, the reason might be that people in a 
certain culture embrace an erroneous normative conception. That is, they 
might be mistaken as regards what makes actions right.  
  
12. Explaining the Persistence of Persistent Moral Disagreement   
In the last section, I argued that realists can explain persistent moral 
disagreements in terms of an error concerning what makes objects have a 
certain moral property or, more precisely, in terms of an error concerning a 
kind of synthetically necessary implication from a certain set of non-moral 
properties to the moral property. However, it might be objected that this 
does not explain why these disagreements are persistent. It is correct that no 
explanation of the persistence of certain disagreements has been provided so 
far. However, the realist conception has some features that individually or 
collectively recommend such an explanation. 
 Firstly, it is important to bear in mind that persistent moral 
disagreements are explained in terms of an error regarding a kind of 
implication that is synthetically, not analytically, necessary. Had the kind of 
implication at issue been analytically necessary, people would most likely 
agree about it to a greater extent since they would have knowledge of it, in 
so far as they are linguistically competent in the relevant respect. By 
contrast, to get knowledge of a synthetically necessary implication may 
require quite thorough deliberation that involves various non-linguistic 
considerations. Hence, knowledge about such an implication may not be 
easy to come by and people could debate it extensively without reaching 
agreement. 
 Secondly, it might be argued that the question as to whether an 
implication of the mentioned kind holds raises intricate philosophical issues. 
As was argued above, disagreements regarding such implications are 
expressions of conflicting normative conceptions. Consider an example of 
such a conflict, the one between utilitarians and deontologists as regards 
131 
 rightness. Which of these views, if any, that is correct might depend on a 
number of philosophical problems, e.g. the relation between moral rightness 
and other evaluative notions, the nature of personhood and the moral 
relevance of phenomena like friendship, love and integrity. Disagreements 
about other normative conceptions might be connected to other but 
nonetheless significant philosophical issues. If there is such a relation 
between normative conceptions and philosophical problems, it should not 
come as a surprise that disagreements concerning normative conceptions are 
persistent. However, this suggestion brings up epistemological problems that 
I will not discuss here. 
 Thirdly, it should be remembered that the realist formula means that 
there may be more than one set of non-moral properties that makes objects 
have a certain moral property (‘multiple realisability’). There may in other 
words be more than one synthetically necessary implication of the 
mentioned kind. This fact can have the effect that discussions about moral 
matters become more complicated than they otherwise would have been, 
thus helping to explain why certain moral disagreements are persistent. 
 Finally, a set of non-moral properties that according to the realist 
formula makes something have a moral property might be immensely 
complicated, involving a long range of non-moral properties that are related 
to each other in various ways. A set of non-moral properties with such a 
complex character might presumably provoke disagreements that cannot 
easily be settled. 
 
13. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I have considered an argument against the existence of 
moral properties that takes its point of departure in moral disagreement: the 
argument from moral disagreement. We have seen that if feature F in 
premise (2) of this argument is assumed to consist in moral disagreements 
being persistent, a significant version of this argument is obtained. Advocates 
of the existence of moral properties should then try to reject premise (3) of 
the argument thus understood. In order to do so, they should provide a 
plausible explanation of persistent disagreements in terms of an error in 
relation to a moral property. I have argued that realism, in contrast to 
reductionism, is able to provide such an explanation. An important reason is 
that realism, unlike reductionism, is able to account for the phenomenon of 
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 normative divergence. As realism is able to provide a plausible explanation 
of persistent disagreements, it is able to refute premise (3) in the sense that 
opponents to the existence of moral properties—non-cognitivists and error-
theorists—are not justified to claim that the best explanations of such 
disagreements do not imply that there is an error in relation to a moral 
property. Hence, they are not in the position to draw the conclusion that 
there are no moral properties. However, it can also be argued that realism is 
able to refute premise (3) in a more thorough way by maintaining that the 
best explanations of persistent disagreements do imply that there is an error 
in relation to a moral property. In section 4, I argued, against non-
cognitivism and error-theory, that there are prima facie reasons to believe 
that the best explanations of moral disagreements are made on the 
assumption that there are moral properties. This means that the best 
explanations of such disagreements imply that there is an error in relation to 
a moral property. This suggests in turn that either reductionism or realism 
provides the best explanations of such disagreements. Now, since realism, in 
contrast to reductionism, is able to provide the required explanation, it is 
reasonable to claim that it provides the best explanations of the relevant kind 
of moral disagreements. Hence, there is reason to claim that it succeeds in 
rejecting premise (3) in the more thorough way just mentioned. 
Consequently, realism seems able to refute the argument from moral 
disagreement and hence defend the existence of moral properties against this 
argument. However, it should be recalled that there may be other 
significant arguments which take their point of departure in moral 
disagreement that I have not dealt with here. 
 
Appendix: Persistent Moral Disagreements and Unknowable Moral Facts 
There is another argument against the existence of moral properties that 
could also be interpreted as a version of the argument from moral 
disagreement. Like the version of the argument we have considered above, 
it can be understood to takes the feature F in premise (2) to consist in moral 
disagreements being persistent. However, according to this version of the 
argument, the persistence of certain moral disagreements is taken as an 
indication of them being irresolvable ‘even in principle’. It is then claimed 
that if there were any moral properties, such disagreements would concern 
moral facts that are impossible to obtain knowledge of. On the assumption 
133 
 that persistent disagreements are like this, it is argued, with premise (3), that 
the best explanations of such disagreements do not imply that there is an 
error in relation to a moral property.46 It is then concluded that there are no 
moral properties. 
 This argument requires without doubt more attention that I am able 
to give it here. Especially, it requires a discussion of moral epistemology. 
However, to my mind it is less plausible than the versions of the argument 
from moral disagreement that have occupied us thus far. As far as I know, 
no one has made plausible the claim that persistent disagreements are 
irresolvable ‘even in principle’. And in case there are such disagreements, it 
might be questioned whether they concern moral facts that are 
unknowable.47 Furthermore, it might perhaps also be questioned whether 
the existence of unknowable moral facts means that the relevant type of 
disagreements are not best explained in term of an error in relation to a 
moral property. 
 It might also be asked why the view that there are unknowable moral 
facts should be considered so untenable. One answer might be that there is 
no explanation of why such facts are unknowable.48 However, on the realist 
account offered above, there might be such an explanation. I mentioned 
earlier that persistent disagreements concerning conflicting normative 
conceptions might raise complex philosophical problems. That such 
problems might concern facts that are unknowable is, I think, nothing we 
would regard as terribly upsetting, although disappointing. If there are 
unknowable moral facts, this might be a consequence of their being 
unknowable philosophical facts. However, I do not claim that there are any 
moral or philosophical facts that are unknowable. 
 There are also other considerations that may make us reluctant to the 
view that there are unknowable moral facts. One such consideration is that 
this view would suggest that many, perhaps all, moral facts are unknowable. 
Another consideration is that it would be unreasonable to hold that some 
moral facts that we take to be evident are unknowable.49 However, the 
                                      
46 See e.g. Bennigson (1996), pp. 411–437. Wright has put forward an argument which 
reminds of this reasoning; see Wright (1992), pp. 140–157. For a forceful criticism 
against this kind of argument, especially as it is formulated in Wright, see Tersman 
(2002), chap. 3. 
47 Cf. Tersman (2002), pp. 68–76. 
48 See e.g. Wong (1984), p. 152. 
49 See e.g. Bennigson (1996), p. 413. 
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 realist account avoids these consequences. What would be unknowable on 
the proposal above is which normative conception is correct; that is, 
whether certain non-moral properties make objects have a certain moral 
property. That this is unknowable is however compatible with most other 
kinds of moral facts being knowable. In chapter 4, I suggested that we might 
be able to apply ‘right’ correctly, and so pick out the actions that are right, 
by means of reference-fixing characteristics that we associate with the term. 
In order to do so, we need not know—at least not exactly—what non-
moral properties make actions right. So, even if we cannot come to know 
exactly what makes actions right, it does not mean that we cannot come to 
know many moral facts or that we cannot know the moral facts that we take 
to be evident. This account seems to gain support from moral 
phenomenology. We do not think we have to know what non-moral 
properties make actions right—at least not exactly—to be justified to claim 
that a certain action is right. What we with certainty take ourselves to know 
is that there are some non-moral properties that make them right. 
135 
 Chapter 6 
Explaining Moral Reason 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
In the meta-ethical literature, it is frequently pointed out that a 
distinguishing feature of moral judgements is that they involve reasons to 
perform actions. One of the strongest arguments against a meta-ethical view 
is accordingly thought to be that it fails to account for this feature of moral 
judgements. However, the claim that moral judgements involve reasons is 
ambiguous. As is often pointed out, one should distinguish between two 
kinds of reasons for performing actions.1 There is a normative reason to 
perform a certain action if there is a norm or standard for assessing actions 
that generates the reason. If a person performs an action there is a normative 
reason to do, her action is justified from the perspective of the standard in 
question. There is a motivating reason to perform a certain action if a person 
who has such a reason is motivated to perform the action. If a person 
performs an action that she has a motivating reason to do, the reason can be 
appealed to in an explanation of her action. In view of this distinction, there 
are basically two ways in which moral judgements can be claimed to involve 
reasons: by involving normative reasons and by involving motivating 
reasons. In the present chapter, I will discuss the relation moral judgements 
have to the first kind of reasons, and in the next chapter I will discuss the 
relation they have to the second kind of reasons. That moral judgements 
involve normative reasons is often put by saying that they are normative or 
that they have normativity. Henceforth when I refer to ‘reasons’ in this 
chapter, I have in mind normative reasons. In both chapters, I will be 
concerned with moral judgements pertaining to rightness. 
 In one fundamental sense it is uncontroversial that judgements to the 
effect that actions are morally right involve normative reasons, namely in so 
far as they imply moral reasons. What is controversial is what moral reasons 
consist in, particularly whether they consist in reasons of rationality, as 
rationalism claims. This is presumably the issue most often discussed in the 
meta-ethical literature on reasons. However, it is not the topic of the 
                                      
1 See e.g. Cullity and Gaut (1997), pp. 1–3, and Smith (1994), pp. 95–96. 
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 present chapter. Rather, I will be concerned with a more basic issue in that 
I will consider the relation between the moral facts stated by moral 
judgements and the moral reasons implied by such judgements. I will argue 
that reductionism and realism construe this relation differently and that this 
has consequences for the plausibility of these views. Reductionism, I will 
argue, construes this relation in such a way that it is unable to answer 
fundamental normative questions and to provide an accurate account of the 
normativity of moral judgements. However, I will argue that realism 
construes this relation in such a way that it is able to answer these questions 
and to provide a reasonable account of the normativity of such judgements. 
In contrast to the previous chapter and the next one, I will in this chapter 
not discuss an argument that has been taken to support non-cogntivism or 
error-theory, but an argument with relevance for the plausibility of 
reductionism and realism, respectively. 
 In the next section, I introduce what I call ‘the moral reason 
principle’ which says, roughly put, that a moral judgement to the effect that 
an action is morally right entails that there is a moral reason to perform that 
action. The subsequent two sections concern how reductionism and realism, 
respectively, read the moral reason principle. In section 5, I argue that 
because of the way reductionism reads this principle, it fails to provide a 
satisfactory answer to a version of the question ‘Why should I do what is 
right?’ However, realism reads the principle in such a way that it is able to 
provide a reasonable answer to this question. This difference indicates, I 
maintain, that realism, unlike reductionism, is able to provide a plausible 
account of the normativity of the pertinent moral judgements. In section 6, 
I respond to three objections that might be directed against the argument 
presented in the previous section. A number of philosophers have argued on 
similar lines regarding analogous normative questions, and in section 7 I 
argue that their arguments can be understood in accordance with my earlier 
reasoning. In section 8, I discuss some other normative questions. In section 
9, I argue briefly that there are reasons to believe that the realist reading of 
the moral reason principle is compatible with rationalism. However, this 
issue deserves a more thorough discussion.  
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 2. The Moral Reason Principle  
Above we saw that there is a reason—i.e. a normative reason—to perform 
an action if there is a norm or standard for assessing people’s actions that 
generates it. Among others Philippa Foot has pointed out that there are 
numerous standards for assessing people’s behaviour that generate such 
reasons, e.g. etiquette, law, morality, prudence and rationality.2 
Consequently, there are e.g. reasons of etiquette, juridical reasons, moral 
reasons, prudential reasons and reasons of rationality to perform or not to 
perform actions. Here I would like to draw attention to the relation 
between, on the one hand, judgements to the effect that actions are right 
and, on the other hand, reasons generated by such standards. When it is 
judged that an action is right, it is normally implied that the action is right 
according to a certain standard for assessing people’s behaviour. Now, the 
following seems to be the case: on any such standard, if an action is right 
according to the standard, then there is a reason, according to that standard, 
to perform the action. A corresponding principle holds for wrongness. We 
may take an example from etiquette. Suppose someone remarks ‘It’s wrong 
to lick on one’s knife while eating’ and ‘wrong’ is to be understood as 
‘wrong according to etiquette’. If this judgement is correct, it follows that 
according to etiquette there is a reason—an etiquette reason—not to lick on 
one’s knife while eating. We can ask an expert on etiquette: ‘Why is it 
wrong to lick on one’s knife while eating?’ She is likely to reply with what 
she takes to be an etiquette reason. She might reply, for example, ‘It’s 
impolite’. However, if she answers that there is no such reason, we would 
doubt that licking on one’s knife while eating actually is wrong according to 
etiquette, granted that we trust her knowledge of these matters.  
 Morality is a standard for assessing people’s behaviour that exhibits the 
observed connection between judgements to the effect that actions are right 
and reasons. Sometimes we use ‘right’ to mean ‘right according to morality’ 
or, simply put, ‘morally right’. Like other standards for assessing people’s 
behaviour, morality generates reasons for action, reasons according to 
morality or, shortly put: moral reasons. Thus, morality provides us with 
moral reasons to perform certain actions. Now, it seems uncontroversial to 
claim that if an action is morally right, it follows that there is a moral reason 
                                      
2 Foot (1978 (1972)), pp. 159–161. Cf. Brink (1992), pp. 8–9; Brink (1997), pp. 20–21; 
Smith (1994), pp. 95–96, and Smith (2001a), p. 119.  
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 to perform that action. It seems also to be the case that to know that ‘right’ 
is to be applied in conformity with this notion is a condition for being 
linguistically competent with respect to the term. Suppose a person claims 
that a certain action is morally right, but that she also believes that there is 
no moral reason to perform it. I think we would regard this as an indication 
of her not being linguistically competent in respect of the term. It seems 
consequently reasonable to claim that the following principle holds:3
 The moral reason principle: It is analytically necessary that if it is morally 
 right to perform an action, then there is a moral reason to 
 perform that action.4
An analogous principle holds for ‘morally wrong’. In what follows I will 
omit ‘morally’ in ‘morally right’ as I throughout will be concerned with 
moral rightness.  
 In the present context, a reason to perform an action is understood as 
a fact to the effect that the action has a certain property, F. So understood, a 
reason consists in the fact that the action has F.5 Such a property can be said 
to constitute the reason. When a person performs an action that she has this 
reason to perform, she consequently performs an action that has this 
property, F. According to the moral reason principle, if an action is right, it 
follows that there is a moral reason to perform it. The moral reason will 
consequently consist in the fact that this action has a certain property. 
 As already indicated, it seems incontrovertible that a moral judgement 
to the effect that an action is right entails the existence of a moral reason in 
the way stated by the moral reason principle. In the primary sense given by 
this principle, it is thus uncontroversial that such moral judgements are 
normative. Something that is controversial is what the moral reason referred 
to in this principle consists in and, hence, what the normativity of such 
moral judgements amounts to. According to a family of views, the reasons 
morality provides should be understood in terms of reasons generated by 
                                      
3 Cf. Brink (1992), pp. 1, 8–9; Brink (1997), pp. 20–21; Copp (1995), p. 190; 
Lillehammer (1999), p. 121; Railton (1993a), pp. 295–296; Shafer-Landau (2003), p. 
166, and Smith (2001a), p. 119. 
4 It might sometimes be appropriate to insert the qualification that an action is right for a 
person to perform. However, as this complication is not relevant to my arguments in the 
present chapter, I will omit the qualification.  
5 See e.g. Raz (1975), pp. 16–20. In what follows, I will presume that the reason in 
question is a complete reason to perform a certain action, e.g. a complete moral reason 
to perform a certain action. Often when people state what they take to be a reason to 
perform an action, they only mention a part of such a reason. For an account of the 
notion of complete reasons, see Raz (1975), pp. 22–25.  
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 some of the other normative standards for assessing people’s behaviour, e.g. 
prudence or rationality. Thus understood, moral reasons comprise a subclass 
of the reasons belonging to this kind of normative standard and moral 
reasons consequently consist in e.g. prudential reasons or reasons of 
rationality.6 (In what follows, I will refer to the latter kind of reasons as 
‘rational reasons’.) According to rationalism, morality provides rational 
reasons, and moral reasons consist consequently in reasons of that kind. This 
view yields a principle which says that, necessarily, if an action is right, there 
is a rational reason to perform it. Judgements to the effect that actions are 
right would then be normative in the strong sense that they imply that there 
are rational reasons to do what is right. Needless to say, there are various 
views as to what rational reasons consist in, and what moral reasons consist 
in if they do not consist in such reasons.7  
 As mentioned earlier, I do not intend to argue for or against any 
particular view of the type just mentioned as regards what moral reasons 
consist in. Moreover, I think that, as far as my arguments are concerned, 
reductionism and realism are possible to combine with various views about 
such reasons. The subsequent discussion will instead concern the more 
formal issue of how the moral reason principle should be interpreted 
internally. More precisely, I have in mind the relation between the facts 
referred to in the antecedent and the consequent of this principle: on the 
one hand, the fact that an action is right, and, on the other hand, the moral 
reason. According to the reading to which reductionists are committed, 
these facts are identical: the moral reason consists in the fact that the action 
is right. According to another reading, open to realists, these facts are not 
identical: the moral reason does not consist in the fact that the action is 
right, but in the fact that the action has a set of non-moral properties which 
makes actions right. This difference, I will argue, is relevant to the 
plausibility of reductionism and realism, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
                                      
6 Cf. Brink (1992), pp. 8–9; Brink (1997), pp. 20–21, and Smith (1994), pp. 95–96. See 
also Darwall (1990), pp. 257–259. 
7 For helpful overviews of different theories about moral reasons, see Brink (1992), pp. 
1–26; Cullity and Gaut (1997), pp. 1–27, and Parfit (1997), pp. 100–105. 
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 3. Reductionism on the Moral Reason Principle 
According to reductionism, rightness is identical with a non-moral property 
G. This view of the relation between rightness and non-moral properties 
has implications for how reductionism reads the moral reason principle. 
 In the last section, we saw the moral reason principle says that it is 
analytically necessary that if it is right to perform a certain action, there is a 
moral reason to perform that action. Now, I think it is reasonable to argue 
that because of their conception of the relation between rightness and non-
moral properties, reductionists are committed to the view that the moral 
reason is identical with the fact that the action is right. To illustrate, 
consider a version of reductionism according to which the non-moral 
property G consists in maximising happiness, i.e. a version of reductionism 
that identifies rightness with maximising happiness. A reductionist 
advocating this view would then have to claim that the moral reason at issue 
consists in the fact that the action has G, i.e. the fact that the action 
maximises happiness. Since maximising happiness on this version of 
reductionism is identical with rightness, the reductionist identifies the moral 
reason with the fact that the action is right. 
 That this reading of the moral reason principle correctly represents 
the relation between moral properties and moral reasons is something that 
often seems to be taken for granted in the meta-ethical literature. For 
example, it is sometimes said or implied without argument that the fact that 
an action is right is a reason to perform the action. Often it is claimed, more 
vaguely, that the fact that an action is right provides or gives a reason to 
perform the action. Accordingly, ‘right’ is sometimes used interchangeably 
with terms such as ‘moral reason’, ‘reason’ and other terms that refer to such 
a reason, e.g. ‘should’. Some authors are also explicit about their acceptance 
of this conception of the relation between rightness or some other moral 
property and moral reason.8 It is significant that they generally do not seem 
to think that this conception needs to be argued for.9
                                      
8 See e.g. Smith (1994), pp. 182–184. For related views, see e.g. Jackson (1998), pp. 
141–142; Johnston (1989), p. 154; Mackie (1977), pp. 73–80, and Scanlon (1998), pp. 
11–12. 
9 It might be argued that this does not hold according to versions of reductionism that 
are subjectivist. For example, consider a subjectivist version of reductionism according to 
which the rightness of actions consists in their being approved of by a person. It might 
be claimed that the moral reason on this view does not consist in the fact that an action is 
approved of by a person and hence not in the fact that an action is right. Rather, the 
moral reason consists in the fact that the action has certain features, viz. the features that 
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  Although it seems reasonable to assume that the mentioned 
conception is the received view, it is worthwhile to make explicit why 
reductionism is committed to it. 
 According to the moral reason principle, it is analytically necessary 
that if an action is right, there is a moral reason to perform that action. In 
the last section, we saw that the moral reason consists in the action having a 
certain property. Suppose a person performs the action that there is this 
reason to perform. She then performs an action that is right. It should next 
be observed that on the reductionist view that rightness is identical with a 
non-moral property G, this moral reason has to consist in the fact that the 
action has G. As we have seen, if a person performs an action that there is a 
moral reason to perform, and the reason is entailed according to the moral 
reason principle, she has performed an action that is right. According to the 
necessary biconditional to which reductionism is committed, it is only if the 
moral reason consists in the fact that the action has G that this holds. It is 
only if the moral reason consists in the fact that the action has G that it 
follows that if a person performs an action that there is this reason to 
perform, she performs an action that is right. Now, reductionism identifies 
rightness with G. Hence, it is committed to the view that the moral reason 
consists in the fact that the action is right.10
                                                                                                              
elicit the person’s approval. One motive for this claim is that on the person’s own view, 
these features presumably constitute her reason for why she approves of the action, 
whereas the attitude itself does not form part of her reason. However, I think that also 
on subjectivist versions of reductionism, the moral reason should be understood 
according to the first alternative. What the person in question takes to be her reason to 
perform an action should be distinguished from what constitutes the moral reason to 
perform an action. On the person’s own view, her attitude is presumably not part of her 
reason. However, the approval is presumably part of the moral reason. One ground for 
this view is that if the person had not had the attitude in question towards the action, 
there would not be a moral reason to perform that action according to the view under 
consideration. Thus, if we inquire what the moral reason is to perform an action 
according to this version of reductionism, we would have to refer to a person’s approval 
to correctly describe the reason. The arguments below can be taken to confirm this 
view.  
10 To illustrate, return to the example of a version of reductionism mentioned above 
according to which G consists in maximising happiness. On this view, the moral reason 
mentioned in the moral reason principle has to consist in the fact that the action 
maximises happiness. This is so since, according to the necessary biconditional to which 
this version of reductionism is committed, it is only if the moral reason is understood in 
this way that it follows that, if a person performs the action that there is this reason to 
perform, she performs an action that is right. Since rightness is identified with 
maximising happiness on this view, the moral reason has accordingly to consist in the 
fact that the action is right. 
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  Another way to reach this conclusion is by means of a reductio. 
Assume that there is a moral reason that is entailed in accordance with the 
moral reason principle which does not consist in the fact that the action has 
G. Suppose a person performs an action that there is this moral reason to 
perform and hence performs an action that is right. On the mentioned 
assumption it would then be possible to perform an action that is right 
without performing an action that has G. But then rightness would not be 
identical with G and reductionism would be false. Hence, in order to 
reduce rightness to G, reductionists are committed to the view that the 
moral reason that an action’s rightness entails consists in the fact that the 
action is right.11
 
4. Realism on the Moral Reason Principle 
According to realism, the relation between rightness and non-moral 
properties is described in the realist formula, and this principle states that 
rightness is not identical with any non-moral property. This view of the 
relation between rightness and non-moral properties has consequences for 
how realism reads the moral reason principle.  
 According to the moral reason principle, it is analytically necessary 
that if an action is right, there is a moral reason to perform it. As we saw in 
the last section, reductionists are committed to the view that the moral 
reason is identical with the fact that the action is right. This is so because 
reductionists claim that rightness is identical with a non-moral property. 
Since realists deny this view, they are free to oppose the mentioned reading 
of the moral reason principle. Realists may instead adopt the following 
reading. On this conception, the moral reason of the relevant kind consists 
in the fact that the action has a set of non-moral properties G, where this set 
is such that it makes the action right. That is, the moral reason entailed by 
the fact that an action is right consists in the fact that the action has a set of 
non-moral properties of the kind mentioned in the realist formula.12 
                                      
11 Return to the example of a version of reductionism above. Assume that the moral 
reason mentioned in the moral reason principle does not consist in the fact that an action 
maximises happiness. Suppose a person performs an action that there is this moral reason 
to perform and hence performs an action that is right. On the mentioned assumption, it 
would then be possible to perform an action that is right without performing an action 
that maximises happiness. But then rightness would not be identical with maximising 
happiness and this version of reductionism would be mistaken. 
12 Since there might be a number of sets of non-moral properties that make actions right 
according to realism, there might also be a number of moral reasons on this view. 
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 According to the realist formula, rightness is not identical with such a set of 
non-moral properties. Consequently, the moral reason is not identical with 
the fact that the action is right.13   
 We may illustrate the difference between reductionism and realism by 
means of an example. Recall the version of reductionism mentioned above 
which says that rightness is identified with maximising happiness. Consider a 
realist counterpart to this view according to which a set of non-moral 
properties of the kind mentioned in the realist formula consists in 
maximising happiness. According to this version of realism, although 
maximising happiness is not identical with rightness, maximising happiness 
makes actions right. Consequently, a moral reason entailed in accordance 
with the moral reason principle consists in the fact that the action maximises 
happiness. As maximising happiness is not identified with rightness, the 
moral reason entailed by the fact that an action is right does not consist in 
the fact that the action is right. 
 
5. ‘Why Should I Do What Is Right?’ 
We often ask what reasons we have to perform certain actions, a type of 
normative questions that we frequently put by asking why we should do so 
and so. Such normative questions may also be asked in relation to moral 
issues. Often these questions ask about a reason to perform one particular 
action; we can for example ask ‘Why should I give him the money back?’ 
However, sometimes normative questions concerning moral issues ask about 
a reason to perform a certain class of actions which has one particular 
property. A fundamental question of this kind is:  
 ‘Why should I do what is right?’  
To make explicit that this question asks about a reason, we may reformulate 
it in the following way: 
 ‘What reason is there for me to do what is right?’14
                                      
13 According to the moral reason principle, it is analytically necessary that if an action is 
right, there is a moral reason to perform that action. This means, as we have seen, that if 
a person performs an action that there is this reason to carry out, she performs an action 
that is right. In the last section, we saw how reductionism accounts for this. Realism 
accounts for this in the following way. On this view, the moral reason consists in the fact 
that an action has a set of non-moral properties which is such that it makes actions right. 
If an action has such a set of non-moral properties, it follows according to the realist 
formula that it is right. Consequently, if a person performs an action that there is this 
moral reason to perform, she performs an action that is right. In contrast to what 
reductionism implies, the moral reason is not identical with the fact that the action is 
right. 
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 In this section, I will argue that reflections on a version of this question 
suggest that the reading realism suggests of the moral reason principle is 
preferable to the reading suggested by reductionism. However, before we 
consider this version of the question, it is important to get clear over what 
questions of this type amount to. That is, we have to consider what the 
purport is of questions of the form ‘What reason is there to do what is F?’, 
where ‘F’ refers to a certain property. As far as I understand, there are 
basically two readings of this type of questions.  
 According to the first interpretation, a question of this type asks what 
reason there is to perform a certain class of actions, one of the properties of 
which is F. On this interpretation, it is not of any special importance that 
these actions have this particular property rather than some other one. To 
ask about a reason to do what is F is just one way to ask about a reason to 
perform this class of actions. This class of actions could be picked out by 
means of some other property the actions have in common. Instead of 
asking what reason there is to do what is F, it could then just as well be 
asked what reason there is to do what has that other property. 
 I think this interpretation is flawed for at least two reasons. To 
illustrate this, we might consider a non-moral example of the kind of 
questions under consideration: ‘What reason is there to do what is legal?’15
 Firstly, the first interpretation construes questions that actually ask 
about different reasons to be asking about the same reason. Consider our 
example: ‘What reason is there to do what is legal?’ Suppose the class of 
actions that are legal also have another property in common. For example, 
assume that these actions also happen to be such that they would be 
approved of by a certain person called Bill. On the first interpretation, it is 
not of any special importance that these actions are legal rather than having 
some other property. This means, as we have seen, that to ask about a 
reason to do what is legal is just one way to ask about a reason to perform 
these actions and that one instead could ask about a reason to do what has 
some other property these actions have in common. According to this 
                                                                                                              
14 In what follows, I will omit the phrase ‘for me’, as I do not think it is relevant to the 
present discussion. It might be thought that the question ‘Why should I do what is 
right?’ can be understood in the following way: ‘Do I have a reason to do what is right?’ 
I will return to this reading in section 8. 
15 It is not significant here which kind of reason the question asks about. We have to 
presume, however, that it asks about the same kind of reason in the various contexts in 
which it is discussed below.  
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 interpretation, instead of asking ‘What reason is there to do what is legal?’, it 
could then just as well be asked ‘What reason is there to do what Bill would 
approve of?’ That is, on the first interpretation, these questions ask about the 
same reason. However, this view seems mistaken, because these two 
questions ask about different reasons. 
 The following objection might be raised against this argument. In 
asking ‘What reason is there to do what is legal?’, a person need not know 
that the class of actions that are legal also happen to be such that they are 
approved of by Bill. It might then be suspected that if she knew this, she 
would take this question to ask about the same reason as ‘What reason is 
there to do what Bill would approve of?’ This objection seems mistaken, 
however, because even if we imagine a person who knows this, she would 
take these questions to ask about different reasons. Thus, suppose a person 
first asks ‘What reason is there to do what is legal?’ and then comes to know 
that legal actions also happen to be such that Bill would approve of them. 
She would still, after having gained this knowledge, take the original 
question to be asking about another reason than ‘What reason is there to do 
what Bill would approve of?’ This is so because in asking the original 
question, she explicitly focuses on actions being legal rather than on their 
having some other property. She asks what reason there is to perform actions 
that have this specific property, rather than some other one. Otherwise 
formulated, she asks what reason there is to perform actions in special 
consideration of their having a particular property: that of being legal. 
However, the question ‘What reason is there to do what Bill would approve 
of?’ does not capture the focus on actions being legal in her original 
question. On the contrary, in the other question, the focus is on quite 
another property. Consequently, it asks what reason there is to perform 
actions that have the property of being such that Bill would approve of 
them, rather than some other property. Put in another way, it asks about a 
reason to perform actions in special consideration of their being such that 
Bill would approve of them. Obviously, this is not the reason the person 
asks about. 
 Secondly, the first interpretation is mistaken because it takes questions 
to have the same answer that do not have the same answer. Suppose it is 
asked ‘What reason is there to do what is legal?’ A possible answer to this 
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 question might be: ‘One avoids to be punished’.16 Suppose, again, that the 
class of actions that are legal happen to be such that Bill would approve of 
them. On the first interpretation, instead of asking the mentioned question, 
it could instead be asked ‘What reason is there to do what Bill would 
approve of?’ Since the first interpretation implies that these questions ask 
about the same reason, it suggests that they have the same answer, e.g. the 
one just indicated. However, this seems incorrect. The indicated answer 
might provide a plausible answer to the former question, but it does not 
seem to provide a plausible answer to the latter one.  
 According to the second interpretation, a question of the type ‘What 
reason is there to do what is F?’ does not ask what reason there is to perform 
a class of actions, one of the properties of which happens to be F. Rather, as 
already has been indicated, it asks what reason there is to perform actions 
that have the particular property F, rather than some other property. That is, 
it asks about a reason to perform actions in special consideration of their 
having the particular property F. This means, at variance with the first 
interpretation, that even if the class of actions that is F also has some other 
property in common, the question cannot be understood to ask what reason 
there is to do what has that property, since this would be to ask about quite 
another reason. The second interpretation can be clarified in the following 
way. According to this interpretation, the question asks what reason there is 
to perform actions that are F irrespective of which other properties they have. 
The question could then be understood to ask what reason there would be 
to perform these actions even if they had not had any other property than F. 
However, we should make exception for those properties that are needed 
for something to be F and those that are consequences of something being 
F, since these properties might be relevant to the reason in question. 
 The correctness of the second interpretation is confirmed by the fact 
that it does not have the difficulties of the first interpretation.  
 Firstly, the second interpretation takes questions that ask about 
different reasons to actually be doing so. Consider our example: ‘What 
reason is there to do what is legal?’ Suppose again that the class of actions 
that are legal happen to have another property in common, that they are 
such that they would be approved of by Bill. According to the second 
                                      
16 This might be a reasonable answer if the question is understood to ask about a 
prudential reason. 
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 interpretation, the mentioned question and the question ‘What reason is 
there to do what Bill would approve of?’ do not ask about the same reason. 
This is so since they ask about reasons to perform these actions in special 
consideration of their having quite different properties: that of doing what is 
legal and that of doing what Bill would approve of, respectively. More 
exactly, whereas the first question asks what reason there is to perform 
actions that are legal, irrespective of which other properties these actions 
have (with the exceptions mentioned above), the second question asks what 
reason there is to perform actions that are such that Bill would approve of 
them, irrespective of which other properties these actions have (with the 
exceptions mentioned above). As can easily be seen, these questions do not 
ask about the same reason.  
 Moreover, the second interpretation takes questions that have 
different answers to actually having different answers. Suppose once more 
that the class of legal actions also happen to be such that Bill would approve 
of them. As we have seen, according to the second interpretation, the 
question ‘What reason is there to do what is legal?’ asks about another 
reason than the question ‘What reason is there to do what Bill would 
approve of?’ Consequently, these questions do not have the same answer. 
For example, although it might be plausible to answer the first question in 
the way indicated above, this would not be a plausible answer to the second 
question. 
 Consequently, questions of the type ‘What reason is there to do what 
is F?’, where ‘F’ refers to a certain property, should be understood according 
to the second interpretation. 
 Next we should notice that the question ‘Why should I do what is 
right?’ or ‘What reason is there to do what is right?’ can be understood in 
different ways depending on what kind of reason the question is taken to 
ask about. As we saw in section 2, there are numerous standards for assessing 
people’s behaviour that generate reasons for action, e.g. etiquette, law, 
morality, prudence and rationality. Two questions that are discussed in 
moral philosophy are ‘What rational reason is there to do what is right?’ and 
‘What prudential reason is there to do what is right?’ One might perhaps 
also ask ‘What juridical reason is there to do what is right?’ There might also 
be other kinds of reasons with regard to which one might ask questions of 
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 this kind. One might perhaps even ask ‘What reason of etiquette is there to 
do what is right?’, although this question might be peculiar. 
 After these clarifications, I would like to turn to a version of the 
question ‘What reason is there to do what is right?’ that is relevant to 
whether we should prefer the reductionist or the realist reading of the moral 
reason principle. In asking this question, we may take ‘reason’ to refer to a 
moral reason. That is, we may ask: 
 ‘What moral reason is there to do what is right?’ 
It should be recalled that in referring to ‘right’, I have in mind moral 
rightness.  
 It may first be observed that our impression of this question is that it 
makes sense. Above it was implied that it is sensible to ask what reason there 
is to do what is right and have in mind e.g. a prudential reason or a reason 
of rationality. We do not seem to respond to the question under 
consideration in any other way; it seems that we just as sensibly can ask 
what reason there is to do what is right and have in mind a moral reason. 
Since the question makes sense, it is reasonable to assume that it has an 
answer.  
 Another way to see that the question ‘What moral reason is there to 
do what is right?’ makes sense is the following. As was observed in section 
2, according to a family of views, the reasons morality provides should be 
understood in terms of the reasons generated by some of the other 
normative standards for assessing people’s behaviour, e.g. prudence or 
rationality. For instance, according to rationalism, morality provides rational 
reasons, and moral reasons consist consequently in rational reasons. On this 
view, it holds necessarily that if an action is right, there is a rational reason 
to perform that action. Advocates of this view investigate what such a 
reason to do what is right consists in; that is, they investigate what a moral 
reason that is identified with a rational reason consists in. They ask 
consequently what rational reason there is to do what is right. As far as I see, 
this question makes perfectly good sense; indeed, it has to make sense if 
such an investigation is to be worthwhile. Now, since the relevant moral 
reasons and rational reasons are identical according to the mentioned view, 
this means that if this question makes sense to ask, so does the question 
under discussion here.  
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  Next it should be observed that ‘What moral reason is there to do 
what is right?’ is a fundamental normative question and that it is important 
that it can be answered. One way to illustrate this is to compare it with 
other normative questions that ask about moral reasons. Above we observed 
that we may ask normative questions about moral issues. Like the question 
under discussion, they are often plausibly understood to be asking about a 
moral reason. There are various questions of this kind. Above I suggested 
that normative questions about moral issues may inquire about a moral 
reason to perform a certain action, such as ‘Why should I give him the 
money back?’ Understood as a question about a moral reason, it becomes 
‘What moral reason is there for me to give him the money back?’ 
Furthermore, as we have just seen, we can ask normative questions about 
moral issues where we ask about a reason to perform a class of actions in 
special consideration of their having a particular property, such as ‘Why 
should I do what is legal?’ Sometimes these questions ask about a moral 
reason. Thus, if we understand the mentioned question to be asking about a 
moral reason, it becomes ‘What moral reason is there to do what is legal?’  
 In comparison with these questions, ‘What moral reason is there to 
do what is right?’ asks a more fundamental normative question. In the 
situation in which it is asked, a person recognises that morality classifies 
certain actions as right, i.e. morally right. The person then asks what moral 
reason there is to do what is right. It can thus be understood as one of the 
ultimate normative questions in relation to morality, since it asks what 
reason morality itself provides us with to perform actions in consideration of 
their having the very property of being right. This is a question that is asked 
in real life and in a number of different situations. Moreover, it is a question 
that we think is of vital importance that it can be answered, especially as it 
tends to force itself on us in certain significant situations in our lives. 
 One type of cases where this question might arise are those where we 
have started to distrust morality. A person who has started to do so might 
end up with adopting a certain kind of moral scepticism with the 
consequence that she will cease to try to do what she believes is right. As an 
illustration, suppose that a person—perhaps after reading Marx and Engels—
has come to suspect that the classification of certain actions as right is put 
into practice merely as a means for the upper classes to prevent the lower 
classes from making revolution. However, she has not yet quite made up 
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 her mind whether this actually is so. She might then ask what reason 
morality as a matter of fact provides to do what is right. That is, she might 
ask what moral reason there is to do what is right—what a moral reason to 
do what is right actually consists in. The answer she arrives at might be 
decisive for whether she becomes a moral sceptic of the indicated kind and 
accordingly for whether she will continue to try to act rightly. 
 A second type of cases are those where we ask this question while 
comparing alternative ways of leading our lives and the actions these 
alternatives would demand from us. This is something we might do when 
we go through existential crises or face fundamental choices in life. One 
alternative a person who finds herself in such a situation may contemplate is 
to live in accordance with morality, something that would require her to 
perform actions that are right. As a part of the process of comparing this 
alternative to other ways of living and the actions these alternatives would 
involve, she might ask what reason morality provides to do what is right—
what moral reason there is to do what is right. The answer she reaches may 
have implications for which kind of life she ultimately decides to live.  
 A third type of cases are those where we ask this question as a part of 
our deliberation whether to perform certain actions. For example, suppose a 
person is convinced that there are certain actions that would be right for her 
to perform, but she also realises that these actions will require great sacrifices 
from her. As a result, she has great difficulties in deciding what to do. It 
might also be the case that her ordinary ways of moral deliberation do not 
yield an answer in the situation in which she finds herself. In an effort to 
decide what to do, she might start to reflect quite generally on the strength 
of the various considerations that might speak for and against doing what is 
right. As a part of this deliberation, she might then ask what reason morality 
provides to do what is right—what moral reason there is to do what is right. 
The answer she arrives at may have implications for what she ultimately 
decides to do.  
 Let us now consider how reductionism answers the question ‘What 
moral reason is there to do what is right?’ The reply reductionism gives is, 
in effect, ‘It’s right’. According to the way reductionism reads the moral 
reason principle, the moral reason at issue consists in the fact that an action 
has a non-moral property G with which rightness is identified. Consider the 
example of a version of reductionism mentioned above according to which 
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 G consists in maximising happiness. When an advocate of this version of 
reductionism is asked ‘What moral reason is there to do what is right?’, her 
answer will be ‘The moral reason to do what is right is that it maximises 
happiness’ or, for short, ‘It maximises happiness’. Since rightness and 
maximising happiness are identical on this view, she answers in effect ‘The 
moral reason to do what is right is that it is right’, or, for short, ‘It’s right’. 
Similar results hold for other versions of reductionism. 
 We may now consider whether this answer to the question states a 
moral reason to do what is right. Consider a person who asks the question 
under discussion and gets an answer to the effect ‘It’s right’. Our reaction to 
such an answer is, I think, that it just repeats what is asked for and that it 
therefore cannot state the requested reason. A moral reason to do what is 
right cannot, properly understood, consist in the very fact that it is right. 
 It might be wondered what the underlying principle is that explains 
why we find the answer reductionism gives to the question under 
consideration unsatisfactory. I would like to offer, very briefly, one proposal 
as to what this principle is. In section 2, I said that in the present context a 
reason consists in a fact to the effect that the action has a certain property. 
Such a property, I suggested, constitutes the reason. It seems natural to think 
of the property that constitutes a reason as that which gives the reason its 
normative force, as the aspect of the reason that speaks in favour of 
performing the action in question. As noted above, we sometimes ask 
questions of the form ‘What reason is there to do what is F?’, where ‘F’ 
refers to a certain property. It is this kind of reason we ask about when we 
pose the question ‘What moral reason is there to do what is right?’ A 
principle that explains our response to the answer reductionism gives to this 
question might now be suggested. The principle is the following: a 
proposed reason to do what is F is such a reason only if the property that 
constitutes it is not identical with F. It is not difficult to come to think of a 
rationale of this principle. Unless a proposed reason fulfils this principle, it 
does not have any normative force. The explanation is that the property that 
constitutes the proposed reason—and hence is supposed to provide 
normative force to the reason—would not be distinct from what the 
proposed reason is meant to be a reason to do. Now, it is evident that what 
according to reductionism is a moral reason to do what is right does not 
satisfy this principle. On this view, the property that constitutes the moral 
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 reason to do what is right is the very property of being right. Hence, what 
according to reductionism is a moral reason to do what is right does not 
have any normative force. According to the mentioned principle, the 
account reductionism offers therefore does not state a moral reason to do 
what is right. It seems reasonable to assume that this explains why we find 
the answer reductionism gives to the question under discussion 
unsatisfactory.  
 We may thus conclude that the answer reductionism gives to the 
question ‘What moral reason is there to do what is right?’—i.e. ‘It’s right’—
does not supply the requested reason. That is, the judgement ‘It’s right’, as 
reductionism understands it, fails to state a moral reason to do what is right. 
It is, as we have seen, the way reductionism reads the moral reason principle 
that is responsible for this failure. There is therefore reason to claim that this 
reading of the moral reason principle is mistaken. As mentioned in section 
2, the moral reason principle concerns the normativity of judgements to the 
effect that actions are right. Since the reading reductionism provides of this 
principle is erroneous in the indicated way, it also seems reasonable to 
assume that reductionism provides a flawed account of the normativity of 
such moral judgements. 
 Let us now consider how realism answers the question ‘What moral 
reason is there to do what is right?’ According to the realist reading of the 
moral reason principle, a moral reason of the relevant kind consists in the 
fact that an action has a set of non-moral properties G which is such that it 
makes actions right. Since such a set of non-moral properties is not identical 
with rightness, realism provides another answer than reductionism. We may 
illustrate this response with help of the example of a version of realism 
mentioned above according to which a set of non-moral properties that 
makes actions right consists in maximising happiness. On this version of 
realism, the moral reason at issue consists in the fact that an action 
maximises happiness. When someone asks an advocate of this version of 
realism ‘What moral reason is there to do what is right?’, she will reply ‘A 
moral reason to do what is right is that it maximises happiness’ or, for short, 
‘It maximises happiness’. Since maximising happiness is not identical with 
rightness on this view, the realist is not committed to giving the answer that 
the reductionist gives. Similar results hold for other versions of realism. 
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  The answer realism provides to the question under consideration does 
not have the difficulty of the answer provided by reductionism. The person 
who poses the question might not be satisfied with the answer because she 
believes that it does not state an accurate moral reason to do what is right. 
Indeed, this might be correct because the particular version of realism that 
provides the answer might be mistaken and therefore incapable of coming 
up with such a reason. However, the inquirer cannot protest that the answer 
merely repeats what she is asking about and therefore does not state the 
required reason. In contrast to the answer reductionism provides, the answer 
realism provides at least mentions a possible candidate for such a reason. 
Hence, this answer can, in contrast to the one reductionism offers, state a 
moral reason to do what is right. 
 This view of what a moral reason to do what is right consists in 
satisfies consequently the principle suggested above. Unlike reductionists, 
realists are not committed to the view that the property which constitutes a 
moral reason to do what is right consists in the property of being right. 
According to the example of a version of realism utilised above, the 
property that constitutes this reason is the property of maximising happiness, 
whereas one has this reason to do what is right. Since a moral reason to do 
what is right fulfils the mentioned principle, it might have normative force. 
The fact that it fulfils the mentioned principle underlines the view that 
realism is able to state a moral reason to do what is right. 
 As is clear from the reasoning above, it is thanks to the way realism 
reads the moral reason principle that it is able to give an adequate response 
to ‘What moral reason is there to do what is right?’ and hence maintain that 
there is a moral reason to do what is right. It is therefore reasonable to claim 
that realism offers a better interpretation of the moral reason principle than 
reductionism. That is, the moral reason entailed by the rightness of an 
action does not consist in the fact that the action is right, but in the fact that 
the action has a set of non-moral properties which is such that it makes 
actions right. The moral reason principle concerns the normativity of 
judgements to the effect that actions are right. Consequently, there is reason 
to assume that realism, unlike reductionism, provides a reasonable account 
of the normativity of such moral judgements.  
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 6. Three Objections 
There are at least three objections that might be raised against the line of 
argument of the previous section. As my responses to these objections are 
implied by what I have said earlier, I will make the discussion of them brief. 
 (i) Suppose it is asked ‘What moral reason is there to do what is 
right?’ Assume that the class of actions that is right might be picked out by 
means of some other property these actions have in common, the property 
A for example. It might then be objected that, instead of asking the 
mentioned question, it could just as well be asked ‘What moral reason is 
there to do what is A?’ It does not seem strange to answer this question ‘It’s 
right’. Hence, it might be thought that the above reasoning is mistaken. 
 As can easily be seen, this objection presumes the first interpretation 
of questions of the type ‘What reason is there to do F?’ considered in the 
last section. It illustrates thereby the importance of distinguishing between 
the two interpretations of this type of questions. Moreover, it illustrates how 
important it is for my arguments that the second interpretation, not the first 
one, is correct. Consequently, in the light of the discussion above, I think 
this objection is mistaken because it rests on the first interpretation. 
Contrary to what this interpretation suggests, in asking ‘What moral reason 
is there to do what is right?’, it is not merely asked what moral reason there 
is to perform a class of actions, a class of actions which might be picked out 
by means of some other of its properties than rightness. Rather, in line with 
the second interpretation, it is asked what moral reason there is to perform 
actions in special consideration of their having the particular property of 
being right. More exactly, it is asked what moral reason there is to perform 
action that are right irrespective of which other properties these actions 
might have (with the exceptions mentioned in the last section). 
Consequently, when it is asked ‘What moral reason is there to do what is 
A?’, quite another question is asked; it is asked what moral reason there is to 
perform actions that are A irrespective of which other properties these 
actions might have (with the mentioned exceptions). This question has 
quite another answer than the original one.  
 (ii) As we have seen, reductionism answers the question ‘What moral 
reason is there to do what is right?’ in terms of actions having a non-moral 
property which is claimed to be identical with rightness. A defender of the 
second objection points out that such an answer need not be felt to be odd 
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 since the person who asks the question may not know that this non-moral 
property is identical with rightness.17 Indeed, that the identity holds might 
not be known by anyone in which case the answer is not felt to be odd by 
anyone. And if the answer is not felt to be odd, the ground for rejecting it 
vanishes. Hence, it might be thought that the argument against the 
reductionist answer is mistaken.  
 In reply to this objection, it should first be pointed out that even if 
the answer reductionism gives is not experienced as strange because it is not 
known that rightness is identified with a certain non-moral property, it still 
does not provide a reasonable answer to the question. For, as I argued in the 
last section, the fact that an action has a non-moral property, where this 
property is identical with rightness, cannot constitute a moral reason to do 
what is right. Thus, even if the answer reductionism gives might appear to 
give such an answer, it does not. This contention is strengthened by the 
following consideration. Suppose someone asks ‘What moral reason is there 
to do what is right?’ The answer she gets is ‘It maximises happiness’. She 
may feel that this actually answers her question. However, later she gets to 
know that the person who answered the question takes rightness and 
maximising happiness to be identical. In that person’s vocabulary, to say that 
actions maximise happiness is just another way of saying that they are right. 
In light of this, the inquirer would presumably feel that she, after all, has not 
been given a satisfactory answer. She is likely to protest that if rightness and 
maximising happiness are thought to be the same, the answer to her 
question ‘What moral reason is there to do what is right?’ cannot be ‘It 
maximises happiness’. The answer she got just repeats what she asked about 
because on the view at issue, to answer ‘It maximises happiness’ is in effect 
the same as answering ‘It’s right’. Such a repetitious answer, she may argue, 
cannot provide the requested reason. 
 (iii) In the last section, I considered the question ‘What moral reason 
is there to do what is right?’, where the rightness referred to is moral 
rightness. According to the third objection, this question is inconceivable 
because it does not make sense to ask what moral reason there is to do what 
                                      
17 This objection is probably stronger when it is used by an adherent of synthetic 
reductionism than when used by an adherent of analytic reductionism. The reason is that 
on analytic reductionism, a person knows which non-moral property that constitutes the 
meaning of ‘right’ in so far as she is linguistically competent with respect to the meaning 
of the term. However, this is not the case according to synthetic reductionism. 
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 is right, where rightness is understood to be moral rightness. In order for a 
question that asks what reason is to do what is morally right to make sense, 
‘reason’ has to be understood as a reason that is not moral. Thus, it cannot 
be argued against reductionism that it is unable to provide an answer to this 
question. 
 There are at least three difficulties with this objection. First, in 
contrast to the two previous objections, I find it hard to think of any reason 
for it that does not beg the question. Of course, it might be claimed that it 
does not make sense to ask ‘What moral reason is there to do what is right?’, 
understood in the indicated way, because the fact that an action is right is 
identical with the pertinent moral reason. But, quite evidently, this 
argument begs the question against my reasoning. Second, as was implied 
above, there are reasons to believe that the question under consideration 
does make sense to ask. This is perhaps most clearly illustrated by the 
examples given above of various kinds of situations in which people may ask 
it. I cannot see but that the question makes perfectly good sense to ask in 
the kinds of situations in which these people find themselves. Third, and 
closely related to the last point, it is implausible to understand people who 
ask the question under consideration to be asking about another reason than 
a moral one. People who ask this question do not look at morality from 
outside and ask what reason there is to do what is right from such an 
external perspective. On the contrary, they find themselves in situations in 
which they are concerned about what reason morality provides to do what 
is right.18 For instance, consider again the person in the first example above, 
a person who has started to mistrust morality. She realises that morality 
classifies certain actions as right but has come to suspect that the motivation 
for this is that of preventing the lower classes from revolting against the 
upper classes. However, she has not made up her mind yet as to whether 
her suspicion is correct. She then asks what reason morality in fact supplies 
to do what is right—what moral reason there actually is to do what is right. 
It is difficult to see that the question she is asking can be understood in any 
other way than as a question about a moral reason. Indeed, the very point of 
                                      
18 However, it should be recalled that according to some views of moral reasons, such 
reasons are identified with reasons belonging to some other normative perspective. Thus, 
suppose moral reasons are identified with rational reasons. In case the inquirer is aware of 
this, when she asks about a moral reason to what is right, she asks about a rational reason 
to what is right. But on the mentioned assumption, she would then not be asking about 
a reason to do what is right from a perspective external to morality. 
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 her question is to ask what reason morality itself provides to do what is 
right. Surely, people may—and perhaps often do—ask about a reason to do 
what is right and have in mind a reason that is not moral. However, that is 
not the question they are asking when they ask the question under 
discussion here. 
 
7. Analogous Normative Questions 
In section 5, I argued that the question ‘What moral reason is there to do 
what is right?’ is not satisfactorily answered by asserting ‘It’s right’, since, to 
put the point briefly, this answer merely repeats what it asked for and 
therefore cannot state the requested reason. Reductionism has to give this 
answer, as we saw, because it is committed to a certain reading of the moral 
reason principle. Accordingly, it might be argued that the way reductionism 
reads that principle is mistaken. This indicates in turn that it fails to provide 
a reasonable account of the normativity of judgements to the effect that 
actions are right. However, realism is not vulnerable to these objections. 
 It is interesting to note that a number of philosophers have argued in 
a similar manner. They have reflected on analogous normative questions and 
have found that these questions cannot be accurately answered in the 
repetitious manner in which reductionism answers the question considered 
above because such responses merely repeat what is asked for and therefore 
fails to state the requested reasons. Among these philosophers are John 
McDowell, George Nakhnikian, Philip Stratton-Lake, and, according to 
one interpretation, G. E. Moore.19 It can be argued that what these authors 
maintain in relation to the questions they discuss lends confirmation to the 
                                      
19 McDowell (1978), p. 14; Nakhnikian (1963), pp. 157–158; Stratton-Lake (1999), pp. 
80–83, and Stratton-Lake (2000), chap. 1. See also e.g. Dancy (2000), pp. 166–167. On 
the relevant interpretations of Moore, see Nakhnikian (1963), pp. 145–146, 156–158, 
and Regan (1972), pp. 48–58. Another author who has argued in a similar manner is R. 
M. Hare; see Hare (1952), chap. 5. Hare argues that if ‘good’ is defined in terms of a set 
of natural properties, the fact that something has these natural properties cannot be cited 
as a reason to get what is good; it cannot, in Hare’s terms, be used to commend what is 
thought to be good. However, Hare thinks that we sometimes want to commend things 
by appealing to properties that are employed in proposals of such definitions. It might be 
argued that Hare’s distinction between an evaluative term’s primary and secondary sense 
makes this possible. According to this proposal, the reason consists in the fact that 
something has the set of natural properties which constitutes the secondary sense of 
‘good’, whereas this is a reason to have the attitude that constitutes the primary sense of 
the term. If this proposal is plausible, a version of non-cognitivism that employs the 
distinction between primary and secondary sense might be able to provide the requested 
answer to the question under consideration. 
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 arguments put forward in section 5. Moreover, I think it can be argued that 
the explanation of why they find the mentioned kind of answer 
unsatisfactory corresponds to the explanation I proposed there. 
 Consider Stratton-Lake’s discussion of the following question: 
 
Why should I do what I believe I ought to do, rather than some other action? [- - -] 
[This question] asks why we should do what we believe we ought to do, rather than 
some other action. Suppose, for the sake of simplicity, we limit this question to cases in 
which our belief is true. [This question] may seem like a deep question if one thinks, as 
Kantians tend to, that the reason why one ought to φ is because one ought to. My view 
is that this cannot be a normative reason why one ought to φ. The normative reasons 
why I ought to φ are those which would constitute a correct answer to the question 
‘why ought I to φ?’. But one cannot answer this question by replying, ‘because you 
ought to φ’. The fact that I ought to φ cannot, therefore, be a reason why I ought to φ. 
If this is correct, then [this question] may be easy to answer. The reason why you should 
do what you believe you ought to do may simply be the reason on the basis of which 
you believe you ought to do these various acts. Suppose you believe you ought to φ, and 
that you believe this because you promised your friend that you would φ. Why should 
you do what you believe you ought to do here? A naïve reply may be ‘because you 
promised your friend that you would do this’.20  
 
Stratton-Lake argues that the question ‘Why should I do what I ought to 
do?’ cannot be adequately answered by asserting ‘Because you ought to’, for 
such an answer fails to mention a normative reason.21 The proper kind of 
answer to the question is instead given in terms of those features of actions 
on the basis of which they are such that they ought to be done.  
 The question Stratton-Lake focuses on runs, when formulated in 
terms of rightness: ‘Why should I do what is right to do?’ As we saw earlier, 
this question can be formulated thus: ‘What reason is there to do what is 
right?’ In asking the mentioned question, Stratton-Lake asks about a moral 
reason.22 This is indicated by the context of the quotation, but also by the 
kind of answer he suggests: that the person in question has made a promise, 
a clearly moral consideration. Formulated in terms of rightness, the question 
Stratton-Lake poses becomes: ‘What moral reason is there to do what is 
right?’ Thus, he asks a question which is directly analogous to the one 
discussed in section 5. Moreover, Stratton-Lake’s arguments in relation to 
this question are remarkably similar to the arguments I put forward there. 
                                      
20 Stratton-Lake (1999), pp. 82–83. 
21 Admittedly, Stratton-Lake starts with the question ‘Why should I to do what I believe 
I ought to do?’ However, since he goes on to considers this question on the assumption 
that the inquirer’s belief is true, it can be understood in the way I do. 
22 From the context it is also clear that Stratton-Lake takes ‘ought’ to refer to a moral 
ought.  
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 First, he argues that the question he discusses cannot be accurately answered 
in the repetitious manner just mentioned because such an answer fails to 
state the requested reason. Second, he argues that the question instead is 
accurately answered in terms of actions having certain features on the basis 
of which they are such that they ought to be done. This idea is quite similar 
to the one proposed by realism concerning how the question discussed 
above should be answered, namely in terms of actions having a set of non-
moral properties that makes them right.  
 Granted these similarities, it is reasonable to hypothesise that one 
underlying explanation of why Stratton-Lake finds that the question ‘Why 
should I do what I ought to do?’ is not satisfactorily answered by claiming 
‘Because you ought to’ is analogous to the explanation I proposed above.23 
To be brief, the explanation would be this. The question Stratton-Lake 
poses, understood in a way corresponding to the second interpretation in 
section 5, is a fundamental normative question in relation to morality. A 
question of this type is not satisfactorily answered in the repetitious manner 
Stratton-Lake opposes because such an answer fails to state the requested 
reason. The underlying explanation can be provided in terms of the 
principle suggested above: a proposed reason to do what is F is such a reason 
only if the property that constitutes it is not identical with F. The reason 
suggested in the repetitious answer Stratton-Lake disapproves of does not 
fulfil this principle and, as a consequence, does not constitute the requested 
reason.  
 Consider briefly reductionism concerning ought. Following the 
reasoning in section 3, reductionism identifies the moral reason at issue with 
the fact that something has that moral feature. That is, reductionism is 
committed to reading an analogue to the moral reason principle in such a 
way that the moral reason at issue is identical with the fact that an action is 
such that it ought to be done. It is thus committed to answer the question 
Stratton-Lake poses in the repetitious manner he repudiates. According to 
the reasoning above, this indicates that reductionism is unable to account 
accurately for the normativity of judgements to the effect that actions ought 
to be done. By contrast, realism concerning ought is not committed to the 
                                      
23 In a later work, Stratton-Lake offers a slightly different explanation of why the 
question cannot be answered in the indicated manner: Stratton-Lake (2000), pp. 16–28. 
However, this explanation is not incompatible with the one I offer here; rather, they 
complement each other. 
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 mentioned understanding of the relation between the fact that an action is 
such that it ought to be done and moral reason. It is therefore not 
committed to giving the repetitious answer to the question posed by 
Stratton-Lake, something which suggests that it is capable of accounting for 
the normativity of such moral judgements. As already indicated, I think the 
same kind of reasoning is applicable to arguments other authors have 
proposed in relation to analogous normative questions.24   
                                      
24 One author who propounds a similar argument is George Nakhnikian. What he says 
is especially relevant to one of the objections I considered in the last section, objection 
(ii). There I imagined that it might objected that the answer reductionists give to the 
question ‘What moral reason is there to do what is right?’, may not be felt as awkward 
because the inquirer might not be aware of the identification advanced by the 
reductionist who gives the answer. It might then be thought that the argument against 
reductionism is mistaken. It is noteworthy that Nakhnikian answers a related objection in 
virtually the same way as I do. He writes: ‘Consider this example. I am trying to show 
you that doing A is your duty. You are not convinced. But A is you duty, I say, because 
you doing A would contribute to the welfare of the community. But suppose that I 
define “A is your duty” to mean that your doing A will contribute to the welfare of the 
community. In that case, “A is your duty” is just another way of saying “Your doing A 
will contribute to the welfare of the community,” and I have not provided a reason why 
doing A is your duty. In asserting “A is your duty” and “Your doing A will serve the 
welfare of the community” I have simply used two different expressions to say the same 
thing. This is illuminating only to those who need a lesson in language. It is of no help 
whatever to anyone who requires to be shown that doing A is his duty’ (Naknikian 
(1963), pp. 157–158). Translated to the question I focus on, Nakhnikian’s point can be 
formulated thus: on the assumption that rightness is identical with a given non-moral 
property, such as contributing to the welfare of community, the question ‘What moral 
reason is there to do what is right?’ is not satisfactorily answered by claiming ‘It 
contributes to the welfare of community’, even if the person who asks the question is 
not aware of the identification. The argument Nakhnikian suggests for why this is so 
corresponds to the one I offered above. It is, roughly put, that even if it is not apparent 
to the one who asks the question, such an answer is just another way to express what is 
asked about and it fails therefore to offer the requested reason. 
 It might perhaps also be argued that the reasoning in section 5 applies to certain 
normative questions concerning moral issues, although they are not directly analogous to 
the type of questions we have so far discussed. Consider, for example, the question ‘Why 
should I be moral?’ As noticed earlier, questions that ask why something should be so 
and so ask about a reason. Moreover, some of these questions ask about a moral reason. 
The phrase ‘to be moral’ might be taken to refer to a disposition to perform actions that 
are right. Thus understood, the question asks what moral reason there is—what reason 
morality provides—to have the disposition to do what is right. Like the question 
considered above, this question seems intelligible to ask. The discussion above about the 
moral reason principle indicates that reductionism has to answer this question by 
claiming, in effect, that the moral reason to be moral—to have the disposition to do 
what is right—is that it is right. This answer is flawed for the same reason as the answer 
reductionists give to the question considered above is: it merely repeats what is asked for 
and does consequently not state the requested reason. The underlying explanation of 
why this response is unsatisfactory can also be claimed to correspond to the explanation 
above. On the realist reading of the moral reason principle, the answer is given in terms 
of actions having a set of non-moral properties which is such that it makes actions right. 
According to the version of realism appealed to earlier, the answer is that a moral reason 
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  Moreover, it seems plausible to argue that my reasoning puts some 
light on what T. M. Scanlon refers to as ‘Prichard’s dilemma’. Scanlon 
writes: 
 
Attempts to explain how the fact that an action is wrong provides a reason not to do it 
face a difficult dilemma. Understood in one way, the answer is obvious: the reason not 
to do the action is just that it is wrong. But this is surely not the kind of answer that is 
wanted: it simply takes the reason-giving force of moral considerations for granted. 
Suppose, on the other hand, that we were to appeal to some clearly nonmoral reason, 
such as that people have reason to be morally good because, taking into account the 
effort that deception requires, the likelihood of being found out, and the costs of social 
ostracism, it is in their self-interest to be moral. This account might supply a reason for 
doing the right thing, but it would not be the kind of reason that we suppose a moral 
person first and foremost to be moved by. I will refer to this as Prichard’s dilemma. So a 
satisfactory answer to our question must not, on the one hand, merely say that the fact 
that an action is wrong is a reason not to do it; but it must, on the other hand, provide 
an account of the reason not to do it that we can see to be intimately connected with 
what it is to be wrong. Answers can thus be arranged along one dimension according to 
their evident moral content, ranging from those that appeal to what seem most obviously 
to be moral considerations (thus running the risk of triviality) to those having the least 
connection moral notions (thus running the risk of seeming to offer implausibly external 
incentives for being moral).25
 
Scanlon is concerned with the following question: ‘What reason is there not 
to do what is wrong?’ From the context of the quotation, it is clear that the 
wrongness at issue is moral wrongness. Scanlon suggests that the kind of 
reason referred to in this question is ‘the kind of reason that we suppose a 
moral person first and foremost to be moved by’, and it seems therefore not 
far-fetched to assume that he has in mind a moral reason.26 Hence, it seems 
reasonable to assume that the question Scanlon poses is directly analogous to 
the fundamental normative questions about moral issues discussed earlier. 
Scanlon considers two answers to the question. The first answer is ‘It’s 
wrong’. Scanlon finds this answer unsatisfactory because ‘it takes the reason-
giving force of moral considerations for granted’ and is ‘running the risk of 
triviality’. The second answer is ‘It’s in your self-interest’. Scanlon finds this 
answer unsatisfactory because it does not state the kind of reason asked for, 
i.e. a moral reason. The fact that both answers are inadequate gives rise to 
what Scanlon calls ‘Prichard’s dilemma’. The dilemma demonstrates, 
                                                                                                              
to be moral—to have the disposition to do what is right—is that this maximises 
happiness. Such an answer may state the reason asked for.  
25 Scanlon (1998), pp. 149–150.  
26 This is also indicated by the fact that Scanlon regards it to be uncontroversial that if an 
action is wrong, there is a reason not to do it. Moreover, it is indicated by the fact that 
he contrasts the kind of reason he seeks with a ‘nonmoral reason’. 
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 Scanlon believes, that a satisfactory answer to the question at issue cannot 
just be ‘It’s wrong’, but at the same time it has to mention a reason that is 
‘intimately connected to what it is to be wrong’.27 Prichard’s dilemma 
deserves detailed discussion. Here I shall only make three comments. First, 
as should be familiar by now, the reasoning above can explain why ‘It’s 
wrong’ is an unsatisfactory answer to the question Scanlon poses. Second, it 
can also explain why he finds this answer unsatisfactory. To answer ‘It’s 
wrong’ can be said to take the reason-giving force of moral considerations 
for granted because it merely presumes that if an action is wrong, it follows 
that there is a reason not to do it, but it does not state what this reason 
consists in. The answer is also, in a certain sense, trivial since it only repeats 
what is asked about. Third, it is plausible to argue that according to the 
realist conception of moral reasons, there is a moral reason that fulfils 
Scanlon’s requirement on a satisfactory answer to the question he poses. On 
this conception, the moral reason at issue consists in the fact that an action 
has a set of non-moral properties which is such that it makes actions wrong. 
Since this set of non-moral properties is not identical with wrongness, the 
realist answer to Scanlon’s question is not merely ‘It’s wrong’. But since 
such a set of non-moral properties makes actions wrong, this answer 
certainly states a reason that is ‘intimately connected to what it is to be 
wrong’.28
                                      
27 Scanlon refers to the discussion in Prichard (1952 (1912)), pp. 149–162. However, it 
is not obvious that Prichard is concerned with the same dilemma that Scanlon 
formulates. For an interpretation and critical discussion of Prichard’s essay, see Schwarz 
(1971), pp. 169–180.  
28 Scanlon argues that ‘an action is wrong if its performance [. . .] would be disallowed 
by any set of principles [. . .] that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, 
unforced general agreement’ (Scanlon (1998), p. 153). He seems to want to characterise 
the moral reason not to do what is wrong in these terms (see e.g. Scanlon (1998), p. 
155). It is controversial whether it is best to construe this view in such a way that it 
reduces, and hence identifies, wrongness with being ‘disallowed by any set of principles 
that one could reasonably reject…’ or in such a way that it says that what makes actions 
wrong is the fact that they have this feature (where ‘make’ is understood as non-
reductive relation). It might be argued that what I said above lends support to the latter 
alternative. (However, there are indications that Scanlon himself prefers the first 
alternative; see Scanlon (1998), pp. 10–12.) Suppose that the first alternative is opted for. 
In that case, it is difficult to see that Scanlon can avoid the first horn of the dilemma he 
presents. According to this alternative, wrongness is identified with being ‘disallowed by 
any set of principles that one could reasonably reject…’ and the pertinent moral reason is 
also understood as the fact that an action has that feature. As a consequence, the moral 
reason is identical with the fact that an action is wrong. Hence, the answer to the 
question Scanlon poses is in effect ‘It’s wrong’. On this alternative, Scanlon’s own view 
would be exposed to the first horn of the dilemma. However, if the second alternative is 
opted for, the first horn of the dilemma is avoided. According to this alternative, the 
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8. Other Normative Questions 
In the previous sections, I maintained that reductionism cannot give 
satisfactory answers to certain fundamental normative questions about moral 
issues, but that realism is able to do so. However, it should be observed that 
reductionism seems to deliver acceptable answers to many familiar 
normative questions about moral issues. Consequently, reflections on these 
questions do not help us to decide which view to prefer. To see this, we 
may recall some of the normative questions about moral issues mentioned in 
section 5. Some such questions, we noticed, ask what moral reason there is 
to perform a particular action. We might for example ask ‘Why should I 
give him the money back?’ and take it as a question about a moral reason. 
That is, we might ask ‘What moral reason is there to give him the money 
back?’ Return to our example of reductionism utilised earlier. According to 
this view, the answer to the question is ‘It maximises happiness’. Since 
rightness and maximising happiness are identical on this view, the answer is 
in effect ‘It’s right’. I do not think either version of the answer reductionism 
provides strikes us as clearly mistaken. Realism answers the question in 
terms of a set of non-moral properties that makes actions right but with 
which rightness is not identified. According to the example of a version of 
realism utilised above, the answer would be ‘It maximises happiness’. I do 
not think this answer strikes us as clearly preferable to the answer offered by 
reductionism. 
 It should be pointed out, however, that the fact that the answers 
realism gives to certain normative questions do not seem to be superior to 
the ones reductionism gives does not show that the arguments of the 
previous sections are flawed. What it shows is rather that the advantages 
realism has over reductionism with regard to reason become manifest only 
when we consider the answers these two views give to certain particular 
kinds of normative questions. As we have seen, these are fundamental 
normative questions about moral issues which ask what reason morality itself 
                                                                                                              
moral reason is characterised in terms of being ‘disallowed by any set of principles that 
one could reasonably reject…’. However, wrongness is not identical with this feature. 
This means that the question Scanlon poses can be answered in these terms without the 
first horn of the dilemma emerging. For relevant discussions of how Scanlon’s view 
should be construed and matters related to this, see McNaughton and Rawling (2003), 
pp. 328–331; Parfit (2003), pp. 389–390, n. 21; Pettit (2000), pp. 156–163; Sosa (2004), 
pp. 374–375, and Stratton-Lake (2003), pp. 70–76. 
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 provides to do what has a certain moral feature. That is, they are questions 
that utilise moral notions both in the reason asked for and in that for which 
a reason is asked. 
 The fact that reductionism seems to give acceptable answers to some 
normative questions may however help to explain why it might not be 
recognised that reductionism fails in the ways I have maintained. The 
explanation is simply that the focus has been on the familiar and common 
kind of normative questions just exemplified rather than on the fundamental 
kind of normative questions discussed earlier.  
 A further explanation is worth mentioning. There are normative 
questions that are similar to the one considered in section 5 but which do 
not make sense. Take the question ‘Do I have a moral reason to do what is 
right?’ This question does not make sense, since if an action is right it 
follows, according to the moral reason principle, with analytic necessity that 
there is a moral reason to perform it. Earlier we considered a version of the 
question ‘Why should I do what is right?’ Assuming that it asks about a 
moral reason, this question is most reasonable interpreted as ‘What moral 
reason is there to do what is right?’ In asking this question, one presupposes 
that there is a moral reason to do what is right; one asks what such a reason 
consists in.29 As we have seen, there is reason to believe that such a question 
makes sense. However, the question ‘Why should I do what is right?’ might 
perhaps also be interpreted similarly to the nonsensical question just 
mentioned. In asking the question thus understood, one asks whether there is 
a moral reason to do what is right.30 Since this question does not make 
sense, it cannot be argued against reductionism that it fails to provide an 
answer to it. If the fundamental normative questions about moral issues 
considered above have been interpreted as questions like this one, this might 
help to explain why it has not been recognised that reductionism fails in the 
ways I have maintained.  
 
9. A Note on Rationalism and Realism 
Above I have maintained that the reading of the moral reason principle 
provided by realism is superior to the reading provided by reductionism. 
The difference in their reading of this principle has, I maintained, 
                                      
29 Cf. Nielsen (1984), pp. 81–82.  
30 Cf. Frankena (1976 (1958)), p. 66. 
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 consequences for the plausibility of reductionism and realism, respectively. 
In spite of these results, the arguments offered with regard to the moral 
reason principle are purely formal, since they merely concern how the 
principle should be read internally, or, more precisely, how the relation 
between the fact that an action is right and moral reason is to be construed. 
Thus, the arguments do not presuppose that moral reasons are understood in 
any particular way. This is as it should be since it is desirable that a reading 
of the moral reason principle is independent of various views of moral 
reasons in order not to beg significant questions. One of the most discussed 
issues in meta-ethics is rationalism.31 It is relevant to consider whether the 
way realism reads the moral reason principle is compatible with this view. If 
it is not, it might be argued that it is not neutral in the desirable way. In 
section 2, I mentioned that rationalism can be understood as the view that 
moral reasons consist in reasons of rationality, what I have referred to as 
‘rational reasons’. As mentioned before, we may formulate this view in the 
following way: 
 Rationalism: It is necessary that if an action is right, then there is a 
 rational reason to perform that action.32
In section 4, we saw that on the realist reading of the moral reason 
principle, a moral reason consists in the fact that an action has a set of non-
moral properties which is such that it makes actions right. Rationalism can, 
as just mentioned, be understood as the view that moral reasons consist in 
rational reasons. According to a rationalist version of realism, a rational 
reason of the relevant kind consists consequently in such a fact. Hence, the 
way realism understands the moral reason principle seems able to 
accommodate rationalism in a relatively straightforward way. 
 It might be argued, however, that even if the realist reading of the 
moral reason principle is compatible with rationalism understood in a 
general way, it does not show that it is compatible with rationalism in 
combination with certain views about what rational reasons consist in. This 
is a large issue that I cannot deal with here. However, I would like very 
briefly to consider a conception of rational reasons that, in combination 
                                      
31 The same question can in principle be asked in relation to some other kind of reasons. 
However, since the relation moral judgements have to rational reasons presumably is 
considered most central, the issue discussed here seems to be the most important one.  
32 Cf. Brink (1992), pp. 1–2, 8–9; Smith (1994), p. 62, and Shafer-Landau (2003), p. 
170.  
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 with rationalism, might be thought to constitute a problem for meta-ethical 
views known as ‘realism’. On this conception of rational reasons, having 
such a reason to perform an action is a function of whether this would 
contribute to the satisfaction of some of one’s desires. Of course, this is 
merely a very rough formulation of a type of view which exists in various 
elaborated versions.33 Rationalism states that, necessarily, if an action is 
right, there is a rational reason to perform that action. The result of the 
combination of these views is that the rightness of an action is dependent on 
whether its performance would satisfy the agent’s desires.34 Is this version of 
rationalism compatible with the way realism reads the moral reason 
principle? I think it is, at least if realists understand it in a certain way. There 
seems to be a possible version of realism which says that what makes an 
action right is a set of non-moral properties which pertains to desires in the 
mentioned way. Thus, the way realism reads the moral reason principle 
seems compatible with rationalism in combination with the mentioned view 
of rational reasons. It remains, though, to account for how such a version of 
realism should be understood.35
 However, even if the way realism reads the moral reason principle is 
compatible with the combination of rationalism and the mentioned 
conception of rational reasons, there are indications that the resulting view 
should be rejected. One of our fundamental notions of morality is that 
requirements of moral rightness are categorical in the sense that they apply 
to people independently of what they happen to desire. As the version of 
realism under consideration appears to be incompatible with this notion, 
there is reason to believe that it should be rejected.36 There are basically two 
ways to do so. Either rationalism might be denied or this conception of 
                                      
33 The most well-known version is presumably the one put forward in Williams (1981 
(1980)), pp. 101–113.  
34 This is of course a much-discussed issue in moral philosophy. For helpful discussions 
of this and related issues, see e.g. Brink (1989), pp. 50–78; Brink (1992), pp. 1–26; 
Cullity and Gaut (1997), pp. 1–23, and Shafer-Landau (2003), chap. 7 and 8. 
35 There is at least one more version of rationalism that might be difficult to combine 
with realism. According to this version, rationalism entails internalism as regards moral 
motivation; see Smith (1994), p. 62. (For criticism of this version of rationalism, see e.g. 
Miller (2003), pp. 229–232.) The reason why this view might be thought to be 
problematic for realism is that it might be argued that internalism is incompatible with 
realism. However, in the next chapter, I will argue that internalism is mistaken.   
36 However, it should be mentioned that there are theories of rational reasons that might 
be seen as versions of the view mentioned above but that are claimed to be compatible 
with the notion that requirements of moral rightness are categorical; see e.g. Smith 
(1994), pp. 164–175. 
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 rational reasons might be denied.37 In fact, I think both these views should 
be denied. However, this is not something I will argue for here. 
 
10. Concluding Remarks 
According to the moral reason principle, moral judgements to the effect that 
actions are right are normative in the fundamental sense that it is analytically 
necessary that if an action is right, there is a moral reason to perform it. 
Reductionism reads this principle in such a way that the moral reason is 
identified with the fact that the action is right. However, realism may read 
this principle in such a way that the moral reason consists in the fact that the 
action has a set of non-moral properties which is such that it makes actions 
right. I have argued that because of this difference, reductionism fails to 
answer a version of the question ‘Why should I do what is right?’, whereas 
realism is capable of doing so. Moreover, I have argued that this indicates 
that reductionism fails to provide an accurate account of the normativity of 
the mentioned kind of moral judgements, whereas realism is capable of 
doing so. I have also suggested that similar lines of reasoning apply to 
analogous normative questions concerning moral issues. I finished the 
chapter by suggesting that the way realism understands the moral reason 
principle is compatible with rationalism. However, this issue requires further 
discussion.  
                                      
37 For various strategies how this might be done, see e.g. Brink (1992), pp. 7–14. 
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 Chapter 7 
Explaining Moral Motivation 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In the last chapter, I mentioned that there are basically two ways in which 
moral judgements can be claimed to involve reasons for actions: by 
involving normative reasons and by involving motivating reasons. I devoted 
that chapter to a discussion of the relation between moral judgements and 
normative reasons of a certain kind, viz. moral reasons. The present chapter 
is devoted to a discussion of the relation between moral judgements and 
motivating reasons. 
 One of the most debated views in meta-ethics is internalism as regards 
moral motivation. According to a well-known argument which I will refer 
to as ‘the internalist argument’, internalism in conjunction with the 
Humean theory of motivation implies that moral judgements do not consist 
in beliefs. The internalist argument means consequently that cognitivism is 
false and provides support to non-cognitivism. In the present chapter, I will 
argue that the internalist argument should be rejected and that cognitivism 
therefore can be maintained. I will do so by arguing against internalism and 
in favour of its opposite, externalism. In order for this argument to be 
plausible, advocates of externalism have to be able to account for moral 
motivation. As a part of the argument, I will maintain that realism, unlike 
reductionism, succeeds to account for how a pertinent aspect of moral 
motivation should be understood on externalism. Consequently, realism, 
unlike reductionism, plays a part in the defence of cognitivism against the 
internalist argument. However, in comparison with the previous two 
chapters, the contribution of realism to the meta-ethical issue dealt with 
here is considerably more limited.  
 In the next section, I formulate internalism and externalism, and in 
the section thereafter I formulate the internalist argument. In section 4, I 
examine the most important considerations that are appealed to in defence 
of internalism and argue that they do not provide such a strong support for 
this view that one might assume. In section 5, I start a discussion about a 
possible counterexample to internalism, the renowned amoralist, and the 
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 different ways internalists have argued that there are no amoralists. In 
section 6, I continue this discussion by arguing that there are descriptions of 
amoralists—what I will refer to as ‘advanced amoralists’—that both are 
compatible with the internalist considerations and cannot be dismissed in 
the ways proposed by internalists. In section 7, I argue by means of some 
ideas in pragmatics that externalism can explain the considerations that are 
thought to provide support to internalism and that these explanations are 
preferable to those offered by internalism. The most interesting argument 
for internalism and against externalism is Michael Smith’s so-called fetishist 
argument. I have saved this argument to a separate discussion in section 8 
where I argue that it is unsuccessful. Smith’s argument raises the question 
how moral motivation should be understood according to externalism. In 
section 9, I argue that realism provides a better account than reductionism 
of a certain type of motivational states which is important to the plausibility 
of externalism. 
 
2. Internalism and Externalism 
As far as I understand, it is generally agreed in meta-ethics that there is a 
significant connection between moral judgements and motivation that calls 
for explanation. However, there are different views about how this 
connection should be accounted for; in particular, there is much 
disagreement about how strong it is. According to an influential view, this 
connection is analytically necessary. Applied to moral judgements to the 
effect that actions are right, this view yields the following principle:1  
                                      
1 There are a number of various theses that are labelled ‘internalism’, including what I 
referred to as rationalism in the previous chapter. In this chapter, I will only be 
concerned with internalism as regards moral motivation. For overviews of various types 
of internalism, see e.g. Audi (1997), pp. 125–159; Brink (1989), pp. 37–43; Parfit (1997), 
pp. 99–105, and Shafer-Landau (2003), pp. 142–145. For useful discussions about the 
definition of internalism as regards moral motivation, see e.g. Cuneo (1999), pp. 361–
363; Korsgaard (1996 (1986)), pp. 315–316, and Svavarsdóttir (1999), pp. 163–165. This 
kind of internalism is embraced by a number of authors, and it might be argued that this 
view has deep historical roots; for arguments to this effect, see e.g. Strandberg (2000), pp. 
71–87. For some instructive statements of this kind of internalism, see e.g. Blackburn 
(1984), p. 188; Falk (1952 (1948)), p. 494; Hare (1952), pp. 20, 168–169; Korsgaard 
(1996 (1986)), pp. 311–334; Smith (1994), chap. 3, and Stevenson (1963 (1937)), p. 13. 
However, not all these authors understand internalism as regards moral motivation in the 
way I do. 
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  Motivational internalism: It is analytically necessary that if a person 
 judges that it is right for her to perform an action, then she is at least 
 somewhat motivated to perform that action.2  
According to motivational internalism—‘internalism’ for short—it is 
analytically necessary that if a person holds a judgement to the effect that an 
action is right, she is motivated to act in accordance with it. As I will 
understand internalism, it states that a person’s motivation to do what she 
judges to be right is internal to her judgement. There are, as far as I see, 
primarily two ways in which motivation can be internal to a person’s moral 
judgement: either in so far as the judgement consists in a motivational state 
of the mentioned kind or in so far as the judgement by itself gives rise to 
such a motivational state, presumably by causing it.3 That the motivation is 
internal to a person’s moral judgement implies that her judgement is 
sufficient for her to be motivated to perform the action. There is thus no 
need for her to be in any state that is not internal to her judgement in this 
way in order to be motivated to perform the action; that is, there is no need 
for her to be in a motivational state that is external to her judgement to be so 
motivated. In the next section, I will consider an important qualification of 
internalism. 
 It is generally presumed in discussions about internalism that this view 
states that motivation is internal to a person’s moral judgement in the way 
described, although it is not always spelled out. This assumption is often put 
by saying that, according to internalism, moral judgements necessarily 
motivate or that they are necessarily motivating. However, it should be 
noted that if internalism is not understood to say that motivation is internal 
to a person’s moral judgement in the indicated way, it would not be able to 
function as a premise in the internalist argument. I will return to this 
consideration in the next section. 
 Since internalism is claimed to be analytically necessary, a person does 
not really judge that an action is right unless she is motivated to perform it 
                                      
2 As I mentioned in chapter 1, I use ‘judgement’ and ‘judge’ in a way that is neutral 
between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. If cognitivism is correct, a moral judgement 
consists (primarily) in a belief; if non-cognitivism is correct, it consists (primarily) in a 
non-cognitive state. In writing about internalism below, I will omit the phrase that the 
person in question judges that the action is right ‘for her’ to perform. However, I will 
take it to be implied in what follows. 
3 There might be variants of these two basic possibilities. According to one such variant, 
a person’s moral judgement partly consists in a motivational state and so entails it. I will 
take such variants to be covered by the formulations mentioned in text.  
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 by a motivational state that is internal to her judgement. Similarly, to know 
that ‘right’ is to be applied in accordance with the principle is a condition 
for being linguistically competent with respect to the term. 
 Motivational externalism—‘externalism’ for short—is the denial of 
internalism.4 Thus, externalism denies that it is analytically necessary that if a 
person holds a judgement to the effect that an action is right, she is 
motivated to act in accordance with it. As I will understand externalism, it 
states that motivation is not internal to a person’s moral judgement in the 
way proposed by internalism. That is, her judgement neither consists in a 
motivational state nor gives rise to it by itself. That motivation is not 
internal to a person’s moral judgement means that her judgement is not 
sufficient for her to be motivated to do what she judges to be right. In order 
for her to be motivated to do what she judges to be right, she has to be in 
an external motivational state; that is, she has to be motivated by a state that 
is not internal to her judgement. External motivational states may consist in 
states that involve moral concerns, but they may also, for example, consist in 
states that involve merely egoistic concerns.   
 According to externalism, a person may genuinely judge that an 
action is right without being motivated to perform it; in particular, she does 
not need be motivated by a motivational state that is internal to her 
judgement. Moreover, taking ‘right’ to apply in accordance with the 
internalist principle is not a condition for being linguistically competent 
with respect to the term.  
 The difference between internalism and externalism can be stated in 
terms of the distinction between normative and motivating reasons. 
Internalists are committed to the view that, with analytic necessity, if a 
person judges that an action is right, she has a motivating reason to perform 
that action. Externalists are committed to the denial of this view. However, 
internalists and externalists are not committed to any particular view of 
normative reasons.5 In order not to confuse normative with motivating 
reasons, I will not make use of the term ‘reason’ in this chapter. 
 
 
                                      
4 Externalism is defended by e.g. Brink (1989), pp. 37–50; Copp (1995), pp. 187–219; 
Shafer-Landau (2003), chap. 6; Svavarsdóttir (1999), pp. 161–219, and Zangwill (2003), 
pp. 143–154.  
5 Cf. Smith (1994), p. 96.  
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 3. The Internalist Argument 
Internalism is widely considered to have far-reaching implications for the 
correctness of meta-ethical views. In particular, according to a very 
influential argument, internalism together with what is known as the 
Humean theory of motivation implies that cognitivism is false. The basic 
claim of the Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs are not sufficient 
for motivation. Thus, the theory says, in Terence D. Cuneo’s formulation, 
that ‘beliefs are not identical with, nor do they generate by themselves, 
desires or motivational states’.6 In addition, the theory claims that non-
cognitive states, notably desires, are necessary for motivation to occur. 
(However, the latter claim is not a necessary part of the argument.)  
 The argument I have in mind—the internalist argument—can be 
represented as follows:7
 (1)  Motivational internalism: It is analytically necessary that if a 
  person judges that it is right for her to perform an action, then 
  she is at least somewhat motivated to perform that action.  
 (2) The Humean theory of motivation: Beliefs are not sufficient for 
  motivation; beliefs do not consist in motivational states, nor do 
  they give rise to motivational states by themselves.  
 (3) Therefore, a person’s judgement to the effect that an action is 
  right for her to perform does not consist in a belief. 
We can now see why it is essential for the internalist argument that 
internalism is understood to say that a person’s motivation to do what she 
judges to be right is internal to her judgement in such a way that her 
judgement is sufficient for her to have that motivation. Premise (1), 
internalism, together with premise (2)—the view that beliefs are not 
sufficient for motivation, neither by consisting in motivational states nor by 
giving rise to such states by themselves—should yield the conclusion (3), 
that a person’s judgement to the effect that an action is right does not 
                                      
6 Cuneo (2002), p. 467. It might be argued, however, that this common formulation of 
the Humean theory of motivation is not in accordance with Hume’s own view; see 
Persson (1997), pp. 211–228.  
7 For clear formulations of the argument, see e.g. Brink (1997), p. 6; Parfit (1997), p. 
106, and Shafer-Landau (2003), p. 121. In the literature, the argument more often seems 
assumed than clearly stated; but see e.g. Blackburn (1984), pp. 188–189. However, it is a 
matter of interpretation how proponents of this line of reasoning would exactly 
formulate the internalist argument. 
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 consist in a belief.8 This means that for (3) to follow, internalism has to be 
understood to state that the person’s judgement is sufficient for motivation, 
either in so far as it consists in a motivational state or in so far as it gives rise 
to such a state by itself. 
 The conclusion (3) entails that cognitivism as regards judgements to 
the effect that actions are right is false.9 (However, it might be argued that 
there are analogues to the internalist argument that pertain to other kinds of 
moral judgements.) Moreover, the argument provides support to non-
cognitivism. 
 Cognitivism can be defended against the internalist argument in 
basically two ways. Which line of defence cognitivists adopt depends on 
whether they want to save internalism, the Humean theory of motivation or 
neither. First, cognitivists who are internalists dispute premise (2), the 
Humean theory of motivation.10 According to one version of this option, 
some beliefs, among which are found not only moral but also non-moral 
beliefs, are sufficient for motivation. According to another version, only 
moral beliefs are sufficient for motivation whereas other kinds of beliefs are 
not. Proponents of this line of thought also differ as to whether the beliefs in 
question are motivating by themselves or because they generate, presumably 
by causing, motivating states. Second, cognitivists who are externalists 
dispute (1). This is also the line of defence that cognitivists who want to 
defend the Humean theory of motivation have to adopt. Cognitivist 
externalists who are not committed to the Humean theory of motivation are 
of course also free to reject (2). 
 In this chapter, I will defend cognitivism by challenging premise (1), 
internalism, and defend externalism in combination with realism. To my 
                                      
8 As we saw in chapter 1, according to some versions of non-cognitivism, moral 
sentences do express beliefs, although secondarily. The internalist argument above may 
thus need to be reformulated to take this into account. 
9 Since beliefs are expressed in sentences that have truth-value, this conclusion can also 
be formulated by saying that moral sentences to the effect that actions are right do not 
have truth-value. 
10 See e.g. Dancy (1993), esp. chap. 1; McDowell (1978), pp. 13–29; McDowell (1979), 
pp. 331–350; McNaughton (1988) pp. 108–113; Nagel (1970), chap. 1, and Wiggins 
(1991), 51–85. For critical views on some aspects of this view, see Strandberg (1999), pp. 
171–192. At least some authors in this tradition seem to have in mind another notion of 
motivational internalism than the one I formulated above. In particular, some of these 
authors seem to believe that moral judgements, i.e. moral beliefs, need not always be 
sufficient for motivation, merely that they sometimes are sufficient for motivation; see e.g. 
McNaughton (1988), pp. 134–135.  
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 mind it might be the case that premise (2), the Humean theory of 
motivation, is mistaken, but this is not something for which I will argue. 
 Before we proceed, I would like to comment on the formulation of 
internalism. Some authors defend a weaker claim than the one I have given 
this label. Michael Smith advocates what he calls ‘the practicality 
requirement’: ‘If an agent judges that it is right for her to φ in circumstances 
C, then either she is motivated to φ in C or she is practically irrational.’11 
Unfortunately, Smith does not explain what practical rationality amounts to, 
but he suggests that it excludes ‘distorting influences of weakness of will and 
other similar forms of practical unreason’.12 Smith’s reason to incorporate a 
requirement of practical rationality into internalism is that it is ‘manifestly 
implausible’ to deny that ‘weakness of the will and the like may defeat an 
agent’s moral motivations while leaving her appreciation of her moral 
reasons intact’.13
 There are basically two reasons why I hesitate to incorporate a 
requirement of practical rationality into internalism. 
 First, it would run the risk of committing internalists to a particular 
view of judgements to the effect that actions are right. If a requirement of 
practical rationality is incorporated into internalism, it has to be something 
about such judgements that explains why it is only if one is practically 
rational that one is guaranteed to be motivated in accordance with them. 
The explanation that most readily comes to mind is that such judgements 
pertain to rational considerations in some way, e.g. by being about what 
people would be motivated to do were they rational.14 If this is correct, the 
principle would commit internalists to a certain understanding of these 
judgements. However, this is undesirable because it might not be a view 
that internalists are prepared to accept. Moreover, it is undesirable to make 
internalism conditional on a view that presumably is more controversial 
than internalism itself. 
                                      
11 Smith (1994), p. 61. Italics added. Cf. Korsgaard (1996 (1986)), pp. 315–317.  
12 Smith (1994), p. 61. Smith’s concept of practical rationality should not be conflated 
with his concept of full rationality which occurs in his analysis of ‘right’; although he 
does not explain the first concept, he gives an elaborated explication of the latter; see 
Smith (1994), pp. 155–161.  
13 Smith (1994), p. 61. Michael Stocker argues in a well-known paper that there are 
cases where people’s motivation does not accord with their evaluative judgements 
because of depression, apathy and the like; see Stocker (1979), pp. 738–753. 
14 Of course, this is Smith’s view. 
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  Second, it would run the risk of getting internalists into a dilemma. 
On the one hand, if the notion of practical rationality is strong, so that 
people have to be practically rational in a quite substantial way to be 
guaranteed to be accordingly motivated, this seems to put considerable 
limits on how extensive the correlation between utterances of moral 
sentences and motivation can be. In that case, there is reason to suspect that 
internalism cannot explain the close correlation between them that often it 
is thought to hold. This would be especially troublesome since one 
argument in favour of internalism is considered to be that it is able to 
explain this correlation. On the other hand, if the notion of practical 
rationality is weak, so that little or no substantial demands are put on being 
practically rational, there is reason to suspect that it does not exclude the 
states of ‘practical unreason’ Smith wants it to exclude. In that case, 
internalism would not be able to account for the exceptions to the 
connection between moral judgements and motivation in the way Smiths 
wishes. Hence, it would not be able to avoid a view Smith believes is 
‘manifestly implausible’. Unfortunately, Smith does not give us an account 
of practical rationality that can help us to settle whether this dilemma can be 
avoided.15
 We can now see that a commentator on the internalist argument finds 
herself in another dilemma. On the one hand, if a requirement of practical 
rationality is incorporated into internalism, the problems just mentioned 
emerge. On the other hand, if internalism is understood in the stronger way 
without a requirement of practical rationality, internalism is not able to 
avoid a view Smith thinks is ‘manifestly implausible’. On either alternative, 
the internalist argument seems to have lost in strength. The most satisfactory 
solution would be to propose a formulation of internalism that avoids this 
dilemma. Unfortunately, I do not know of such a formulation.16 I have 
therefore chosen the following strategy. In the discussion below, I will in 
general continue to understand internalism in the stronger way described in 
the last section. However, in my arguments against internalism, I will not 
appeal to states that qualify as practical irrationality. This approach might not 
be entirely satisfactory but it avoids the dilemma. It avoids the relevant parts 
of the first horn of the dilemma for the following reasons. Understood in 
                                      
15 For a related problem with the practicality requirement, see Miller (2003), p. 221. 
16 Cf. Svavarsdóttir (1999), pp. 164–166. 
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 this way, internalism does not appeal to a notion of practical rationality that 
the pertinent judgements have to comprise and there is thus no reason to 
believe that it commits internalists to a particular understanding of these 
judgements in the way mentioned above. Neither is there any immediate 
reason to believe that it is not able to explain the tight correlation that is 
assumed to hold between utterances of moral sentences and motivation. It 
avoids the second horn of the dilemma for the following reason. Since I do 
not appeal to states that qualify as practical irrationality in my arguments 
against internalism, I leave open the possibility that there is a formulation of 
internalism that accounts for why there might be exceptions to the assumed 
connection between moral judgements and motivation because of practical 
irrationality. Hence, I do not appeal to a view that is, as Smith says, 
‘manifestly implausible’.17 In understanding internalism in this way, I admit 
for the possibility that there is a version of this view that steers clear of the 
dilemma. One way internalism might avoid the dilemma is if there is a 
formulation of ‘practically rational’ that does not have the mentioned 
problems. Since there might be such a formulation, I will at the relevant 
points in the discussion assume that advocates of internalism can appeal to a 
formulation of that kind in order to avoid arguments directed against this 
view.  
 
4. Internalist Considerations 
In the present section, I will examine the considerations that, in my view, 
constitute the most significant support to internalism. It is customarily taken 
for granted, also by those who deny internalism, that these considerations 
make this view seem plausible. However, I will suggest that on closer 
examination these considerations do not have the strength that they often 
are assumed to have. As it is not possible for me to discuss all considerations 
that have been thought to support internalism, I will limit my discussion to 
the three that, to my mind, are most central.18
                                      
17 For the same reason, this strategy avoids the second horn of the dilemma that 
internalists run the risk of getting into. 
18 There are a number of traditional arguments for internalism that I will not discuss, 
among others R. M. Hare’s argument from practicality. The main reason why I do not 
discuss these arguments is that few moral philosophers, internalists included, nowadays 
seem to believe that they provide support to internalism. These arguments are 
consequently seldom considered in recent literature on internalism. For an early, but still 
useful, discussion of considerations that have been supplied in defence of internalism, see 
Frankena (1976 (1958)), pp. 49–73. For recent discussions, see e.g. Björnsson (1998), 
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  (i) The consideration that most often is advanced in support of 
internalism is the intuition that it would be paradoxical if a person would 
utter a sentence to the effect that an action is right if she is not motivated to 
perform it.19 For example, we would be perplexed were we to hear a 
person utter the sentence ‘It’s right to give money to the Red Cross’ and 
then come to believe that she is not at all motivated to give any money to 
the organisation. An important reason why we would find this paradoxical 
is, I think, that we have difficulties understanding why a person who is not 
so motivated would utter such a sentence. Unless she is accordingly 
motivated, we simply see no point in her uttering the sentence. Such an 
utterance, we might feel, would lack its appropriate function, and we would 
as a consequence be unsure how to understand it. As a result, in cases where 
a person utters a sentence to the effect that an action is right, but we have 
come to believe that she is not motivated to perform the action, we look for 
an explanation of why she nevertheless utters the sentence. We might for 
example come to believe that she does not, after all, judge that the action is 
right. 
                                                                                                              
esp. chap. 3, and Cuneo (2002), pp. 465–486. For discussions of Hare’s argument, see 
e.g. Rønnow-Rasmussen (1993), chap. 1, and Björnsson (1998), pp. 55–60.  
 One traditional argument put forward in support of internalism should be 
mentioned, however. It runs, roughly, in the following way. It is claimed that if an 
action is right, there has to be a reason to perform it. It is further argued that according 
to internalism, moral judgements imply reason, but according to externalism they do not. 
Hence, it is concluded that internalism is correct and externalism incorrect. (For a recent 
expression of this argument, see Korsgaard (1996 (1989)), p. 43.) William K. Frankena 
was perhaps the first one to point out that the argument rests on an ambiguity as regards 
‘reason’ between motivating reasons and normative reasons (Frankena (1976 (1958)), pp. 
51–59). (For a recent version of this response, see Cuneo (2002), pp. 483–485.) True, 
internalists claim that if a person holds a moral judgement, she has a motivating reason to 
perform the action, whereas externalists deny this. But to hold this against externalism 
would be to beg the question. It might then be argued that the kind of reason the 
argument appeals to is not motivating reasons but normative reasons. However, neither 
internalism nor externalism claims that if a person judges that an action is right, it follows 
that she has a normative reason to perform the action. Both internalists and externalists 
can hold that the fact that an action is right implies normative reasons of various sorts, 
e.g. reasons of rationality. But this has nothing to do with them advocating internalism 
and externalism. Of course, if internalism is combined with the view that motivating 
reasons are normative reasons, it follows that if a person judges that an action is right, she 
has a normative reason to perform it. However, this is not something that follows from 
internalism itself. Moreover, the view that motivating reasons are normative reasons 
seems more controversial than internalism. It therefore seems implausible to presume this 
premise in an argument in favour of internalism. 
19 An utterance need not be verbal; it might be written or indicated in some other way.  
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  This intuition seems to support internalism.20 It is reasonable to argue 
that the explanation of why we feel that it would be paradoxical if a person 
would utter a sentence to the effect that an action is right unless she is 
motivated to perform it, is that a person’s judgement which such a sentence 
is used to express entails that she is motivated to act in accordance with it. 
 However, it is important to note that this intuition does not imply 
that internalism is correct. One reason is of particular interest. Even if 
people do not utter a sentence to the effect that an action is right unless they 
are motivated to perform it, this is compatible with the possibility that they 
judge—but do not utter the corresponding sentence—that an action is right 
without being so motivated.21 However, although the intuition under 
consideration does not imply that internalism is correct, it lends support to 
internalism since this view can explain it in the way just indicated. 
 (ii) Another consideration that is thought to support internalism is 
that we expect that when a person utters a sentence to the effect that an 
action is right, she is motivated to perform it.22 This expectation is 
presumably vindicated by experience. It may be hypothesised that in most 
cases where we have experienced a person utter a sentence to this effect, she 
has either performed the action or at least shown some indications of being 
motivated to perform it. Accordingly, when this expectation is unfulfilled, 
we look for an explanation. 
 This consideration, more obviously than the previous one, does not 
imply that internalism is correct. But, again, it supports internalism in so far 
as internalism can explain it; the ultimate explanation for why we expect 
that a person’s utterance to the effect that an action is right is accompanied 
by motivation to perform it might be that there is a connection between 
moral judgements and motivation of the sort maintained by internalists. 
 (iii) It may further be argued that we have the intuition that it would 
be paradoxical if a person would judge that an action is right if she is not 
motivated to perform it.23 This intuition is the one of the three 
                                      
20 Philosophers attracted to internalism who take their point of departure in the 
philosophy of language seem especially influenced by this intuition; see e.g. Hare (1952), 
pp. 164–165, and Stevenson (1944), pp. 16–17. For other testimonies of this intuition, 
see e.g. Dancy (1993), p. 4; Lockie (1998), p. 16; Smith (1972), p. 87, and Smith (1994), 
p. 6. 
21 Cf. Frankena (1976 (1958)), pp. 66–67. 
22 See e.g. Smith (1972), p. 90. 
23 See e.g. Milo (1981), p. 375. 
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 considerations that would give the strongest support to internalism. It is 
therefore interesting to note that it is seldom referred to in support of 
internalism. 
 One explanation as to why this intuition is rarely appealed to in 
support of internalism is presumably that it is weaker than the one 
mentioned in connection with the first consideration above (i). I think that 
we would find it truly paradoxical if a person would judge that an action is 
right, utter a sentence to this effect, but not be motivated to perform the 
action. However, we would find it less paradoxical if a person merely would 
judge that an action is right, without giving voice to her judgement, and not 
be motivated to perform the action. Consider the following two cases. 
Consider first a person who judges that it is right to give money to the Red 
Cross but who does not utter any sentence to this effect. She keeps, so to 
speak, her view to herself. However, try to imagine that she is not 
motivated to perform the action.24 Consider next a person who judges that 
it is right to give money to the Red Cross and who also utters a sentence to 
this effect. We might for example imagine that she tells her friends that it is 
right to give money to the organisation, writes it in an e-mail or argues for 
this view in an article in a newspaper. However, try to imagine that she is 
not either motivated to give any money to the Red Cross. It seems that we 
would find the latter case more paradoxical than the former. Now, it might 
be argued that if internalism is correct, we should find the first case as 
paradoxical as the second. According to internalism, it is analytically 
necessary that if a person judges that an action is right, she is motivated to 
perform it. On this view, there does not seem to be any significant 
difference between the two cases that explains why we find the second case 
more paradoxical than the first one. The fact that we find the latter case 
more paradoxical may then be taken to suggest that our responses are not 
best explained by internalism, but by some other view which in certain 
respects has similar implications as this notion. This alternative view would 
then connect the motivation primarily to the utterance of the sentence in 
question and only secondarily and derivatively to the judgement. I will 
return to this issue in section 7. 
                                      
24 I use the expression ‘try to imagine’ here because it would be question begging against 
internalism to presume that we actually are able to imagine these situations. 
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  This suggestion finds some support if we compare our reactions to the 
moral cases with our reactions to relevant non-moral cases. Consider first a 
person who judges that a certain individual is an uncle but who does not 
utter a sentence to this effect. Try to imagine that she holds that the 
individual in question is not a male. Consider next a person who also judges 
that a certain individual is an uncle and who does utter a sentence to this 
effect. Try to imagine that also this person holds that the individual in 
question is not a male. I think we find that the first case would be as 
paradoxical as the latter. And if we find the second case more paradoxical 
than the first one, the difference seems nevertheless lesser than between the 
moral cases. This suggests that had a person’s judgement to the effect that an 
action is right with analytic necessity implied that she is motivated to 
perform the action, we would not have responded differently to the two 
moral cases either. 
 It should also be noted that even if the intuition under 
consideration—that it would be paradoxical if a person would judge that an 
action is right unless she is motivated to perform it—is accurate, it does not 
imply that internalism is correct. One reason is of particular importance. As 
we saw above, for internalism to be correct, the motivational state that 
motivates a person to do what she judges to be right has to be internal to 
her judgement, either in so far as her judgement consists in such a 
motivational state or in so far as it gives rise to such a state by itself. 
However, the intuition under consideration is compatible with that a person 
is motivated to do what she judges to be right, but that the motivational 
state in question is external to her judgement. But, again, even if this 
intuition does not imply that internalism is correct, it may gain support to 
internalism in so far as this view is able to explain it. 
 In connection to this observation, we should notice a further aspect 
of our intuitions that is relevant to the support the third consideration gives 
to internalism. We might find it paradoxical if a person would judge that an 
action is right without being motivated at all to perform it. However, I 
think we would find it less paradoxical if a person would judge that an 
action is right, be motivated to perform it, but be motivated merely by a 
motivational state that is external to her judgement. Consider the following 
two cases. Consider first a person who judges that it is right to help a certain 
person in need. However, try to imagine that she is not at all motivated to 
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 provide the help. Consider next a person who also judges that it is right to 
help the person in question. Try to imagine, however, that she is motivated 
to provide the help, but that she is motivated by purely egoistic motives and 
not at all by any moral motives. That is, try to imagine that the motivation 
is external and not internal to her judgement. She may for example be 
motivated by a desire to promote her career or to avoid social ostracism.25 It 
seems that we would find the first case more paradoxical than the second. 
Now, analogous to the previous cases, it might be argued that if internalism 
is correct, we should find the second case as paradoxical as the first one. 
Internalism says that if a person judges that an action is right, she is 
motivated to perform the action, where this motivation is internal to her 
judgement. According to internalism, there seems to be no significant 
difference between the two cases that explains why we find the first case 
more paradoxical than the second. The difference in our responses to the 
two cases can therefore be taken to indicate that our intuitions are not best 
explained by internalism, but rather by some other view the implications of 
which are in certain respects similar to those of internalism. According to 
this alternative view, motivation would be connected to the moral 
judgement irrespective of whether it is internal or external to it. I will 
return to this issue in section 7. 
 The intuition that would give the strongest support to internalism is 
that it would be paradoxical if a person would judge that an action is right if 
she is not motivated to perform the action by a motivational state that is 
internal to her judgement. It is therefore significant that advocates of 
internalism do not appeal to this intuition in defending their view. 
 If what I have argued in this section is correct, none of the 
considerations I have discussed implies that internalism is correct. As far as I 
understand, this means that the support these considerations give to 
internalism is weaker than often has been thought to be the case. They 
support internalism to the extent that internalism is able to explain them, 
but this is compatible with there being other explanations that are as good 
as, or even better than, the ones internalism offers. We have also seen that 
                                      
25 Here we have to presume that the person’s ‘purely egoistic’ considerations are not part 
of her moral considerations. Consequently, we have to presume that her desire to do 
what promotes her career or to avoid social ostracism is not internal to her moral 
judgement. Note that we do not have to assume that egoistic considerations are not 
moral considerations. The only thing we have to assume is that they are not moral 
considerations according to her moral view. 
182 
 there are some reasons to believe that there actually are superior 
explanations; in section 7, I will sketch the contours of such an account. 
Also when it comes to its explanatory power, internalism seems 
consequently weaker than it often has been assumed to be. However, it 
should immediately be recalled that there is an argument that may seem to 
provide a strong case for internalism: Smith’s fetishist argument. This 
argument requires a separate treatment and discussion of it will be 
postponed to section 8. 
 
5. The Amoralist and Her Critics 
In the last section, I examined various considerations that are taken to 
support internalism. In this section and the next, I will examine whether 
there are reasons to believe that internalism is mistaken. The most obvious 
mode of doing so is to explore whether there are any counterexamples to it. 
 As is well known, externalists have argued that there is a kind of 
person who constitutes such a counterexample: the amoralist. An amoralist, as 
I will understand her, is simply any person who would falsify internalism by 
not being motivated in the way required by this view. Thus understood, the 
amoralist is a rather abstract figure whose character can be specified in 
different ways. The author whose discussion of the amoralist has become 
most influential is presumably David O. Brink. Brink, who argues against 
internalism by means of the amoralist, characterises such a person as one 
‘who is indifferent to what he concedes are moral considerations’.26 In the 
next section, I will try to formulate versions of the amoralist which, in my 
view, make a stronger case against internalism than Brink’s formulation 
might seem to allow, but for the time being we can bear Brink’s 
characterisation in mind. 
 As can be suspected from that mentioned in the previous section, the 
amoralist is, at least at first appearance, likely to strike us as a quite peculiar 
character. Think of the amoralist as Brink sees her. We probably feel that it 
would be odd if a person would concede that a certain action is right but 
nonetheless not be motivated to perform it. Externalists can respond by 
admitting that the amoralist might not actually exist, and perhaps never have 
existed or will exist, but maintain that it nevertheless is possible to conceive of 
such a person. Advocates of this view can then maintain that since 
                                      
26 Brink (1989), p. 48. 
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 internalism is claimed to be analytically necessary, the fact that we can 
conceive of the amoralist is sufficient to show that internalism is mistaken.27
 Although the debate between internalists and externalists may be 
taken to indicate that people’s intuitions about the amoralist diverge to some 
extent, I think it is difficult for internalists to outright deny that people take 
the amoralist to be conceivable.28 That the amoralist appears to have this 
characteristic is something granted also by internalists.29 Internalists do thus 
better to admit that the amoralist may seem conceivable, but argue that this 
impression is mistaken. In order to make this contention plausible, they 
suggest various explanations as to why this impression is mistaken.30
 First, internalists may argue that the person who seems to be an 
amoralist does not really judge that that the action in question is right, 
although it might appear so. Since she does not hold the judgement, 
internalists are not committed to claiming that she is motivated to perform 
the action. As this response stands, it is question begging since it merely 
denies something that is implied by the description of the amoralist. In order 
to be persuasive, it has to be supplemented with a reasonable explanation of 
why the person in question does not hold the judgement. Basically two such 
explanations have been offered. 
 According to R. M. Hare, we should understand the supposed 
amoralist as using the moral term in question in ‘inverted commas’.31 
Applied to ‘right’, this means that, rather than judging that an action is right, 
she judges that according to a moral view accepted by certain people, the action is 
right. Thus understood, her judgement is not genuinely moral, but rather a 
judgement about how people who embrace a certain moral view would 
judge an action in terms of rightness. In contrast to genuine moral 
judgements, such a judgement does not entail that she is motivated to 
perform the action. This explanation might be supplemented by various 
stories as to why the person in question uses ‘right’ in this way. 
 According to another explanation of this kind, the supposed amoralist 
does not hold a judgement to the effect that an action is right because she is 
not linguistically competent with respect to ‘right’. According to Michael 
                                      
27 Cf. Brink (1989), p. 46. 
28 See e.g. Smith (1994), p. 67. 
29 Cf. Smith (1994), p. 67. 
30 For an overview of different explanations internalists can propose, see Lockie (1998), 
p. 21. 
31 See e.g. Hare (1952), pp. 124–25, 164–167.  
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 Smith, ‘the very best we can say about amoralists is that they try to make 
moral judgements but fail’, and the reason why they fail is that they lack 
‘mastery of moral terms’.32
 Second, internalists may argue that the person who seems to be an 
amoralist does not provide a counterexample to internalism because even if 
she does judge that an action is right, her motivation to perform it is 
cancelled because she is practically irrational. According to this view, the 
most plausible form of internalism incorporates a requirement of practical 
rationality in the way explained in section 3. When a person is not 
motivated to do what she judges to be right, this is accounted for by 
claiming that she suffers from some state that qualifies as practical 
irrationality.33
 These explanations may seem persuasive. The reason is presumably 
our initial feeling that the amoralist is such a peculiar character. Each of the 
arguments gives an explanation as to why a person who seems peculiar 
appears possible to conceive of although this impression is mistaken. Our 
initial feeling that the amoralist is peculiar together with one or more of 
these explanations may thus have us conclude that our impression that such 
a person is conceivable is, on closer inspection, erroneous.  
 It might be argued, however, that this conclusion is premature. One 
reason is that it might be suspected that the explanations above succeed to 
dismiss the possibility of the amoralist only if she is described in certain 
particular ways. Take the explanation suggested by Smith, according to 
which the assumed amoralist is not linguistically competent in respect of 
‘right’. It might be wondered whether it is not possible to describe an 
amoralist in such a way that we would consider her as competent in that 
respect. Also as regards the other internalist explanations it might be 
suspected that there are descriptions of amoralists in view of which we 
would come to similar conclusions. Consequently, it might be possible to 
argue that these explanations do not show that there is no amoralist who 
cannot be explained away in any of the manners suggested by internalists. 
                                      
32 Smith (1994), pp. 68, 70. 
33 Another strategy to explain away the assumed amoralist would be to argue that she is 
motivated to do what she judges to be right, but that her motivation is very weak. As far 
as I know, no one has appealed to this explanation. One problem with this response is 
that it seems question begging against externalism.  
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  Let us now connect what I have said in this section with the 
discussion in the previous one. There it was observed that none of the 
considerations that typically are thought to support internalism implies it. 
Each consideration is consequently compatible with there being a person 
who constitutes a counterexample to internalism. In this section, we have 
found that the explanations internalists offer of why the amoralist 
erroneously appears conceivable may seem persuasive, but that it might be 
possible to provide descriptions of amoralists that could not be dismissed in 
any of these ways. These reflections suggest that there might be descriptions 
of amoralists such that they are both compatible with the internalist 
considerations and cannot be dismissed in the ways suggested by advocates 
of internalism. I will call amoralists who fulfil these conditions advanced 
amoralists. In the next section, I will indicate how amoralists of this sort can 
be understood. In the previous section, we made observations that indicate 
some of the characteristics advanced amoralists might have; I will 
accordingly return to these observations below. 
 
6. Advanced Amoralists  
In order to be able to characterise advanced amoralists, I will begin by 
making five observations regarding how amoralists may be described. 
Consideration of each observation will suggest how advanced amoralists can 
be understood.  
 (a) First I would like to call attention to an ambiguity that is common 
in descriptions of the amoralist. This ambiguity is illustrated by Brink’s 
characterisation, according to which the amoralist is a person who is 
indifferent to what she concedes are moral considerations. According to one 
way of understanding the amoralist, she judges that an action is right, 
acknowledges this by uttering a sentence to this effect, but is not motivated 
to perform the action. According to another way of understanding her, she 
judges that an action is right, does not make any corresponding utterance, 
and is not motivated to perform the action. Formulations such as Brink’s are 
open to both these interpretations. It is important to note that the latter 
formulation is sufficient for internalism to be mistaken. In section 4, we saw 
that the former case seems more paradoxical than the latter. It might 
therefore be suspected that one reason why the amoralist seems as such a 
peculiar person is that we think of her in the former way and not in the 
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 latter. Moreover, understood in the latter way, the amoralist is compatible 
with the first internalist consideration.34 This indicates that descriptions of 
advanced amoralists may adopt this alternative.  
 This observation is relevant to Hare’s explanation mentioned above, 
according to which a supposed amoralist does not hold a genuine moral 
judgement but uses the moral term in question in inverted commas. 
According to this explanation, when the supposed amoralist uses ‘right’, she 
does not hold a genuine moral judgement, but rather a judgement about 
how people who embrace a certain moral view would judge an action in 
terms of rightness. In order for this explanation to be applicable, we have to 
imagine that she uses ‘right’, and hence that she utters a moral sentence 
involving this term. This explanation exploits the fact that when a person 
utters a sentence she may hold another judgement than the one the sentence 
ordinarily is used to express. This explanation is not applicable if we think of 
the amoralist in the latter way mentioned above. As the amoralist on that 
alternative does not utter a moral sentence, she cannot be dismissed by 
claiming that she uses the moral sentence to express another judgement than 
the sentence ordinarily is used to express. 
 (b) There is a further significant ambiguity in the formulation of the 
amoralist that is also illustrated by Brink’s characterisation of this character. 
According to one way of understanding the amoralist, she judges that an 
action is right, but is not motivated to perform it by any motivational state 
whatsoever. This interpretation of the amoralist is predominant in the 
literature. According to another way of understanding her, she judges that 
an action is right, is motivated to perform it, but is motivated by a 
motivational state that is external to her judgement, not by any motivational 
state that is internal to it. Both these formulations are compatible with 
formulations such as Brink’s. It is important to notice that the latter 
formulation is sufficient for internalism to be mistaken. As was noticed in 
section 4, we find the former case more paradoxical than the latter. It might 
therefore be suspected that one reason why we find the amoralist so peculiar 
is that we think of her in the former way and not in the latter. Moreover, 
understood in the latter way, the amoralist is compatible with the third 
                                      
34 This description of the amoralist is also compatible with the second internalist 
consideration. 
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 internalist consideration. Hence, advanced amoralists may be understood in 
accordance with this alternative. 
 This observation is relevant to Smith’s suggestion that the supposed 
amoralist does not hold a judgement to the effect that an action is right 
because she is not linguistically competent in respect of ‘right’. According to 
the latter characterisation of the amoralist, she might be able to identify the 
actions to which ‘right’ applies and have her motivation guided in 
accordance with these identifications, although her motivation does not 
come from an internal motivational state but from an external motivational 
state. Note first that the fact that a person has the capacity to identify the 
objects to which a term applies in itself indicates that she is linguistically 
competent in respect of the term.35 Hence, it is reasonable to hold that the 
amoralist, as characterised in the latter way above, is linguistically competent 
with respect to ‘right’. However, she is not only able to do this; she also 
manages to have her motivation guided by what she takes ‘right’ to apply 
to. That is, she is motivated to do what she judges to be right. On the view 
considered in section 4—that we feel that there is a significant connection 
between judgements to the effect that actions are right and motivation—this 
should reinforce our view that she is linguistically competent as regards 
‘right’. Hence, if we understand the amoralist in the latter way, Smith’s 
explanation seems less compelling. Of course, it might objected that the 
person in question is not linguistically competent in respect of ‘right’ 
because the motivational state that accounts for her motivation is not 
internal to her judgement. But this contention is question begging since it 
presumes that being so motivated is part of the mentioned competence. 
Moreover, as we saw in section 4, internalists do not appeal to the intuition 
that motivation is internal to the pertinent judgements to support their 
view—presumably because we do not have this intuition.36
                                      
35 Cf. Brink (1989), pp. 46–48; Smith (1994), pp. 66–67, and Svavarsdóttir (1999), pp. 
191–192. 
36 The present point is also relevant for another argument put forward by Smith to the 
effect that a supposed amoralist does not hold a genuine moral judgement (Smith (1994), 
pp. 68–71). The argument consists in an analogy between colour judgements and moral 
judgements. According to Smith, ‘the ability to have the appropriate visual experiences 
under suitable conditions is partially constitutive of possession of colour concepts and 
mastery of colour terms’ (Smith (1994), p. 69). Hence, even if a colour blind person 
applies colour terms correctly, she does not hold colour judgements because she lacks the 
colour experiences that are constitutive of mastery of such terms. Similarly, according to 
Smith, even if a person applies ‘right’ to actions that have this property, she does not 
hold moral judgements because she lacks the motivation that is constitutive of mastery of 
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  This observation also has implications for the way of dismissing the 
supposed amoralist that maintains that even if she does judge that an action 
is right, her lack of motivation is explained by the fact that she is practically 
irrational. This explanation is not applicable if we understand the amoralist 
in the latter way mentioned above. The reason is that she is motivated to do 
what she judges to be right, although not by a motivational state that is 
internal to her judgement, but one that is external to it. It might be objected 
that unless a person is motivated by a motivational state that is internal to 
her judgement, she is practically irrational. This objection raises difficult 
issues that cannot be dealt with here. However, it should be noted that this 
assumption does not find support in the observation which motivates that a 
requirement of practical rationality is incorporated into internalism. As we 
saw in section 2, the reason Smith adopts such a requirement is the 
observation that even if a person judges that an action is right, she might not 
be motivated to perform it because she suffers from, in Smith’s words, 
‘weakness of will and other similar forms of practical unreason’. This 
observation might be taken to support the view that if a person is not 
motivated at all to do what she judges to be right, the explanation might be 
that she is practically irrational. This is also the implication Smith takes the 
observation to have. However, it does not support the view that if a person 
is not motivated to do what she judges to be right by a motivational state 
that is internal to her judgement, she is practically irrational. Neither is this 
something Smith maintains or provides arguments for. 
 (c) As mentioned in the last section, although the amoralist has been 
characterised in different ways by different authors, she appears usually as a 
rather abstract figure in the literature. One aspect of this abstractness is that 
we are not provided with any explanation as to why she lacks the 
appropriate moral motivation to do what she judges to be right. One reason 
why we find the amoralist peculiar may consequently be that we have not 
                                                                                                              
this term. One difficulty with this analogy is that it seems doubtful whether colour 
experiences are constitutive of mastery of colour terms. However, the main difficulty is 
that according to the latter way of understanding the amoralist mentioned above, she is 
motivated to do what she judges to be right; it is just that she is not motivated by a state 
that is internal to her judgement, but by a state that is external to it. Hence, if we 
understand the amoralist in this way, she is analogous to the competent user of colour 
terms. This seems to mean that the analogy cannot be used to show that the supposed 
amoralist is not linguistically competent with respect to ‘right’ and hence that it cannot 
be used to show that she does not hold the relevant moral judgements. For other 
arguments against Smith’s analogy, see Brink (1997), pp. 22–26, and Tenenbaum (2000), 
pp. 114–116. 
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 been given such explanations. Hence, in describing advanced amoralists we 
may provide such explanations. 
 It might be argued that there are a number of reasonable explanations 
of this kind.37 According to one kind of explanation, a person believes that 
doing what she judges to be right does not serve her self-interest and 
therefore loses her moral motivation. According to another kind of 
explanation, a person’s indifference or negative attitude towards matters 
belonging to a certain area makes her lose her moral motivation in 
connection with these matters. According to a third kind of explanation, a 
person feels that morality requires a great deal from her and, overcome by 
these demands, she loses her moral motivation. Yet another kind of 
explanation applies when a person who finds herself in extraordinary 
circumstances, e.g. extreme fear, hunger or stress, loses her moral 
motivation. Some explanations might consist in combinations of two or 
more of these types of explanations. 
 (d) One aspect of the abstractness of the amoralist, as she ordinarily 
appears in the literature, is that she is assumed to lack the appropriate 
motivation as regards all the actions she judges to be right. This point is 
connected to the previous one. According to the most plausible 
explanations, she may not lack the motivation as regards all these actions, 
but only as regards those belonging to a certain kind.38 For example, she 
might be morally motivated in relation to actions that concern her family 
but not in relation to actions that concern her work. 
 This observation is relevant to the internalist explanation that employs 
the idea that the supposed amoralist is not linguistically competent in respect 
of ‘right’. The person we now are considering may be such that she, at least 
as regards most kinds of actions, is able to identify the actions to which 
‘right’ applies and have her motivation guided in accordance with these 
identifications. It then seems implausible to maintain that she is not 
linguistically competent in respect of ‘right’. Moreover, since she, at least as 
regards most kinds of actions, is motivated to do what she judges to be right, 
it is less plausible to claim that she is practically irrational. 
 (e) A further aspect of the abstractness of the amoralist, as she appears 
in the literature, is that she seems to lack the appropriate motivation as 
                                      
37 For proposals of such explanations, see Lillehammer (2002), pp. 18–21; Shafer-Landau 
(2003), pp. 148–151, and Svavardsóttir (1999), pp. 191–192. 
38 Cf. Brink (1997), pp. 24–25; Lillehammer (2002), p. 19, and Sadler (2003), p. 74. 
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 regards the actions she judges to be right all the time. This observation is 
connected to the two previous ones. According to the most plausible 
explanations, the amoralist may lack the motivation only occasionally.39 If she 
lacks the motivation only as regards a certain type of actions, she might lack 
it as regards these actions only occasionally.  
 This observation has the same implications for the internalist 
explanations as the previous observation. If the person in question lacks the 
motivation in question only occasionally, it is less plausible to claim that she 
is not linguistically competent in respect of ‘right’ or that she is practically 
irrational.  
 The five observations above, (a)–(e), suggest how advanced amoralists 
can be characterised. However, every characterisation of an advanced 
amoralist does not need to comprise all these observations, and different 
characterisations of advanced amoralists may put emphasis on different 
aspects of them. There might in other words be a number of descriptions of 
advanced amoralists. This holds particularly since, as we saw in relation to 
(c), there are a number of explanations as to why an amoralist is not 
accordingly motivated. Consider the following example. 
 
Amanda has worked as a bureaucrat at the tax authority for many years. When she 
began, she found it quite interesting and was enthusiastic about her tasks. However, she 
has gradually become less interested in what she does. In fact, she finds her tasks so 
uninteresting that her only motive for continuing working there is that she is afraid that 
she would have difficulties finding another job. Amanda exemplifies a not too 
uncommon psychological phenomenon. If a person loses interest in a certain area, or has 
negative associations in relation to it, she might, at least temporarily, become 
unmotivated to perform actions connected to that area, unless she believes that 
performing these actions will affect her in egoistic terms. Now, her work involves moral 
considerations of various sorts. Particularly, it involves moral considerations in relation to 
the cases of suspected tax avoidance she handles. Here is an example of how Amanda’s 
moral motivation in relation to these cases is influenced by the situation she finds herself 
in. She holds that it is right for her to investigate into all the facts relevant to a particular 
case. However, due to the way she feels about her work, she is not motivated to do so 
by any other motive than an egoistic one. Thus, she is motivated to investigate into all 
the facts relevant to the case because she wants to keep her job, and she believes that if 
she does not handle the case properly, she might lose it. She is consequently motivated 
to do what she judges to be right, but only by a motivational state that is external to her 
moral judgement.40 However, in relation to many other matters, Amanda is motivated 
to do what she judges right by non-egoistic motives. In fact, not even when it comes to 
handling cases of suspected tax avoidance she is always motivated by purely egoistic 
considerations. For example, she is sometimes—perhaps most of the time—motivated to 
                                      
39 Cf. Lillehammer (2002), p. 19, and Shafer-Landau (2003), p. 146. 
40 Here we have to assume that Amanda’s egoistic motives are not internal to her moral 
judgements. 
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 investigate into all the facts relevant to a case because she judges that it is fair, and 
therefore right, to do so. 
 
I think that it is plausible to assume that we find Amanda conceivable. 
Moreover, since she is described in accordance with the above observations, 
there is reason to believe that she is compatible with the considerations that 
are taken to support internalism and that she cannot be dismissed in the 
ways suggested by internalists. There are thus reasons to believe that 
Amanda provides support to the view that internalism is mistaken. I also 
think that the situation which she finds herself in is one that we might find 
ourselves in at times. Due to certain circumstances, we may sometimes be 
motivated to do what we judge to be right merely by non-moral 
considerations even if we otherwise are motivated by moral ones. If this is 
correct, Amanda would not only be conceivable; she would exemplify a 
kind of person who actually exists. As I suggested earlier, there are also 
reasons to think that there are descriptions of other advanced amoralists that 
would characterise them is such a way that we would find them 
conceivable. It should be pointed out that I do not claim that we do not 
find Amanda and other advanced amoralists peculiar. However, as I will 
argue in the next section, this is something externalism can account for. 
 
7. Externalist Explanations of Internalist Considerations 
In this section, I will suggest that externalism can explain the considerations 
that are taken to support internalism. Moreover, I will suggest that these 
explanations are superior to those internalism offers. These explanations will 
also make it possible for externalists to account for why we may find 
amoralists peculiar. As suggested above, we may find amoralists strange 
because they seem difficult to reconcile with the considerations that are 
assumed to provide support to internalism. If externalists are able to explain 
these considerations, they are also in the position to explain why amoralists 
may seem peculiar. In proposing these explanations, I will draw on some 
ideas in pragmatics. To provide a satisfactory underpinning of the 
explanations would however require a substantial discussion of these ideas, 
something I am not able to provide here. As a consequence, my suggestions 
are incomplete and in need of further investigation.41
                                      
41 At a very late stage in the work with this thesis, I found that David Copp and Stephen 
Finlay develop views that are highly relevant to the topic of the present section and in 
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  Before I turn to the explanations inspired by pragmatics, I would like 
to call attention to two other kinds of explanations that externalists may put 
forward. The various explanations should however not be seen as 
competitors but rather as complementing each other. One kind of 
explanation appeals to the fact that the process of making us act morally is 
an essential part of our upbringing and, more generally, of shaping us into 
social beings. To facilitate this process, various psychological means are 
made use of; for example, doing what is judged to be right is associated with 
self-respect and other positive emotions, whereas doing what is wrong is 
associated with negative emotions such as guilt and shame. In case the 
process has been carried out successfully, we tend to feel that we have to do 
what we judge to be right and are consequently motivated to do so. 
According to another kind of explanation, moral judgements are connected 
to concerns that have a strong tendency to motivate us, such as various 
forms of well-being. Thus, one reason why we are motivated to do what 
we judge to be right is that actions that are right are connected to concerns 
of this type.  
 The latter kind of explanation is related to issues I will deal with in 
the next two sections. As we have seen, externalists account for a person’s 
motivation to do what she judges to be right in terms of a motivational state 
that is external to her judgement. There are at least two questions that may 
be asked about such a motivational state. First, it might be asked what kind 
of content it has. On the assumption that it is a desire, it might be asked if it 
is desire to do what is right or a desire to perform actions that have certain 
other features. Second, it might be asked what the content of such a 
motivational state consist in. On the assumption that the motivational state 
is a desire, it might be asked what is involved in a desire to do what is right. 
Similarly, if it is a desire to perform actions with certain other features, it 
might be asked which these features are. I will bring up these issues in the 
next two sections. However, I will only discuss them in so far as they are 
directly relevant to the plausibility of externalism. 
 Let us now turn to the first internalist consideration noticed in section 
3 and how externalism may explain it. According to this consideration, we 
                                                                                                              
certain respects similar to the views I defend here; see Copp (2001), pp. 1–43, and Finlay 
(2004), pp. 205–223. Unfortunately, I have not been able to take into account their 
views.   
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 would find it paradoxical if a person would utter a sentence to the effect that 
an action is right unless she is motivated to perform the action.  
 I think there might be various views in pragmatics that can help to 
explain this and the other two internalist considerations. This is especially so 
since my points are quite general and presumably not necessarily connected 
to a particular theory. One philosopher who suggests explanations of this 
kind is John Searle.42 However, like some other commentators, I am 
attracted to the idea that such explanations can be formulated in terms of 
Paul Grice’s notion of conversational implicature.43 Grice argues that we as 
competent language users recognise certain rules so as to contribute to the 
kind of conversation in which we are engaged in a way that serves the 
generally accepted purpose of the conversation. The fact that we are 
understood to do so generates conversational implicatures. Thus, if a person 
utters a certain sentence, her utterance will—on the assumption that those 
involved in the communication are competent in the required way—be 
understood to conversationally implicate certain things due to the generally 
accepted purpose of the conversation. Take the following simple example. 
Imagine that two persons are putting together a bookcase. One purpose of 
their conversation is to facilitate their work. Suppose one of them is about 
to put shelves into the bookcase and that she says to the other person ‘The 
shelves are over there’. Given the purpose of the conversation, it might be 
assumed that her utterance conversationally implicates that she wants the 
other person to give her the shelves.44 If it turns out that she does not want 
the shelves, her utterance will seem strange. On Grice’s theory, the 
                                      
42 Searle (1969), chap. 6, esp. pp. 139, 144–145, 147–149, 152, 154, and Searle (1979 
(1975)), pp. 30–57, esp. pp. 32, 39–40. For an early suggestion of how externalist may 
explain internalist considerations along these lines, see Frankena (1976 (1958)), pp. 64–
65, 67. 
43 The main text by Grice is Grice (1989a (1975)), pp. 22–40, but see also Grice (1989b 
(1975)), pp. 41–57. Some authors suggest that internalist considerations can be explained 
in terms of conversational implicatures; see e.g. Milo (1981), pp. 373–377, and 
Tenenbaum (2000), p. 125. For two significant discussions of how the relation between 
moral judgements and motivation can be explained in terms of pragmatics, see Copp 
(2001), pp. 1–43, and Finlay (2004), pp. 205–223. Finlay makes use of Grice’s notion of 
conversational implicatures whereas Copp puts his views in terms of Frege’s notion of 
‘colouring’. See also Barker (2000), pp. 268–279. Walter Sinnot-Armstrong argues that 
‘ought’ sentences conversationally implicate ‘can’: Sinnott-Armstrong (1984), pp. 255–
259. 
44 Of course, it might be necessary to add some information about the situation for this 
claim to be true. 
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 explanation is that she then would have said something that is not consistent 
with a proper recognition of the purpose of the conversation.45  
 Grice emphasises that what is conversationally implicated is not a part 
of the meaning of a judgement, since it is not implied by the content of 
what the persons says, but rather ‘implied’—i.e. conversationally 
implicated—by her saying it: ‘the implicature is not carried by what is said, 
but only by the saying of what is said’.46 Thus, that the person in the 
example above wants the other person to give here the shelves is not 
implied by her judgement, but conversationally implicated by her utterance. 
Conversational implicatures can be connected to a wide range of sentences. 
However, certain sentences and words may have conversational implicatures 
connected to them quite regularly. In such cases, it might be assumed that 
the connections between them can become conventionalised, at least to a 
certain extent.47 As regards such sentences and words, it is easy to presume 
that implicatures are connected to the contents of what is said, although this 
is not the case. 
 Now, it is seems reasonable to assume that one of our foremost 
concerns when we are involved in conversations about moral issues is to get 
each other to know how we are motivated in relation to certain types of 
actions.48 There are presumably various reasons why we have this concern. 
One reason may issue from the fact that moral matters typically are relevant 
to our well-being or, more generally, to things we care much about. Thus, 
one reason for this concern may be that how we are motivated in relation to 
moral matters influences our actions, which in turn might affect the well-
being of others, the well-being of people for whom they care, and, more 
generally, the things they care about. Another reason why we have this 
concern may issue from the fact that in conversations about moral matters, 
                                      
45 The rule which the person has offended is presumably the maxim ‘be relevant’; see 
Grice (1989a (1975)), p. 27. This is also the rule which seems brought into play in the 
moral cases below. 
46 Grice (1989a (1975)), p. 39. Cf. Searle (1979 (1975)), pp. 39–40, 42–43.   
47 See Searle (1979 (1975)), pp. 31, 40–42, 49–50. See also Grice (1989a (1975)), p. 37, 
and Grice (1989b (1975)), p. 43. However, this assumption raises the complicated issue 
what relation holds between Grice’s notion of conversational implicatures and his notion 
of conventional implicatures. As far as I understand, the distinction between them is not 
sharp. As I describe matters here, it would perhaps be more accurate to characterise the 
implicatures that are connected to moral utterances and sentences as conventional 
implicatures than as conversational implicatures. This would presumably also be more in 
line with Searle’s view. However, in this sketch, I will formulate my points in terms of 
conversational implicatures. 
48 See Smith (1972), p. 89–90. See also Milo (1981), p. 376–377.  
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 we typically do such things as advise, commend, and prescribe people to 
perform or not to perform actions. That is, we use moral language to exert 
various kinds of influences on the actions of those who we communicate 
with. To accomplish these things and hence to exert the intended 
influences, it might be assumed that it is essential that we get others to 
understand whether or not we want the actions in question to be 
performed. Accordingly, it is essential that we get others to know that we 
are motivated in relation to these actions in certain ways.    
 It might be hypothesised that as a consequence of the mentioned 
concern, a generally recognised purpose of moral conversations is to let each 
other know whether or not we are motivated to perform certain actions.49 
On this assumption, when a person utters a sentence to the effect that an 
action is right, her utterance conversationally implicates that she is 
motivated to perform that action. Suppose it is accepted that the connection 
between sentences and conversational implicatures might become 
conventionalised to a certain extent. Given the importance of the 
mentioned purpose of moral conversations, it might be assumed that such a 
sentence quite generally is connected to the conversational implicature in 
question and that the connection between them has become accordingly 
conventionalised.  
 We can now provide an explanation of the first internalist 
considerations—that we would find it paradoxical if a person would utter a 
sentence to the effect that an action is right unless she is accordingly 
motivated. Suppose a person’s utterance of a sentence to the effect that an 
action is right conversationally implicates that she is motivated to perform 
the action. If she is not motivated to perform the action, her utterance is not 
consistent with a generally accepted purpose of moral conversations. As a 
consequence, we find her utterance paradoxical. This also explains our 
feeling that there is no point in her utterance, that it does not fulfil its 
function, that we have difficulty understanding why she utters it. On the 
assumption that the conversational implicature is connected to the moral 
sentence in such a regular way that the connection has become 
conventionalised to a certain degree, it is even more readily explained that 
we find her utterance perplexing. 
                                      
49 Searle observes the importance of the ‘point or purpose’ of conversations for what 
sentences convey: Searle (1969), pp. 149, 154.  
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  It is important to notice that this explanation does not mean that a 
person cannot judge that an action is right—without uttering the 
corresponding sentence—unless she is accordingly motivated. For, as we 
have seen, that a person is motivated to perform the action is not implied by 
what she says, the judgement the sentence expresses, but conversationally 
implicated by her uttering the sentence. Hence, this explanation is 
compatible with externalism. 
 A significant feature of conversational implicatures is that they are 
cancellable in the sense that a person can forestall a conversational implicature 
that her utterance would otherwise have.50 To illustrate, return to the 
person in the example above who utters ‘The shelves are over there’. 
Suppose that just after having said this she says ‘But I don’t want them’. 
After hearing the second utterance, we would accept that she does not want 
the shelves in spite of the fact that this is what we would otherwise take the 
first utterance to conversationally implicate. However, we would be 
perplexed by her second utterance given the purpose of the conversation. 
Proper implications follow necessarily and cannot be cancelled in this way. 
Suppose a person says ‘That person is an uncle’ and then adds ‘But the 
person is not a male’. Her latter utterance does not mean that uncles are not 
males, since this is something that necessarily follows from something being 
an uncle. The sentences she has uttered are consequently contradictory. It is 
therefore interesting to notice that moral utterances seem to work more like 
the first kind of utterances than the latter. Suppose a person says ‘It’s right to 
give money to the Red Cross’ and then adds ‘But I haven’t the slightest 
inclination to give any money to that organisation’. I think we would 
accept that, after having uttered these sentences, she has succeeded in 
informing us that she judges that it is right to give money to the Red Cross 
but that she is not motivated to do so. In particular, I do not think we 
would consider the sentences she has uttered to be contradictory, as 
internalism would suggest. However, given that moral conversations have 
the purpose suggested above, we would find her second utterance 
perplexing. 
 Let us now turn to the second internalist consideration—that we 
expect that when a person utters a sentence to the effect that an action is 
right, she is motivated to perform it.  
                                      
50 Grice (1989a (1975)), p. 39. Cf. Searle (1979 (1975)), pp. 39–40. 
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  Given that the appropriate conditions are fulfilled, people who are 
competent language users know that when they utter a sentence to the 
effect that an action is right, their utterance conversationally implicate that 
they are motivated to perform the action. As a result, there is a significant 
correlation between the voicing of such sentences and motivation to act in 
accordance with them which explains our expectation. 
 According to the third consideration that is thought to support 
internalism, we would find it paradoxical if a person would judge that an 
action is right unless she is motivated to perform it.  
 For reasons supplied in section 4, this consideration provides a weaker 
support to internalism than the first consideration; it is thus not in such an 
immediate need of explanation. However, I think there is an explanation on 
the lines above. (A similar explanation is suggested by Ronald D. Milo.51) 
We may start by considering a non-moral case. Suppose a person says 
‘Smith has not been to prison yet’. It might be assumed that this utterance 
conversationally implicates that Smith runs the risk of being put in prison.52 
However, it is possible for a person to hold the judgement that Smith has 
not been to prison yet without believing that Smith runs the risk of being 
put in prison. But in that case it would be strange to say that she believes 
that Smith has not been to prison yet, since this, given the conversational 
implicature, would be to suggest that she does believe that Smith runs the 
risk of being put in prison. A similar reasoning applies to the moral case. 
According to the suggestion above, an utterance to the effect that an action 
is right conversationally implicates that the person in question is motivated 
to perform the action. Given this implicature, it would be strange to 
describe her as holding the judgement that the action is right unless she is 
motivated to perform it, since this would be to suggest that she is motivated 
to perform the action. That is why we have the impression that the kind of 
situation referred to in the third internalist consideration would be 
paradoxical. 
 There is a related explanation of the third internalist consideration. (A 
similar explanation is proposed by M. B. E. Smith.53) On the assumption 
that a generally accepted purpose of engaging in moral conversations is to 
get each other to know what we are motivated to do, it is reasonable to 
                                      
51 Milo (1981), p. 377. 
52 Cf. Grice (1989a (1975)), p. 24. 
53 Smith (1972), pp. 89–90. 
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 assume that we primarily are interested in people’s moral judgements in so 
far as these judgements have implications for what they are motivated to do. 
It is therefore paradoxical to say that a person judges that an action is right 
unless she is motivated to perform it, since one then has said something that 
is irrelevant given the purpose of moral conversations.  
 In chapter 1, I mentioned that non-cognitivists may argue that moral 
sentences express beliefs, although secondarily. The reasoning above 
suggests that cognitivists who are externalists in a corresponding manner 
may argue that moral sentences express non-cognitive states, although 
secondarily. According to this account, if a person utters a sentence to the 
effect that an action is right, her utterance conversationally implicates that 
she is motivated to perform the action. In that way, what the person says 
expresses that she is in a certain motivational state. On the assumption that 
such states consist in non-cognitive states, it can be assumed that what she 
says expresses that she is in a certain motivational non-cognitive state. 
However, it does so only secondarily. Echoing the non-cognitivist account 
mentioned in chapter 1, the reason why this is so might perhaps be 
understood in the following way. Suppose a person asserts a sentence in 
which ‘right’ figures, e.g. ‘It’s right to give money to the Red Cross’. 
According to the present view, when ‘right’ is used in such a sentence, it is 
not necessarily used to express a certain non-cognitive attitude. More 
exactly, it is not the case that unless the person in question has such an 
attitude, her use of the term is incorrect. However, this claim should be 
qualified. It holds merely if we understand ‘correct’ in a narrow sense. As 
we have seen, that a person expresses a motivational state is a function of 
her uttering a sentence involving the term, where the utterance 
conversationally implicates that she is motivated to perform an action. On 
this view, the attitude in question is thus connected to the uttering of a 
sentence, not to the meaning or content of the term. As a consequence, the 
person’s use of the term might be correct even if she lacks the attitude. 
However, for reasons provided above, her use of the term is inconsistent 
with a generally recognised purpose of moral conversations. In a broader 
sense of ‘correct’, her use of the term does therefore not qualify as correct. 
 Thus far I have argued that the three main considerations thought to 
support internalism can be explained in a way that is compatible with 
externalism. However, in section 4, we saw that our responses to two 
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 significant cases suggest that externalism may be in a better position to 
explain our intuitions than internalism.  
 Let us first recall the observation that we would find it more 
paradoxical if a person would judge than an action is right and utter a 
sentence to this effect without being motivated to perform it, than if she 
merely would judge that an action is right without being motivated to 
perform it.  
 If internalism were correct, it would seem that we should find the 
second case as paradoxical as the first one. As we do not, internalism seems 
to have difficulty explaining our different responses to the two cases. 
Externalism can give an explanation on the lines above. According to that 
account, there is a significant connection between uttering sentences to the 
effect that actions are right and being motivated to perform these actions, 
since the utterances conversationally implicate that the persons in question 
are thus motivated. However, the connection between the corresponding 
judgements and motivation is weaker. As we have seen, to say that a person 
judges that an action is right might be taken to suggest that she is motivated 
to perform the action. But this is because the conversational implicature 
already is in place and because there is an underlying understanding of the 
purpose of moral conversations that generates this implicature. The 
judgement itself does not conversationally implicate anything of the kind; 
indeed, judgements do not conversationally implicate anything at all. 
Moreover, on this account, a person’s judgement to the effect that an action 
is right does not, contrary to what internalism maintains, with analytic 
necessity imply that the person is motivated to act in accordance with it. 
Given this difference in strength between, on the one hand, uttering a 
sentence to the effect that an action is right and being motivated and, on the 
other hand, judging that an action is right and being motivated, it is quite 
natural that we respond differently to the two cases under consideration.  
 Let us next turn to the observation that we would find it more 
paradoxical if a person would judge that an action is right without being 
motivated at all to perform it, than if she would judge that an action is right 
and be motivated to perform it, but merely by a motivational state that is 
external to her judgement. 
 As was the case in relation to the last observation, internalism seems 
to have difficulty explaining why we respond differently to the two cases. 
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 Externalism can give the following account. Above it was suggested that a 
primary purpose of engaging in moral conversations is to get each other to 
know what we are motivated to do. Given this purpose, it is fairly 
unimportant from what source the motivation comes; what is important is 
that a person is motivated to perform a certain action, not whether the state 
that motivates her is internal or external to her moral judgement. As a 
result, if a person utters a sentence to the effect that a certain action is right, 
her utterance conversationally implicates that she is motivated to perform 
the action, irrespective of whether the state that motivates her is internal or 
external to the corresponding judgement. Hence, it would be paradoxical if 
a person would utter such a sentence if she were not motivated at all to 
perform the action. But it would be less paradoxical if she would utter the 
sentence and be motivated by an external motivational state and not by an 
internal one. Now, according to the explanation proposed above, to the 
extent we find it misleading to say that a person judges that an action is right 
unless she is motivated to perform the action, this is a reflection of the 
conversational implicature and the purpose of moral conversations that 
generates it. As a consequence, we have a similar view of the relation 
between moral judgements and external and internal motivational states as 
we have of the relation between moral utterances and internal and external 
motivational states. We therefore find it more paradoxical to say that a 
person judges that an action is right if she is not motivated at all to perform 
it, than to say that she judges that an action is right if she is motivated 
merely by a motivational state that is external to her judgement. 
 
8. Smith’s Fetishist Argument  
Thus far I have argued that there are mainly two reasons to reject 
internalism and accept externalism. First, amoralists—particularly advanced 
amoralists—provide counterexamples to internalism. Second, externalism 
can provide explanations of the considerations that are taken to support 
internalism and these explanations are preferable to those internalism offers. 
The conclusion that externalism is superior to internalism is however 
preliminary. Michael Smith has presented a much discussed argument 
against externalism and for internalism known as ‘the fetishist argument’. 
Until I have made plausible that this argument is mistaken, I am not in the 
position to conclude that externalism is superior to internalism. 
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  As we will see, Smith’s argument raises an important question: what is 
the content of the motivational states that account for our moral motivation 
to do what we judge to be right? Smith argues that externalists cannot 
provide a satisfactory answer to this question whereas internalists can. In this 
section, I will discuss how externalist should answer this question in 
particular consideration of Smith’s argument. In the next section, I will 
continue by arguing that realism provides externalism with a better account 
of the pertinent motivational states than reductionism. 
 According to Smith, considerations concerning the amoralist are not 
sufficient to decide between internalism and externalism. An independent 
argument is required, and the fetishist argument, he believes, is such an 
argument.54 It is a ‘striking fact about moral motivation’, Smith claims, ‘that 
a change in motivation follows reliably in the wake of a change in moral 
judgement, at least in the good and strong-willed person’.55 Thus, if a good 
and strong-willed person changes her judgement about which action that is 
right, she will become motivated to perform the action she judges to be 
right after the change and lose her motivation to perform the action she 
judged to be right before the change.56 Now, the question is how this 
reliable connection between changes in moral judgement and motivation is 
best explained. 
 On Smith’s view, the kind of state that accounts for a person’s 
motivation to do what she judges to be right consists in a desire.57 He sees 
two ways to understand such a desire: either as a desire de dicto to do what 
                                      
54 Smith has presented somewhat different versions of the argument. Here I follow 
mainly Smith’s original formulation of the argument (Smith (1994), pp. 71–76), since it, 
to my mind, provides the strongest account of it. I have also been helped by two latter 
formulations of the argument: Smith (1996), pp. 175–184, and Smith (1997), pp. 111–
117. My understanding of the argument has also gained from some of the critical 
comments it has given rise to: Brink (1997), pp. 26–29; Cuneo (1999); pp. 359–380; 
Dreier (2000), pp. 619–638; Lillehammer (1997), pp. 187–195; Olson (2002), pp. 89–95; 
Shafer-Landau (1998), pp. 353–358, and Svavarsdóttir (1999), pp. 194–215. Smith offers 
the argument mainly as an argument against externalism and for his practicality 
requirement. However, the argument, if correct, supports also internalism as this view is 
understood here; cf. Smith (1994), p. 72. 
55 Smith (1994), p. 71. 
56 This holds only ceteris paribus because there might be motivational states that are not 
related to her moral judgements that are such that she still is motivated to perform the 
action in question after the change in moral judgement. In what follows, I will take the 
ceteris paribus clause for granted. 
57 The reference to desires here should not be taken to imply that internalists or 
externalists are committed to the Humean theory of motivation. We might consequently 
think of the relevant motivational states as beliefs or desires that are generated by beliefs. 
For the sake of simplicity, I will however stick to ‘desire’.  
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 the person judges to be right or as a desire de re to do what she judges to be 
right. The two types of desires differ as to their contents. If the person is 
motivated by a desire de dicto to do what she judges to be right, her desire 
has a content that involves the concept of rightness; the concept of rightness 
figures as a part of the intentional content of her desire. According to this 
alternative, she is motivated to perform actions with the particular aim to do 
what is right. If the person is motivated by a desire de re to do what she 
judges to be right, her desire does not have a content that involves the 
concept of rightness. In having such a desire, she is motivated to do what 
she judges to be right, but the concept of rightness is not part of the content 
of her desire. According to this alternative, she does not desire to perform 
the actions in question with the particular aim to do what is right. Put 
metaphorically, in the first case she desires to perform actions because they 
are right; in the second case she does not. A desire de re to do what is judged 
to be right might consist in a desire to perform actions with certain morally 
relevant features that right actions are thought to have, e.g. to promote the 
well-being of certain people.  
 Internalists explain the reliable connection in terms of the internal 
connection they think holds between a person’s judgement to the effect that 
an action is right and motivation. Before the change, the good and strong-
willed person’s judgement to the effect that a certain action is right entails 
that she is motivated to perform that action. After the change, her 
judgement to the effect that a certain other action is right entails that she is 
motivated to perform that action. And as the first entailment does not hold 
after the change in judgement, she has lost her former motivation. Since 
holding a moral judgement of the indicated kind is sufficient for being 
accordingly motivated, there is no need, on this view, to appeal to anything 
but the judgements to explain the reliable connection. Smith believes that 
advocates of internalism are free to insist that good and strong-willed 
persons are motivated by a desire de re, not by a desire de dicto, to do what 
they judge to be right. 
 According to externalism, a person’s judgement to the effect that an 
action is right does not entail that she is motivated to perform the action. 
Such judgements are thus not sufficient to explain the reliable connection 
between changes in moral judgements and motivation in the good and 
strong-willed person. Externalists therefore have to refer to a motivational 
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 state that is external to such judgements which, in combination with these 
judgements, explains the reliable connection. On Smith’s view, the only 
kind of motivational state that can fill this function is a desire de dicto to do 
what is judged to be right. But this explanation is implausible, Smith argues, 
because good and strong-willed persons cannot plausibly be considered to 
be motivated by such a desire:  
 
Good people care non-derivatively about honesty, the weal and woe of their children 
and friends, the well-being of their fellows, people getting what they deserve, justice, 
equality and the like, not just one thing: doing what they believe to be right, where this 
is read de dicto and not de re. Indeed, commonsense tells us that being so motivated is a 
fetish or moral vice, not the one and only moral virtue.58  
  
Smith concludes that since internalism is able to give an explanation of the 
reliable connection in terms of a desire de re to do what is judged to be 
right, whereas externalism is committed to an explanation in terms of a 
desire de dicto, internalism provides a better explanation of the reliable 
connection than externalism. 
 I think it can be argued that Smith’s fetishist argument against 
externalism is mistaken. I will start by arguing that Smith does not 
appreciate that externalism can explain numerous instances of the reliable 
connection by appealing to a desire de re. I will then continue by arguing 
that in the cases where externalism may have to refer to a desire de dicto, this 
is not a problem for this view. 
 It is important to first make clear that externalists can offer an 
explanation of many instances of the reliable connection in terms of a desire 
de re to do what is judged to be right. This kind of explanation runs in terms 
of a change in beliefs about which actions that have certain features that 
right actions are thought to have together with a desire de re, where this is a 
desire to perform actions that have these features.  
 To see how this kind of explanation works, consider an example of 
the reliable connection. Suppose a good and strong-willed person initially 
judges that it is right not to give any money to the beggars in the town 
centre, but changes her view and comes to judge that it is right to give 
money to them, and that she changes motivation accordingly: before the 
change she was not motivated to give any money to the beggars, but after 
the change she is motivated to do so, and her former resistance has vanished. 
                                      
58 Smith (1994), p. 75. 
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 Suppose now that she believes that actions that are right have certain, as she 
sees it, morally relevant features. In the present context, it is not important 
which these features are. However, there seem to be reasons to believe that 
features of that kind normally are fairly particular and concrete, but also that 
views of what they consist in might vary among people. We may assume 
that the person in question believes that actions which are right are such 
that they provide support to people in need, do not make people feel 
miserable, etc.59 Suppose further that she has a desire to perform actions that 
have these features. Externalists can now give the following explanation of 
this instance of the reliable connection. Before the change in moral 
judgement, when she judged that it is right not to give money to the 
beggars, she did not believe that giving money to the beggars had these 
features. However, for some reason she comes to believe that giving money 
to the beggars actually has these features. (She may for example come to 
believe that they will not buy drugs for her money, something she thought 
before.) Accordingly, after the change in moral judgement, when she judges 
that giving money to the beggars is right, she believes that giving money to 
them has these features. Given her desire to perform actions with these 
features, she was not motivated to give any money to the beggars before the 
change in moral judgement, whereas she is motivated to do so after the 
change, and her former resistance has disappeared.  
 It is important to be clear about the nature of the kind of desire 
referred to in this kind of explanation. The features that the person in 
question assumes to be morally relevant consist in features that she believes 
that actions that are right have. The desire is consequently a desire to do 
what she judges to be right. However, this is a desire de re, not a desire de 
dicto. Although she believes that these actions are right, her desire to 
perform them does not involve the concept of rightness as a part of its 
content; she is not motivated to perform them because they are right. On 
this kind of explanation, there is thus no need to assume that good and 
strong-willed people are motivated by a desire de dicto to explain the reliable 
connection. Hence, just as internalists, externalists can refer to a desire de re 
                                      
59 On realism, it may seem natural to assume that these features consist in non-moral 
properties that, according to the person in question, make actions right (where ‘make’ is 
understood in accordance with the realist formula). But these features do presumably not 
have to consist in such right-making properties. They may for example consist in the 
properties that are involved in the reference-fixing characteristics associated with ‘right’.  
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 in the form of a desire to perform actions with certain morally relevant 
features to explain the reliable connection. 
 To my mind, this kind of externalist explanation of the reliable 
connection seems quite natural. Why, then, does Smith believe that 
externalists have to appeal to a desire de dicto to explain the reliable 
connection? The answer is not entirely clear from what Smith says. But as 
far as I understand, the reason is that he has in mind instances of the reliable 
connection that, unlike the kind of cases just considered, involve changes in 
beliefs about the morally relevant features of right actions.60 In Smith’s 
vocabulary, the person in question has changed her view of what features 
make actions right.  
 Consider again the example of the reliable connection mentioned 
above: the good and strong-willed person who changes judgement as to 
whether it is right to give money to the beggars and whose motivation 
changes accordingly. But assume now that she simultaneously changes her 
view of the morally relevant features of right actions. That is, assume that 
she simultaneously changes her view of which the morally relevant features 
are that actions that are right have. On the kind of externalist account 
proposed above, the reliable connection is explained in terms of a change in 
belief about which actions that have the morally relevant features together 
with a desire to perform actions that have these features. These features 
remain the same before and after the change; the person in question has 
merely changed her view of which actions that have them. In the case we 
now are considering, the person has however changed her view of which 
these features are, not, or not merely, her view of which actions that have 
them.61 The externalist account described above thus refers to a desire to 
perform actions with features that she after the change no longer believes 
that right actions have. It can consequently not figure in an explanation of 
why she after the change in moral judgement, when she judges that it is 
right to give money to the beggars, is motivated to act in accordance with 
                                      
60 Smith discusses an example where a person first decides to vote for the libertarian 
party and after a change in his ‘most fundamental values’ decides to vote for the social 
democrats (Smith (1994), pp. 71–72). He also considers a case where a person starts off 
being a strict utilitarian, but then becomes an advocate of a normative view that accepts 
special concerns for family members (Smith (1996), pp. 180–181). See also Smith (1997), 
pp. 113–115. 
61 On realism, it is plausible to assume that the person in question has changed her view 
of which the non-moral properties are that make actions right (where ’make’ is 
understood in the accordance with the realist formula). 
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 her judgement. It might therefore be concluded that externalism cannot 
provide explanations of instances of the reliable connection like this one in 
terms of a desire de re.  
 Externalists can provide explanations of these instances of the reliable 
connection in terms of a change in moral judgement together with a desire 
de dicto to do whatever is judged to be right. Return to the example above. 
Before the change in moral judgement, when the person judges that it is 
right not to give money to the beggars, she is, due to her desire de dicto to 
do what she judges to be right, not motivated to give any money to the 
beggars. After the change, when she judges that it is right to give money to 
the beggars, she is, due to her desire de dicto, motivated to do so. 
 If this reasoning is correct, externalists have to maintain that good and 
strong-willed persons are motivated by a desire de dicto to explain the 
instances of the reliable connection where these persons alter beliefs about 
the morally relevant features of right actions. It is important to see that this 
conclusion is weaker than the one Smith believes follows from the 
argument. As he presents the argument, it is supposed to show that 
externalists are committed to explaining all instances of the reliable 
connection in good and strong-willed persons in terms of such a desire. But, 
as we have seen, externalists can explain the instances of the reliable 
connection where good and strong-willed persons do not alter beliefs in the 
mentioned way in terms of a desire de re. 
 There is a further consideration which indicates that Smith’s 
argument is weaker than it appears to be on first appearance. This issue 
concerns what is involved in being a ‘good and strong-willed person’. Of 
course, what is involved in being such a person is a complicated issue; here I 
will only consider two simplified conceptions. According to a substantial 
conception of a good and strong-willed person, she is motivated to do what 
in fact is right, not merely what she judges to be right. This is presumably the 
commonsense understanding of such a person.62 According to a non-
substantial conception of a good and strong-willed person, she is motivated 
to do what she judges to be right, but not necessarily what in fact is right. 
Now, if we assume the substantial conception of what it means to be good 
and strong-willed, the reasoning directed against externalism above is 
mistaken. Since the good and strong-willed person on this conception is 
                                      
62 Cf. Copp (1997), p. 51. 
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 motivated to do what in fact is right, there can be no question of her 
changing motivation in the relevant respect. In that case there is no reliable 
connection that is in need of explanation, and the argument above does not 
get off the ground.63 Accordingly, in a subsequent comment on his 
argument, Smith makes clear that it is not the substantial conception he has 
in mind, but the non-substantial.64
 There are at least two difficulties with Smith’s non-substantial 
conception of a good and strong-willed person in the present context. One 
is that it does not accord with our notion of good people. Suppose, for 
instance, that a convinced racist believes that right actions are such that they 
contribute to the extermination of a certain race and that she is motivated to 
perform these actions. According to the non-substantial conception, she 
would qualify as good, but this result seems counterintuitive. However, the 
main difficulty is that if we understand a good and strong-willed person in 
the non-substantial way, it is not at all clear why it would be any problem 
for externalists to claim that such a person is motivated by a desire de dicto to 
do what she judges to be right. According to the substantial conception of 
the good and strong-willed person, it may perhaps seem problematic to 
assume that she is motivated by such a desire because it might be argued that 
                                      
63 This argument may need to be qualified. It might be the case that a substantially good 
and strong-willed person is not motivated to perform actions that are right. To put the 
point in terms I have utilised above, the reason is that she may be mistaken about which 
actions have the morally relevant features of right actions. That is, she may be mistaken 
about which actions have the morally relevant features that actions that are right have. 
(Cf. Stratton-Lake (2000), p. 16–17.) But something that she presumably is not wrong 
about is which these features are. For example, if helping people in need is such a feature, 
she recognises this and is motivated to perform actions which she believes have this 
feature. However, she might be mistaken about which actions have this feature and as a 
consequence be motivated to perform actions that are not right. Which morally relevant 
features actions that are right have is stated in the correct moral account of such actions. 
Smith claims accordingly that substantially good and strong-willed persons have ‘the 
motivations that the one true morality tells them that they should have’ (Smith (1996), p. 
177). It is primarily in this sense that a good and strong-willed is motivated to do what in 
fact is right. As we have seen, the substantially good and strong-willed person recognises 
the mentioned features and changes accordingly not her view of which these are. 
Neither does she change her motivation in relation to these features. Hence, she does 
not change moral judgement or motivation in a way that externalists need to explain in 
terms of a desire de dicto to do what is judged to be right. Consequently, this qualification 
does not affect my point against Smith’s argument. 
64 Smith (1996), p. 176–177. In order avoid misinterpretations of his argument, Smith 
has abandoned the term ‘good and strong-willed person’ and prefers instead the term 
‘moralist’. 
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 persons with that character are not motivated by a desire that has the 
content of a desire de dicto. (However, I am not sure this is correct either.) 
This is also the idea suggested by much of what Smith says about good and 
strong-willed persons. Consider for example the quotation above where he 
claims that such a person is motivated by ‘honesty, the well and woe of their 
children and friends’, etc., and not by a desire de dicto, because the latter would 
be a ‘fetish or moral vice’.65 When Smith appeals to the content of a good and 
strong-willed person’s desire in this way, he clearly has a substantially good 
and strong-willed person in mind. However, on the non-substantial 
conception of a good and strong-willed person, it is not at all that obvious 
why it would be so problematic to claim that she is motivated by a desire de 
dicto, as there does not seem to be anything in such a person’s character that 
rules out that she is motivated by a desire with such a content.  
 If what I have argued so far is correct, the fetishist argument is weaker 
than it seems at first appearance. Externalists are not committed to 
explaining the reliable connection in substantially good and strong-willed 
persons by claiming that they are motivated by a desire de dicto to do what 
they judge to be right. The only instances of the reliable connection which 
externalists might need to explain in terms of such a desire are those that 
involve changes in beliefs about which the morally relevant features are in 
persons who are non-substantially good and strong-willed.66 Would this be 
a problem for externalists?  
                                      
65 Smith (1994), p. 75. Italics added. 
66 It should be observed that externalists are able to provide explanations of at least some 
instances of the reliable connection which involve changes in beliefs about the morally 
relevant features of right actions in terms of a desire de re to do what is judged to be 
right. Externalists can do so on the assumption that the person in question has a pre-
existing desire to perform actions with certain features and that she after the change 
comes to believe that these features are had by actions that are right. Let us consider an 
illustration of how this kind of explanation might work. Recall again the example above: 
the person who changes her judgement as to whether giving money to the beggars is 
right and who modifies her motivation accordingly, while she simultaneously alters her 
view as regards the morally relevant features of right actions. Before the change she 
believes that actions that are right have certain, as she sees it, morally relevant features. 
Let us call these features F1. To illustrate, we may assume that one member of F1 is that 
of contributing to people’s ability of taking care of themselves. She has a desire to 
perform actions with F1. She does not believe that giving money to the beggars has F1 
and is accordingly not motivated to give any money to them. We now add the 
assumption that the person in question has a desire to perform actions that have certain 
other features, F2. One feature of F2, we might assume, is that of contributing to 
equality among people. Now, the following happens. As she contemplates her moral 
view, she comes to doubt whether F1 really are the features right actions have. A result 
of this process is that she becomes convinced that F2, not F1, are the morally relevant 
features these actions have. As we saw, she has the desire to perform actions with F2. 
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  I think the answer to this question is ‘no’. As far as I understand, we 
are quite commonly motivated by a desire de dicto to do what we judge to 
be right. Rather than defending the view that it is not problematic to refer 
to a desire de dicto to explain the indicated instances of the reliable 
connection, I will therefore suggest that it is difficult to see that there are 
any good reasons to believe that it is problematic; in particular, I will argue 
that it is difficult to see that Smith has offered any such reasons. 
 One important reason why it may be thought to be problematic to 
claim that we are motivated by a desire de dicto to do what we judge to be 
right is, as I have already suggested, due to a failure to distinguish between 
substantially and non-substantially good and strong-willed persons. When 
Smith starts off arguing against explaining the reliable connection in terms of 
a desire de dicto, he has a substantially good and strong-willed person in 
mind. He then continues his reasoning on the presumption that the same 
argument holds for a non-substantially good and strong-willed person. 
However, I fail to see that he has provided any reason for this view.  
 Another reason why it might be thought problematic is the view that 
a person who is motivated by a desire de dicto to do what she judges to be 
right has to be consciously aware that she is motivated by such a desire. It 
might be argued that this would be awkward because we do not experience 
ourselves as being motivated by a desire to do what is right, where this is 
understood as a desire de dicto. Smith indicates that he believes that 
externalists are committed to this conception when he says that, according 
to this view, a good and strong-willed person is motivated by a ‘self-
consciously moral motive’.67 However, it is difficult to see why externalists 
should be thus committed. Externalists may—and presumably should—
claim that we are not consciously aware that we are motivated by a desire de 
                                                                                                              
The change in her view of the features of right actions, has her reflecting over which 
actions that have F2. When she considers whether giving money to the beggars has F2, 
she realises that it actually has these features. She becomes accordingly motivated to give 
money to the beggars. This explanation of the reliable connection does not appeal to any 
desire de dicto to do what she judges to be right. Before the change, she was motivated by 
a desire de re in the form of a desire to perform actions that have features F1, and after 
the change she is motivated by a desire de re in the form of a desire to perform actions 
that have features F2. However, this kind of explanation rests on a crucial presumption: 
that the person in question has a pre-existing desire to perform actions with certain 
features and that she after the change comes to believe that these features are had by 
actions that are right. We can presumably not make this presumption as regards all 
relevant instances of the reliable connection. 
67 Smith (1994), p. 74. 
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 dicto. They may in other words claim that such a desire stays in the 
background of our moral deliberations.68
 There is a further reason why it may be thought to be problematic to 
claim that we are motivated by a desire de dicto to perform actions that we 
judge to be right. Some of the things Smith says suggest that he believes that 
when we are motivated by such a desire, we are motivated to perform these 
actions without any consideration of their properties other than that they 
are right. He writes in other words as if we on this alternative would be 
motivated to perform these actions irrespective of which other properties 
we believe they have.69  
 However, there seems to be no reason to assume that this is the case. 
On any reasonable view of rightness, it is the case that if a person judges that 
an action is right, she believes that the action has this property in virtue of 
having certain non-moral properties. This means that when she is motivated 
by a desire de dicto to do what she judges to be right, she is not motivated to 
perform these actions irrespective of which other features she believes they 
have. One way to see this is the following. Suppose a person is motivated to 
perform an action by a desire de dicto to do what she judges to be right. She 
then believes that the action is right in virtue of having certain non-moral 
properties. If she comes to believe that the action does not have the non-
moral properties she first thought it had, she might come to believe that the 
action is not right after all. Given her desire de dicto, her motivation to 
perform the action will then vanish.70   
 If these remarks are correct, there is reason to believe that there is no 
problem for externalists to refer to a desire de dicto to do what is judged to 
be right in explaining the instances of the reliable connection mentioned 
above: those that involve changes in beliefs as regards which the morally 
relevant features are in persons who are non-substantially good and strong-
willed. And, as we have seen, these are the only cases where externalists 
might need to refer to such a desire. Together with the arguments presented 
earlier, this provides reasons to reject Smith’s fetishist argument.  
                                      
68 Cf. Shafer-Landau (2003), pp. 158–159, and Svavarsdóttir (1999), p. 202. For the 
distinction between background and foreground desires, see Pettit and Smith (1990), pp. 
565–592.  
69 See e.g. Smith (1997), pp. 114–115. 
70 Cf. Zangwill (2003), pp. 148–149. 
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  One important question I have left uncommented is whether there 
would be any difficulty for externalists in maintaining that also substantially 
good and strong-willed persons are motivated by a desire de dicto to do what 
they judge to be right. Like a number of other commentators on Smith’s 
argument, I have difficulty seeing anything problematic about this.71 
Moreover, I am inclined to think that considerations such as those just 
offered can explain why it is mistakenly thought be problematic. If this is 
correct, there is no reason to believe that the only instances of the reliable 
connection that are explainable in terms of a desire de dicto are those 
mentioned above. On the contrary, many, perhaps the majority, of the 
instances of the reliable connection might be explainable in this way. 
However, as Smith’s discussion bears witness, some people seem to have the 
very strong intuition that substantially good and strong-willed persons are 
not motivated by such a desire. Hence, it might be difficult to argue against 
this view in a convincing way. And, as we have seen, it is not necessary to 
do so in order to cast doubt on Smith’s argument. 
 
9. Reductionism, Realism and Moral Motivation 
According to externalism, a person’s motivation to do what she judges to be 
right consists in a motivational state that is external to her judgement. In the 
last section, we saw that on the assumption that motivational states are 
desires, externalism may suggest that such a motivational state consists in a 
desire with either of two types of contents. Either it is a desire de re to do 
what is judged to be right. That is, it is a desire to perform actions that have 
certain features which are assumed to be morally relevant, where these 
features are thought to be had by actions that are right. Or it is a desire de 
dicto to do what is judged to be right. That is, it is, briefly put, a desire to 
perform actions with the particular aim to do what is right. 
 I do not think that meta-ethical theories have anything significant to 
say about desires de re to do what is judged to be right. As I indicated in the 
last section, the features involved in such desires are presumably rather 
concrete and particular. Moreover, people might differ to a great extent as 
to which these features are. There seems to be little reason to believe that a 
                                      
71 Cf. Copp (1997), pp. 49–50; Sadler (2003), pp. 69–71; Svavarsdóttir (1999), pp. 202–
203, and Zangwill (2003), pp. 146–148. 
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 meta-ethical theory could capture this variety, and I see no particular reason 
why it should. 
 Concerning the desires de dicto, things are different. Since meta-
ethical theories are, among other things, about the nature of moral 
properties, we can require that such a theory is able to account for this kind 
of desire. This means that one relevant measure of the plausibility of a meta-
ethical theory is whether it succeeds in doing so. Moreover, for externalism 
it is especially important that there is a meta-ethical theory that can meet 
this requirement, since it explains certain instances of the reliable 
connection in terms of a desire de dicto. If externalism cannot be combined 
with a meta-ethical theory of this kind, there is in other words reason to 
believe that externalism cannot explain moral motivation in a satisfactory 
way. 
 Let us consider how analytic reductionism, synthetic reductionism 
and realism, respectively, characterise a desire de dicto to what is judged to be 
right. 
 
Analytic reductionism 
Analytic reductionism has a significant consequence for the content of a 
desire de dicto to do what is judged to be right. According to this view, the 
meaning of ‘right’ is constituted by a certain non-moral property. As we 
have seen earlier, a person who is linguistically competent as regards the 
meaning of ‘right’ knows what constitutes the meaning of the term. This 
suggests that if she is motivated by a desire de dicto to do what she judges to 
be right, she desires to perform actions that have the mentioned property. 
Thus, the property will be part of the content of her desire de dicto.72
 Let us next note that on any version of analytic reductionism that 
appears at least remotely plausible, the non-moral property that constitutes 
the meaning of ‘right’ presumably will be quite abstract. This is a 
consequence of various requirements placed on a correct reductive account 
of the meaning of the term. According to one of these requirements, this 
property has to be recognised by anyone who is linguistically competent in 
respect of the meaning of ‘right’ and hence by people who embrace widely 
different substantive normative conceptions. Consequently, according to an 
                                      
72 Of course, she does not need be consciously aware that she is motivated by a desire 
with this content. 
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 influential family of views, the meaning of ‘right’—and other ‘thin’ moral 
terms—should be understood in terms of what a highly idealised creature, 
e.g. an ideal observer, would approve of.73  
 However, I suspect that the non-moral property that constitutes the 
meaning of ‘right’ on any plausible account is so abstract that it is, at least 
generally, implausible to ascribe to us a desire to perform actions that have 
such a property. For example, it does not seem to be an accurate description 
of our moral motivation to claim that we are motivated by a desire to 
perform actions that a highly idealised creature would approve of. 
Admittedly, we may at times be motivated by such a desire. But it seems 
implausible to suppose that we are motivated by such a desire whenever we 
are motivated by a desire de dicto to do what we judge to be right.  
 It might also be wondered why, from our own perspective, we would 
be motivated by a desire to perform actions that have such an abstract 
property. This question arises particularly as it might be very difficult for us 
to get to know which actions that have this property. For example, suppose 
that the meaning of ‘right’ is understood in terms of what a highly idealised 
creature, such as an ideal observer, would approve of. Such a creature 
presumably has characteristics that no existing human being has; for 
example, she has a unique epistemic position, involving all relevant true 
beliefs, etc.74 As a consequence, it will be quite hard, perhaps impossible, for 
us to know which actions such a highly idealised creature would approve of. 
But then it seems difficult to understand why we would be motivated by a 
desire to perform these actions. After all, as far as we know, the actions such 
a creature would approve of might be ones that we are not at all interested 
in seeing carried out. Moreover, given that it is quite difficult to get to 
know which actions that have the non-moral property that constitutes the 
meaning of ‘right, it is quite difficult to know which actions to perform in 
order to do what is right. It would then be even harder to understand why 
we would be motivated to perform actions that have this property. 
 Gilbert Harman has pressed a related objection against the view that 
people who are motivated to do what is right are motivated by a desire to 
perform actions that an ideal observed would approve of. Harman argues 
that such a desire would ‘too “outer directed” to count as a moral 
                                      
73 For an elaborated version of this view, see Firth (1952), pp. 317–345.  
74 Cf. Firth (1952), pp. 333–335.  
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 motive’.75 If I understand him correctly, he thinks that a person who is 
motivated by such a desire would be too much concerned with what an 
ideal observer would approve of and too little concerned with the qualities 
of her own actions. Harman concludes: ‘Such a desire is precisely not a 
desire to do something simply because it is right.’76
 However, it should be admitted that whether these arguments are 
plausible depends on what the meaning of ‘right’, according to analytic 
reductionists, consists in. There might be an account of the meaning of 
‘right’ that evades them. Hence, they are by no means conclusive. 
 
Synthetic reductionism  
Synthetic reductionism does not have the same consequence as analytic 
reductionism regarding the content of a desire de dicto to do what is judged 
to be right. According to this view, the reference of ‘right’ consists in a 
certain non-moral property. However, it is not part of being linguistically 
competent with respect to ‘right’ to know what the reference of the term 
consists in. This means that a when a person has a desire de dicto to do what 
she judges to be right, it does not follow that she desires to perform actions 
that have a certain non-moral property, where this property constitutes the 
actual reference of ‘right’. Hence, this property need not be part of the 
content of her desire de dicto. 
 This view does not have the difficulty with analytic reductionism 
mentioned above. Since it does not imply that a person who is motivated by 
a desire de dicto is motivated by a desire whose content involves the non-
moral property that ‘right’ refers to, there is no reason to believe that the 
content of her desire involves an unduly abstract property.  
 However, synthetic reductionism seems to have a problem that is 
relevant in the present context. As just mentioned, on this view it is not part 
of a person’s linguistic competence in respect of ‘right’ to know what non-
moral property constitutes the reference of the term. She refers to this non-
moral property even if she is not aware of it and even if she believes that 
rightness consists in something else entirely. This has the consequence that 
there may be an awkward discrepancy between the content of the moral 
sentences a person utters and her moral motivation. 
                                      
75 Harman (1986b), p. 1. 
76 Harman (1986b), p. 4. Cf. Johnston (1989), pp. 157–158.  
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  To see this, consider the following example. Assume that the non-
moral property that ‘right’ refers to according to synthetic reductionism is 
that of maximising happiness. When a person utters a moral sentence such as 
‘It’s right to give money to the Red Cross’, ‘right’ thus refers to maximising 
happiness. However, imagine a person whose view of rightness does not 
accord with what ‘right’ actually refers to and who believes that rightness 
consists in something else than maximising happiness. We may for example 
think of a convinced defender of a certain normative conception, such as 
the dedicated deontologist mentioned in chapter 5. Assume further that she 
is motivated to perform the action by a desire de dicto to do what she judges 
to be right. Now, what she desires to do is what she judges to be right, 
where this feature consists in what she believes rightness consists in. What she 
desires to do is what is right according to her view of rightness. As a 
consequence, in the example at issue, the feature which is involved in the 
person’s desire de dicto does not correspond to what ‘right’ actually refers to. 
 As a result, when the person in question utters ‘It’s right to give 
money to the Red Cross’, ‘right’ in this sentence refers to another feature 
than the feature that is involved in the content of her desire de dicto to do 
what she judges to be right. This consequence seems problematic. When a 
person utters a sentence of this type, and she is motivated to perform the 
action, we take ‘right’ to indicate a feature of the action which is relevant to 
her being motivated to perform it. More precisely, we take the term to 
indicate a feature that helps to explain the person’s motivation. This seems 
especially to be the case when we take her to be motivated by a desire de 
dicto. However, in the mentioned kind of cases, the property referred to in 
the sentence may not be relevant to her motivation to perform the action. 
Hence, it does not have the mentioned explanatory function. There is one 
kind of cases where this consequence seems particularly awkward. I have in 
mind the cases where the sentence in question is true, where the person 
consequently is correct in her belief that the action is right, and where she is 
motivated by a desire de dicto to do what she judges to be right. In such cases 
we seem to assume that in referring to ‘right’, she has succeeded in 
identifying a feature of the action, rightness, where this feature is such that it 
helps to explain her motivation to perform the action. However, as far as I 
see, this conception cannot be maintained on synthetic reductionism. 
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 Realism 
We may start by observing that realism does not have the implication of 
analytic reductionism concerning the content of a desire de dicto to do what 
is judged to be right. Realism denies that the meaning of ‘right’ is 
constituted by a particular non-moral property. Hence, the content of a 
desire de dicto does not involve such a property. According to the realist 
formula, the relevant aspect of the meaning of ‘right’ can instead be 
captured by saying that an action to which the term applies has a set of non-
moral properties—some set of non-moral properties—such that it makes 
actions right. (For the sake of simplicity, I put my points here in terms of 
the simplest formulation of the realist formula.) Hence, in virtue of being 
linguistically competent in respect of the meaning of ‘right’, a person who is 
motivated by a desire de dicto desires to perform actions that have this 
property. This property will consequently be part of the content of her 
desire de dicto.  
 Since the content of a desire de dicto according to realism does not 
involve any particular non-moral property that constitutes the meaning of 
‘right’, there is no reason to believe that this view characterises the content 
of the desire as too abstract, at least not in the way that provides a difficulty 
for analytic reductionism. 
 As we saw earlier, synthetic reductionism avoids this difficulty. 
However, realism avoids also the difficulty with synthetic reductionism 
mentioned above. To see this, consider an example that corresponds to the 
one discussed earlier. Suppose a person utters a moral sentence such as ‘It’s 
right to give money to the Red Cross’. According to realism, ‘right’ in this 
sentence does not refer to a particular non-moral property. Rather, it refers, 
in accordance with the realist formula, to the irreducible property rightness 
where an action with this property has a set of non-moral properties such 
that it makes actions right. Let us assume that the set of non-moral 
properties which makes the action in question right is that of maximising 
happiness. However, imagine a person who believes that what makes 
actions right is something else than actually makes them right, i.e. 
something else than maximising happiness. Her conception of what makes 
actions right is in other words erroneous. Moreover, assume that this person 
is motivated by a desire de dicto to do what she judges to be right. Now, on 
the realist formula, the relevant aspect of the meaning of ‘right’ can be 
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 captured by saying that an action to which the term applies has a set of non-
moral properties such that it makes actions right. This means, as we saw 
above, that in virtue of being linguistically competent with respect to the 
meaning of ‘right’, a person who is motivated by a desire de dicto to do what 
she judges to be right is motivated by a desire to perform actions that have 
precisely this feature. Consequently, the feature that is involved in her desire 
de dicto to do what she judges to be right corresponds to what ‘right’ refers 
to. And this holds irrespective of her being mistaken about what makes 
actions right.  
 On this view, the discrepancy between the content of moral 
sentences and moral motivation that troubles synthetic reductionism does 
not emerge. That is, on realism there is no discrepancy between, on the one 
hand, what ‘right’ refers to in the moral sentence the person utters, and, on 
the other, the feature which is involved in the content of her desire de dicto 
to do what she judges to be right. Even though she is mistaken about which 
non-moral properties that make actions right, ‘right’ in the sentence she 
utters refers to the same feature that is contained in her desire de dicto, i.e. 
rightness as this property is understood according to the realist formula. 
Consequently, realism does not have the awkward consequence of synthetic 
reductionism.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I have considered an important argument against 
cognitivism and in favour of non-cognitivism: the internalist argument. I 
have maintained that this argument can be rejected by denying one of its 
premises, internalism, and by accepting externalism. First, I argued that 
there are counterexamples to internalism in the form of amoralists—
particularly in the form of what I have called advanced amoralists. Second, I 
argued that there is reason to believe that externalism can explain the 
considerations that are thought to provide support to internalism and that 
these explanations are preferable to those offered by internalism. (It is worth 
pointing out, however, that the first line of reasoning, if successful, is 
sufficient to show that internalism is mistaken.) In the latter line of 
reasoning, I appealed to some ideas in pragmatics. However, this account is 
incomplete and in need of further investigation. Moreover, I maintained 
that Michel Smith’s fetishist argument in favour of internalism and against 
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 externalist fails. Smith’s argument raises an important question that 
externalists have to address, namely how moral motivation should be 
understood on this view. I finished the chapter with arguing that realism 
provides a better account than reductionism of certain pertinent instances of 
moral motivation. As a consequence, realism, unlike, reductionism, is able 
to contribute to the defence of cognitivism against the internalist argument.  
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 Chapter 8 
Moral Dependence 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The distinguishing characteristic of realism, as this view is understood here, 
is that moral properties constitute a separate category of properties and that 
they consequently are irreducible to non-moral properties. In chapter 4, I 
pointed out that notwithstanding their stress on the irreducibility of moral 
properties, realists have to be able to account for our notion that objects 
have moral properties in virtue of having non-moral properties. I 
hypothesised that realists can do so by adopting the realist formula. This 
formula, I maintained, gains support from our considerations in relation to 
the questions posed in chapters 2 and 3. In the three subsequent chapters, I 
then argued that realism, much owing to the realist formula, is capable of 
explaining meta-ethical issues concerning moral disagreement, reason and 
motivation. Partly due to its explanatory capacity in relation to moral 
disagreement and motivation, it is possible for realism to counter significant 
arguments put forward in support of non-cognitivism and error-theory. In 
combination with the difficulties of non-cognitivism and error-theory 
mentioned in the introductory chapter, this indicates that realism is to be 
preferred to these views. Moreover, since realism, again much thanks to the 
realist formula, offers better explanations of the mentioned meta-ethical 
issues than reductionism, there is reason to believe that realism is to be 
preferred also to this view.  
 As is evident from this short summary of the reasoning thus far, the 
notion that objects have moral properties in virtue of having non-moral 
properties—particularly as it is expressed in the realist formula—is important 
for the arguments put forward in support of realism in the previous chapters. 
For this reason, I will in the present chapter examine how this dependence 
relation between moral and non-moral properties should be understood on 
realism. In particular, I will discuss some significant objections that can be 
directed against realism with regard to this relation. 
 In the next section, I call attention to the importance of realism and 
other meta-ethical views being capable of explaining the dependence of 
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 moral properties on non-moral properties. In section 3, I argue that a 
traditional attempt to account for this relation is insufficient for realist 
purposes. In section 4, I return to the realist formula and argue that it does 
not have these difficulties. I also consider the objection that the realist 
formula is incompatible with particularism. In section 5, I introduce the 
well-known distinction between strong and weak supervenience and find 
that the realist formula implies both. I then argue in section 6 that in order 
to capture the mentioned dependence relation, strong supervenience is 
required. In sections 7 and 8, I discuss two arguments, proposed by Simon 
Blackburn and Jaegwon Kim, respectively, according to which strong and 
weak supervenience poses dilemmas for realism. I argue that there are 
reasons to believe that realism is able to avoid these dilemmas and abide by 
strong supervenience. However, in relation to Kim’s argument, it is found 
that realism faces problems that I cannot deal with satisfactorily in the 
present thesis. In section 9, I consider J. L. Mackie’s well-known arguments 
from queerness and argue that there are reasons to believe that realism is 
able to avoid them. However, it is found that Mackie’s arguments raise 
issues that require further examination.  
 
2. The Importance of Moral Dependence  
Previously I pointed out that one of our fundamental convictions as regards 
morality is that objects have moral properties in virtue of having non-moral 
properties, or to put the same point in the way I will make use of here, that 
moral properties depend on non-moral properties. (Above I reserved the 
term ‘make’ to signify the irreducible dependence relation between moral 
and non-moral properties that holds according to the realist formula.) The 
fundamental character of this notion is indicated by the fact that it seems to 
be a condition for being linguistically competent in respect of moral terms 
to know that these terms are to be applied in such a way that this 
dependence relation is recognised. Suppose, for example, that someone 
makes statements which indicate that she does not believe that a person’s 
goodness depends on certain of the person’s non-moral properties. She then 
seems committed to the view that it would be correct to claim that a person 
is good even if the person has no non-moral properties at all or that two 
persons can differ as regards goodness in spite of the fact that they do not 
differ in any of their non-moral properties. We would presumably regard 
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 her statements as a sign that she is not linguistically competent in respect of 
‘good’. As I suggested earlier, since knowing that this necessary dependence 
relation should be recognised in one’s application of moral terms arguably is 
a condition for being competent in the indicated respect, there is reason to 
believe that it is analytically necessary that moral properties depend on non-
moral properties.  
 It is sometimes assumed that it is part of the mentioned competence 
to know that moral terms are to be applied in such a way that it is 
recognised that moral properties depend on natural properties, not non-
moral properties.1 According to this view, it might consequently be claimed 
that it is analytically necessary that moral properties depend on natural ones. 
However, I think this view is misguided. There are various conceptions of 
natural properties, and this view might perhaps be more plausible on some 
of these conceptions than on others. But consider a person who believes 
that a certain moral property depends on properties that are incontrovertibly 
non-natural. For example, think of a person who holds the view that an 
action’s rightness depends on it having the property of being commanded 
by God.2 Although most of us would deny this view, I do not think we 
would claim that the person lacks in linguistic competence with respect to 
‘right’. Hence, it does not seem analytically necessary that moral properties 
depend on natural properties. 
 However, it is reasonable to argue that the linguistic competence at 
issue involves other aspects concerning the relation between moral and non-
moral properties than the one just mentioned. I have two such aspects in 
mind, but there might be others as well. 
 First, it can be argued that it is part of this competence to know that 
statements to the effect that an object has a certain moral property are to be 
justified by citing some of the object’s non-moral properties. For instance, 
someone who is asked about the reason why she claims that a certain person 
is good, and who does not recognise that she is expected to justify her claim 
by citing some of the person’s non-moral properties, may be suspected not 
to be fully linguistically competent in respect of ‘good’. 
 Second, it can be argued that it is part of this competence to know 
                                      
1 See e.g. Blackburn (1993 (1985)), pp. 145–146; Dreier (1992), p. 15, and Smith 
(1994), p. 40. 
2 For a similar argument directed against Blackburn, see Klagge (1984), pp. 374–375. 
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 that moral explanations are to be justified in terms of non-moral properties.3 
For instance, suppose someone claims that a person’s goodness explains that 
she performed certain actions. The person who proposed the explanation 
may then be urged to justify this explanation. If she does not recognise that 
she is expected to provide the justification in terms of some of the assumed 
good person’s non-moral properties, we may take this as an indication of 
her lacking linguistic competence with respect to ‘good’. (I will return to a 
related observation in the next chapter.) 
 Thus, there are indications that the linguistic competence with regard 
to moral terms that concerns the relation between moral properties and 
non-moral properties involves more aspects than the notion that moral 
properties depend on non-moral properties. However, these additional 
aspects seem explainable in terms of the competence with regard to the 
dependence relation. As far as the epistemic aspect is concerned, when a 
person justifies a moral claim in terms of non-moral properties, this could be 
understood in terms of her trying to point at the non-moral properties on 
which the moral property in question depends. Similarly, as far as the 
explanatory aspect is concerned, when a person justifies her claim that an 
object’s moral property explains that something has happened in terms of 
the object’s non-moral properties, this could also be understood as an 
attempt to point to the non-moral properties on which the moral property 
depends. The fact that linguistic competence with regard to the dependence 
relation between moral and non-moral properties can be employed to 
explain other aspects of this competence accentuates the fundamental nature 
of this relation.  
 Another way to see the importance of the notion that moral 
properties depend on non-moral properties is to compare what holds for 
moral properties with what holds for certain other kinds of properties. In 
similarity with moral properties, it is claimed that these properties stand in a 
relation of dependence to some underlying properties. And in similarity 
with moral properties, it is sometimes claimed that these properties are 
irreducible to the underlying properties. However, in contrast to moral 
properties, this dependence relation is not connected in the same way to 
linguistic competence with respect to the discourse in question. One 
                                      
3 Cf. Audi (1993), pp. 101–103. 
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 example of the latter phenomenon is provided by mental properties.4 
Suppose we understand Cartesian dualism as the view that there are two 
substances, the mental and the physical, which have separate existences. This 
view may be taken to imply that mental properties do not depend on 
physical ones. Although this position is implausible, it is conceivable. It 
seems at least possible to imagine that the fact that a person entertains a 
certain belief or harbours certain feelings is not dependent on her being in a 
certain physical state. This suggests that acknowledging the dependence of 
mental properties on physical properties is not part of the linguistic 
competence with respect to mental terms. This view finds further support in 
the observation that although we do not believe in the existence of 
disembodied beings, as for example angels or ghosts, we do not charge 
people who do so with not being linguistically competent with respect to 
mental terms. Colours provide another relevant example. It is claimed about 
colours that they depend on physical properties but are not reducible to 
such properties. And it does not seem to be part of being linguistically 
competent with respect to colour terms to recognise that colours depend on 
physical properties.5
 The difference between mental properties and moral properties 
implies that a moral analogue to Cartesian dualism, moral dualism, 
according to which moral properties do not depend on any non-moral 
properties, is implausible. As far as I know, nobody has ever embraced this 
view, although meta-ethicists who believe that moral properties are 
irreducible have been accused of doing so.6
 These remarks on the significance of the dependence of moral 
properties on non-moral properties suggest that any reasonable meta-ethical 
theory should be able to account for it. However, how this notion should 
be understood is open to dispute. This is especially so since the dependence 
relation might be understood more or less literally. 
 Meta-ethical views which claim that certain moral sentences involve 
moral terms in virtue of which moral properties are ascribed to objects and 
that moral properties exist so that some of these sentences are true, 
                                      
4 Cf. Blackburn (1993 (1985)), pp. 139–141; Jackson (1998), p. 119, and Klagge (1988), 
p. 466. 
5 Cf. Blackburn (1993 (1985)), pp. 144–145.  
6 See Warnock (1967), p. 14. For defences of Moore, see Baldwin (1985), pp. 24–30, 
and Cox (1970), 265–269.    
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 characterise the dependence relation in terms of an ontological relation 
holding between moral and non-moral properties. This is presumably the 
most literal manner to understand the notion that moral properties depend 
on non-moral ones. Realists claim that moral properties ontologically 
depend on non-moral properties in a way that is incompatible with identity 
and hence with reduction. Reductionists, by contrast, claim that moral 
properties ontologically depend on non-moral properties in a way that 
entails identity. It might be tempting for realists to argue that we talk about 
the relation between moral and non-moral properties in a manner which 
indicates that the relation is asymmetric and hence not one of identity. 
Thus, we say that moral properties depend on non-moral properties, that 
non-moral properties make objects have moral properties, etc. However, we 
also seem to use this vocabulary when we are certain that identity is the 
case. I take it that we may say, for example, that the fact that a person is an 
unmarried man makes him a bachelor or that the fact that something is 
water depends on the fact that it is H2O. The fact that we use this 
asymmetric vocabulary in talking about the relation between moral and 
non-moral properties thus does not seem to be relevant to the dispute 
between realists and reductionists. 
 Meta-ethical views that reject the existence of moral properties 
cannot give the required explanation in terms of a straightforward 
ontological dependence relation. Error-theorists agree with realism and 
reductionism that certain moral sentences involve moral terms in virtue of 
which moral properties are attributed to objects, but deny that there are any 
moral properties and conclude therefore that all such sentences are false. 
Consequently, on this view there are no ontological dependence relations 
between moral and non-moral properties. (Indeed, as we will see below, 
one argument put forward in support of error-theory is that the existence of 
this dependence relation should be rejected because it would be 
metaphysically queer.) Non-cognitivists deny that moral sentences involve 
moral terms in virtue of which moral properties are ascribed to objects and 
hence that such sentences have truth-value. On this view, moral sentences 
do not ascribe any moral properties that depend on non-moral ones. Instead 
non-cognitivists have to account for the dependence relation in a non-
ontological, and presumably less literal, way. Taking their point of departure 
in their view that moral sentences express non-cogntive states, advocates of 
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 this view may argue that such states are to be had towards objects which 
have certain non-moral properties in a consistent way mirroring ontological 
dependence.7
 In what follows, I will consider how the dependence of moral 
properties on non-moral properties should be accounted for according to 
realism. 
 
2. General Dependence 
A natural starting-point for a discussion of how realists should characterise 
the dependence of moral properties on non-moral properties is G. E. 
Moore’s classical formulation of the relation he thinks holds between 
intrinsic value and intrinsic properties. This is especially so since one of 
Moore’s purposes seems to be spell out his view that even though intrinsic 
value depends on intrinsic properties, it is not reducible to such properties.8 
Moore writes:  
 
[I]f a given thing possesses any kind of intrinsic value in a certain degree, then not only 
must that same thing possess it, under all circumstances, in the same degree, but also 
anything exactly like it [as regards intrinsic properties], must, under all circumstances, 
possess it in exactly the same degree. Or to put it in the corresponding negative form: It 
is impossible that of two exactly similar things one should possess it and the other not, or 
that one should possess it in one degree, and the other in a different one. 
 I think this [. . .] proposition also is naturally conveyed by saying that the kind of 
value in question depends solely on the intrinsic nature of what possesses it.9
 
Since Moore is interested in intrinsic value, he assumes that this property 
depends on intrinsic properties, i.e., roughly, non-relational properties.10 
Realists, on the other hand, should not restrict the type of non-moral 
properties that moral properties can depend on in this way, but should allow 
for the possibility that they depend on ‘extrinsic’, i.e., roughly, relational 
                                      
7 See e.g. Blackburn (1993 (1971)), pp. 122, 125–126, and Hare (1952), pp. 133–136, 
145-147, 159. 
8 See e.g. Moore (1993 (1922)), pp. 284, 295–297.  
9 Moore (1993 (1922)), p. 287. Other philosophers who also believe that moral 
properties or evaluative properties are irreducible have made similar claims. For two early 
examples, see Ross (1988 (1930)), pp. 116–123, and Sidgwick (1981 (1907)), pp. 208–
209. Hare seems to be the one who made the dependence relation known as 
‘supervenience’; see e.g. Hare (1952), pp. 130–131, 153–155, and Hare (1989 (1984)), 
pp. 66–81. Jaegwon Kim has developed various concepts of supervenience, see e.g. Kim 
(1993 (1984)), pp. 53–78, and Kim (1993 1990)), pp. 131–160. (I will return to Kim’s 
views on supervenience later on in this chapter.)  
10 It might be argued that this does not even hold for intrinsic value; see e.g. 
Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000), pp. 33–49. 
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 non-moral properties.   
 If we map over what Moore says about the relation between moral 
properties and non-moral properties and take into consideration what was 
said in the last section about it being analytically necessary that moral 
properties depend on non-moral properties, we obtain the following claim: 
 The general formula: It is analytically necessary that, for any objects x 
 and y, if x and y are exactly similar as regards their non-moral 
 properties, then x and y are exactly similar as regards a moral property 
 M, i.e. both x and y have M or neither has. 
This formula can be said to capture a general dependence of moral 
properties on non-moral properties, since it expresses the idea that moral 
properties depend on the category or family of non-moral properties as a 
whole, rather than on particular subsets of such properties. 
 It is worth noticing that the general formula is a non-symmetric claim 
in a certain sense: that two objects are exactly similar as regards their non-
moral properties entails that they are exactly similar as regards a moral 
property, but the converse does not follow. But while it is non-symmetric, 
it is not asymmetric either; it is neither nor. Although it does not entail that 
sameness as regards a moral property is followed by sameness as regards non-
moral properties, a claim which would be quite implausible, it is not 
incompatible with this being the case. However, it would be easy to rewrite 
the formula so as to exclude this possibility and hence make into a kind of 
asymmetric claim. 
 At least three considerations indicate that realists should not stay 
satisfied with the general formula. 
 Firstly, it seems fairly vacuous. For example, it might be argued that 
two objects cannot be exactly similar as regards all their non-moral 
properties because they have to differ as regards at least some relational non-
moral properties. But in that case it seems of little significance that the fact 
that two objects are exactly similar as regards all their non-moral properties 
entails that they are similar as regards a moral property. In particular, it is 
difficult to see that this would say anything important about the dependence 
of moral properties on non-moral properties.11
                                      
11 There are related objections that can be directed against the general formula. For 
example, that two objects are exactly similar as regards their non-moral properties is 
compatible with the fact that they do not have any non-moral properties at all, in which 
case it seems mistaken to take the general formula to say that moral properties depend on 
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  Secondly, it is compatible with moral properties being identical with 
non-moral properties. The general formula says that sameness as regards 
non-moral properties entails sameness as regards a moral property. This can 
be the case even if a moral property is identical with a non-moral property. 
Because realists deny this view, they should not stay satisfied with the 
general formula.  
 There is a third reason why realists should not stay satisfied with the 
general formula. To see this, consider that there are non-moral properties 
that are irrelevant to whether objects have a certain moral property.12 For 
instance, a person’s non-moral property of having a certain weight does not 
seem relevant to her being morally good. Still, such properties are included 
among the non-moral properties on which moral properties, according to 
the general formula, depend. This may perhaps not seem to be a difficulty 
for this claim, since it should be understood as an attempt to capture the 
idea that moral properties depend on the category of non-moral properties 
as such, the whole family of non-moral properties, not on any particular 
non-moral properties. However, we also take moral properties to depend 
on particular subsets of non-moral properties, where these subsets only 
contain non-moral properties that are relevant to objects having the moral 
properties. The general formula has thus to be supplemented with a 
dependence claim that captures this idea.  
 The last difficulty could perhaps be explained by appeal to linguistic 
competence concerning moral terms. It seems to be a part of that 
competence not only to know that moral terms are to be applied in such a 
way that it is recognised that moral properties depend on non-moral ones, 
but also in such a way that it is recognised that they depend on particular 
subsets of non-moral properties. Consider someone who makes statements 
which indicate that she believes that a person’s goodness depends on all of 
the person’s non-moral properties. It seems plausible to say that we would 
take this as an indication of her not being linguistically competent with 
                                                                                                              
non-moral properties. (Cf. Bailey (1998/99), p. 55, and Grimes (1991), pp. 82, 85.) To 
this objection it might perhaps be responded that it is impossible for an object not to 
have any non-moral properties. For example, it might be argued that all objects have 
various relational non-moral properties. The objection would perhaps be more 
troublesome on the conception that moral properties necessarily depend on natural 
properties, since it might not be plausible to rule out the possibility that objects entirely 
lack natural properties. 
12 Cf. Dancy (1981), p. 374; Griffin (1992), pp. 314–316; Grimes (1991), pp. 88–89, and 
Kim (1993 (1984)), p. 66.  
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 respect to ‘good’, since she does not seem to understand which kind of non-
moral properties that is relevant and thus could make a difference for 
whether the term applies. If linguistic competence and the relevance of 
non-moral properties are related in this way, it could explain why we find 
the idea that all non-moral properties are relevant so peculiar. 
  
4. Realist Dependence  
In the last section, I argued that for at least three reasons, the general 
formula is unsatisfactory as a formulation of a realist account of the 
dependence of moral properties on non-moral properties. This gives us 
reason to return to the realist formula and inquire whether it avoids these 
difficulties. Recall the realist formula as it was stated in chapter 4: 
 The realist formula: (i) It is analytically necessary that, for any object x, 
 and for any moral property M, if x has M, then there is a set of non-
 moral properties G such that (A) x has G, and (B) it is synthetically 
 necessary that, for any object y, if y has G, then y has M. (ii) M is not 
 identical with any non-moral property.13
It seems evident that the realist formula avoids the two first difficulties of the 
general formula. First, it cannot be accused of being vacuous, among other 
things because it, unlike the general formula, does not refer to all non-moral 
properties of the objects in question. Second, in virtue of including (ii), the 
realist formula is, unlike the general formula, incompatible with a moral 
property being identical with a non-moral property. The realist formula also 
seems to avoid the third problem with the general formula. The kind of set 
of non-moral properties it refers to does not need to contain all non-moral 
properties of an object. On the contrary, it is plausible to assume that such a 
set only consists of a subset of an object’s non-moral properties. It is 
therefore plausible to claim that the realist formula is able to give expression 
to the notion that an object’s moral property depends only on a set of non-
moral properties that is relevant to the object having the moral property.
                                      
13 In the last section, I argued that the kind of dependence Moore takes to hold between 
intrinsic value or goodness and intrinsic properties in ‘The Conception of Intrinsic 
Value’ is insufficient for purposes of realism. It is therefore interesting to note that when 
Moore reconsiders the matter in ‘Reply to my Critics’, he provides an account that 
comes close to the realist formula: ‘I have always supposed that it [i.e. goodness] did so 
“depend,” in the sense that, if a thing is good (in my sense), then that it is so follows from 
the fact that it possesses certain natural intrinsic properties, which are such that from the 
fact that it is good it does not follow conversely that it has those properties’ (Moore 
(1942), p. 588).   
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  However, it might be objected that even if the kind of set of non-
moral properties referred to in the realist formula may contain only what is 
relevant to the object having the moral property, the realist formula does 
not guarantee that this is the case. There is nothing in the realist formula that 
guarantees that the kind of set of non-moral property it refers to only 
contains what is relevant to an object having the moral property and hence 
is what its moral property depends on. 
 I would like to reply to this objection with two comments. We 
should first observe that to answer it in a way that the objector would find 
completely satisfactory, it would probably be necessary to construe a kind of 
set of non-moral properties that only contains relevant non-moral properties 
and that could be inserted in the realist formula.14 However, I think it is 
quite difficult to do so in a manner that is neutral in the desirable way. In 
order not to beg any significant questions, the realist formula should be 
compatible with various views about what makes objects have a moral 
property. It should then leave open the possibility that such a set of non-
moral properties contains merely one non-moral property, but also that it 
contains a conjunction of a number of such properties, properties which 
might be heterogeneous. Moreover, it should leave open the possibility that 
these properties can be related to each other in different ways. Granted the 
various ways such a set of non-moral properties could look like, it seems 
difficult to construe one abstract kind of set of non-moral properties that is 
neutral in the desirable way. Second, it might be replied that it is not a task 
of meta-ethics to construe such a set. As we have seen, the realist formula is 
able to give expression to the view that an object’s moral property depends 
only on a set of non-moral properties that is relevant to the object having 
the moral property. There, it might be claimed, ends the task of meta-
ethics. It is then up to a normative conception to specify what such a set of 
non-moral properties looks like. 
 In this connection, it is suitable to take the opportunity of considering 
a certain objection against the realist formula. It might be suspected that it is 
incompatible with a much debated view in contemporary ethics known as 
‘particularism’. This contention raises a number of issues that are impossible 
to do justice to here. However, I think it is reasonable to argue that the 
                                      
14 Jaegwon Kim proposes one quite general way to construe sets of relevant properties 
that can constitute the supervenience base of a supervenient property; see e.g. Kim (1993 
(1984)), pp. 58–59. 
230 
 realist formula is compatible with the main tenet of particularism. It is 
presumably irreconcilable with a view commonly associated with 
particularism, but it might be argued that this problem is not especially 
serious. 
 When Jonathan Dancy, the most prominent advocate of 
particularism, sets out to define this view, he writes:  
 
Particularism, I want to say, is an expression of a general holism in the theory of reasons; 
it is the application of holism to the moral case. Holism in the theory of reasons holds 
that a feature that is a reason in favour in one case may be no reason at all in another, 
and in a third may even be a reason against.15
 
Thus understood, particularism claims that the relevance of non-moral 
properties is context dependent. As far as I understand, this view is generally 
considered to be the main tenet of particularism.16 It can perhaps be 
formulated in the following way: a non-moral property which, when 
instantiated in one object, contributes to the object having a certain moral 
property, might, when instantiated in another object, contribute to that 
object not having the moral property, and might, when instantiated in yet 
another object, contribute in neither of these ways. Suppose A is such a 
property. The reason why A’s relevance varies in this way is that some of 
the object’s other non-moral properties determine whether A is relevant 
and, if it is, which relevance it has. The relevance of A is thus context 
dependent, where the context is made up by other non-moral properties of 
the object. Particularists find support for this view in various thought 
experiments of which the following might serve as an example.17 Suppose 
an action causes pleasure and that we think that it is right because it has that 
non-moral property. This fact may have us believe that causing pleasure is a 
non-moral property which always contributes to actions being right. To see 
that this is not at all evident, imagine that the action of executing a person 
in public causes pleasure in the audience.18 In that case, we might be 
inclined to say, the property of causing pleasure does not contribute to the 
action being right. Perhaps we might even be inclined to say that it 
                                      
15 Dancy (1999a), p. 144. 
16 Cf. Crisp (2000), p. 34; Dancy (1993), p. 60; Hooker (2000), p. 6; Kihlbom (2002), 
pp. 23–28; McNaughton (1988), pp. 193–194, and Raz (2000), p. 59. For a defence of 
the opposite of holism, atomism, see Alm (2004), pp. 312–331.  
17 For various examples, see e.g. Crisp (2000), pp. 36–37; Dancy (1993), pp. 60–62, and 
Sinnott-Armstrong (1999), pp. 3–4.   
18 For this example, see Dancy (1993), p. 61, and McNaughton (1988), p. 193. 
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 contributes to the action not being right. If this is correct, the relevance of 
causing pleasure varies depending on the context made up by other non-
moral properties, e.g. the property of being a public execution. 
 I think it can be suggested that the realist formula is compatible with 
the relevance of non-moral properties being context dependent. A set of 
non-moral properties that according to the realist formula makes objects 
have a moral property might consist of a number of non-moral properties. 
Within such a set, the relevance of a moral property might be context 
dependent, where the context is made up by the other non-moral properties 
in the set. 
 Consider the following simple example of how this might be possible. 
(There are presumably more sophisticated accounts, but here I am merely 
interested in the principal point that the realist formula is compatible with 
the relevance of non-moral properties being context dependent.19) Suppose 
that an object has the following set of non-moral properties: A & -B & C. 
Suppose further that this set of non-moral properties makes the object have 
M; that is, this set of non-moral properties is of the kind referred to in the 
realist formula. In this set, A might contribute to the object having M. This 
can perhaps be understood in the following way: in this set, A is such that if 
the object had not had A, it would not have had M. However, suppose 
another object has the following set of non-moral properties: A & B & C. 
Suppose further that this set does not make the object have M. In this set, A 
might contribute to the object not having M. More exactly, in this set, A is 
such that if the object had not had A, it would have had M. Or, as regards 
this set, A does not contribute in either way; that is, neither of the two 
counterfactuals holds. Thus, whether A is relevant, and, if it is, which 
relevance it has, is determined by the other non-moral properties in the 
respective set of non-moral properties, i.e. A’s relevant context. In the sets 
at issue, the active part of the context is -B and B, respectively. 
 We may apply this picture of the context relevance of non-moral 
properties to the thought experiment mentioned above. Let the moral 
property, M, be ‘rightness’, A be ‘causing pleasure’ and B ‘being a public 
execution’. In the first set of non-moral properties mentioned above (A & -
B & C), A contributes to the object having M because it figures in a context 
                                      
19 One potential difficulty with the approach suggested here is that it makes use of 
complements of properties, ‘negative properties’. 
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 partly made up by -B. In the second set of non-moral properties mentioned 
above (A & B & C), A contributes to the object not having M, or does not 
contribute in either way, because it figures in a context made up partly by 
B. 
 The following objection might be directed against this suggestion. 
The kind of set of non-moral properties that according to the example 
above makes objects have a moral property consists of a conjunction of 
non-moral properties. Assume that conjunction is a proper way of forming 
properties so that a conjunction of properties itself is a property. In that case, 
such a set of non-moral properties is a non-moral property. Now, such a 
non-moral property appears to contain all non-moral properties that are 
relevant to a certain object having a moral property.20 But this means that it 
does not have any context that determines its relevance. The relevance of 
such a non-moral property is in other words not context dependent. Hence, 
the proposal above is incompatible with the view that the relevance of non-
moral properties is context dependent. 
 However, I do not think the suggestion above is incompatible with 
particularism; at least, I do not think it runs counter to the spirit of this 
view. The sort of non-moral properties particularists appeal to in their 
examples, and whose relevance is claimed to be context dependent, are 
simple properties, e.g. ‘causing pleasure’, ‘breaking a promise’, ‘lying’, 
‘being unkind’ and ‘being cruel’. However, the kind of non-moral 
properties that would make objects have a moral property if simple non-
moral properties as these are context dependent would be complex, perhaps 
very complex, non-moral properties. As far as I see, it is not incompatible 
with particularism—at least not with the spirit of this view—to claim that 
such complex properties are not context dependent.  
 Thus far, I have argued that the realist formula is compatible with the 
main tenet of particularism, i.e. the view that the relevance of non-moral 
properties is context dependent. However, particularism is often associated 
with another view, namely with the claim that there are no true moral 
principles. This view does indeed seem incompatible with the realist 
formula. The reason is that the realist formula contains (B): a synthetically 
necessary implication from a set of non-moral properties to a moral 
property. Such an implication constitutes a kind of moral principle. Indeed, 
                                      
20 This will become clearer when we consider so-called enabling conditions below. 
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 since there might be a number of sets of non-moral properties that make 
objects have a certain moral property, a number of moral principles of this 
kind might hold. 
 It is sometimes assumed that the context dependence of non-moral 
properties means that there are no true moral principles.21 This assumption 
seems unfounded. As we have just seen, the context dependence of the 
relevance of (simple) non-moral properties is compatible with the realist 
formula. The realist formula involves (B), which, as just mentioned, is a 
kind of moral principle. Hence, the relevance of non-moral properties being 
context dependent seems compatible with the truth of at least one kind of 
moral principles. 
 The claim that there are no true moral principles finds instead support 
in another view advocated by Dancy: that there is a distinction between, on 
the one hand, the non-moral properties that make objects have a certain 
moral property and, on the other hand, the non-moral properties that 
merely enable other non-moral properties to make objects have the moral 
property, but which do not themselves have this function, what are called 
‘enabling conditions’.22 Dancy admits that he does not know how to draw 
this distinction in any clear way.23 Consequently, it is unclear whether a 
certain non-moral property on this view should be classified as belonging to 
the first or second category. However, sets of non-moral properties of the 
kind described above, and which are hypothesised to make objects have a 
moral property if the relevance of non-moral properties is context 
dependent, may contain non-moral properties of a type that Dancy 
explicitly argues are enabling conditions. To see this, recall the set of non-
moral properties mentioned above, A & -B & C, which might be assumed 
to make objects have a moral property M. In the thought experiment 
mentioned above, -B represents ‘not being a public execution’. As Dancy 
                                      
21 See e.g. Dancy (1993), p. 66. 
22 See e.g. Dancy (1993), pp. 22–26, 55–58; Dancy (1999a), pp. 148–150, and Dancy 
(1999b), pp. 26–29. When I discuss the objection issuing from enabling conditions, I 
follow Dancy in using ‘make’ in a wider sense, not connected exclusively to the realist 
formula. 
23 Dancy (1999a), p. 148. Dancy admits this in a response to an objection raised by 
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen: Lippert-Rasmussen (1999), pp. 101–104. Dancy’s admission 
concerns his wider tripartite distinction between ‘foreground properties’, ‘active 
background properties’ and ‘inert background’ properties, but as far as I understand, it 
applies also to the simpler distinction I focus on here. Dancy’s view on enabling 
conditions is criticised by e.g. Kihlbom (2002), pp. 62–65; Lippert-Rasmussen (1999), 
pp. 99–104; Raz (2000), pp. 68–69, and Sinnott-Armstrong (1999), pp. 2–8.  
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 sees matters, this non-moral property enables A, i.e. ‘causing pleasure’, to 
make the action in question have M, i.e. right, but it is not itself a right-
making property.24 Dancy writes: 
 
The action’s not having a property strong enough to make it right is not a property in 
virtue of which it is wrong, though it is something required of it if it is to be wrong. Not 
having a countervailing property is something without which it would be right and with 
which it is bound to be wrong; but it is not what makes it wrong—that is done by more 
ordinary things like being unkind or cruel.25
  
In Dancy’s view, non-moral properties of the mentioned type are thus 
enabling conditions and not among the non-moral properties which make 
objects have a certain moral property. Dancy’s argument for this view, 
when applied to rightness, is that they are not ‘something for which we 
judge the action to be right’.26 Generally put, the argument is that such 
non-moral properties are not among our reasons for judging that objects 
have a moral property. 
 We can now see that Dancy’s distinction between non-moral 
properties that make objects have a certain moral property and enabling 
conditions may be thought to have at least two consequences for the realist 
formula. First, it can be taken to imply that the realist formula may not state 
a set of non-moral properties that makes objects have a moral property. 
According to the mentioned distinction, a set of non-moral properties of 
the kind referred to in the realist formula may contain a non-moral property 
that is not among the properties that make objects have a moral property, 
but only enables other properties to do so. (For example, it might involve a 
property as -B.) As a result, it may seem mistaken to claim that such a set of 
non-moral properties makes objects have a moral property. Second, the 
distinction can be taken to imply that moral principles of the kind stated in 
(B) may turn out to be false. Assume that true moral principles, if there are 
any, state non-moral properties that make objects have a moral property.27 
As we have seen, the mentioned distinction suggests that in case a set of 
                                      
24 It may be assumed that a property of the kind ‘being a public execution’ is such that 
its absence is necessary for an object to have a certain moral property; such properties 
might be called ‘defeaters’. For a classification for various types of defeaters, see Sinnott-
Armstrong (1999), p. 5. 
25 Dancy (1993), p. 77. See also e.g. Dancy (1993), pp. 80–81, and Dancy (1999b), p. 
26.   
26 Dancy (1993), p. 81. 
27 Cf. Dancy (1993), pp. 76–77, and Dancy (1999b), p. 26. 
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 non-moral properties contains an enabling condition, it fails to make objects 
have a moral property. It follows that a version of (B) which refers to such a 
set of non-moral properties does not constitute a true moral principle. Since 
the second consequence can be seen as a special case of the first 
consequence, I will focus on the first one. 
 I am not quite sure that this line of reasoning can be met in a 
completely satisfactory way. However, I would like to respond with the 
following observations. 
 First, it should be kept in mind that it is on the assumption that non-
moral properties are context dependent in the way particularists claim that 
these two consequences arise. According to this view, the contribution a 
non-moral property makes to an object’s moral property depends on its 
context. This implies that it is not the case that, for any object, if it has such 
a non-moral property, it has a certain moral property. For example, it is not 
the case that, for any object, if it has A, it has M. This means that such a 
property alone cannot constitute a set of non-moral properties of the kind 
referred to in the realist formula. On the contrary, for a set of non-moral 
properties to be such that, for any object, if it has that set of non-moral 
properties, it has a moral property, we have to add what Dancy considers to 
be enabling conditions to the set. For example, we have to add properties 
such as -B to a set of non-moral properties involving A for such an 
implication to hold. It is only if a set of non-moral properties is 
supplemented in this way that it can figure in the realist formula. As we 
have seen, according to Dancy’s distinction, it might be argued that such a 
set of non-moral properties does not make objects have a moral property. 
However, assume that the relevance of non-moral properties is not context 
dependent. In that case, there might be a non-moral property, or a 
combination of non-moral properties, such that, for any object, if it has that 
non-moral property or combination of non-moral properties, it has a moral 
property. Such a non-moral property, or combination of non-moral 
properties, could then alone constitute a set of non-moral properties of the 
kind referred to in the realist formula.28 On this alternative, there is no need 
to add any enabling conditions. Such a set of non-moral properties could 
then be what makes objects have a moral property. 
                                      
28 Granted, of course, that the implication is synthetically necessary. 
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  Second, it seems reasonable to suggest the adoption of a more 
technical sense of ‘make’, according to which also non-moral properties that 
Dancy’s classifies as enabling conditions are among the properties that make 
objects have a certain moral property. This means that even if a set of non-
moral property of the kind referred to in the realist formula involves a 
property that Dancy classifies as an enabling condition, it can be such that it 
makes objects have a moral property. However, it would do so in a sense 
that presumably diverges somewhat from the ordinary sense of ‘make’. As 
far as I understand, this adjustment in our usage of the term would be rather 
innocent, since little of real philosophical importance seems to follow from 
it. This contention is reinforced by the fact, admitted by Dancy, that there 
does not seem to be any clear distinction between non-moral properties that 
make objects have a moral property and enabling conditions. It should also 
be pointed out that Dancy does not deny that there are true implications 
that take us from a set of non-moral properties to a moral property.29 What 
he stresses is that such an implication does not state non-moral properties 
that make objects have a moral property and that it therefore does not 
constitute a true moral principle. This suggests that this aspect of the debate 
about particularism—unlike the aspect that concerns context dependence—
can be understood to concern how the term ‘make’ should be used, rather 
than some more fundamental philosophical issue. 
 Third, it should be observed that the realist formula indirectly 
involves a set of non-moral properties that does not contain any non-moral 
properties that Dancy classifies as enabling conditions. Such a set of non-
moral properties is a subclass of a set of non-moral properties of the kind 
referred to in the realist formula. A set of that kind contains only properties 
that make objects have a certain moral property, in the stricter sense of 
‘make’ Dancy appeals to. This being the case, it might be maintained that 
the realist formula, after all, succeeds in stating a set of non-moral properties 
that—in the stricter sense of ‘make’—makes objects have a moral property. 
 Lastly, we may question Dancy’s view that the non-moral properties 
that he classifies as enabling conditions are not among our reasons for 
judging that objects have a certain moral property. Joseph Raz argues, in a 
critical discussion of particularism, that we should distinguish between the 
reasons people cite in support for their moral judgements and the reasons 
                                      
29 See e.g. Dancy (1999b), p. 26. 
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 there actually are for these judgements.30 These may of course come apart in 
different ways and for different reasons. However, what is important in the 
present context is that there might be features that people do not cite as 
reasons for their moral judgements even though they actually constitute 
such reasons. For example, suppose we ask someone about her reasons for 
asserting that a certain person is good. She is likely to mention features of 
the person that she takes to be in some way characteristic of the person 
being good, features she experiences as somehow ‘standing out’ and being 
especially important in consideration of the person’s goodness. However, 
there may be other features that are less conspicuous and lie more in the 
‘background’ which also constitute reasons to judge that the person is good, 
but which she does not mention. It seems reasonable to suppose that what 
Dancy classifies as enabling conditions are among these features. For 
example, although a person would not mention ‘not being cruel’ among the 
non-moral properties that make a person good, this does not mean that this 
non-moral property does not comprise a reason to judge that the person is 
good. Moreover, that the non-moral properties Dancy classifies as enabling 
conditions may be among the reasons to judge that something has a moral 
property might be something people would agree to, if we were to call their 
attention to these properties.31 Suppose, for example, that the person 
mentioned above claims that someone is good because she is friendly and 
benevolent. We may point out to her that if the person had been cruel, she 
would not have been good. Suppose we then ask if this does not mean that 
‘not being cruel’ is among the features that constitute reasons to judge that 
the person is good. It seems reasonable to assume that she would agree. 
 If the last comment is plausible, we are in the position to question 
Dancy’s view that the non-moral properties that he classifies as enabling 
conditions are not among our reasons for judging that objects have a certain 
moral property. This suggests that his argument for claiming that these non-
moral properties are enabling conditions and not among the non-moral 
properties that make objects have a moral property is mistaken. In other 
words, we may question Dancy’s distinction. This, in turn, would mean that 
the two consequences described above do not follow. However, it should 
be admitted that I have not demonstrated that these considerations apply to 
                                      
30 Raz (2000), pp. 61–70. Cf. Lippert-Rasmussen (1999), p. 102.  
31 Cf. Raz (2000), p. 67. 
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 all non-moral properties Dancy classifies as enabling conditions. There 
might be non-moral properties that are so outlandish that they cannot be 
assumed to belong to the non-moral properties that make objects have a 
moral property, but have to be classified as enabling conditions.32
 
5. The Realist Formula and Supervenience     
It is now time to call attention to something that has remained implicit so 
far: the close resemblance between the realist formula and supervenience 
claims. Like the realist formula, supervenience claims are generally intended 
to capture a dependence relation holding between properties, e.g. the 
dependence of moral properties on non-moral properties. We may 
distinguish between two supervenience claims that concern the relation 
between these two types of properties.33 Consider first: 
 Weak supervenience: It is necessary that, for any object x, and for any 
 moral property M, if x has M, then there is a set of non-moral 
 properties G such that (a) x has G, and (b) for any object y, if y has 
 G, then y has M. 
The occurrence of ‘necessary’ that opens this claim binds the formula as a 
whole. However, the implication in (b) is not prefixed with ‘necessary’ and 
consequently does not extend to all possible worlds. In weak supervenience, 
(b) merely says that any object within a possible world which has a set of 
non-moral properties G has M. It does not say that any object in all other 
possible worlds which has G has M. The correlation between G and M does 
not, so to speak, spread to other possible worlds. Consider next: 
 Strong supervenience: It is necessary that, for any object x, and for any 
 moral property M, if x has M, then there is a set of non-moral 
 properties G such that (a) x has G, and (b) it is necessary that, for any 
 object y, if y has G, then y has M. 
As before, the first occurrence of ‘necessary’ binds the formula as a whole. 
However, in strong supervenience the second occurrence of ‘necessary’ 
binds the implication in (b). Since the implication in (b) now is prefixed in 
this way, it says that it holds in all possible worlds that any object which has 
G has M. Thus, the correlation between G and M does spread to other 
                                      
32  The non-moral property -B above, ‘not being a public execution’, is perhaps a case 
in point. 
33 As far as I know, Jaegwon Kim was the first one who observed the difference between 
strong and weak supervenience; see e.g. Kim (1993 (1984)), pp. 57–67. 
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 possible worlds. 
 The realist formula and the two supervenience claims differ in two 
important respects. 
 First, whereas the realist formula, in virtue of involving the condition 
(ii), rules out that a moral property is identical to a non-moral property, the 
two supervenience claims are neutral in this regard. They lack (ii) and are 
consequently compatible both with that identity holds and that it does not. 
The fact that they are neutral in this respect suggests that they might be 
adopted by realists and reductionists alike. 
 Second, whereas the realist formula specifies the kind of necessities at 
issue, the two supervenience claims do not. They are consequently neutral 
also in this respect. This means that various versions of weak and strong 
supervenience can be generated by the insertion of different kinds of 
necessities in each respective claim. 
 Moreover, it is important to notice that, on the appropriate reading of 
the two occurrences of ‘necessary’, the realist formula entails strong 
supervenience. Of course, it also entails weak supervenience. As we will see 
in sections 7 and 8, arguments have been proposed to the effect that realists 
should not adopt strong supervenience. If these arguments are correct, they 
would also show that realists should not adopt the realist formula. Since 
these arguments have been formulated in terms of strong supervenience, I 
will discuss them in terms of this claim rather than in terms of the realist 
formula.  
 
6. Strong or Weak Supervenience? 
It may now be asked whether realists should adopt strong supervenience or 
weak supervenience.34 The answer seems to be that realists should opt for 
strong supervenience. The primary reason is that weak supervenience is too 
weak to capture the notion that an object’s moral property depends on a set 
of its non-moral properties whereas strong supervenience succeeds in doing 
so. This reason is quite general and applies to other properties as well. 
Among others Jaegwon Kim has argued that in order for a supervenience 
claim to state a dependence relation between properties, it cannot be 
understood as weak supervenience; it has to be understood as strong 
                                      
34 In chapter 4, I argued that realists should adopt the realist formula, which entails 
strong supervenience. Here I will for the moment ignore this result and consider 
whether there are any other reasons for realists to adopt strong supervenience. 
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 supervenience.35  
 To see why this is the case, consider the following example. Suppose 
we want to claim that a person’s goodness depends on her having a set of 
non-moral properties G. As we saw in the last section, weak supervenience 
requires merely that within a possible world any person who has G is good. 
This means that weak supervenience is compatible with that people in 
another world who have G are not good. This indicates that, on weak 
supervenience, it would be mistaken to claim that a person’s goodness 
depends on her having G, since a person could have this set of non-moral 
properties and yet not be good. If a person could have G and yet not be 
good, we would not consider the co-instantiation of goodness and G as a 
matter of dependence, but rather as a matter of coincidence: that people 
who have G happen to be good. In Kim’s words: ‘Determination or 
dependence is naturally thought of as carrying a certain modal force: if being 
a good man is dependent on, or is determined by, certain traits of character, 
then having these traits must insure or guarantee being a good man’.36 Strong 
supervenience provides the required supplement. Applied to the example 
above, it says that it holds in all possible worlds that any person who has G is 
good. This indicates that it contains the modal strength that is required for 
the relevant dependence relation to hold. The same reasoning applies to 
other moral properties. Hence, realists should adopt strong supervenience 
rather than weak. 
 Furthermore, it should be born in mind that much of our moral 
thinking is constituted by thought experiments. Generally put, in thought 
experiments we ask how things would be under certain specified conditions 
by imagining how things are in a certain possible world. For instance, being 
convinced that envy is relevant to whether a person is good, I might ask if I 
would be a better person were I not so envious by imagining how I am in a 
possible world in which I am less envious than I am in the actual world. We 
often trust the results of such thought experiments and draw certain 
conclusions from them; for one thing, we let our moral decisions be guided 
by them. For example, convinced by the result in my thought 
experiment—that I would be a better person were I less envious—I might 
                                      
35 See e.g. Kim (1993 (1984)), pp. 59–61, and Kim (1993 (1990)), pp. 143–144. In 
relation to morality, similar points have been made by e.g. Blackburn (1993 (1985)), p. 
132, and Depaul (1987), pp. 431–432.   
36 Kim (1993 (1984)), p. 60. 
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 decide to try to get less envious. However, if only weak supervenience were 
the case, thought experiments would not be of any help, since we then 
would not be justified to hold beliefs about one possible world that are 
based on what we believe about another possible world.37 In particular, we 
would not be justified to believe that non-moral properties contribute, or 
fail to contribute, to objects having moral properties in the same way in our 
word as they do in the possible worlds employed in our thought 
experiments. However, since thought experiments often seem reliable, there 
is reason to believe that weak supervenience is insufficient. Strong 
supervenience allows us to trust them, and there is therefore reason for 
realists to adopt this claim. 
 
7. Blackburn: Strong or Weak Supervenience—a Dilemma 
According to a much discussed argument put forward by Simon Blackburn, 
realism faces a dilemma with regard to strong and weak supervenience. 
Blackburn’s argument displays, roughly put, the following structure: (i) 
Realists have reason to prefer strong supervenience to weak. (ii) However, 
strong supervenience results in reduction. (iii) Realists are then advised to 
adopt weak supervenience. But then they face what Blackburn calls ‘the 
explanatory problem’ which they fail to account for. Thus, realism faces a 
dilemma: strong supervenience leads to reduction whereas weak 
supervenience leads to the explanatory problem. (iv) A certain version of 
non-cognitivism can account for the explanatory problem and should thus 
be preferred.38 (Here I will only be concerned with steps (i)–(iii).) 
 I think it is reasonable to argue that realism can avoid the dilemma 
presented by Blackburn. However, a caveat is in place: I find Blackburn’s 
argument difficult to understand, so what I argue against is to a great extent 
an interpretation of what he says. 
 Blackburn does not characterise supervenience in the terminology 
adopted above. However, I have chosen to reformulate Blackburn’s 
                                      
37 Cf. Kim (1993 (1984)), pp. 60–61.  
38 The argument is presented in Blackburn (1993 (1971)), pp. 111–129; Blackburn 
(1984), pp. 182–187, and Blackburn (1993 (1985)), pp. 130–148. Here I will mainly 
follow Blackburn’s latest formulation of the argument. In trying to understand it, I have 
been helped by the various critical comments it has given rise to: Bovens and Drai 
(1999), pp. 241–245; Brueckner (2002), pp. 67–70; Dreier (1992), pp. 13–38; Elliot 
(1987), pp. 133–137; Klagge (1984), pp. 370–380; Klagge (1987), pp. 312–315; 
McFetridge (1985), pp. 245–258; Noonan (1985), pp. 78–85; Shafer-Landau (2003), pp. 
84–89; Yasenchuk (1995), pp. 84–89, and Zangwill (1995), pp. 240–262. 
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 supervenience claims to this terminology so as to make it easier to 
determine the bearing of his arguments on realism.39 Despite this, I will in 
this section make use of some of Blackburn’s names of certain theses.  
 Let us now consider the relevant steps in Blackburn’s argument.   
 (i) Blackburn concedes that strong supervenience appears to be what 
realists should opt for. The reason, which Blackburn apparently does not 
regard as conclusive, is similar to the one I mentioned above: on strong 
supervenience, but not on weak, is it reasonable to hold that an object’s 
moral property depends on a set of its non-moral properties or, as Blackburn 
puts it, that a set of the object’s non-moral properties ‘underlies’ its moral 
property.40
  (ii) Blackburn suggests, however, that there is reason for realists not to 
adopt strong supervenience. In the terminology adopted here, he argues as 
follows. Assume that there is an object which has a moral property M. On 
strong supervenience, it then follows that there is a set of non-moral 
properties G such that the object has G and it holds necessarily that 
whatever object has G has M. That is, a necessary implication of the 
following kind holds:  
                                      
39 Blackburn explains weak supervenience as the thesis ‘that as a matter of necessity, if 
something x is F, and G* underlies this, then anything else in the physical or natural (or 
whatever) state G* is F as well’. Formally Blackburn represents weak supervenience thus:  
(S) N((∃x)(Fx&G*x&(G*xUFx)) ⊃ (y)(G*y⊃Fy)) 
‘N’’ should be read ‘necessarily’; ‘Fx’ is a particular moral truth or fact; ‘G*x’ is a 
‘definite total set of G truths’, a set of natural truths which do not include all the truths of 
this kind about the object. ‘U’ represents ‘the relation [. . .] that holds when one 
“underlies” the other’. Blackburn represents strong supervenience thus: 
(?) N((∃x)(Fx&G*x&(G*xUFx)) ⊃ N(y)(G*y⊃Fy)).  
(Blackburn (1985 (1993), pp. 131–133.) 
As can be seen, Blackburn makes use of the term ‘underlie’ and its formal equivalent ‘U’ 
in his account of supervenience. One difficulty with this notion is that if G* underlies F, 
it seems reasonable to assume that F depends on G*, in which case the ‘underlying 
relation’ is nothing but the converse of the supervenience relation in so far as this is 
understood to express dependence. This means, however, that one cannot use ‘underlie’ 
or ‘U’ in an explanation of what supervenience amounts to, unless one is prepared to 
accept that the account is circular. On the other hand, if one understands ‘underlie’ in a 
way which does not mean that it is related to dependence in the indicated way, it is 
difficult to see which relevance it has for an explication of supervenience. It can further 
be argued that on Blackburn’s characterisation of supervenience, weak supervenience (S) 
becomes a rather peculiar claim. If, as the first antecedent of (S) says, G* underlies F it 
seems hard to deny that each object in any possible world which has G* also has F, since 
a reasonable interpretation of ‘underlie’ means that F depends on G*, and this relation 
presumably holds across possible worlds, as we saw in the last section. 
40 Blackburn (1993 (1985)), p. 132. Blackburn believes that supervenience claims are 
intended to state that moral properties depend on natural properties rather than on non-
moral properties. However, this difference between our formulations of supervenience is 
not important in the present context. 
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  (N) It is necessary that, for any object x, if x has G, then x has M.41
Now, according Blackburn, the truth of an implication like (N) means that 
M has been reduced. To avoid this conclusion, Blackburn believes that 
realists should deny (N). To make this explicit, they should assert the 
following kind of claim:  
 (P) It is possible that there is an object x that has G but which does 
       not have M. 
 (iii) In Blackburn’s view, in order to account for the notion that an 
object’s moral property depends on a set of its non-moral properties, realists 
should adopt weak supervenience. That is, they should maintain that it 
holds in any possible world that if there is an object which has a moral 
property M, it has a set of non-moral properties G, and then, within a 
possible world where an object has G, every object which has G has M. 
Moreover, in order to avoid reduction, realists should combine weak 
supervenience with (P). As a result, they maintain that there is a possible 
world in which objects that have G do not have M. On this view, the 
relation between G and M which is the case within a possible world does 
not spread to other possible worlds; on the contrary, there is a possible 
world where objects which have G do not have M.  
 On this proposal, realists would allow that there are two types of 
possible worlds: worlds where every object which has G has M and worlds 
where no object which has G has M. The type of world that would not be 
accepted is this: a world in which some objects that have G have M and 
some objects that have G do not have M, what Blackburn calls ‘mixed 
worlds’. In the light of the discussion in the last section, it is also clear that 
realists should not accept the existence of mixed worlds, since it seems 
difficult to reconcile with the idea that an object’s moral property depends 
on G.  
 Blackburn argues that the denial of mixed worlds confronts realists 
with what he calls ‘the explanatory problem’. Given that there are possible 
worlds in which every object which has G has M, but also a possible world 
in which no object which has G has M, realists have to explain why this 
combination is not possible within a possible world. If the combination of, 
on the one hand, having G and M, and, on the other hand, having G and 
                                      
41 There might be a number of sets of non-moral properties for which this holds. 
Consequently, a number of necessary implications of this kind might hold. 
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 not having M is allowed as regards all possible worlds taken together, there 
does not seem to be any good reason why this combination is not allowed 
to hold also within the same possible world. In Blackburn’s words, realists 
have difficulties explaining ‘the ban on mixed worlds’.  
 It is weak supervenience together with (P) that generates the 
explanatory problem, and the reason seems to be that this conception of 
dependence is a kind of hybrid. If an object’s moral property M depends on 
G, then objects which have G should have M everywhere or the co-
existence of G and M is not a matter of dependence, but rather of 
coincidence, in which case the combination of G and the presence or 
absence of M should not be excluded anywhere. In Blackburn’s words: 
‘Supervenience becomes, for the realist, an opaque, isolated, logical fact for 
which no explanation can be proffered.’42
 As far as I see, there is no reason for realists to be perplexed by the 
explanatory problem as such, since it is more of a dramatisation of the 
observation that weak supervenience is insufficient to guarantee dependence 
than a problem of its own. The reason why realists have the explanatory 
problem if they adopt weak supervenience together with (P) is that they 
then are not in the position to claim that the correlation between a set of 
non-moral properties G and a moral property M holds across all possible 
worlds. As a consequence, they are not in the position to make plausible 
that M depends on G. To point out that realists have difficulty explaining 
the ban on mixed worlds if they adopt weak supervenience and (P) is thus, 
as I see it, merely a way to illustrate that it is unreasonable to adopt weak 
supervenience if one wants to maintain that a moral property depends on a 
set of non-moral properties. This view finds support if we consider strong 
supervenience. On the assumption that a moral property M strongly 
supervenes on a set of non-moral properties G, it follows that there is no 
possible world where an object has G but does not have M. Consequently, 
if realists adopt strong supervenience, they do not face the explanatory 
problem. They may then also be in the position to claim that M depends on 
G. 
 Nevertheless, according to Blackburn, realists face a dilemma when it 
comes to supervenience: if realists adopt strong supervenience this leads to 
reduction, but if they adopt weak supervenience together with (P), the 
                                      
42 Blackburn (1993 (1971)), p. 119. 
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 explanatory problem arises. 
 How should realists respond to the supposed dilemma? Above I have 
argued that realists should agree with Blackburn about step (i); realists 
should prefer strong to weak supervenience. Realists should also accept step 
(iii); as we have seen, if realists embrace the combination of weak 
supervenience and (P), the explanatory problem seems difficult to avoid. 
But let us ask whether realists should accept step (ii): does strong 
supervenience result in reduction? 
 The reason why Blackburn believes that strong supervenience results 
in reduction is that it together with the assumption that there is an object 
which has a moral property M entails that an implication like (N) is true. 
Moreover, he indicates that he believes that implications of this kind are 
false. I think both these contentions should be denied. 
 That an implication like (N) is true does not result in reduction, at 
least not in the sense this notion is understood here. The most important 
reason is that the truth of such an implication does not mean that a 
necessary biconditional involving a moral property M and a non-moral 
property holds. However, that such a biconditional holds is a necessary 
condition for property identity and hence for reduction. 
 Nevertheless, even if the truth of an implication like (N) is 
compatible with a moral property being irreducible, it might be thought 
that there is a persuasive argument to the effect that there are no true 
implications of that kind. There seem to be two main candidates for such an 
argument: Hume’s law or Moore’s open question argument.  
 Hume’s law is often formulated in the dictum ‘Is does not imply 
Ought’. The truth of an implication like (N) is incompatible with the spirit 
of Hume’s law, since it means that an implication from a set of non-moral 
properties to a moral property holds. Hume’s law seems to be the summing-
up of an argument the main premise of which is that moral judgements do 
not consist in cognitive states, such as beliefs, but rather in non-cognitive 
and motivational ones, such as desires.43 However, this premise is quite 
controversial and realists should dispute it. In fact, in chapter 7 I argued that 
                                      
43 Hume (1978 (1888)), pp. 468–470. Cf. Mackie (1980), pp. 61–63. According to 
another interpretation, Hume reminds us that a moral sentence cannot be inferred from a 
non-moral sentence without a premise which connects these two types of sentences. 
However, this view does not support the view that no implication like (N) holds; rather, 
such an implication could work as such a premiss. 
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 the main argument for it—internalism—is mistaken.   
 The open question argument may seem to provide a stronger support 
to Blackburn’s view that an implication like (N) does not hold. In chapter 
2, I argued that an amended version of this argument is plausible. However, 
it is important to note that the open question argument concerns analytically 
necessary truths. Accordingly, in order for it to have any consequence for 
the truth of an implication like (N), ‘necessary’ in (N) has to be understood 
as ‘analytically necessary’. That is, (N) has to be read as (Na). (The 
corresponding version of (P) would be (Pa).) This means that if ‘necessary’ 
in (N) is understood in some other way, e.g. as ‘synthetically necessary’, 
Blackburn cannot rely on the open question argument to show that no 
implication like (N) holds and, as a consequence, that realists should not 
adopt strong supervenience. It should also be mentioned that Blackburn 
indicates that it is if (N) is read as (Na) that he finds it most problematic.44
 However, Blackburn believes that realists cannot read (N) in a non-
analytic way. His argument for this contention takes its point of departure in 
the view that it is an analytic truth that the moral claims depend on natural 
claims. In a ‘modern idiom’, Blackburn says, to deny an analytically true 
proposition would be ‘constitutive of lack of competence with the 
vocabulary’ in question.45 Supervenience is connected to competence in this 
way: ‘It seems to be a conceptual matter that moral claims supervene on 
natural ones. Anyone failing to realize this, or to obey the constraint, would 
indeed lack something constitutive of competence in the moral practice.’46  
 Blackburn believes that realists should agree with his point about 
competence in respect of moral discourse and accordingly read the first 
occurrence of ‘necessary’ in a supervenience claim as ‘analytically necessary’. 
He then argues that if realists read the occurrence of ‘necessary’ in weak 
supervenience as ‘analytically necessary’, this would not make any significant 
difference for the realist position vis-à-vis supervenience. He says that 
realists have to avoid claiming that an implication like (Na) holds, and have, 
by contrast, to maintain that a claim like (Pa) does hold. Thus, they would 
face the explanatory problem again, but now on an analytic level. Blackburn 
then continues by arguing that strong supervenience should not either be 
adopted by realists because they would then be committed to the truth of an 
                                      
44 Blackburn (1993 (1985)), p. 137. 
45 Blackburn (1993 (1985)), p. 136. 
46 Blackburn (1993 (1985)), p. 137.  
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 implication like (Na). I have difficulty following Blackburn’s reasoning on 
this point, and it certainly deserves further discussion.47 However, 
Blackburn can be understood to presume that if realists are convinced by his 
point in relation to competence with respect to moral discourse and thus 
read the first occurrence of ‘necessary’ in strong supervenience as 
‘analytically necessary’, then they have to read the second occurrence of 
‘necessary’ in the same way. This would mean that realists are committed to 
the truth of an implication like (Na), and no such implication holds 
according to the reasoning earlier.   
 We should however question Blackburn’s presumption. That the first 
occurrence of ‘necessary’ in the strong supervenience is read as ‘analytically 
necessary’ does not imply that the second occurrence of ‘necessary’ has to be 
read in the same way. This means that the following reading of strong 
supervenience is open to realists: 
 It is analytically necessary that, for any object x, and for any moral 
 property M, if x has M, then there is a set of non-moral properties G 
 such that (a) x has G, and (b) it is synthetically necessary that, for any 
 object y, if y has G, then y has M. 
Needless to say, this is the realist formula without the condition (ii). It 
seems reasonable to assume that this alternative should be open to realists 
because they may want to claim that it is analytically necessary that if an 
object has a moral property, it has some set of non-moral properties such 
that it necessary that if an object has that set, it has the moral property, but 
at the same time deny that the latter holds with analytic necessity.48 Indeed, I 
have argued above that this is what realists should say. As the first 
occurrence of ‘necessary’ in this claim represents analytic necessity, it is part 
of being linguistically competent in respect of moral terms to know that 
these terms are to be applied in such a way that it is recognised that moral 
properties depend on non-moral properties. Thus, realists can claim with 
Blackburn that anybody not acknowledging this lacks competence with 
                                      
47 I think Nick Zangwill comes closest to an adequate interpretation of Blackburn’s 
argument; see Zangwill (1995), pp. 240–262.  
48 James Dreier has proposed a similar claim in response to Blackburn’s argument: Dreier 
(1992), pp. 20–21. However, he wants to combine it with the idea that moral properties 
are identical with natural properties. Cf. Danielsson (2001), p. 95, and McLaughlin 
(1995), p. 27. 
248 
 regard to moral vocabulary.49 But although it is part of this competence to 
know that moral terms are to be applied in such a way that it is 
acknowledged that moral properties depend on non-moral properties, it 
need not be part of this competence to know which non-moral properties 
the moral properties depend on. This is reflected in the fact that the second 
occurrence of ‘necessary’ does not represent analytic necessity. That is, there 
is no analytically necessary implication from a particular set of non-moral 
properties to a moral property. This version of the strong supervenience 
does thus not commit realists to the truth of an analytically necessary 
implication like (Na). If realists adopt this version of strong supervenience, 
they can consequently evade the argument related above. 
 To sum up, realists can avoid the dilemma put forward by Blackburn 
and maintain strong supervenience.  
  
8. Kim: Strong or Weak Supervenience—another Dilemma 
In the preceding section, we saw that Blackburn argues that strong and 
weak supervenience confront realists with a dilemma. The dilemma is, 
roughly put, this: if realists adopt weak supervenience, they face the 
explanatory problem, whereas if they adopt strong supervenience, they 
accept a claim that leads to reduction. I also mentioned that the explanatory 
problem is not an independent problem, but rather a dramatisation of a 
point made in section 7, namely that weak supervenience is too weak to 
warrant the claim that an object’s moral property depends on a set of its 
non-moral properties. Thus understood, the dilemma put forward by 
Blackburn is structurally analogous to a dilemma suggested by Jaegwon 
Kim. That dilemma is quite general and applies not only to moral and non-
moral properties, but to any attempt to state a non-reducible dependence 
relation between properties in terms of supervenience. The dilemma is, 
roughly put, the following: if weak supervenience is adopted, dependence 
between properties cannot be accounted for, since this kind of 
supervenience is too weak, whereas if strong supervenience is adopted, an 
important step towards reduction has been taken. Although the dilemmas 
proposed by Kim’s and Blackburn’s exhibit essentially the same structure, 
Kim’s argument for the second horn is, as we shall see, different, and, I 
                                      
49 Here I ignore that Blackburn, unlike me, believes that is ‘a conceptual matter that 
moral claims supervene on natural ones’ (Blackburn (1993 (1985)), p. 174; italics added), 
as this difference has no significance for the present point. 
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 think, stronger. 
 The reason Kim gives for the first horn was considered in section 7, 
and I will not comment on it further. The reason Kim gives for the second 
horn is, in brief, that on the assumption that disjunction is a proper way of 
forming properties—that is, if a disjunction of properties itself is a 
property—there is a disjunctive property involving all the different base 
properties for a given strongly supervenient property. It follows that there is 
a necessary biconditional involving the supervenient property and the 
disjunctive property.50  
 Applied to the relation between moral and non-moral properties and 
formulated in terms of the terminology adopted above, Kim’s argument can 
be understood in the following way.51 We may start by assuming that 
conjunction is a proper way of forming properties. This means that if a set 
of non-moral properties of the kind referred to in strong supervenience 
consists of a conjunction of non-moral properties, it is itself a non-moral 
property.52 Thus understood, strong supervenience says the following: it is 
necessary that if an object has a moral property M, it has a non-moral 
property G which is such that the following holds: necessarily, whatever 
object has G has M. Let us call the disjunction of all the non-moral 
properties for which this holds ‘DM’. Suppose we accept that disjunction is 
a proper way of forming properties and hence that DM is a property. That 
an object has this disjunctive property then necessarily implies that it has M. 
Thus, the following implication, the ‘first part’ of the biconditional, holds: 
necessarily, for any object x, if x has DM, x has M. Now, recall again that, 
according to strong supervenience, it is necessary that if an object has M, it 
has a non-moral property G such that, necessarily, whatever object has G 
has M. That is, it is necessary that if an object has M, it has some non-moral 
property for which this holds. Such a non-moral property is one of the 
disjuncts in DM. Suppose again that we accept disjunctive properties. We 
                                      
50 See e.g. Kim (1993 (1984)), pp. 70–78, and Kim (1993 (1990)), pp. 150–155. 
51 As already mentioned, Kim’s argument is quite general and would presumably affect 
all areas where there is an interest in claiming that there is a non-reducible dependence 
relation between properties. It is also widely discussed, particularly in the philosophy of 
mind. The bearing of the argument on moral properties is also considered by a number 
of authors; see e.g. Depaul (1987), p. 434; Jackson (1998), pp. 122–123, Shafer-Landau 
(2003), pp. 93–94, and Wedgewood (1999), pp. 209–210.  
52 That properties can be closed under conjunction is presupposed in Kim’s argument. In 
the present context, I will for the sake of the argument take it for granted that this 
assumption is correct. 
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 could then state an implication which is the ‘second part’ of the 
biconditional: necessarily, for any object x, if x has M, x has DM. The 
conjunction of the two implications gives us the following necessary 
biconditional: 
 It is necessary that, for any object x, x has M if and only if x has DM. 
Kim’s argument thus seems to show that strong supervenience entails a 
necessary biconditional involving a moral property M and a non-moral 
property DM. If a biconditional of this type is true, a necessary condition for 
property identity is fulfilled. It might then be thought that with strong 
supervenience an important step towards reduction has been taken. In 
particular, it might be suspected that M is identical with DM. By contrast, 
weak supervenience does not entail a necessary biconditional of this sort 
since it lacks the required modal force. But as we saw in the last two 
sections, weak supervenience is not an option for realism. It should be 
mentioned that Kim does not claim that a necessary biconditional of the 
mentioned kind implies that a property is identical with a disjunctive 
property or that the former has been reduced to the latter. Rather, he 
believes that it implies ‘the possibility of reducing the supervenient to the 
subvenient’.53 It is not clear to me what further conditions Kim believes 
should be satisfied for property identity or reduction to be the case. 
 Kim’s argument raises a number of fundamental metaphysical 
problems that I cannot deal with here. However, I would like to respond to 
it in the following way. 
 First it is important to keep in mind that Kim’s argument rests on a 
controversial presumption: that properties are closed under disjunction so 
that a disjunction of properties, such as DM, itself is a property. As a matter 
of fact, as is pointed out in a recent paper, the prevalent view in the 
literature seems to be that this is not the case.54  
 Moreover, as D. M. Armstrong in particular points out, there are 
some intuitively striking arguments against the existence of disjunctive 
properties.55 Armstrong calls attention to the fact that the notion of 
disjunctive properties offends against the principle that a property is 
‘identical in its different particulars’.56 Suppose an object has a certain 
                                      
53 Kim (1993 (1990)), p. 153. 
54 Clapp (2001), p. 112. 
55 See e.g. Armstrong (1978), pp. 19–23.  
56 Armstrong (1978), p. 20. 
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 property A, but lacks another property B, and that another object has B, but 
lacks A. It then seems paradoxical to claim that this means that they have 
the same property. Yet, they would if properties can be closed under 
disjunction, since they would have the disjunctive property ‘A or B’. 
Armstrong thinks it would be ‘laughable’ to maintain that these objects are 
identical in some respect in virtue of having such a ‘property’. Moreover, 
Armstrong points out that the notion of disjunctive properties breaks the 
natural link between properties of objects and the causal influence they 
exercise. Suppose again that an object has A but lacks B. Some of the causal 
influence that the object exercises might then be explainable in terms of A. 
The object’s causal influence is not explainable in terms of B for the simple 
reason that it lacks B. The object having ‘A or B’ does thus not add 
anything to the causal influence it has. But then it seems strange to claim 
that ‘A or B’ is a property. Moreover, the object that has A but not B might 
share no causal influence with an object that has B but not A. But then it 
seems strange to say that they have the ‘property’ ‘A or B’ in common. 
 To my mind, Armstrong’s arguments provide strong intuitive support 
against the existence of disjunctive properties. There are also other 
arguments to this effect.57 However, it should immediately be admitted that 
some authors believe that there are disjunctive properties. What is important 
to note, however, is that they do not generally seem to accept that all 
disjunctions of properties are properties. (It can be mentioned that Kim 
himself in later a work maintains that not all disjunctions of properties are 
properties.58) On the contrary, it is often argued that only disjunctions of 
properties that fulfil a certain particular criterion have that status.59 These 
authors disagree, however, what this criterion amounts to. Consequently, 
even if some disjunctions of properties are properties, it is an open question 
what criterion is correct and whether DM fulfils it. Unfortunately, this issue 
raises deep metaphysical questions that I cannot discuss here.  
 However, suppose that a disjunction of properties such as DM does 
                                      
57 According to an influential line of thought, one reason to be suspicious of the 
existence of disjunctive properties is that they cannot figure in the appropriate kind of 
laws. This argument is particularly associated with Jerry Fodor. For related arguments, 
see e.g. Pereboom and Kornblith (1991), pp. 125–132; Owens (1989), pp. 197–202, and 
Seager (1991), pp. 93–98. For other arguments against the existence of (some types of) 
disjunctive properties, see Teller (1983), pp. 57–61, and Zangwill (1998), pp. 151–164.  
58 Kim (1993 (1992)), pp. 319–322.  
59 See e.g. Clapp (2001), pp. 123–132; Penczek (1997), pp. 203–219, and Van Cleve 
(1990), pp. 230–232. 
252 
 qualify as a property. This means that the necessary biconditional involving 
a moral property M and a disjunctive property DM mentioned above holds. 
Does this mean that M is identical with DM? According to one view of 
property identity it does, because a property A being necessarily co-
extensive with a property B provides both a necessary and sufficient 
condition for A being identical with B. However, according to the view of 
property identity that appears to be predominant, it does not. On this view, 
a property A and a property B may be necessary co-extensive and yet not 
identical.60 For example, the property of being a closed straight-sided figure 
having three sides (being trilateral) and the property of being a closed 
straight-sided figure having three angles (being triangular) are necessary co-
extensive. However, as for example Elliott Sober argues, being trilateral and 
being triangular do not seem to be the same property.61 Thus, it seems 
reasonable to maintain that even if necessary co-extensiveness provides a 
necessary condition for property identity, it does not provide a sufficient 
condition. Hence, the biconditional above might hold without M and DM 
being identical. Unfortunately, what constitutes necessary and sufficient 
conditions for property identity raises yet another of the fundamental 
metaphysical questions that I am not able to discuss here.62 This means that 
whether Kim’s argument provides evidence that a moral property M is 
identical with a disjunctive non-moral property DM cannot be settled in the 
present work. However, as we have seen, there are a number of arguments 
to the effect that this is not the case. There are thus reasons to believe that 
strong supervenience is compatible with realism and that realists 
consequently can maintain this version of supervenience. 
 However, suppose that Kim’s argument succeeds in demonstrating 
that a moral property M and a disjunctive non-moral property DM are 
identical. This would mean that realism is false since M would not be 
                                      
60 See e.g. Achinstein (1974), pp. 266–267; Marras (1993), pp. 286–287; Shafer-Landau 
(2003), pp. 90–91; Smith (1999), pp. 107–108, and Sober (1982b), pp. 183–189.  
61 Sober (1982b), pp. 185–186. See also e.g. Shafer-Landau (2003), p. 91. For an 
opposing view, see Jackson (1998), pp. 125–127. For other examples of necessarily co-
extensive non-identical properties, see e.g. Achinstein (1974), pp. 266–270.  
62 It might be proposed that a further necessary condition for property identity is 
sameness of causal powers; see e.g. Achinstein (1974), pp. 266–272. However, it is 
controversial whether sameness of causal powers is a necessary condition for property 
identity. Moreover, even if it is accepted that it is, it is controversial whether necessary 
co-extensiveness and sameness of causal powers constitute necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions for properties to be identical. 
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 distinct from a non-moral property.63 I have two comments on this result. 
First, I think we still would have the intuition, indicated by Armstrong’s 
arguments, that M is distinct from DM. The argument that would have us 
conclude that there are disjunctive properties, and so that M is identical 
with DM, would presumably be felt as a rather abstract philosophical 
argument which has little to do with how we ordinarily conceive of these 
matters. Second, if the mentioned situation occurs, we should distinguish 
between two kinds of reductionism with different strengths, where the 
weaker one may draw on the points made in support of realism in earlier 
chapters. According to strong reductionism, corresponding to what is called 
‘reductionism’ above, a moral property M is identical with a certain non-
disjunctive non-moral property. According to weak reductionism, a moral 
property M is identical with a disjunctive non-moral property DM. 
However, weak reductionism retains a certain asymmetry between M and 
the disjuncts contained in DM. Especially, if an object has one of the 
disjuncts in DM, it has M, but the converse does not follow; what follows is 
merely that if an object has M, it has some disjunct in DM, not that it has any 
particular of these disjuncts. Accordingly, advocates of this view might 
appeal to this asymmetry and argue that weak reductionism has some of the 
explanatory advantages suggested for realism in previous chapters. However, 
I will not examine to what extent weak reductionism can exploit what was 
said there.    
 To sum up, there are reasons to believe that realism can avoid the 
dilemma proposed by Kim and maintain strong supervenience. However, 
whether realism ultimately succeeds in doing so depends on fundamental 
metaphysical issues that have not been discussed here. 
 
9. Mackie’s Arguments from Queerness 
Among the most discussed arguments against the existence of moral 
properties are J. L. Mackie’s arguments from queerness. One of these 
arguments concerns the dependence of moral properties on non-moral 
properties and is thus directly related to the main topic of this chapter. In 
this section, I will discuss this argument, but I will also take the opportunity 
of commenting on those of Mackie’s queerness arguments that are not 
                                      
63 Moreover, if this is correct, the realist formula would be self-contradictory, since it, in 
virtue of (i), would imply that a moral property is identical with a non-moral property 
and, in virtue of (ii) would deny that such an identity holds. 
254 
 immediately concerned with the dependence relation.  
 Mackie takes the queerness arguments to provide support to his error-
theory. Before he presents his queerness arguments, he argues that there are 
moral sentences which involve moral terms in virtue of which moral 
properties are ascribed to objects. If the queerness arguments are correct, 
there are no moral properties and all moral sentences of this kind are false; 
hence, error-theory is established. However, on the view that moral 
sentences do not ascribe moral properties to objects, these arguments may 
instead be taken to support non-cognitivism. Mackie’s queerness arguments 
are in other words not necessarily connected to error-theory, but can be 
appealed to by other meta-ethical positions which deny the existence of 
moral properties. 
 Mackie considers there to be two arguments from queerness: one 
metaphysical and one epistemological. However, at closer inspection 
Mackie presents at least three metaphysical arguments and one 
epistemological argument. Furthermore, one of the metaphysical arguments 
has at least two different interpretations. I will discuss these arguments in 
turn. 
 According to Mackie, the arguments from metaphysical queerness 
show that ‘[i]f there were objective values, then they would be entities or 
qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything 
else in the universe’.64 Hence, the arguments are meant to show that if there 
were any objective values—of which moral properties would be a 
subclass—they would be metaphysically queer. As we will see above, 
according to some interpretations of Mackie’s arguments, it is not moral 
properties themselves that would be queer in this respect, but rather some 
feature related to them, such as their depending on natural properties. 
However, Mackie presumes that the metaphysical queerness pertaining to 
moral properties provides reason not to allow such properties in ontology. 
Hence, in Mackie’s view it should make us deny the existence of moral 
properties. 
 One way to defend the existence of moral properties against Mackie’s 
contention would be to question the mentioned presumption and argue that 
the existence of moral properties can be maintained even if the metaphysical 
queerness arguments are correct, that is, even in case moral properties were 
                                      
64 Mackie (1977), p. 38. 
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 metaphysically queer.65 However, I believe that realists can argue that the 
metaphysical queerness arguments fail and that Mackie therefore has not 
provided reason to deny the existence of such properties. 
 The first argument from metaphysical queerness. According to this 
argument, moral properties would be metaphysically queer because they 
would be, as Mackie puts it, ‘authoritatively prescriptive’, they would be 
‘intrinsically action-guiding and motivating’ and have ‘to-be-doneness and 
not-to-be-doneness somewhat built into’ them.66 In the present context, 
this feature seems most relevant in relation to rightness and wrongness. If I 
understand Mackie correctly, the authoritative prescriptivity of rightness 
would mean that if a person knows that an action is right, it follows that she 
is motivated to perform the action. 
 This argument does not pose any difficulty for realism, at least not for 
the version of this view I find most plausible. In chapter 7, I argued that 
realists should deny internalism, the view which says, in brief, that if a 
person judges that an action is right, it follows that she is motivated to 
perform the action. On the assumption that there are moral properties, it is 
reasonable to believe that such a judgement consists in a belief. Given this 
assumption, it is reasonable to believe that Mackie’s notion of authoritative 
prescriptivity implies internalism. The reason is that if a person knows that an 
action is right, she believes that it is right. The arguments directed against 
internalism in chapter 7 can then be directed against the notion of 
authoritative prescriptivity.67  
 Moreover, it can be argued that even if realists adopt internalism, they 
would not be vulnerable to Mackie’s argument. As I understand Mackie’s 
notion of authoritative prescriptivity, it says that if a person knows that an 
action is right to perform, and hence the judgement is true, it follows that 
she is motivated to perform the action. Internalism says that if a person 
judges that an action is right, it follows that she is motivated to perform the 
action, even if her judgement is not true. Internalism seems more reasonable 
than authoritative prescriptivity because it is difficult to see any reason why 
a person’s moral judgment would entail that she is motivated only in case 
                                      
65 Cf. Brink (1989), pp. 173–174. Cf. Wreen (1985), pp. 154–155. A similar observation 
holds for the argument from epistemic queerness.  
66 Mackie (1977), pp. 49, 40. 
67 Cf. Brink (1989), p. 172, and Wreen (1985), p. 153.  
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 the judgement is true.68 But if a person’s moral judgement does not need to 
be true in order to be connected in the indicated way to motivation, there 
is no reason to believe that motivation pertains to metaphysical matters at 
all. In particular, there is no reason to believe that rightness, or other moral 
properties, would have to be ‘intrinsically motivating’ and have ‘to-be-
doneness and not-to-be-doneness built into’ them.69 On internalism, there 
is thus no reason to make reference to any magic force of moral properties 
to explain moral motivation. It is rather to be explained in terms of the 
content of moral judgements. In that case, Mackie’s claim that moral 
properties are ontologically queer appears to be misguided. 
 The second argument from metaphysical queerness. According to this 
argument, moral properties would be metaphysically queer because they 
would be non-natural properties.70  
 Unfortunately, Mackie does not make clear how he conceives of the 
distinction between natural and non-natural properties. However, the 
quotation above, together with other things Mackie says, indicates that he 
thinks that non-natural properties are different from natural properties in 
that they are not part of nature or ‘the universe’. He claims, moreover, that 
moral properties would have to be something like Plato’s forms. I think one 
reasonable way to understand Mackie is that he conceives of the difference 
between natural and non-natural properties in terms of the causal relations 
holding in nature. Natural properties would then be properties that are part 
of nature in the sense that they are involved in these causal relations. Non-
natural properties, on the other hand, would be properties that are not part 
of nature in that sense; they are not involved in its causal relations and stand 
accordingly outside the causal order of nature.71 Of course, this conception 
of the distinction between natural and non-natural properties requires 
further examination; however, I will not pause to provide such an account 
here.  
 In reply to Mackie’s second metaphysical queerness argument, 
                                      
68 Cf. Dancy (1993), p. 1. 
69 Suppose my interpretation of Mackie is mistaken; more precisely, suppose he holds 
that a judgment to the effect that an action is right entails motivation even if the 
judgement is not true. However, in that case there is no reason to believe that 
motivation is related to metaphysical matters and that moral properties are metaphysically 
queer. 
70 Mackie (1977), p. 38. 
71 Cf. Baldwin (1985), pp. 34–35; Smith (1999), pp. 93–101, and Sturgeon (2003), p. 
538.  
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 understood in the indicated way, it should first be recalled that in chapter 1 
I defended a conception of realism according to which moral properties 
might be natural properties. I also mentioned that realists may claim that 
moral properties are natural in at least three different senses, one of them 
being that moral properties are part of nature in the sense of being involved 
in its causal relations. Moreover, in the next chapter I will defend the view 
that moral properties, as realism conceives of them, are involved in causal 
explanations of various facts. If that line of reasoning is successful, realism 
would not only be compatible with the view that moral properties are 
natural properties in the indicated sense; this claim would be part of the 
most reasonable version of realism.  
 The third argument from metaphysical queerness. In contrast to the two 
metaphysical queerness arguments considered so far, the third one does not 
directly concern moral properties. It concerns rather the dependence of 
moral properties on natural properties. Mackie writes: 
 
Another way of bringing out this queerness [i.e. the metaphysical queerness] is to ask, 
about anything that is supposed to have some objective moral quality, how this is linked 
with its natural features. What is the connection between the natural fact that an action is 
a piece of deliberate cruelty—say, causing pain just for fun—and the moral fact that it is 
wrong? It cannot be an entailment, a logical or semantic necessity. Yet it is not merely 
that the two features occur together. The wrongness must somehow be ‘consequential’ 
or ‘supervenient’; it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what in 
the world is signified by this ‘because’?72
 
I think there are at least two different interpretations of this argument.73
 According to one interpretation, Mackie argues that the dependence 
of moral properties on natural properties would be metaphysically queer 
because it is unexplainable. Mackie urges in the quoted passage that it is 
explained what is signified by saying that something has a moral property 
                                      
72 Mackie (1977), p. 41. 
73 According to a third interpretation of this argument, Mackie argues that the 
dependence relation between moral and non-moral properties would be queer because it 
would hold between properties belonging to two widely different categories: non-
natural and natural properties. What Mackie suggests on this interpretation is that a 
relation that is supposed to hold between moral properties qua non-natural properties and 
natural properties would be different from other kinds of relations ‘in the world’ and 
hence metaphysically queer. As a consequence, we should deny that there is such a 
relation. And since no such relation occurs, there are no moral properties. Interpreted in 
this way, the third metaphysical queerness argument does not pose any difficulty for 
realism. As just mentioned, in the next chapter I will argue that moral properties are 
natural properties. In that chapter, it will also be implied that moral properties depend on 
natural properties. 
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 ‘because’ it has certain natural properties.74 He seems to presuppose that no 
such account can be proffered. On this interpretation, Mackie maintains that 
in being unexplainable, this dependence relation would be different from 
any other relation we encounter between properties ‘in the world’ and hence 
metaphysically queer. Consequently, its existence should be denied. And 
since no such relation occurs, there are no moral properties. 
 Interpreted in this way, I think the third metaphysical queerness 
argument is unfounded, the reason being that Mackie is mistaken in 
presuming that the relation between moral properties and what they depend 
on is unexplainable. In particular, it may be argued that realists are able to 
provide such an account in terms of the realist formula. (Mackie assumes 
that moral properties would depend on natural properties, whereas on the 
realist formula they depend on non-moral properties. As this difference is 
insignificant to the present argument, I will ignore it.) However, it might 
rightly be argued that this rejoinder to Mackie’s argument is insufficient. On 
this contention, to properly explain the dependence of moral properties on 
non-moral properties, it is not enough to come up with a claim that 
describes the connection between these properties. The dependence relation 
also has to be explained in the sense that evidence is presented which 
provide reasons to believe that the proposed dependence claim actually 
holds. However, realists are able to explain the dependence relation also in 
this sense. In chapter 4, I argued that the realist formula finds support in our 
considerations regarding the questions posed in chapters 2 and 3. Moreover, 
in chapters 5, 6 and 7, I argued that the realist formula is able to account for 
various meta-ethical issues, and this provides further support to this notion. 
However, it might be objected that also this rejoinder to Mackie’s argument 
is insufficient. On this contention, it is not sufficient that the general 
relation between moral and non-moral properties is explained, e.g. in the 
form of the realist formula. It is also required that the relation between a 
particular set of non-moral properties and the moral property in question is 
accounted for. Formulated in terms of the realist formula, it has to be 
explained why a particular set of non-moral properties—rather than some 
other one—makes an object have a certain moral property. However, as far 
                                      
74 Horgan and Timmons interpret Mackie in a similar way: Horgan and Timmons 
(1992a), pp. 227–230, and Horgan (1993), pp. 560–563. Their arguments raise 
fundamental issues that cannot be dealt with here. See Zangwill (1997), pp. 511–516, for 
a critique of Horgan and Timmons. 
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 as I see, this is not a task of meta-ethics. Rather, it is something that should 
be settled by the correct normative theory or, put more generally, by the 
correct normative conception.75
 According to another interpretation of the third metaphysical 
queerness argument, Mackie maintains that the difficulty with the 
dependence of moral properties on natural properties concerns the kind of 
modality it would involve. The modality in this dependence relation, 
Mackie maintains, cannot be a matter of logical or semantic necessity; 
neither, he thinks, can it be a matter of mere coincidence. What Mackie 
claims according to this interpretation is that the modality involved in this 
dependence relation would be different from any other modality ‘in the 
world’ and hence metaphysically queer. Consequently, the existence of a 
dependence relation that involves it should be denied. And since no such 
relation occurs, there are no moral properties. 
 As we have seen, realists may argue that moral properties depend on 
non-moral properties in the way stated in the realist formula. One part of 
the formula is (B): a synthetically necessary implication from a set of non-
moral properties to a moral property. Although Mackie is not explicit as to 
what a problematic kind of modality would be, synthetic necessity has been 
considered with suspicion. It might therefore be thought that since the 
realist formula involves this notion, it is vulnerable to Mackie’s argument.  
 Understood in this way, the argument raises fundamental questions 
about modality that, needless to say, I am unable to say anything about here. 
However, I would like to respond to this argument with the following 
comments.  
 It should first be recalled that also synthetic reductionism employs 
synthetic necessity; so if this notion poses a difficulty for realism, it 
presumably does so for synthetic reductionism as well.  
 Moreover, and more importantly, it should be recalled that the 
notion of synthetic necessity is utilised in Kripke’s and Putnam’s account of 
the reference of natural kind terms. As far as I understand, it is quite 
generally acknowledged that they provide a plausible view of the reference 
of such terms. Furthermore, to my knowledge it is not regarded as a serious 
problem for this account that it employs synthetic necessity. This indicates 
that the fact that this notion is involved in the realist formula does not pose 
                                      
75 Cf. Brink (1989), p. 175, and Shafer-Landau (2003), pp. 95–96. 
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 a difficulty for realism. In particular, the fact that it is employed in the 
mentioned account of the reference of natural kind terms suggests that the 
realist formula does not involve a kind of modality which is different from 
any other modality ‘in the world’. Hence, the realist formula does not involve 
a metaphysically queer kind of modality. It should further be recalled that 
the reason why the realist formula involves synthetic necessity is due to 
considerations in relation to thought experiments similar to those Kripke 
and Putnam use to establish their view. This supports the view that, just as 
the modality involved in Kripke’s and Putnam’s view of natural kind term, 
the modality involved in the realist formula is not metaphysically queer. 
Consequently, the fact that synthetic necessity figures in the realist formula 
should not make us conclude that the dependence relation described in the 
formula does not occur and that moral properties therefore do not exist. 
 It should further be mentioned that some authors, among others 
Putnam himself, argue that the mentioned account of the reference of 
natural kind terms is appropriate to other terms as well.76 In fact, he believes 
that his view of reference ‘apply to the great majority of all nouns, and to 
other parts of speech as well’.77 Perhaps we are not prepared to agree that 
this view of reference is so generally applicable. However, if it is applies at 
least to some other terms than natural kind terms, synthetic necessity may 
figure in accounts of the reference of terms that are more akin to moral 
terms than natural kind terms are. Moreover, it may then be hypothesised 
that synthetic necessity figures in accounts of terms which refer to properties 
that are irreducible. In that case, synthetic necessity might be employed in 
much the same way in these accounts as it is employed in the realist 
formula.78 Mental terms might be an example. According to one view, 
irreducible mental properties strongly supervene on physical properties and 
the second occurrence of ‘necessary’ in this supervenience claim should be 
understood as synthetic necessity.79 Such a claim comes quite close to the 
realist formula.  
 There are also other considerations that might lessen the worry that 
the modality involved in the realist formula is metaphysically queer. One 
                                      
76 See e.g. Putnam (1975), pp. 242–245. See also e.g. Copp (2000), pp. 114–116. Of 
course, particularly Kripke argues that a similar account is available for names. 
77 Putnam (1975b), p. 242. 
78 Cf. Brink (1989), pp. 175–176.  
79 See e.g. Macdonald (1989), p. 194. Cf. Kim (1993 (1984)), p. 66. 
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 reason to be suspicious of synthetic necessity is the view that it makes up a 
separate kind of necessity which is quite different from that of analytic 
necessity. However, according to an influential view, there is only one kind 
of necessity of the relevant sort.80 On this view, the distinction between 
analytic and synthetic necessity is not a distinction between two separate 
kinds of necessities; it is rather a distinction between the different epistemic 
relations we have to this one necessity.81
 The argument from epistemological queerness. Also Mackie’s 
epistemological queerness argument is directed against the existence of 
moral properties. According to Mackie, if we are aware of moral properties 
‘it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or 
intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything 
else’.82 Hence, such a faculty would be epistemologically queer. Mackie 
considers this, in analogy with his line of reasoning in relation to the 
metaphysical queerness arguments, to provide a reason to deny that there is 
such a faculty. Consequently, we are not aware of moral properties. 
Assuming that we would be aware of moral properties if there were any, it 
follows that there are no moral properties. 
 As I mentioned in chapter 1, one of the main limitations with the 
present thesis is that I do not discuss epistemological issues in the way that 
would be required to provide a fully satisfactory defence of realism. Here I 
will merely provide some brief reflections that give reasons to believe that 
realism is not vulnerable to Mackie’s epistemological queerness argument.  
 Mackie’s reason to believe that, on the assumption that we are aware 
of moral properties, there would have to be a special faculty of moral 
perception is arguably his view that moral properties would have to be non-
natural properties.83 Thus understood, the idea is that since moral properties 
would have to be non-natural properties, they cannot be known by means 
of our ordinary perceptual apparatus standing in causal contact with them. 
                                      
80 See e.g. Jackson (1998), pp. 67–86, and McLaughlin (1995), pp. 26–27.  
81 Another reason to be suspicious of synthetic necessity is the view that it cannot be 
explained. However, in relation to the last point, it has been argued that synthetic 
necessity might be explained in terms of analytic necessity or linguistic conventions. If I 
have understood this view correctly, it does not say that there is no synthetic necessity; it 
says rather that synthetic necessity is generated by analytically necessary claims in 
combination with certain other premises. See e.g. Jackson (1989), pp. 80–83, and Sidelle 
(1989), pp. 30–40. 
82 Mackie (1977), p. 38. 
83 Cf. Brink (1989), p. 180. For another interpretation, see Sturgeon (2002), pp. 194–
195.  
262 
 For this reason, some sort of special faculty is needed. However, as has 
already been noted, realists may claim that moral properties are natural 
properties, among other things in the sense that they are part of nature by 
being involved in its causal relations. In the next chapter, I will suggest that 
moral properties are natural properties in this sense. My arguments will 
moreover suggest that the non-moral properties which moral properties 
depend on are natural properties. On this view, it might be the case that we 
can come to acquire moral knowledge in virtue of coming into causal 
contact with properties belonging to these two kinds. This can be the case 
in different ways. According to a common conception of observations, an 
observation is a belief which is a direct causal result of a perceptual 
experience.84 Thus, the most apparent way in which we can acquire moral 
knowledge is presumably that the mentioned properties cause us to have 
moral observations, i.e. moral beliefs which are direct causal results of sense 
perceptions. However, there are also other types of facts these properties can 
cause and which can provide us with moral knowledge. It might be argued, 
for example, that there are observations which do not involve reference to 
any moral property which can have this function. (In the next chapter, I 
will mention some facts of this kind.) One important way in which we may 
acquire moral knowledge was mentioned in chapter 4. There I suggested 
that realists may hypothesise that we are able to apply a moral term correctly 
because there are certain reference-fixing characteristics that we associate 
with the term. This is made possible since the non-moral properties which 
make objects have moral properties are causally responsible for these 
characteristics and so causally regulate our use of the term by means of 
them. Hence, as moral realism is understood here, it is not committed to the 
existence of a special faculty of moral perception. 
 It should also be noticed that Mackie’s notion of a special faculty of 
moral perception makes him presume that the correct view of moral 
justification would have to be a version of intuitionism.85 Intuitionism is an 
instance of foundationalism, a view which says, in brief, that a belief is 
justified only if it is foundational, i.e. self-justifying or non-inferentially 
                                      
84 See e.g. Harman (1977), p. 5; Sayre-McCord (1996), p. 174; Tännsjö (1990), p. 54, 
and Werner (1983), p. 653. It should be noted that on this conception of moral 
observation, there need not be perceptions directly of moral properties (cf. Werner 
(1983), p. 666). For an account that attaches a fundamental importance to moral 
observations in moral justification, see Tännsjö (1990), chap. 3. 
85 Mackie (1977), p. 38. 
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 justified, or inferred from some foundational beliefs.86 The picture Mackie 
suggests is that the special faculty of moral perception provides us with 
moral ‘intuitions’ which have the status of foundational moral beliefs. 
 There are at least three difficulties with Mackie’s view of moral 
justification. First, a number of meta-ethicists argue that intuitionists are not 
committed to the existence of a special faculty of moral perception.87 This 
means that there might be a more plausible form of intuitionism than the 
one Mackie sketches that realists may adopt.88 Second, it might be argued 
that there also are other forms of foundationalism than intuitionism which 
realists can adopt. According to one such view, moral observations—
understood as moral beliefs which are direct causal results of perceptual 
experiences—function as foundational beliefs. However, I will not try to 
evaluate the plausibility of these alternatives. Third, a number of recent 
meta-ethicists argue that the correct model of moral justification is not 
foundationalism, but some version of coherentism.89 Coherentism says, in 
brief, that a belief is justified in so far it is part of a coherent set of beliefs, 
where the coherence of such a set is a function of, among other things, the 
explanatory relations that hold between the beliefs which are part of the set. 
I will not dwell on how coherentism should be understood to apply to 
moral justification. However, in light of what was said above, it is important 
to notice that the view that beliefs are justified in so far as they are part of a 
coherent set of beliefs does not mean that perceptual experiences do not 
have any part to play in moral justification. Generally, according to 
coherentism, perceptual experiences are relevant to the coherence of a set of 
beliefs by giving rise to beliefs that are part of such a set. This means that for 
example moral observations—understood in the indicated way—can be part 
of a coherent set of beliefs, e.g. in virtue of explaining other beliefs in the 
set and thereby enhancing its coherence.90 Corresponding claims hold for 
other beliefs that pertain to perceptual experiences. It is also worth 
mentioning that on coherentism a wide range of beliefs might be relevant to 
                                      
86 My characterisation of foundationalism and coherentism follows Brink’s: Brink 
(1989), pp. 101–104.  
87 See e.g. Audi (1996), pp. 108–109; Brink (1989), pp. 109–110, and Sinnott-
Armstrong (1996), p. 26.  
88 Robert Audi is presumably the one who has done most to develop a modern form of 
intuitionism; see e.g. Audi (1996), pp. 101–136.  
89 See e.g. Boyd (1988), pp. 199–202, 206–209; Brink (1989), chap. 5; Goldman (1988), 
chap. 5, and Sayre-McCord (1996), pp. 137–189  
90 Cf. Brink (1989), pp. 136–138, and Sayre-McCord (1996), pp. 173–174.  
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 moral justification, e.g. philosophical beliefs and other beliefs of a markedly 
theoretical character.   
 To sum up, there are reasons to believe that Mackie’s various 
arguments from queerness do not succeed in showing that realists are 
committed to the existence of phenomena—either in the form of moral 
properties, dependence relations or epistemological faculties—that are queer 
in the relevant sense. Hence, there are reasons to believe that these 
arguments do not establish that moral properties do not exist. However, 
Mackie’s arguments also raise important questions that I have not dealt with 
here. 
 
10. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has been devoted to a discussion of how realism should 
conceive of the dependence of moral properties on non-moral properties. In 
particular, I have defended the realist formula against a number of 
objections. Among other things, I have responded to two dilemmas that are 
thought to emerge because the realist formula entails strong supervenience, 
and I have responded to Mackie’s arguments from queerness. However, I 
have also pointed out various respects in which this defence of realism is 
incomplete. I would like to end the chapter by recalling two important 
reasons why this is so. First, the dilemma Jaegwon Kim presents suggests 
that if strong supervenience is adopted, an important step towards reducing 
moral properties to non-moral properties has been taken; in particular, the 
argument might be taken to show that moral properties are identical with 
non-moral properties. Although I have argued that there are reasons to 
believe that the adoption of strong supervenience does not have this 
consequence, whether this is correct depends on fundamental considerations 
in metaphysics that have not been dealt with here. Second, Mackie’s 
epistemological queerness argument raises the question how moral 
epistemology should be understood on realism. Although I gave some 
reasons to believe that realism can avoid this argument, I have not provided 
any realist moral epistemology. 
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 Chapter 9 
Moral Explanations 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the most debated issues in contemporary meta-ethics is whether 
moral properties have any explanatory function and particularly whether 
they are involved in causal explanations. According to a much debated 
argument put forward by Gilbert Harman, moral properties are not part of 
such explanations, at least not if they are irreducible, as realism claims. This 
contention makes him draw the conclusion that we are not justified in 
believing in the existence of moral properties thus conceived. The main part 
of this chapter is devoted to arguing that, contrary to Harman’s contention, 
there are reasons to maintain that moral properties are involved in causal 
explanations, also on the assumption that they are irreducible. 
Consequently, realists are justified to uphold their existence. However, I 
will also consider the explanatory function of such properties. 
 In the next section, I give a brief outline of Harman’s argument. As 
we will see, it involves as an essential premise an explanatory criterion 
which states a condition that an entity has to fulfil in order for us to be 
justified in believing in its existence. In developing his argument, Harman 
adduces three different criteria, which I will refer to as ‘the causal criterion’, 
‘the best explanation criterion’ and ‘the pragmatic criterion’. The two first 
criteria are the most central. In section 3, I argue that, contrary to Harman’s 
contentions, there are reasons to maintain that moral properties fulfil the 
first criterion. However, Harman admits that this criterion might be too 
strong and proposes the second criterion. In relation to the second criterion, 
Harman argues that moral properties fulfil it only on condition that they are 
reducible. If this is correct, we would not be justified in believing in the 
existence of moral properties as realism conceives of them. I argue in section 
4 that there are reasons to believe that moral properties fulfil the second 
criterion even if they are irreducible. In section 5, I maintain that Harman’s 
argument faces a dilemma which provides reason to believe that even if 
irreducible moral properties do not fulfil the second criterion, this should 
not make us draw the conclusion that they do exist; rather, it indicates that 
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 the criterion is too strong. In section 6, I consider the third explanatory 
criterion Harman appeals to, arguing that irreducible moral properties fulfil 
it. Having maintained that irreducible moral properties fulfil Harman’s 
causal criteria, I discuss in section 7 how realists should conceive of the 
causal powers of such properties.  
 
2. An Outline of Harman’s Argument 
According to Harman, there is a significant difference between scientific 
entities and moral properties.1 In brief, while scientific entities are involved 
in explanations of scientific observations, moral properties are not involved 
in explanations of moral observations. Harman formulates this view by 
saying that moral properties are not ‘needed’ to explain moral observations 
or that they are ‘totally irrelevant’ to the explanations of them. As 
mentioned in the last section, Harman appeals to two main explanatory 
criteria. Their common essence is, roughly put, that in order for us to be 
justified in believing that a certain entity exists, it has to be involved in 
causal explanations of our observations with regard to it. The idea behind 
this assumption is presumably that for us to be justified in believing in the 
existence of a certain entity, we have to have some evidence of its existence. 
On a general empiricist notion, we have such evidence only if there is 
reason to believe that it has some kind of effect on our observations or helps 
to account for such an effect. And if it has such an effect, or helps to 
account for such an effect, it is involved in the causal explanations of our 
observations with regard to it. From the assumed difference between 
scientific entities and moral properties together with the explanatory criteria, 
Harman draws the conclusion that we are not justified in believing in the 
existence of moral properties. By contrast, we are justified in believing in 
the existence of scientific entities, at least as far as the criteria are concerned. 
 As indicated, Harman argues that we are not justified in accepting the 
existence of moral properties because they are totally irrelevant to the 
explanation of moral observations. An observation is, in Harman’s 
terminology, a belief formed as a direct result of a perceptual experience.2 
However, it is clear that Harman takes the argument to establish that moral 
                                      
1 Harman presents the argument in Harman (1977), chap. 1, and Harman (1986a), pp. 
57–68.  
2 Harman (1977), p. 5. 
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 properties are totally irrelevant to the explanation of other facts as well.3 In 
what follows, I will at times draw on this more general formulation of the 
argument. 
 
3. The Causal Criterion  
Harman introduces his argument by exemplifying the difference he thinks 
holds between scientific entities and moral properties regarding causal 
explanations of observations. Suppose a physicist who sees a vapour trail in a 
cloud chamber comes to believe ‘There goes a proton’. Harman claims that, 
given certain assumptions mainly about the physicist’s scientific beliefs, a 
reasonable explanation of this observation is that a proton actually moves 
through the cloud chamber. However, suppose a person who sees some kids 
pour gasoline on a cat that they then set on fire comes to believe ‘That 
action is wrong’. In such a case, Harman claims, a reasonable explanation of 
this observation is not that the action actually has the moral property of 
being wrong. Rather, a moral observation is to be explained by referring 
primarily to the person’s ‘moral sensibility’, i.e., roughly, the moral beliefs 
she already has.4 Harman formulates the difference between the two cases in 
the following way:  
 
Facts about protons can affect what you observe, since a proton passing through the 
cloud chamber can cause a vapour trail that reflects light to your eye in a way that, given 
your scientific training and psychological set, leads you to judge that what you see is a 
proton. But there does not seem to be any way in which the actual rightness or 
wrongness of a given situation can have any effect on your perceptual apparatus. In this 
respect, ethics seems to differ from science.5  
 
Harman’s stress on ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ gives reason to hypothesise that he 
appeals to the following criterion: 
 The causal criterion: We are justified in believing that a certain entity 
 exists only if we are justified in believing that it causes, and hence 
 causally explains, our observations with regard to it.6  
                                      
3 Cf. Sturgeon (1984), p. 54. 
4 On both these accounts, we also have to refer to various additional facts in order to 
explain a moral observation, e.g. facts about the perceptual apparatus of the person in 
question. I will consider reference to these facts as implied in what follows. 
5 Harman (1977), pp. 7–8. 
6 Cf. Sayre-McCord (1988), p. 263. I will take ‘entity’ to cover e.g. properties. It might 
be argued that what ultimately have causal powers are not properties themselves, but 
their instances or exemplifications. (See e.g. Marras (1993), pp. 293–294.) As I do not 
think this qualification is relevant in the present context, I will ignore it. 
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 Harman’s argument would then be that since moral properties, in contrast 
to scientific entities, do not fulfil the causal criterion, we are not justified in 
accepting their existence. 
 A general problem with Harman’s argument is that it is difficult to see 
that he offers any clear reasons to believe that scientific entities causally 
explain scientific observations, whereas moral properties do not causally 
explain moral observations. The example Harman gives does not, as far as I 
understand, prove the alleged difference between scientific entities and 
moral properties; rather, it illustrates what should be proved. 
 It is important to notice from the outset that we provide explanations 
in terms of moral properties. Moreover, it is important to notice that in 
doing so, we assume that these properties are causally responsible for various 
facts. Thus, it seems to be part of our conception of moral properties that 
they make things happen, that they have effects on how things are going. As 
Nicholas L. Sturgeon argues, there are several types of moral explanations 
where this assumption is implied.7 In one quite common kind of cases, we 
explain a person’s actions by referring to a moral property related to her 
character. We may for example claim that a person performs a certain 
action—helps people in need in spite of considerable costs to herself, say—
because she is good. In another kind of cases, we explain people’s responses 
to actions by referring to a moral property these actions are thought to have. 
We may for example claim that a person approves of a certain action 
because it is right. Another example belonging to this category occurs when 
a person’s moral belief about an action is explained by reference to its moral 
property. (It is this kind of moral explanations Harman focuses on.) In a 
third kind of cases, we explain an event in a society by referring to a moral 
property of one of its institutions. We might for example claim that a 
revolution broke out because the legal system is unjust.  
 Moreover, moral explanations often seem to be confirmed, and this 
can be taken to support the view that moral properties actually are causally 
explanatory. Suppose, for example, that it is claimed that a certain person is 
good. Considering the assumed relation between being a good person and 
helping people in need despite considerable costs to oneself, it might be 
expected that if the person in question is given the opportunity, and some 
                                      
7 Sturgeon (1984), pp. 63–65. See also Sturgeon (1986b), pp. 122, 124–125. For an 
account of explanations in terms of moral rules, see Sayre-McCord (1992), pp. 55–71.  
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 further conditions are satisfied, she will help people in need even if it would 
mean considerable costs to herself. Predictions of this kind often turn out to 
be correct. This can be taken to confirm the view that a person’s goodness is 
causally responsible for her actions. Similar considerations hold for other 
moral properties and for the other kinds of moral explanations.  
 These considerations do not demonstrate that moral properties have 
any causal powers; after all, through history a number of explanations have 
seemed plausible which we nowadays consider to be mistaken. However, it 
seems fair to claim that they give us prima facie reasons to maintain that 
moral properties are causally explanatory. It is in other words a belief we are 
justified in maintaining in the absence of successful arguments to the 
contrary. Moreover, to give up such a fundamental belief requires strong 
reasons. 
 Furthermore, there is a certain inconsistency in Harman’s reasoning 
which is relevant in the present context. Before Harman presents his case 
against the existence of moral properties, he makes clear that all observations 
are ‘theory laden’. This idea is familiar from contemporary philosophy of 
science. It means, roughly put, that what a person observes to a certain 
extent is a function of her prior beliefs which are part of the ‘theory’ she 
holds about the world. This, Harman claims, is true both of scientific and 
moral observations. Harman believes, as we have seen, that moral 
observations are explained in terms of the person’s prior moral beliefs; no 
reference to moral properties is needed. But as regards scientific 
observations, he believes that they are explained in terms of prior scientific 
beliefs and scientific entities. However, since Harman fails to point to any 
relevant difference between the scientific case and the moral case, he should 
say that what holds for the scientific case also holds for the moral case, and 
vice versa. That is, either he should say that both scientific and moral 
observations are explained by prior beliefs, or that both are explained also by 
entities in the world. Since he presumably is not prepared to draw the first 
conclusion, he should opt for the second one. 
 According to contemporary philosophy of science—influenced by the 
works of Pierre Duhem and W. V. O. Quine—we should assume that at 
least some of our theory laden prior beliefs are true. The reason is, in brief, 
that since we cannot test any hypothesis in isolation from what we 
otherwise believe, we have to presume that at least some of the beliefs that 
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 are part of the theory we currently hold are true. If we make this 
assumption, we do not have to conclude that scientific observations are 
explained merely in terms of prior scientific beliefs without any reference to 
scientific entities. For example, if we assume that the physicist’s scientific 
beliefs about, among other things, the relation between vapour trails and 
protons are true, there is an explanation of her observation ‘There goes a 
proton’ which involves the existence of protons. What is notable is that if 
we make the corresponding assumption about our moral beliefs, we reach a 
similar conclusion as regards moral properties. If we assume that at least 
some of our moral beliefs are true, we need not rest content with 
explanations merely in terms of moral beliefs, but are in the position to 
provide explanations of our moral observations which involves the existence 
of moral properties.8 For example, if we assume the truth of our beliefs 
about, among other things, the wrongness of causing intense pain to animals 
just because it is fun, there is an explanation of the person in the example 
above making the observation ‘That action is wrong’ which involves the 
existence of wrongness. 
 It might be objected that we are justified in assuming that certain 
beliefs which are part of scientific theories are true, but that are we are not 
justified in making the corresponding assumption about moral beliefs. There 
are mainly two problems with this response. First, to deny that we should 
assume the truth of certain prior moral beliefs would be to make exception 
to a principle that has found widespread acceptance in contemporary 
philosophy of science, and it is difficult to see why it should not apply to the 
moral area as well.9 It may also be noted that Harman has not argued for 
this view. Second, if Harman would maintain that we should not presume 
the truth of certain moral beliefs in the way we assume the truth of certain 
scientific beliefs, it is difficult to see that he has produced an independent 
argument against the existence of moral properties. In to be able to maintain 
the view that the moral beliefs are not true, he has to have support from 
some meta-ethical argument, e.g. some argument discussed in preceding 
chapters. But then it is difficult to see that his argument from explanation 
                                      
8 Cf. Brink (1989), pp. 185–186; Sturgeon (1984), pp. 67–72, and Werner (1983), pp. 
665–673. Of course, we also have to presume other background assumptions than those 
I mentioned here.  
9 Note that we do not have to assume that all, or most, of our moral beliefs are true; we 
only have to assume that some of them, perhaps the most fundamental, are. 
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 adds any reason to believe that we are not justified in accepting the 
existence of moral properties. After all, if we assume that our moral beliefs 
do not hold true, this would in itself suggest the non-existence of moral 
properties.10  
 Another difficulty with the argument under discussion is that the 
causal criterion seems too strong. Harman himself recognises this difficulty 
and exemplifies it with mathematics.11 We hardly believe that the subject 
matter of mathematics, such as numbers, causally explain our mathematical 
beliefs. But from this we do not draw the conclusion that there are no 
numbers, that mathematical sentences are false and that we cannot have 
mathematical knowledge.12  
 To sum up, there are prima facie reasons to maintain that moral 
properties are causally explanatory, and Harman has not presented any 
successful argument against this view. Thus, there is reason to maintain that 
moral properties fulfil the causal criterion. Moreover, even if they would 
not, this would not show that we are not justified in believing in their 
existence, since the criterion is too strong.  
 
4. The Best Explanation Criterion 
Harman believes, as we have seen, that the causal criterion might be too 
strong, among other things because of the implication it has for 
mathematics. However, he still thinks there is a relevant difference between 
mathematics and morality:  
 
Since an observation is evidence for what best explains it, and since mathematics often 
figures in the explanations of scientific observations, there is indirect observational 
evidence for mathematics. There does not seem to be observational evidence, even 
indirectly, for basic moral principles. In explaining why certain observations have been 
made, we never seem to use purely moral assumptions. In this respect, then, ethics 
appears to differ not only from physics but also from mathematics.13
 
It might be hypothesised that Harman appeals to the following criterion: 
                                      
10 Cf. Sturgeon (1984), pp. 56–57. 
11 Harman (1977), pp. 9–10. Harman’s reference to mathematics may have us revise the 
causal criterion. The reason is that it may seem strange to assume that numbers are 
entities in any reasonable sense. In that case, the truth of mathematical sentences or 
mathematical knowledge would not be threatened by the fact that numbers do not pass 
the causal criterion. To avoid this difficulty, we might formulate the causal criterion in 
terms of truths rather than in terms of entities. 
12 For other examples, see Sayre-McCord (1988), p. 266.  
13 Harman (1977), p. 10.  
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  The best explanation criterion: We are justified in believing that a certain 
 entity exists only if the assumption that it exists is part of (‘figures in’) 
 the best explanations of our observations with regard to it.14  
Assuming this criterion, the argument would be the following. Even if 
matters belonging to mathematics, e.g. numbers, do not cause anything 
themselves, mathematical assumptions are part of the best explanations of 
certain scientific observations. By contrast, the assumption that there are 
moral properties is not part of the best explanations of moral observations. 
According to the criterion, it follows that we are not justified in believing in 
their existence.  
 Harman believes that this argument can be met on condition that 
moral properties are reducible. He suggests that moral properties might be 
reducible to non-moral properties that are referred to in the best 
explanations of our moral observations.15 In that case, a necessary condition 
for us being justified in accepting the existence of moral properties is 
fulfilled. However, Harman does not think the argument can be met if 
moral properties are conceived of as irreducible. He believes that the 
assumption that there are irreducible moral properties is not part of the best 
explanations of our moral observations; as he puts it, such properties are 
‘totally irrelevant’ to the explanations of such observations. Consequently, 
irreducible moral properties do not fulfil the best explanation criterion, and 
we are not justified in believing in their existence. 
 If Harman is correct, moral properties would fulfil the best 
explanation criterion on reductionism but not on realism. It is therefore 
relevant to inquire whether Harman is correct in claiming that the 
assumption that there are moral properties is not part of the best 
explanations unless they are reducible. 
 The argument against the existence of irreducible moral properties 
issuing from the best explanation criterion has a difficulty similar to the 
argument issuing from the causal criterion: Harman does not offer any clear 
                                      
14 Cf. Sayre-McCord (1988), p. 267. 
15 Harman (1977), p. 13, and Harman (1986a), pp. 64–67. Although Harman has some 
doubts as to whether such a reduction is possible, this seems to be the alternative he opts 
for; see Harman (1986a), pp. 66–67. Harman assumes that moral properties would be 
reducible to natural properties. However, I will formulate his view in terms of non-moral 
properties. This is of no consequence to my arguments against Harman’s views. Harman 
is not explicit about which kind of reduction he has in mind, but what he says suggests 
that he believes that a reduction of a moral property implies that it is identical with a 
natural property; see Harman (1986a), p. 67. 
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 reason as to why moral properties being reducible or not should be relevant 
to whether their existence is assumed in the best explanations. However, in 
the quotation above he makes—more or less in passing—a suggestion that 
perhaps might be taken to bolster his view: ‘In explaining why certain 
observations have been made, we never seem to use purely moral 
assumptions.’ The argument can be understood in the following way: the 
fact that we do not refer to moral properties to explain moral observations 
shows that the assumption that there are moral properties is not part of the 
best explanations of these observations; at least, this holds unless they are 
reducible in the mentioned way. There are at least two difficulties with 
Harman’s contention.  
 Firstly, it is difficult to see that the quoted remark agrees with the 
facts. It seems that it has mainly two interpretations. It might mean that we 
never appeal to moral properties at all to explain moral observations, or it 
might mean that we never appeal only to moral properties to explain moral 
observations, but that in the cases where we refer to such properties, we 
always refer to non-moral properties as well. However, both these views 
seem to be falsified by the way in which we provide these explanations. As 
can be seen from the examples Sturgeon gives of moral explanations, we do 
refer to moral properties to explain various facts, including moral 
observations. And sometimes we refer only to moral properties, without 
mentioning any non-moral properties. (I will return to the second 
interpretation below.) Hence, there are prima facie reasons to believe that 
moral properties are involved in the relevant explanations irrespective of 
whether they are reducible or not. 
 Secondly, Harman’s view that the assumption that there are 
irreducible moral properties is not part of the best explanations does not find 
support in the pertinent test. As we have seen, Harman formulates his view 
by saying that irreducible moral properties are ‘totally irrelevant’ to 
explanations. Sturgeon proposes the following test of this kind of 
irrelevance: ‘if a particular assumption is completely irrelevant to the 
explanation of a certain fact, then the fact would have obtained, and we 
could have explained it just as well, even if the assumption had been false.’16 
For example, to have an indication of whether the wrongness of a certain 
                                      
16 Sturgeon (1984), p. 65. Sayre-McCord proposes a modified test: Sayre-McCord 
(1988), p. 272. For a test of the explanatory relevance of mental properties that resembles 
Sturgeon’s test, see e.g. Marras (1993), pp. 294–295. 
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 action is completely irrelevant to the explanation of a person’s belief that it 
is wrong, we should inquire if she would have responded in this way even if 
the action had not had that property. Now, as we saw in the last chapter, 
moral properties strongly supervene on non-moral properties. That is, it is 
necessary that if something has a certain moral property, it has some set of 
non-moral properties, such that the following holds: it is necessary that if an 
object has that set of non-moral properties, it has the moral property.17 We 
might believe, for example, that if an action involves deliberately causing 
intense pain to an animal just for the fun of it, it is wrong. That moral 
properties strongly supervene on non-moral properties means that if the 
action had not been wrong, it would have been different as regards its non-
moral properties. But, Sturgeon points out, if the action had been different 
in that respect, it is reasonable to assume that the person in question would 
not have responded as she did.18 For example, if the action had not caused 
pain to the animal, she would not have believed that it is wrong. Thus, if 
the action had not been wrong, the person would not have responded as she 
did. Similar considerations apply to other moral properties. This line of 
reasoning holds irrespective of whether moral properties are irreducible or 
not. Thus, Sturgeon’s test does not provide support to the claim that 
irreducible moral properties are completely irrelevant to the explanations of 
facts. This means, according to this test, that it has not been shown that the 
assumption that there are such properties is not part of the best 
explanations.19
                                      
17 Instead of appealing to strong supervenience, the same point can be made in terms of 
the realist formula. However, as Sturgeon’s point is relevant quite apart from the 
correctness of the realist formula, I formulate it in terms of strong supervenience. I will 
make use of strong supervenience also in other contexts where a general issue 
concerning the relation between moral and non-moral properties in relation to 
explanation is under discussion. However, when I consider more specifically how realists 
should understand the casual powers of moral properties, I will employ the realist 
formula. 
18 Of course, a person might be such that she would think that the action is wrong even 
if the action had quite other non-moral properties. She might for example believe that 
whatever young people do, it is wrong. However, this is not something Harman can 
presume. Cf. Sturgeon (1984), pp. 66–67.  
19 Sturgeon notices that it might be objected that this reasoning is question begging 
against Harman’s argument. The reason would be that it rests on the view that the 
following kind of implications hold: necessarily, if something has a certain set of non-
moral properties, it has a certain moral property. However, Harman might want to deny 
all such assumptions and claim that something may have whatever non-moral properties 
without having any moral property. So even if the action mentioned above causes 
intense pain to an animal, it is not wrong. In that case, the person in question might 
believe that the action is wrong although this is not the case. Then there would be 
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  In response to objections put forward by Sturgeon, Harman has 
provided basically two arguments to support his claim that irreducible moral 
properties are completely explanatorily irrelevant.20  
 Firstly, Harman argues that the types of moral explanations Sturgeon 
refers to do not imply that the moral properties themselves have any 
explanatory function. He puts this point by saying that such an explanation 
does not show that it is ‘the actual wrongness’ of an action that is ‘generating’ 
a person’s moral belief that the action is wrong.21 As I read Harman, he 
maintains that unless moral properties are reducible to non-moral properties 
that explain moral observations, examples such as Sturgeon’s fail to indicate 
that moral properties explain such observations. He also insists that in the 
absence of such reductions, moral observations are to be explained in terms 
of people’s prior moral beliefs without any reference to moral properties. 
 Secondly, and in close connection to the first argument, Harman 
argues that Sturgeon’s test does not provide an appropriate test of whether 
entities are completely irrelevant to explanations. Put in the terms Harman 
makes use of in his original formulation of the argument, his point can be 
stated thus: although irreducible moral properties as characterised by ‘moral 
epiphenomenalism’ do not qualify as completely irrelevant according to 
Sturgeon’s test, they are indeed so. Harman understands moral 
epiphenomenalism as the view that moral properties are ‘epiphenomenally 
supervenient on natural properties in the sense that the possession of moral 
properties is explained by possession of the relevant natural properties and 
nothing is influenced or explained by the possession of moral properties’.22 
What cause the fact to be explained—in our example, the person’s belief 
                                                                                                              
reason to believe that the wrongness of the action is completely irrelevant to the 
explanation of her moral belief according to Sturgeon’s test. However, it seems difficult 
for Harman to deny the mentioned kind of assumptions. One reason is that they are a 
fundamental part of our moral outlook and to abandon them would require good 
arguments. However, Harman has not provided any arguments to this effect. Another 
reason is that Harman presumably is not prepared to deny the corresponding kind of 
assumptions in other areas, e.g. science. He might want to reply that there is a difference 
between morality and science that justifies us to deny such assumptions in the first case 
but not in the latter. This takes us back to an observation made in the last section. To 
make his argument plausible, Harman has to explain why we should accept prior 
scientific beliefs but not prior moral beliefs. Moreover, if he makes this move, it is 
difficult to see that he has succeeded to provide an independent argument against the 
existence of moral properties. See Sturgeon (1984), pp. 68–73. 
20 Harman responds to Sturgeon (1984), pp. 49–78 in Harman (1986a), pp. 57–68. 
Sturgeon responds in turn in Sturgeon (1986a), pp. 69–78.  
21 Harman (1986a), p. 62. Cf. Harman (1984), pp. 33–34.  
22 Harman (1986a), p. 63. 
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 that an action is wrong—are according to moral epiphenomenalism the 
non-moral properties on which the wrongness of the action supervenes. 
Since the wrongness supervenes on these non-moral properties, the fact 
would not have occurred unless the action had been wrong. That is, if the 
action had not been wrong, it would not have had the non-moral properties 
that cause the fact, and the fact would consequently never had occurred. 
The wrongness would thus not qualify as completely irrelevant on 
Sturgeon’s test. Harman stresses however that according to moral 
epiphenomenalism, the wrongness of the action itself does not cause any 
facts. As I read him, he therefore concludes that the moral property is 
completely irrelevant to explanations even if it does not qualify as such 
according to Sturgeon’s test.  
 As far as I can see, Harman’s arguments fail to provide support his 
view that moral properties are explanatorily irrelevant unless they are 
reducible. 
 First I would like to comment on the dialectic of the debate and on 
which side that has the burden of proof. Earlier I mentioned that in 
providing moral explanations, we sometimes refer only to moral properties 
to explain various facts, without mentioning any non-moral properties. In 
the first argument, Harman maintains that the examples Sturgeon gives of 
moral explanations do not show that moral properties themselves explain 
moral observations. However, since we enter the debate with the 
mentioned assumption, it is up to those who believe that moral properties 
themselves are not involved in the relevant explanations to prove their case. 
As far as I can see, Harman has not provided any arguments to this effect. 
An analogous comment applies to Harman’s second argument. He suggests 
that there is one view—moral epiphenomenalism—according to which 
irreducible moral properties themselves do not cause anything. However, 
the mere fact that there is such a position cannot establish that irreducible 
moral properties are not causally effective.23 Moreover, Harman does not 
offer any argument to the effect that moral epiphenomenalism follows if 
moral properties are irreducible. Hence, what he says does not show that 
moral properties are causally ineffectual if they are irreducible. 
 Let us now consider more specifically the first of Harman’s 
arguments. I think this argument reveals a conflation between the two 
                                      
23 Cf. Sturgeon (1986a), p. 75. 
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 explanatory criteria considered so far: the causal criterion and the best 
explanation criterion. According to the first criterion, for us to be justified 
in believing in the existence of an entity, it is necessary that we are justified 
in believing that the entity itself is causally effective. According to the 
second criterion, for us to be justified in believing in the existence of an 
entity, it is merely necessary that the assumption that it exists is part of the 
best explanations. When Harman complains that the kind of examples 
Sturgeon’s gives does not show ‘the actual wrongness’ of an action is 
‘generating’ the belief that the action is wrong, his formulation suggest that 
he has the first criterion in mind. However, as he has abandoned this 
criterion, he cannot appeal to it. 
 Moreover, it is reasonable to argue that the assumption that there are 
moral properties can be part of the best explanations even if such properties 
are not causally effective themselves. Admittedly, this assumption may 
perhaps not be part of the best explanations in the same way in which 
mathematical assumptions, according to Harman, is part of such 
explanations. However, the assumption that there are moral properties 
might be part of such explanations in virtue of moral properties strongly 
supervening on non-moral properties that are causally effective. According 
to strong supervenience, it is necessary that if something has a certain moral 
property, it has some set of non-moral properties such that the following 
holds: it is necessary that if something has that set of non-moral properties, it 
has the moral property. Suppose that the non-moral properties on which 
the moral property supervenes are causally effective. This suggests that the 
assumption that these properties exist is part of the best explanations.24 
Given that the moral property strongly supervenes on these non-moral 
properties—so that, necessarily, if an object has these non-moral properties, 
it has the moral property—it is then reasonable to believe that the 
assumption that the moral property exists also is part of such explanations. 
Hence, it is reasonable to believe that moral properties can fulfil the best 
explanation criterion even if they are not causally effective themselves. 
 Harman claims, as we have seen, that Sturgeon’s examples of moral 
explanations do not imply that moral properties themselves are causally 
effective. Earlier we saw that he can be interpreted to maintain that we 
never refer only to moral properties in explaining moral observations. It is 
                                      
24 Cf. Majors (2003), p. 134. 
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 worth noticing that in making these claims, Harman might be misled by 
certain features of moral explanations. Above all, we provide such 
explanations on the assumption that the non-moral properties on which 
moral properties supervene have causal powers.25 Moreover, it is reasonable 
to believe that non-moral properties are causally more fundamental than 
moral properties. To see this, consider the following example. Suppose 
someone explains the fact that a person performed certain actions by 
claiming that the person is good. However, imagine that it is objected that it 
is not quite clear how the goodness of the person explains these actions. 
The person who offered the explanation will then presumably try to answer 
this objection by providing an explanation in terms of the non-moral 
properties on which, to her mind, the goodness of the person supervenes. 
She might for example claim that the person in question performed the 
actions because she is friendly and generous. This indicates that the actions 
are causally explained by the non-moral properties on which the goodness 
of the person supervenes. It might also be taken to suggest that the causal 
powers ultimately are had by the non-moral properties, not the moral 
property. The reason is that the explanatory significance of the person’s 
goodness is accounted for in terms of the causal powers of the non-moral 
properties. That is, what she says suggests that the person’s goodness explains 
her actions because the non-moral properties on which her goodness 
supervenes causally explain these actions. Similar considerations apply to 
other kinds of moral explanations and other moral properties. 
 It is however important to notice what these features of moral 
explanations do not imply. First, they do not imply that moral properties are 
not also causally effective. We may hesitate to claim that moral properties 
have causal powers that are independent of the causal powers of the non-
moral properties on which they supervene. However, they may have their 
causal powers in virtue of the causal powers of the non-moral properties on 
which they supervene. Moreover, even if they have their causal powers in 
virtue of the causal powers of the non-moral properties, their causal powers 
may differ from the causal powers of the non-moral properties in a certain 
way. (I will return to this possibility in section 7.) Second, even if moral 
properties do not have any causal powers at all and the causal powers only 
are possessed by the non-moral properties, this does not mean that the 
                                      
25 Cf. Audi (1993), pp. 100–103. 
279 
 assumption that there are moral properties is not part of the best 
explanations. As we have seen, this assumption might be part of such 
explanations because moral properties strongly supervene on non-moral 
properties that have causal powers. Thus, Harman cannot appeal to the 
mentioned features of moral explanations to support his view. 
 Let us now turn to the second of Harman’s arguments. This argument 
too rests on a conflation between the causal criterion and the best 
explanation criterion. As I read Harman, he claims that moral properties as 
characterised by moral epiphenomenalism are completely irrelevant to 
explanations even if they do not qualify as such according to Sturgeon’s test 
because they are not causally effective themselves. In claiming this, he 
cannot have the best explanation criterion in mind, since entities on this 
criterion may be causally ineffectual and yet not completely irrelevant to 
explanations. Rather, he seems to have the causal criterion in mind. 
However, as he has abandoned this criterion, he cannot appeal to it. 
 There is a further reason why Harman’s appeal to moral 
epiphenomenalism does not support his view. What Harman says about 
moral epiphenomenalism suggests that he believes that this view 
characterises moral properties in such a way that they are completely 
irrelevant to explanations. In Harman’s vocabulary, this means that the 
assumption that there are such moral properties is not part of the best 
explanations, from which it, according to the best explanation criterion, 
follows that we are not justified in accepting their existence. But, as already 
has been suggested, it does not seem plausible to claim that moral properties 
do not exist on moral epiphenomenalism. Recall again that moral properties 
strongly supervene on non-moral properties. On moral epiphenomenalism 
this means that it is necessary that if something has a moral property, it has a 
set of non-moral properties—which is causally effective—such that the 
following holds: necessarily, if something has that set of non-moral 
properties, it has the moral property. Since the non-moral properties in 
question are causally effective and thus quite evidently exist, it seems hard to 
deny that the moral property that is necessitated by them also exists. There 
is a parallel here in mental epiphenomenalism, the view on which moral 
epiphenomenalism is modelled.26 According to this view, mental properties 
                                      
26 However, it might be the case that, according to mental epiphenomenalism, mental 
properties do not strongly supervene on physical properties. 
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 supervene on causally effective physical properties, but are not causally 
effective themselves. However, as far as I understand, this view is not 
generally taken to imply that mental properties do not exist. In any case, to 
deny the existence of epiphenomenal properties seems quite controversial. 
Robert Audi makes a similar point in relation to moral properties: ‘To be 
sure, if there are epiphenomena—items that have no casual power but 
appear only as effects—then being real is consistent with being 
inconsequential.’27   
 
5. A Dilemma for Harman’s Argument 
The analogy between moral properties and mental properties suggested by 
Harman’s appeal to moral epiphenomenalism raises an important issue. 
Harman believes, as we have seen, that moral properties do not fulfil the 
best explanation criterion unless they are reducible. Now, there are a 
number of other properties that are considered to be irreducible, among 
others mental properties and colours. It might then be asked which 
implications Harman’s argument has for these properties on the assumption 
that they are irreducible. As far as I see, Harman’s argument faces a 
dilemma.28 The claim that irreducible moral properties do not fulfil the best 
explanation criterion seems to commit him to the same view as regards 
other irreducible properties. But it seems implausible to claim that we are 
not justified in believing in the existence of for instance mental properties 
and colours thus understood. In any event, such a view is quite 
controversial. This indicates that the criterion is too strong. Harman may 
then respond by maintaining that these properties do fulfil the criterion even 
if they are irreducible. But then it is difficult to see that he can maintain that 
irreducible moral properties do not fulfil the criterion as well. Harman’s 
argument seems in other worlds to face the following dilemma: either other 
irreducible properties, like irreducible moral properties, do not fulfil the best 
explanation criterion, in which case the criterion is too strong, or 
irreducible moral properties, like other irreducible properties, do fulfil the 
criterion. On both alternatives, Harman has failed to demonstrate that we 
are not justified in believing in the existence of irreducible moral properties. 
In order to avoid this dilemma, Harman has to make plausible that there is a 
                                      
27 Audi (1993), p. 98. 
28 For a related line of reasoning, see Sayre-McCord (1988), pp. 274–275. See also 
Pressler (1988), pp. 359–364, and Quinn (1986), pp. 537–539. 
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 difference between irreducible moral properties and other irreducible 
properties which explains why we are justified in believing in the existence 
of the latter but not in the former. In the next section, I will consider 
Harman’s proposal as to what such a difference might consist in. 
 In this context, it is suitable to respond to an objection that might be 
directed against my reasoning. I have argued that Harman is not successful 
in his attempt to show that irreducible moral properties do not fulfil the best 
explanation criterion. It might be argued that this view presumes a too weak 
conception of what provides the best explanations and that if we invoke a 
more demanding one, we will reach the result that irreducible moral 
properties do not fulfil this criterion. Brian Leiter suggests that whether an 
explanation is better than another is due to two factors: its consilience and 
its simplicity. An explanation is more consilient than another ‘if it explains 
more classes of facts than the other does’.29 Leiter argues that there are 
‘naturalistic’ explanations in terms of e.g. evolutionary theory or 
psychoanalysis that are simpler and more consilient than moral explanations. 
He concludes that moral properties do not fulfil the best explanation 
criterion and that we consequently are not justified in believing in their 
existence. 
 In reply to this objection, it may first be pointed out that what criteria 
determine whether an explanation is better than another, and how these 
criteria should be interpreted, are controversial issues.30 Any argument that 
rests on a particular understanding of these things is therefore bound to be 
contentious. In the absence of agreement on these matters, it may therefore 
be preferable to adhere to a conception of explanation whose implications 
are in line with common sense, even if it is not clearly specified. I think it is 
such a conception we have in mind when we take Sturgeon’s examples to 
be evidence that moral properties explain various facts.  
 Moreover, it might be argued that Leiter does not succeed in 
showing that moral properties do not fulfil the best explanation criterion 
even if the standards are understood in the way he proposes.  
 Consider first Leiter’s view that there are naturalistic explanations that 
are more consilient than moral explanations. It is important to be clear over 
how consilience should be understood to be relevant to Leiter’s argument. 
                                      
29 Leiter (2001), pp. 80–81. 
30 Cf. Griffin (1996), p. 62. 
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 As far as I understand, for an explanation E to be more consilient than an 
explanation E’ in a way that provides support to Leiter’s contention, it is not 
sufficient that E explains more classes of facts than E’ merely in the sense 
that E applies to a larger number of facts than E’. It has also to be the case 
that E explains the facts that E’ explains. The reason is that if the latter 
condition is not fulfilled, E’ might have an advantage over E in terms of 
explanatory value by being able to explain facts that E cannot explain. In 
that case, it seems mistaken to claim that E is more consilient than E’ in a 
way that justifies the claim that E is a better explanation than E’. Suppose 
that there are naturalistic explanations, e.g. psychoanalytic explanations, 
which explain a larger number of facts than moral explanations. However, it 
might be suspected that they are not able to to explain the facts that the 
moral explanations explain. If that suspicion is correct, they do not seem to 
be more consilient than moral explanations in the relevant sense. 
Consequently, it does not follow that moral properties do not fulfil the best 
explanation criterion.  
 Moreover, we might question Leiter’s reason for believing that moral 
explanations are less consilient than naturalistic explanations. The reason he 
gives for this claim is that naturalistic explanations explain both non-moral 
and moral facts whereas moral explanations merely explain moral facts.31 
This claim seems unfounded. As can be seen from the examples of moral 
explanations Sturgeon mentions, we refer to moral properties to explain 
various non-moral facts.32  For example, a person’s goodness can explain 
why she helps people in need, and the injustice of a society can explain why 
a revolt among its citizens broke out.  
 Consider next Leiter’s view that there are naturalistic explanations 
that are simpler than moral explanations. Leiter’s reason for this claim is that 
moral explanations involve the assumption that there are moral properties 
whereas naturalistic explanations do not. However, simplicity is a two-
edged sword. An explanation that does not refer to moral properties is 
surely simpler in the mentioned respect. But in another respect it is 
                                      
31 Leiter (2001), p. 88. Crispin Wright argues in a similar way with reference to what he 
calls the ‘wide cosmological role’ of explanations: Wright (1992), pp. 191–199, and 
Wright (1996), pp. 14–15. For a criticism of naturalistic explanations in a moral context, 
see Sturgeon (1992), pp. 101–110.  
32 Cf. Shafer-Landau (2003), p. 103. 
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 presumably less simple, since it has us to rewrite all our moral explanations 
in non-moral terms. Such explanations might be extremely complicated. 
 Finally, Leiter’s line of reasoning faces the dilemma presented above. 
Suppose it is argued that irreducible moral properties do not fulfil the best 
explanation criterion because explanations that refer to such properties are 
less consilient and simple than explanations that do not. On this view, there 
is reason to believe that other properties that are thought to be irreducible, 
such as mental properties and colours, fail to fulfil the best explanation 
criterion for the same reason. However, it seems untenable to claim that 
these properties do not exist. In any case, such a conclusion is quite 
controversial. Suppose it is replied that such properties do fulfil the best 
explanation criterion because explanations which refer to them are more 
consilient and simpler than alternative explanations. However, in that case it 
seems difficult to avoid the corresponding conclusion concerning irreducible 
moral properties.  
 We may now summarise this section and the previous one. Harman 
argues that moral properties fulfil the best explanation criterion only on 
condition that they are reducible. However, we have found reasons to 
maintain that moral properties fulfil the criterion even if they are 
irreducible. Moreover, the dilemma above suggests that even if irreducible 
moral properties do not fulfil the criterion, this should not make us claim 
that we are not justified in believing in their existence; rather, it indicates 
that the criterion is too strong. 
 
6. The Pragmatic Criterion 
In the last section, I argued that Harman’s argument faces a dilemma 
regarding the best explanation criterion unless he can show that there is a 
relevant difference between irreducible moral properties and other 
irreducible properties. Harman can be understood to address this worry with 
regard to colours. He seems willing to admit that colours might be 
irreducible.33 However, he still thinks there would be an important 
difference between colours thus understood and irreducible moral 
properties:  
  
[W]e will still sometimes refer to the actual colors of objects in explaining color 
perception, if only for the sake of simplicity. [- - -] We will continue to believe that 
                                      
33 Harman (1977), p. 22. 
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 objects have colors because we will continue to refer to the actual colors of objects in the 
explanations that we will in practice give. A similar point does not seem to hold for 
moral facts. There does not ever seem to be, even in practice, any point to explaining 
someone’s moral observations by appeal to what is actually right or wrong, just or unjust, 
good or bad. [- - -] So, the reasons we have for supposing that there are facts about 
colors do not correspond to reasons for thinking that there are moral facts.34  
  
It seems reasonable to assume that Harman appeals to the following 
criterion: 
 The pragmatic criterion: We are justified in believing that a certain entity 
 exists only if it is practically useful to refer to it in explanations of 
 our observations with regard to it.35  
For the criterion to be relevant for the discussion in the last section, we 
might formulate the following argument on Harman’s behalf. Even if 
colours are irreducible, it is practically useful to refer to them in 
explanations of colour observations. However, it is not practically useful to 
refer to irreducible moral properties in explanations of moral observations. 
Therefore, we are not justified in believing in the existence of such 
properties according to the pragmatic criterion. 
 In response to this argument, it should be pointed out that in the 
same way as it may be practically useful to refer to colours, it may be 
practically useful to refer to irreducible moral properties.36 There might be a 
number of reasons why this is the case. Harman proposes that explanations 
in terms of colours are simpler, and therefore more practical, than 
explanations in terms of physical properties. Correspondingly, explanations 
in terms of moral properties might be simpler than explanations in terms of 
the underlying non-moral properties. This would especially be the case if 
moral properties supervene on a number of sets of non-moral properties or 
if such a set of non-moral properties consists of long and complicated 
conjunctions of non-moral properties. It is therefore difficult to see that 
Harman succeeds in showing that there is a difference between irreducible 
                                      
34 Harman (1977), p. 22. Harman says that reductions of colours might be ‘complex, 
vague, and difficult (probably impossible) to specify’ (Harman (1977), p. 22). As I 
interpret Harman, he leaves room for the possibility that colours are irreducible in the 
sense of ‘reduction’ I use here. 
35 It might be objected that Harman does not intend to put forward a necessary 
condition. But it is doubtful whether it would strengthen Harman’s argument if he 
instead is understood to propose a sufficient condition. For one thing, it does not seem 
plausible to assume that the fact that it is practically useful to refer to an entity in 
explanations is enough to establish that we are justified to believe in its existence. 
36 Cf. Brink (1989), p. 192; Sayre-McCord (1988), p. 275, and Sturgeon (1984), p. 58. 
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 moral properties and colours which justifies the view that the former do not 
fulfil the pragmatic criterion whereas the latter do.  
 In this context, it is appropriate to draw attention to some ways in 
which irreducible moral properties might play important roles in 
explanations of various facts.37  
 For instance, it seems reasonable to argue that explanations in terms 
of irreducible moral properties might provide information on a more 
suitable level of generality than explanations merely in non-moral terms. 
Consider the following example of how this might be the case. Suppose the 
property of being good supervenes on a number of sets of non-moral 
properties. Suppose further that persons who are good regularly are causally 
connected to certain facts. For instance, it might be the case that they 
typically perform certain actions and evoke certain reactions. Assume now 
that it is asked about a certain person why she performed a certain action or 
why people responded to her action in a certain way. In some situations the 
answer ‘She’s a good person’ might provide a better explanation than an 
answer in terms of the set of non-moral properties which the goodness of 
the person supervenes on in the particular case at issue. The reason is that 
the person would have acted roughly in the same way and would have 
evoked roughly the same reactions if she instead had instantiated some of 
the other sets of non-moral properties that goodness supervenes on. It might 
then be fairly unimportant which particular set of non-moral properties the 
good person instantiates in this particular case; such information is simply 
superfluous. Thus, explanations in terms of an irreducible moral property 
might provide information on a more suitable level of generality than 
explanations in terms of the various sets of non-moral properties which the 
moral property supervenes on.  
 This reasoning suggests that explanations in terms of irreducible moral 
properties may have a unique explanatory function. As the example just 
mentioned indicates, by referring to a moral property it is possible to 
provide one single explanation of a whole collection of facts. No single 
explanation only in terms of the sets of non-moral properties that the moral 
property supervenes on would is able to do this, since each such explanation 
would refer to different sets of non-moral properties. Thus, to have one 
                                      
37 For related arguments, see Brink (1989), pp. 194–195; Majors (2003), pp. 139–140, 
Railton (1998), pp. 178–179, and Sayre-McCord (1988), pp. 275–276. For criticism of 
these arguments, see Leiter (2001), pp. 93–101, and Zimmerman (1984), pp. 85–87. 
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 single explanation of these facts, we have to adhere to an explanation stated 
in terms of an irreducible moral property; explanations in terms of non-
moral properties cannot have this function.  
 Moreover, moral explanations may allow us to identify regularities 
that are difficult or impossible to identify merely in non-moral terms. 
Suppose again that the property of being good supervenes on a number of 
sets of non-moral properties. Suppose further that persons who are good 
generally are causally connected to certain facts; they typically perform 
certain actions and evoke certain reactions. It may be the case that the 
regularities that hold between people who are good and the mentioned facts 
are difficult or impossible to identify in terms of the non-moral properties 
which goodness supervenes on. One reason might be that these relations are 
immensely complicated because goodness supervenes on a great number of 
sets of non-moral properties. However, these regularities might be 
identifiable in terms of goodness. Like the previous observation, this 
observation indicates that explanations in terms of an irreducible moral 
property may have a distinct explanatory function that explanations in terms 
of non-moral properties cannot fulfil. 
 There are consequently reasons to believe that irreducible moral 
properties may have important roles to play in explanations of various facts. 
It therefore seems plausible to think that if irreducible moral properties 
figure in these explanations, the assumption that there are such properties is 
part of the best explanations. It is important to observe that the mentioned 
explanations do not presuppose that moral properties have causal powers 
themselves. It might be the case that the moral properties appealed to in 
these explanations do not have any causal powers, but that the causal powers 
merely accrue to the non-moral properties that the moral properties 
supervene on. This means that the assumption that there are irreducible 
moral properties might be part of the best explanations even if such 
properties do not have any causal powers. Hence, irreducible moral 
properties might pass the best explanation criterion without being causally 
efficacious themselves. Although I used goodness in these examples, I think 
my claims are valid for other moral properties as well. 
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 7. Three Conceptions of the Causal Powers of Moral Properties 
In the previous sections, I argued that there are reasons to believe that 
irreducible moral properties fulfil the three explanatory criteria Harman 
appeals to. The first two of these criteria concern, broadly understood, the 
causal explanatory role of moral properties. In this section, I will inquire 
how realists may conceive of the causal powers of moral properties.  
 The discussion in section 4 suggests that there are three alternative 
conceptions of the causal powers of moral properties:38 (i) A moral property 
M has causal powers that differ from the causal powers of the non-moral 
properties it supervenes on.39 (ii) A moral property M has the same causal 
powers as the non-moral properties it supervenes on. (iii) A moral property 
M does not have any causal powers; the pertinent causal powers are had by 
the non-moral properties it supervenes on.40 In the preceding sections, we 
saw that there are reasons to maintain that, on any of these alternatives, 
irreducible moral properties fulfil the best explanation criterion. On the two 
first alternatives, but not the third, such moral properties also fulfil the causal 
criterion.  
 In what follows, I will consider the three alternatives in turn. In 
doing so, I will consider which assumptions would lead advocates of realism 
to adopt these alternatives and whether these alternative pose any difficulties 
for this view. But first an important caveat is in place. The three alternatives 
raise fundamental metaphysical issues that I am not able to deal with here. 
This means that my discussion of moral causation is incomplete; especially, 
there might be issues concerning the nature of causation and the nature of 
properties that are relevant to the plausibility of these alternatives but which 
I fail to take into consideration. 
 Alternative (i). According to this alternative, the causal powers of a 
moral property M differ from the causal powers of the non-moral properties 
                                      
38 Alternatives (i) – (iii) have counterparts in various views about the causal powers of 
mental properties. Quite generally, much of the discussion on mental causation is 
relevant for the question whether moral properties have causal powers and, if they do, 
how this should be understood. Unfortunately, I am not able to discuss the relation 
between moral and mental causation here. For relevant discussions, see e.g. Brink (1989), 
pp. 195–196; Majors (2003), pp. 135–138, and Shafer-Landau (2003), pp. 108–110. 
39 Different alternatives may hold for different moral properties. For the sake of 
simplicity, I assume here that the same alternative applies to all moral properties. 
Moreover, I assume that a moral property M supervenes on more than one set of non-
moral properties.  
40 This view corresponds to what Harman calls ‘moral epiphenomenalism’. 
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 it supervenes on. As far as I see, realists can defend this alternative only in a 
quite weak version. There are basically three assumptions realists can make 
that would generate this view. 
 The first assumption is that moral properties have causal powers. As 
we saw in section 3, this view is supported by our conception of moral 
properties as it manifests itself in the moral explanations we provide of 
various facts. 
 The second assumption is that in so far as moral properties have any 
causal powers, they have such powers in virtue of the causal powers of the 
non-moral properties on which they supervene. As was argued in section 4, 
this view finds support in the way in which we justify claims to the effect 
that moral properties causally explain facts; for instance, we justify the claim 
that a person’s goodness causes her to perform certain actions by citing the 
non-moral properties on which we take her goodness to supervene. More 
generally, this view finds support in the layered conception of reality, 
according to which the causal powers of one level of reality are had in 
virtue of the causal powers of the level next ‘below’.41 Another way of 
formulating this conception is that moral properties inherit their causal 
powers from the non-moral properties on which they supervene. 
 In the previous chapters, I argued that realists should understand the 
dependence of moral properties on non-moral ones in terms of the realist 
formula. Since I in this section will discuss how realists should conceive of 
the causal powers of moral properties, I will make use of this notion. In 
accordance with the second assumption, realists may thus suggest that if a 
moral property M has any causal powers, it has the causal powers of the sets 
of non-moral properties that make objects have M, where ‘make’ is 
understood in line with the realist formula.42 One explanation of this 
relation between causal powers is that token identity holds between 
instances of M and instances of such sets, i.e. that each instance of M is 
identical with a certain instance of a set of non-moral properties that makes 
objects have M.43 To apply a point often made in the philosophy of mind, 
this is compatible with M not being identical with a certain set of non-
                                      
41 See e.g. Kim (1993 (1993)), pp. 337–339. 
42 These sets of non-moral properties might in turn have their causal powers in virtue of 
the causal powers of the properties they supervene on. This is an aspect of the layered 
conception of reality.  
43 Cf. Kim (1993 (1993)), p. 355. 
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 moral properties.44 (It might seem strange to say that a set of properties has 
causal powers; what have causal powers are presumably properties or their 
instances. However, for the sake of simplicity, I will stick to the 
terminology adopted in previous chapters.) 
 The third assumption is that the sets of non-moral properties which 
make objects have M have different causal powers. That is, at least two of 
the sets which make objects have M do not have the same causal powers. 
 We can now see how a certain version of alternative (i) is obtained 
from these assumptions. According to the two first assumptions, a moral 
property M has causal powers and it has the causal powers of the sets of 
non-moral properties which make objects have this moral property. 
According to the third assumption, these sets have different causal powers. 
These assumptions imply that M does not have the same causal powers as 
any particular one of these sets. Notice next that these assumptions imply 
that M has causal powers that outreach the causal powers of each individual 
set of non-moral properties which makes objects have this moral property. 
The moral property M has the causal powers of the various sets of this kind. 
Since these sets have different causal powers, M has causal powers that 
exceed the causal powers of each such set. It might then be argued that 
there is a certain sense in which the causal powers of M differ from the 
causal powers of the non-moral properties it supervenes on. Admittedly, this 
version of alternative (i) is quite weak, since it does not mean that M has 
any causal powers that are not had by any of these sets of non-moral 
properties. Rather, it has the causal powers of all these sets taken together. 
In other words, M does not have any novel causal powers as compared with 
the causal powers of these sets of non-moral properties. As far as I see, it is 
difficult for realists to maintain a stronger version of this alternative, granted 
that they accept the second assumption. However, I want to leave it open 
whether a stronger version of (i) is feasible.45
 We might now ask if adopting alternative (i) would pose any 
difficulties for realism. It might be argued that according to a certain notion 
of properties, the present version of this alternative is too weak for realism. 
                                      
44 In case the set of non-moral properties in question consists of a conjunction of 
properties, we might assume that properties are closed under conjunction and hence that 
such a set comprises one property. 
45 Cf. Pereboom and Kornblith (1990), pp. 128–132, 142–144.  
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 On this notion, proposed by Jaegwon Kim, a property it ‘real’ only if it has 
causal powers that are not had by any of the properties is supervenes on.46
 The notion of a ‘real’ property appealed to in the argument cannot be 
dealt with in the present context, but it is reasonable to assume that the 
sense in which Kim uses ‘real’ is not relevant for whether a certain property 
exists. There are various views to the effect that properties of a certain kind 
have their causal powers inherited from the properties they supervene on 
and hence do not have any novel causal powers as compared with these 
properties. However, our responses to these views do not seem to be that 
they imply that these properties do not exist and are not ‘real’ in that sense. 
On the notion that a property is not ‘real’ unless it has novel causal powers, 
there is presumably a number of properties that would not qualify as ‘real’; 
moral properties would consequently be in good company.47 Rather than 
concerning the existence of properties, the sense of ‘real’ Kim appeals to 
seems to concern whether the properties in question belong to reality’s 
fundamental causal constituents. However, that moral properties are not 
‘real’ in that sense should readily be accepted by realists. 
 Alternative (ii). According to this alternative, a moral property M has 
the same causal powers as the non-moral properties it supervenes on.  
 Notice first that it is hard to deny the first and second assumption 
mentioned above. As we have seen, the first assumption finds support in our 
notion of moral properties as it reveals itself in our moral explanations. The 
second assumption is difficult to deny, for doing so would be to deny the 
way in which we justify moral explanations. Moreover, it would be to deny 
the layered conception of the world, a picture with considerable intuitive 
appeal. However, suppose realists deny the third assumption. That is, 
suppose it is thought that the sets of non-moral properties which make 
objects have a moral property M have the same causal powers. In that case, 
M has the same causal powers as each such set. Then realists should adopt 
alternative (ii). 
 Would this alternative pose a problem for realism? According to one 
conception of properties, sameness of causal powers is constitutive of 
property identity.48 On this notion, it might be thought that if a property A 
                                      
46 See e.g. Kim (1993 (1993)), p. 350. Kim refers to this principle as ‘Alexander’s 
dictum’.  
47 Cf. Shafer-Landau (2003), p. 110. 
48 See e.g. Mumford (1998), pp. 121–125. Cf. Armstrong (1978), pp. 43–47. 
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 and a property B have the same causal powers, they are identical. If this is 
correct, it might be suspected that alternative (ii) is incompatible with 
realism.49
 In response to this argument, it should first be pointed out that it is 
controversial whether sameness of causal powers is constitutive of property 
identity. Second, even if sameness of causal powers is thus constitutive, it 
does not comprise a sufficient condition for property identity.50 At least one 
more condition has to be fulfilled for a property A to be identical with 
property B: A has to be necessary co-extensive with B, so that a necessary 
biconditional involving A and B holds.51 Something that might be 
problematic for realism is if a moral property M and the sets of non-moral 
properties that make objects have this moral property have the same causal 
powers and there is a necessary biconditional involving M and a disjunctive 
property DM consisting of these sets of non-moral properties. The latter 
would be the case only on condition that disjunction is a proper way of 
forming properties. However, in the preceding chapter we saw that there 
are reasons to deny this view. Moreover, it is controversial whether 
necessary co-extensiveness and sameness of causal powers constitute 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for property identity.52 I think we 
have to accept that, once again, we have reached a point where the 
discussion of realism raises fundamental metaphysical questions that cannot 
be dealt with here. Consequently, whether considerations in relation to the 
causal powers of moral properties provide reasons to believe that moral 
properties are identical with non-moral properties and that realism therefore 
is mistaken cannot be settled in the present thesis. 
  Alternative (iii). According to this alternative, a moral property M 
does not have any causal powers; the causal powers associated with M are 
merely had by the non-moral properties it supervenes on. As this alternative 
                                      
49 A similar argument might be directed against realism if it is combined with the weak 
version of alternative (i) described above, since a moral property M according to this 
version has the same causal powers as the sets of non-moral properties which make 
objects have this moral property, taken together.  
50 See e.g. Achinstein (1974), pp. 273–274; Clarke (1999), p. 300–301; Heil (1999), pp. 
192–193, and Macdonald (1989), pp. 223–224. 
51 For a proof to the effect that sameness in causal powers does not imply necessary co-
extensiveness, see Achinstein (1974), pp. 273–274.  
52 According to one conception of properties, they have a qualitative aspect as well as a 
dispositional or causal aspect; see e.g. Martin (1997), pp. 213–217. 
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 denies the first assumption mentioned above, there is reason for realists to 
oppose it.  
 However, there is a certain argument that would provide realists with 
a reason to adopt alternative (iii). The argument I have in mind is a version 
of an argument originally formulated by Jaegwon Kim in relation to mental 
causation.53 However, it might with some revisions be mapped over to the 
moral area. The question posed in the original argument is how a mental 
property and the physical property it supervenes on in a particular instance 
of it are causally related to a certain result. In the moral case, and formulated 
in terms of the realist formula, the question is how a moral property M and 
the set of non-moral properties G which makes an object have this moral 
property in a particular instance of it are causally related to a certain result. 
In the argument thus understood, two options are considered. The first 
option is that M and G have causal powers such that M and G are jointly, but 
not separately, sufficient for the result. The second option is that M and G have 
causal powers such that M and G each, separately, are sufficient for the result. 
Now, both these options give rise to difficulties according to the argument. 
The first option seems to violate the second assumption above. Since both 
M and G are needed to bring about the result on this option, M seems to 
have causal powers that are not derived from the sets of non-moral 
properties which make objects have this moral property. The second option 
is taken to imply that the result in question is causally overdetermined, a 
consequence Kim thinks should be avoided, at least when it comes to 
mental causation. The two options rest on the assumption that both a moral 
property M and the sets of non-moral properties that make objects have this 
moral property have causal powers. Since both of these options are 
considered to be untenable, the argument may be taken to suggest that M 
does not have any causal powers, but that the causal work is done solely by 
the non-moral properties. 
 As mentioned above, there is reason for realists to oppose alternative 
(iii). We should therefore inquire whether alternatives (i) and (ii) can evade 
                                      
53 See e.g. Kim (1993 (1993)), pp. 350–353. Kim does not consider this argument as 
decisive; he regards it rather as an argument for mental epiphenomenalism that has to be 
responded to by those who hold that mental properties have causal powers. Moral 
analogues to this argument are considered by Majors (2003), pp. 135–138, and Shafer-
Landau (2003), pp. 106–110. 
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 the argument. It might be argued that they can, and the reason is that both 
recognise the second assumption mentioned above.  
 Let us consider whether alternative (i) can avoid the argument. 
Notice first that the version of this alternative considered above does not 
have the difficulty with the first option. Since it recognises the second 
assumption, it says that a moral property M does not have any causal powers 
that are not had by any of the sets of non-moral properties which make 
objects have this moral property. Thus, M and a set of non-moral properties 
G do not have different causal powers such that M and G are jointly, but 
not separately, sufficient for a particular result. It might further be argued 
that alternative (i) does not have the problem with the second option. 
Again, according to the version of alternative (i) under consideration, M 
does not have any causal powers that are not had by any of the sets of non-
moral properties which make objects have this moral property. This suggests 
that M and G do not have causal powers such that G with its causal powers 
is sufficient for a particular result and that M with its additional causal 
powers is sufficient for the same result. There are thus not, strictly speaking, 
two separate causal explanations of why a particular result occurs; rather, 
there is only one causal explanation that can be given either in terms of M 
or in terms of G.54 If this is correct, it means that alternative (i) does not 
lead to overdetermination, at least not if this alternative is understood in the 
way described earlier.55 A similar line of reasoning holds for alternative (ii).
 It can further be argued that even if alternative (i) or (ii) would result 
in overdetermination, this would not be of a kind that is especially 
                                      
54 If I understand Kim correctly, he provides a similar account of mental causation in 
reply to the argument in relation to mental properties; see e.g. Kim (1993 (1993)), pp. 
352–353. However, Kim seems to think that mental properties on such a view would 
not be ‘real’ properties, i.e. properties with novel causal powers. He also suggests that an 
analogous account holds for the causal powers of moral properties: Kim (1983), pp. 53–
54. As regards mental causation, a similar view is proposed by e.g. Clarke (1999), pp. 
304–313.  
55 It might be objected that when M is instantiated, it has also other causal powers than 
those had by the set of non-moral properties which makes an object have this moral 
property in that particular instance of it. The reason would be that M also has the causal 
powers of the other sets of non-moral properties which make objects have this moral 
property. It might then be suggested that these causal powers, together with the causal 
powers of the set which makes an object have M in the particular instance at issue, 
results in overdetermination. It is difficult to answer this objection in the present context, 
since it raises questions that I am not able to deal with here. Especially, it brings up the 
question whether M, in each of its instances, carries with it all its causal powers, i.e. all 
the causal powers it has in virtue of the various sets of non-moral properties that make 
objects have M. Some authors seem to take this assumption for granted; see e.g. Clarke 
(1999), p. 310. 
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 problematic. If I understand Kim correctly, in the cases he considers 
overdetermination arises because a mental property is presumed to have 
causal powers that are not had by any of the physical properties it 
supervenes on. That is, in the cases he considers overdetermination arises 
because it is presumed that a mental property has novel causal powers as 
compared with the causal powers of the physical properties it supervenes 
on.56 Kim believes that the view that mental properties have novel causal 
powers is associated with serious difficulties because it threatens the ‘causal 
closure of the physical domain’.57 The corresponding view in relation to 
moral properties—that a moral property has novel causal powers as 
compared with the non-moral properties it supervenes on—would be 
problematic because it seems difficult to reconcile with the second 
assumption mentioned above. However, if overdetermination arises on 
alternative (i) or (ii), it would presumably not be because a moral property 
has novel causal powers. The reason is that both these alternatives 
acknowledge the second assumption—at least the versions of these 
alternatives I have considered here. This may be taken to suggest that if 
overdetermination arises on either of these alternatives, it would be of a 
kind that is fairly innocent. 
 There is a further reason to believe that it would not be particularly 
problematic for alternatives (i) and (ii) if they cannot avoid 
overdetermination. Moral properties are only one kind of properties among 
many that are thought to be supervenient on some underlying properties. 
Other examples are mental properties, colours and properties belonging to 
various special sciences, such as biology and sociology. Moreover, there are 
reasons to believe that these properties cannot be reduced to the underlying 
properties. Now, analogous arguments to the one above could be proposed 
for each such area; indeed, as mentioned above, the argument was originally 
presented in relation to mental causation. This suggests that, as regards all 
                                      
56 In such cases, a certain caused result has a sufficient causal explanation both in terms of 
the novel causal powers of a mental property and in terms of the causal powers of the 
physical properties which the mental property supervenes on.  
57 This is, in brief, the view that each physical fact has a sufficient causal explanation 
merely in terms of the causal powers of physical properties. If mental properties have 
novel causal powers as compared with the causal powers of the physical properties they 
supervene on, this view is threatened. The reason is that it would mean that a physical 
fact might have a sufficient causal explanation in terms of the causal powers of a mental 
property where these causal powers are not the same as the causal powers of the physical 
properties the mental property supervenes on. 
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 these areas, we would have to choose between accepting overdetermination 
and accepting that the supervenient properties lack causal powers. 
Whichever of these alternatives holds for moral properties, it will 
consequently hold for properties in other areas as well.58 Moreover, of the 
two alternatives, overdetermination seems preferable. For example, it seems 
more reasonable to maintain that both biological properties and the physical 
properties they supervene on have causal powers than to hold that biological 
properties do not have any causal powers at all, even if the first alternative 
would imply overdetermination. 
 Thus, there are reasons to believe that realists are not forced to adopt 
alternative (iii). Suppose, however, that this alternative is correct. Would 
this make realism vulnerable to any objections, besides that it would not be 
able to ascribe causal powers to moral properties? It might be argued that on 
the view that moral properties do not have any causal powers, we are not 
justified in believing in their existence. However, as was observed above, 
this notion seems too strong. In previous sections, we have also seen that 
there are reasons to believe that moral properties may exist even if they do 
not have any causal powers themselves. 
 As we have seen, there is reason for realists to oppose alternative (iii), 
since it implies that moral properties do not have any causal powers. 
However, there is one important reason why it might be tempting for 
realists to support this alternative. According to this alternative, a moral 
property M and what makes objects have this moral property do not have 
the same causal powers. Now, if a property A and a property B have 
different causal powers, A and B are evidently not identical. Accordingly, if 
it would turn out to be difficult to combine alternative (i) or (ii) with the 
view that moral properties are not identical with non-moral properties, 
alternative (iii) might become attractive to realists.  
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
Harman thinks that for us to be justified in believing in the existence of a 
certain entity, it has to fulfil an explanatory criterion. He proposes two main 
criteria of this kind, the causal criterion and the best explanation criterion, 
and argues that moral properties do not fulfil either of them, at least not if 
                                      
58 For basically the same point, see e.g. Majors (2003), pp. 136–137; Pereboom and 
Kornblith (1990), pp. 142–143, and Shafer-Landau (2003), pp. 109–110. Majors and 
Shafer-Landau accept overdetermination in the moral case as well in others.  
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 they are irreducible. He therefore concludes that we are not justified in 
believing in the existence of such properties. However, he also admits that 
the causal criterion seems be too strong. In this chapter, I have argued with 
Sturgeon that, according to our notion of moral properties as it manifests 
itself in our moral explanations, moral properties causally explain various 
facts. There are thus prima facie reasons to believe that moral properties are 
causally explanatory, and this view should not be abandoned in the absence 
of strong arguments. However, I have maintained that Harman fails to 
supply such arguments. Thus, it can be maintained that moral properties 
fulfil the causal criterion. Moreover, I have argued that there are reasons to 
believe that moral properties fulfil the best explanation criterion. In 
particular, I have maintained that Harman is not successful in his attempt to 
show that moral properties do not fulfil this criterion unless they are 
reducible to non-moral properties. Realists can consequently uphold the 
view that moral properties, as they understand them, exist. We have also 
found that in case irreducible moral properties would not fulfil the best 
explanation criterion, this should not make us draw the conclusion that such 
properties do not exist; rather, it indicates that the criterion is too strong. 
Moreover, I have argued that realists may conceive of the causal powers of 
moral properties according to three alternatives. However, it should be 
stressed that the discussion of causal powers of moral properties is 
incomplete, since it raises fundamental metaphysical issues that I have not 
discussed. As we have seen, this limitation is important because these issues 
might be relevant to whether the causal role of moral properties is 
compatible with realism.  
 In chapter 1, I mentioned different senses in which properties may be 
natural properties. According to one of these, properties are natural in so far 
as they are part of nature by being involved in its causal relations. In this 
chapter, we have found that realists can maintain that moral properties are 
natural properties in this sense. Moreover, the discussion in this chapter 
suggests that the non-moral properties which make objects have moral 
properties are natural properties in this sense. 
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